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	<title>Foreign Policy BlogsAfrica | Foreign Policy Blogs</title>
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		<title>Graceland (And Its Controversies) At 25</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/05/16/graceland-and-controversies-25/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=graceland-and-controversies-25</link>
		<comments>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/05/16/graceland-and-controversies-25/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 16 May 2012 14:31:02 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Derek Catsam</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Southern Africa]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=61946</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
Twenty-five years ago Paul Simon released his album Graceland, an album that not only became a worldwide hit, but massively expanded the audience of his collaborators, Ladysmith Black Mambazo and simultaneously provided exposure to South African music to millions around the globe. A <a href="http://movies.nytimes.com/2012/05/11/movies/under-african-skies-about-the-paul-simon-album-graceland.html?nl=movies&#38;emc=edit_fm_20120511">new documentary</a> (which I have as ...]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="http://graphics8.nytimes.com/images/2012/05/06/sunday-review/editorial/editorial-articleLarge.jpg" alt="Paul Simon and Ladysmith Black Mambazo in Rotterdam, (New York Times)" width="600" height="360" /></p>
<p>Twenty-five years ago Paul Simon released his album <em>Graceland</em>, an album that not only became a worldwide hit, but massively expanded the audience of his collaborators, Ladysmith Black Mambazo and simultaneously provided exposure to South African music to millions around the globe. A <a href="http://movies.nytimes.com/2012/05/11/movies/under-african-skies-about-the-paul-simon-album-graceland.html?nl=movies&amp;emc=edit_fm_20120511">new documentary</a> (which I have as of yet been unable to see) explores not only the making of the album, but also some of the <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/opinion/sunday/back-to-graceland.html?_r=1">controversy surrounding it</a>.</p>
<p>It might seem nearly impossible to imagine now, but while <em>Graceland</em> emerged as something of a feel-good album, for many it was anything but. In order to utilize Ladysmith Black Mambazo Simon essentially violated the cultural boycott that the South African government and other organizations in South Africa and across the globe advocated in an attempt further to isolate the Apartheid government, which in 1986 was perhaps at its most draconian.</p>
<p>At minimum, Simon displayed a great deal of naivete and consequently not a bit of arrogance in dealing with the maelstrom that surrounded <em>Graceland</em>. Some thought he was using Ladysmith Black Mambazo for his own purposes while others simply found his unwillingness to recognize why the cultural boycott was in place to be galling.</p>
<p><em>Graceland </em>pretty perfectly embodies a grey area surrounding the cultural boycott. The most obvious violators engaged in egregious behaviors &#8212; for example willfully ignoring the boycott to play &#8220;Sin City&#8221; and then self-servingly claiming that their music was beyond politics when it was anything but, especially for the white regime that had enforced segregation in entertainment and sport as in every other element of South African life under apartheids both petty and grand. And perhaps the boycott was cast in too broad strokes, was too blunt an instrument that did not allow for fine differentiation or case-by-case assessments. And to be sure, Ladysmith Black Mambazo deserved to have its own agency in choosing how to address the injustices of its own country, and that getting its own music out was in itself utterly worthwhile.</p>
<p>Reasonable people can certainly disagree about these questions, especially as they have become historical questions. But at a minimum one hopes that Simon (and perhaps other artists who skirted the line) has become more thoughtful and more reflective about those times and what his work meant and did not mean in a time when the opposition to apartheid used blunt instruments because blunt instruments were what they had at their disposal.</p>
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		<title>Somalia, Sovereignty in Catch-22</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/05/03/somalia-sovereignty-catch-22/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=somalia-sovereignty-catch-22</link>
		<comments>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/05/03/somalia-sovereignty-catch-22/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 May 2012 22:32:30 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Abukar Arman</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Horn of Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[African Union]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AMISOM]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[foreign peacekeeping]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Somalia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sovereignty]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[TFG]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UN]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=61059</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/05/03/somalia-sovereignty-catch-22/gen-diini-3/" rel="attachment wp-att-61080"></a>For more than two decades, <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">Somalia</a>’s sovereignty has been in limbo- or in an utterly defunct status. Though there are many causes, a particular one stands out exponentially: volatile security. For no nation can claim, or (like in <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">Somalia</a>’s case) reclaim its sovereignty while dependent ...]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong></strong><a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/05/03/somalia-sovereignty-catch-22/gen-diini-3/" rel="attachment wp-att-61080"><img class="aligncenter size-full wp-image-61080" title="Gen Diini" src="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/Gen-Diini2.jpg" alt="" width="320" height="209" /></a>For more than two decades, <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">Somalia</a>’s sovereignty has been in limbo- or in an utterly defunct status. Though there are many causes, a particular one stands out exponentially: volatile security. For no nation can claim, or (like in <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">Somalia</a>’s case) reclaim its sovereignty while dependent on another country, coalition, or a peace-building force for security.</p>
<p>And though road-based security has been a top priority, it has been an objective made difficult by the many hurdles along the way!</p>
<p>Rebuilding the national security apparatus of a country like <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">Somalia</a>, which, as a result of protracted war became brain-drained and resource-drained, is not an easy task. This task is even more difficult when there is a constant struggle with certain elements within the <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">international community</a> that I refer to as the Ghost-lords on whether or not there is an urgent need to rebuild the Somali National Security apparatus.</p>
<p>Since Jan 2007 when AMISOM (the African Union peacekeeping force to <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">Somalia</a>) was assembled, the <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">international community</a> has spent almost all of the funds appropriated to restore and sustain security in <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">Somalia</a> into that force. Though their record might not be entirely immaculate as some of their past tactics were rightly criticized by human rights organizations, by and large, AMISOM has done an exceptional job in helping the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) establish a strong foothold and restore security. That said, their long-term presence does inadvertently demoralize the Somali soldiers, make the rebuilding of the Somali National Army and other security apparatus a lesser priority, and undermine the case to reclaim the sovereignty of the Somali state.</p>
<p>More than the huge pay and total cost disparity between AMISOM and Somali soldiers—the former’s over all per soldier per month cost being roughly 23 times the latter—the demoralizing factor comes from consistently late soldier salaries ($100 per month) that are funneled through AMISOM. Since its initial 6 months security focused mandate, AMISOM has morphed into a jack of all trades. Going back to the Somali soldiers, despite the unfair coverage they get from media, they the real infantry force of every AMISOM- led operations. They are the ones who suffer most of casualties. And because of the UN Arms Embargo and financial constraints, they neither possess heavy arms nor armored trucks; neither bullet-proof vests nor enough ammunition. They don’t even have appropriate communication devices as they rely on a few cell phones, and, unlike their partners, when wounded in battle, they don’t get emergency evacuation or get flown out of the country for medical care.</p>
<p>In a tragic irony, their foes—who often outgun them—describe their disadvantage and misfortune as being worse than <em>sa’abooley</em>. This is a Somali slang which means those who rely on the palm of their hands. It is a term that developed during the lawless era of Mogadishu when groups of marauding gangs or criminals would roam around the city for a game and bring along a few of their patsies who have no guns of their own who become de facto human shield in the hope to inherit the guns of those who get killed either from their friends or from the other side.</p>
<p>Every conference held, every appeal made to the international donors, and every resolution sought through the UN Security Council was mainly about strengthening AMISOM, enhancing its pay scale, prolonging or broadening its mandate. In these meetings and conferences, Somali military officials and experts are seldom, if at all, invited to offer their own assessments.</p>
<p>The man currently leading the Somali army, General Abdulqadir Ali Dini, has received his military trainings both in the United States and the old Soviet Union. He was the commander of the Commandoes Unit of the Somali National Army before the collapse of the state. He is a man held in high regard as he refused to participate in the clan-based civil strife and be morally responsible for the blood of many innocent people. Since he was appointed to his current post almost two years ago, the national army has undergone tangible transformation in terms of discipline, integration, loyalty, and clan balance.</p>
<p>Of course, when it comes to sustainable security, there is no quick fix; especially when rebuilding a defunct army from ground up. Sustainable security could be attained only through a highly trained and well equipped local army. Foreign forces can be of help in the short-term, when there is a strategic plan to scale them down as the local army’s competence improves. Currently, there is no apparent effort to rebuild the Somali security apparatus with the right training, equipment, and resources to gradually replace AMISOM. Lip-service is all there is.</p>
<p>A few weeks ago, the commander of the police force, General Sharif Sheekhuna Maye, has threatened to resign out of frustration because the meager salaries for his force is never on time due to certain questionable bureaucratic processes set by the United Nations Political Office for <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">Somalia</a> (UNPOS) and AMISOM. Is such condition conducive to building a police force willing to deploy and establish law and order in newly liberated areas far from their comfort zone? Instead of addressing this kind of concern, AU approves a police force contingent to join AMISOM to police liberated areas. Also, US, Britain and France have declared their commitment to provide enhanced trainings, to AMISOM Special Forces that is!</p>
<p><strong></strong>Against this backdrop and a number of other issues, <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">Somalia</a> is trying to reclaim its sovereignty as an independent nation state. And that very desire has been the carrot that the Ghost-lords dangled in front of a nation eager to emerge out of its transitional status by August 2012. If you are a curious mind who must know to what status: it is, interim!</p>
<p>Meanwhile, the <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">international community</a> is pushing a controversial draft constitution to replace the one ratified in 1961, though, among other problems, this document does not define what constitutes the legal boundaries of the Somali state. And this could sow the seed for a perpetual inter-Somali territorial conflict.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, enshrined in every UN Security Council’s resolution on <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">Somalia</a> as one of its clauses are these words: “Reaffirming<em> </em>its (UNSC) respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and unity of <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">Somalia</a>, including <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">Somalia</a>’s rights with respect to offshore natural resources, including fisheries, in accordance with international law”. But, at this juncture, all that <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">Somalia</a> has is a flag and a seat in the United Nations.</p>
<p>Granted, no state is wholly sovereign as such sovereignty belongs only to The One who set the world in motion! However, states can, and should, have claim to sovereignty. That is the highest political authority within certain negotiated or legally defined geographical territory accepted by the United Nation. This type of sovereignty is necessary to establish the rule of law, to govern independently, to protect the nation’s values, territorial integrity, unity, and to mobilize for defense against internal and external threats.</p>
<p>The more the process for <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">Somalia</a> to reclaim its sovereignty is delayed, the more al-Shabaab, who just carried out their latest suicide bomb in Dhusa Mareeb, would be emboldened and the more the TFG and the post August government would be discredited.</p>
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		<title>The Limit of Clooney’s Satellite Spy Project in Sudan</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/04/27/limit-clooneys-satellite-spy-project-sudan/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=limit-clooneys-satellite-spy-project-sudan</link>
		<comments>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/04/27/limit-clooneys-satellite-spy-project-sudan/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Apr 2012 19:07:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Ndumba J. Kamwanyah</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[North Africa]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=60589</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The current fighting between North Sudan and South Sudan in the disputed border oil town of Heglig provides a litmus test on the success of actor George Clooney’s, goal of “deterring a return to full-scale civil war” between the two sides. Clooney has even recently met with President Obama to ...]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div id="attachment_60595" class="wp-caption alignleft" style="width: 310px"><a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/04/27/limit-clooneys-satellite-spy-project-sudan/690px-sudan_sat/" rel="attachment wp-att-60595"><img src="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/690px-Sudan_sat-300x260.jpg" alt="" title="690px-Sudan_sat" width="300" height="260" class="size-medium wp-image-60595" /></a>
<p class="wp-caption-text">satellite images of Sudan</p>
</div>
<p>The current fighting between North Sudan and South Sudan in the disputed border oil town of Heglig provides a litmus test on the success of actor George Clooney’s, goal of “deterring a return to full-scale civil war” between the two sides. Clooney has even recently met with President Obama to drive home his Sudan cause, Satellite Sentinel Project (SSP).<br />
Despite the full knowledge that Clooney’s high-tech spy satellite was watching from 300 miles up in the sky, apparently it did not stop the Government of Sudan from launching a military campaign in South Sudan, including the aerial bombardment of civilians near Bentium, the capital of South Sudan’s Unity State.  Nor did it deter the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), a South Sudan military wing, from looting the Sudan military base in the disputed border town of Heglig.<br />
According to the Enough Project’s website, what is important about the Satellite Sentinel Project is how it works to achieve its goals of “deterring and documenting threats to civilians along both sides of the border between North and South Sudan” to prevent a return to full-scale civil war between them. First, the SSP would capture from 300 miles away satellite images of &#8220;possible threats to civilians, detect bombed and razed villages, or note other evidence of pending mass violence.&#8221;  Second, the Harvard Humanitarian Initiative analyzes the captured satellites images for reporting (supplemented by information collected from sources on the ground).  Third, the Enough Project then sounds the alarm by releasing the findings to the world through the press and social media such as Twitter and Facebook.<br />
Equipped with all this information, the end-result is that policymakers around the world and all other stakeholders involved would listen and act in favor of intervening to stop a potential massacre of innocent civilians on both sides of the border. In short, the SSP is a case study for making perpetrators of war crimes and human rights abuses aware that the world is watching them.<br />
But here is what the SSP is not doing:  By focusing on a deterrence strategy, the SSP does not address the underlying root causes of the conflict between South and North Sudan. Sudan’s conflict is not just a conflict about who is attacking who, but is rather much more complex, caused by interwoven factors of religion, ethnicity, race, and competition for resources.  If anything, the presence of the SSP is in fact encouraging competitive behavior between the two sides by pitting them against each other instead of directing their efforts toward reconciliation. In societies such as Sudan, with a history of deep division and distrust, deterrent approaches and measures do not end conflict, but only provide a temporary hiatus. The truth is that South and North Sudan not only have a long history of living together (sometimes in contradiction and conflict), but they also have more in common than a complete separation as symbolized by this satellite. </p>
<p>The bottom line is that the SSP, with all good intentions, sends a powerful message to perpetrators of war crimes and human rights abusers that the world is watching them, but does not provide a lasting solution to Sudan’s complex conflict. </p>
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		<title>Covering Africa</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/04/27/60581/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=60581</link>
		<comments>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/04/27/60581/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 27 Apr 2012 17:15:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Derek Catsam</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=60581</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[&#160;
&#160;
Laura Seay has an important piece in Foreign Policy, <a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/25/how_not_to_write_about_africa?page=full">&#8220;How Not to Write About Africa.&#8221;</a> In addition to pointing out what not to do Seay also argues that coverage of Africa ought to derive from within Africa by and large by Africans. This is a useful prescription, but I ...]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>&nbsp;</p>
<div class="wp-caption alignnone" style="width: 510px"><img title="The World's View of Africa" src="http://graphjam.files.wordpress.com/2008/07/arbitraryuser.png" alt="" width="500" height="314" />
<p class="wp-caption-text">How the World Views Africa</p>
</div>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Laura Seay has an important piece in <em>Foreign Policy</em>, <a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/25/how_not_to_write_about_africa?page=full">&#8220;How Not to Write About Africa.&#8221;</a> In addition to pointing out what not to do Seay also argues that coverage of Africa ought to derive from within Africa by and large by Africans. This is a useful prescription, but I would shift the remedy slightly &#8212; yes, by all means, Africans ought to write about Africa, and more to the point, Ivorians about Cote d&#8217;Ivoire,  Nigerians about Nigeria, and so forth. But even more important is that those who work as Africa correspondents, whether from within Africa or from &#8220;The West,&#8221; should actually have some demonstrable background and strength in African affairs. I am always astounded how fungible the elite media believes foreign correspondents to be. After a few years in Africa a reporter will move on to Latin America or Europe, the belief apparently being that the skill set of a correspondent is more important than actual knowledge.</p>
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		<title>Africa needs its own BRICS aka KENSA</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/04/23/africa-brics-aka-kensa/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=africa-brics-aka-kensa</link>
		<comments>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/04/23/africa-brics-aka-kensa/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 23 Apr 2012 13:00:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Scott Firsing</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Brazil]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[BRICS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[KENSA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nigeria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[regional power]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Africa]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=60322</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/brics32.jpg"></a>
The recent BRICS summit at the end of March 2012 led to a substantial amount of controversy surrounding South Africa’s membership. Various political analysts were seen on television and in newspapers all answering a similar question to this one: Given its economic, military and population numbers, is South Africa ...]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong><a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/brics32.jpg"><img class="aligncenter  wp-image-60562" title="Leaders wave during a group photo for the BRICS Summit in New Delhi" src="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/brics32.jpg" alt="" width="640" height="569" /></a></strong></p>
<p>The recent BRICS summit at the end of March 2012 led to a substantial amount of controversy surrounding South Africa’s membership. Various political analysts were seen on television and in newspapers all answering a similar question to this one: Given its economic, military and population numbers, is South Africa really worthy to be part of such a group? When analyzing the facts and figures, the blunt answer is no.</p>
<p>The other so called plausible explanation for South Africa being in BRICS is the perception of South Africa being the ‘gateway into Africa.’ In the international politics game of 2012, there is absolutely no need for a ‘gateway’ of any kind.</p>
<p>If country X wants to deal with country Y, it does not have to go through country Z. Country X just deals with Country Y directly. It would be like China going through South Africa in order to secure oil contracts in Angola. Absurd.</p>
<p>Regardless, South Africa will stay a BRICS member, whatever that entails in the future. The most recent gossip is the BRICS countries setting up their own bank.</p>
<p>All African countries, like South Africa, are busy trying to attract Foreign Direct Investment and raise their own profile. They are trying to increase their competitiveness and uplift their country and its people. One of these countries in particular is Nigeria.</p>
<p>Nigeria has often never seen eye to eye with the other perceived leader of Africa, South Africa. Nigeria often stands up and pronounces that they are the leader of Africa (either directly or indirectly), which they did at the<a href="http://tribune.com.ng/index.php/news/38252-nigeria-leads-africa-in-nuclear-security-issues"> recent </a>Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, South Korea. This is so much so that Nigeria believes it should be the next member of BRICS or BRINCS.</p>
<p>The West African country is currently hosting the 6th Lagos Economic Summit &#8211; EHINGBETI 2012 (April 23-25, 2012) entitled ‘From BRICS to BRINCS: Lagos holds the key.’ In a press release sent out prior to the conference, Ivor Ichikowitz, chairman of <a href="Http://www.paramountgroup.biz">Paramount Group</a>, South Africa’s largest privately held defence contractor, said that the potential succession of Nigeria to BRICS would signal a positive step. However, and more importantly, Mr Ichikowitz argues that a pan-African BRICS would be a more helpful step for the continent.</p>
<p>Mr Ichikowitz is right; Africa needs its own BRICS. He didn’t go into complete detail in his press release, but that is perfectly fine because I will finish his analysis for him.</p>
<p>The leaders of the various African regions do need to form their own body in order to promote African interests, as well as their own (political, economic, and even security in some instances).  Its name…KENSA.</p>
<p>KENSA, or Kenya, Egypt, Nigeria and South Africa, makes perfect sense. They are the ‘heavyweights’ in their respective regions (East Africa- Kenya, North Africa- Egypt, Southern Africa- South Africa, West Africa- Nigeria) and within their various political and economic regional blocs (Kenya- COMESA, Egypt- CEN-SAD, Nigeria- ECOWAS/CEN-SAD, South Africa- SADC, SACU).</p>
<p>Other African notables can be asked to join later depending on the success of the venture (ie Angola, Ghana).</p>
<table border="1" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0">
<tbody>
<tr>
<td valign="top" width="53">Country</td>
<td valign="top" width="59">GDP (2010, billion USD)</td>
<td valign="top" width="50">Rank in Africa</td>
<td valign="top" width="50">% of African GDP</td>
<td valign="top" width="78">Population</td>
<td valign="top" width="50">% of Africa (app. 1 billion)</td>
<td valign="top" width="78">Military Expenditure</td>
<td valign="top" width="57">World Ranking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top" width="53">Kenya</td>
<td valign="top" width="59">32.163</td>
<td valign="top" width="50">10th</td>
<td valign="top" width="50">1.86%</td>
<td valign="top" width="78">39,000,000</td>
<td valign="top" width="50">3.9%</td>
<td valign="top" width="78">594,000,000</td>
<td valign="top" width="57">77th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top" width="53">Egypt</td>
<td valign="top" width="59">218.466</td>
<td valign="top" width="50">2nd</td>
<td valign="top" width="50">12.6%</td>
<td valign="top" width="78">83,000,000</td>
<td valign="top" width="50">8.3%</td>
<td valign="top" width="78">3,914,000,000</td>
<td valign="top" width="57">41st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top" width="53">Nigeria</td>
<td valign="top" width="59">216.803</td>
<td valign="top" width="50">3rd</td>
<td valign="top" width="50">12.5%</td>
<td valign="top" width="78">158,000,000</td>
<td valign="top" width="50">15.8%</td>
<td valign="top" width="78">1,724,000,000</td>
<td valign="top" width="57">57th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td valign="top" width="53">South Africa</td>
<td valign="top" width="59">357.29</td>
<td valign="top" width="50">1st</td>
<td valign="top" width="50">20.6%</td>
<td valign="top" width="78">49,000,000</td>
<td valign="top" width="50">4.9%</td>
<td valign="top" width="78">3,735,000,000</td>
<td valign="top" width="57">43rd</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
<p>Why KENSA? Economics is the key indicator to examine in the 21st century because economics determines, among other things, how much you can spend on hard power (aka military). If we look at GDP figures alone, KENSA represents almost 50% of the continent (47.56% to be exact).</p>
<p>For South Africa, being a part of KENSA, and BRICS and KENSA for that matter makes perfect sense. Its 2011 foreign policy white paper proclaims that “its evolving international engagement is based on two central tenets, namely: Pan-Africanism and South-South solidarity. South Africa recognises itself as an integral part of the African continent and therefore understands its national interest as being intrinsically linked to Africa’s stability, unity, and prosperity.”</p>
<p>South Africa has actively pursued a policy of greater engagement, both economic and political, with its neighbours and the African continent as a whole. However, many around the continent do not see South Africa in the same light including Nigeria, as mentioned earlier.</p>
<p><a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/04/23/africa-brics-aka-kensa/south-africa-and-nigeria/" rel="attachment wp-att-60325"><img class="size-thumbnail wp-image-60325 alignleft" title="South Africa and Nigeria" src="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/South-Africa-and-Nigeria-150x150.jpg" alt="" width="150" height="150" /></a>Therefore, the biggest hurdle to this KENSA exercise is whether or not South Africa and Nigeria would be able to work together. As Chris Landsberg <a href=" http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11857/nigeria-south-africa-tensions-leave-african-leadership-gap)">writes</a>, “Nigeria has long seen itself as a leader in Africa, having played a championing role in the anti-apartheid struggle, while South Africa sees itself <a href="http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/4886/assessing-south-africa-in-all-its-dimensions">an exemplar of both democracy</a> and the conduct of international relations.”</p>
<p>Interesting enough, when I googled KENSA, I received this definition, “The name of KENSA creates a restless, creative nature that takes you into many ventures, but does not allow you to see things through to a satisfactory completion.” If this doesn’t describe Africa, I don’t know what does.</p>
<p>The 21st century is Africa’s century and it needs to stop seeing ‘things through to satisfactory completion.’</p>
<p>For example, the brainchild of Qaddafi aka the African Union is making headway in certain areas like peace and security, but it made a mockery of itself when it failed to elect a leader at its recent summit, which overshadowed the summit&#8217;s theme of boosting intra-Africa trade. Moreover, it failed to assist the starving African people during the 2011 East Africa food crisis.</p>
<p>This is where KENSA can play a large role. It is much easier for four countries to decide on key political and economic issues than 54. It’s much easier for four heads of state to sit around a table and discuss crucial issues then to have 54 countries maneuvering behind the scenes and forming alliances.</p>
<p>In view of the asymmetry of power, KENSA needs to come together and start taking on more of a leadership role. Kenya, Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa can boost a ‘uniform’ presence and influence in the international arena that would have been unimaginable even a decade ago.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Photo credits- 1- http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/321440/20120329/brics-delhi-declaration-russia-china-india-brazil.htm</p>
<p>2- http://www.crossed-flag-pins.com/Friendship-Pins/South-Africa/Flag-Pins-South-Africa-Nigeria.html</p>
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		<title>Kony/Kony II (2012)</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/04/19/konykony-ii-2012/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=konykony-ii-2012</link>
		<comments>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/04/19/konykony-ii-2012/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 19 Apr 2012 19:20:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Sean Patrick Murphy</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Central Africa]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=59907</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[On April 20 there will be a global effort to make the world aware of Joseph Kony.
Kony is the leader of a central African rebel group known as the Lord&#8217;s Resistance Army (LRA). For more than 20 years his group has abducted children to fight on his behalf, made sexual ...]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On April 20 there will be a global effort to make the world aware of Joseph Kony.</p>
<p>Kony is the leader of a central African rebel group known as the Lord&#8217;s Resistance Army (LRA). For more than 20 years his group has abducted children to fight on his behalf, made sexual slaves of others, and has encouraged mutilation.</p>
<p><iframe src="http://www.youtube.com/embed/3WkqXUv1ieY" frameborder="0" width="425" height="350"></iframe></p>
<p>What is important about the films made by a man trying to stop Kony and bring him to justice is how the message has gone viral.</p>
<p>Perhaps for the first time, policymakers are listening to their constituents about why their countries should try and stop Kony. They are listening and acting in favor of arresting Kony despite the fact that there is no political or economic reason for doing such.</p>
<p>They are being pressured by many because it is the right thing to do.</p>
<p>This movement to address the plight of the “invisible children” began with a filmmaker who shows the life of his young son and compares it to the life of Jacob, a boy who was displaced because of the LRA and whose brother was killed by them.</p>
<p><a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/kony_2012_by_ads2142-d4s21oe.jpg"><img class="aligncenter size-medium wp-image-59908" title="kony_2012_by_ads2142-d4s21oe" src="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/kony_2012_by_ads2142-d4s21oe-195x300.jpg" alt="" width="195" height="300" /></a></p>
<p>The filmmaker shows dozens of homeless children sleeping in crowded conditions and how, if they were American children, that would be big news. He doesn’t think where or when a person is born should determine whether he or she enjoys basic human rights.</p>
<p>It is expected that hundreds or thousands of people around the world will blanket their towns and cities with Kony 2012 posters at sundown on Friday, April 20. The aim of the effort, called “Cover the Night,” is to make Kony “famous,” to shed light on the atrocities he has committed.</p>
<p>The first film about Kony can be found <a href="http://www.kony2012.com/watch_the_movie.html">here</a>. The second one can be found <a href="http://www.kony2012.com/watch_the_movie2.html">here</a>.</p>
<p>Murphy can be reached at: Lojano@comcast.net</p>
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		<title>Dear President Mugabe</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/04/18/dear-president-mugabe/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=dear-president-mugabe</link>
		<comments>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/04/18/dear-president-mugabe/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 18 Apr 2012 14:04:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Ndumba J. Kamwanyah</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Southern Africa]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=59808</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/04/18/dear-president-mugabe/800px-mugabecloseup2008-2/" rel="attachment wp-att-59811"></a>What a pity that the people of Zimbabwe and the world made hoopla about your recent trip to Singapore, which turned out to be an ordinary trip for you to attend to your daughter’s post graduate studies in Hong Kong. But can you blame them for believing ...]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/04/18/dear-president-mugabe/800px-mugabecloseup2008-2/" rel="attachment wp-att-59811"><img src="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/800px-Mugabecloseup20081-300x199.jpg" alt="" title="800px-Mugabecloseup2008" width="300" height="199" class="alignleft size-medium wp-image-59811" /></a>What a pity that the people of Zimbabwe and the world made hoopla about your recent trip to Singapore, which turned out to be an ordinary trip for you to attend to your daughter’s post graduate studies in Hong Kong. But can you blame them for believing that your trip was nothing but that of a dying president seeking medical treatment in a foreign country? Why would a president be whisked out of the country to a foreign country in a cloud of dark secrecy?  And there is an historical precedent to back it up: You, the greatest Pan Africanist, are known for seeking medical treatment in Asia, with more than ten trips to Singapore alone. </p>
<p>Surely, you are not alone in carrying out this tradition of sitting African presidents and politicians seeking medical treatment abroad.  The late Nigerian President Umaru Yar’Adua spent most of his last days abroad for medical reasons. The same story goes for former Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa, who has his share of spending time abroad in search of better medical treatment.  In Ghana, after having been involved in an auto accident in 2008, former president Kufuor flew abroad for a thorough medical check-up. So did Togo’s President Gnassingbe Eyadema who died while being evacuated for medical treatment abroad.  </p>
<p>The same is also true that the point here is not that the world wants you dead, as you once proclaimed in your political rhetoric.  Nor is it about whether you are “fit as a fiddle,” as your information minister put it to reporters.  Certainly, I for one sincerely want to see you healthy and live beyond 100 yrs, but what does it say about Zimbabwe and the country’s health care system if the first citizen would rather seek medical treatment in foreign countries? What you are failing to grasp is that you as the president seeking medical treatment abroad is tantamount to a vote of no confidence in your own governing. What you are also failing to see is that there is a correlation between your governing and Zimbabwe’s dilapidated public health system.</p>
<p>But more importantly, I can’t help but wonder what goes on in your mind when lying in those well maintained hospital beds in Singapore with well trained doctors and health care workers (for gracious’ sake, I won’t blame you if you don’t think about all this, after all, you are sick). Do you think of the many million ordinary Zimbabweans who have no choice to seek this luxurious medical attention? Do you think of Zimbabwe’s children and elderly (just like you) who are dying due to shortage of medicine and well trained medical doctors in the country? Do you also ask yourself how and why they, your host country, can manage to maintain and run such hospital? Do you have similar hopes for Zimbabwe?</p>
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		<title>When Mugabe Goes Does The Fantasy Become a Nightmare?</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/04/17/mugabe-fantasy-nightmare/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=mugabe-fantasy-nightmare</link>
		<comments>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/04/17/mugabe-fantasy-nightmare/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 17 Apr 2012 03:20:05 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Derek Catsam</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Southern Africa]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=59727</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
[Reuters/Philimon Bulawayo]
Last week there was a mini Twittersplosion. Rumors began to fly that Robert Mugabe, who had recently traveled to Singapore, was gravely ill. Some asserted that he was on the verge of death.
Te response was not exactly joy &#8212; most African observers are much like I am, they would ...]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="http://s1.reutersmedia.net/resources/r/?m=02&amp;d=20120412&amp;t=2&amp;i=593777141&amp;w=460&amp;fh=&amp;fw=&amp;ll=&amp;pl=&amp;r=CBRE83B0WIT00" alt="Robert Mugabe Celebrated His 88th Birthday in February" width="600" height="500" /></p>
<p>[Reuters/Philimon Bulawayo]</p>
<p>Last week there was a mini Twittersplosion. Rumors began to fly that Robert Mugabe, who had recently traveled to Singapore, was gravely ill. Some asserted that he was on the verge of death.</p>
<p>Te response was not exactly joy &#8212; most African observers are much like I am, they would like Mugabe to go; they do not necessarily want to publicly hope for his death. But the response was optimistic, sometimes almost giddy. On 9 April I wrote two Tweets in response (you can follow me @dcatafrica where I often post #FPAAfricaBlog) which read as follows:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px;">Re. rumors that Mugabe is dying: remember, allegedly the Generals have still never saluted Tsvangirai. Does not bode well for near future.</p>
<p>I followed minutes later with the following:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 30px;">In other words &#8212; Mugabe yielding power would be a good thing. His dying with no clear future leadership plans would not be.</p>
<p>My point was, and continues to be, that Mugabe&#8217;s departure would be a good thing for Zimbabweans if there is some sense of what happens next. But a vacuum in which Mugabe dies and there is a scramble for who will take a control, a scramble that would almost surely be decided not at the ballot box or through the logic of succession but rather by the men with guns, would likely be devastating and would not portend long-term stability. Morgan Tsvangirai might seem like the rightful leader of the country, but the odds of such a transition happening smoothly are long.</p>
<p>The rumors of Mugabe&#8217;s decline were <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2012-04-10-mugabe-ill-health-reports-dismissed/">premature</a>. He returned to Harare and his spokesmen declared the wily old despot to be <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/12/us-zimbabwe-mugabe-idUSBRE83B0KE20120412">&#8220;fit as a fiddle.&#8221;</a> Mugabe&#8217;s supporters took more than a little bit of pleasure in tweaking those who hoped that the rumors might have something to them. And Mugabe&#8217;s threats to live forever seem to many to be more than wishful thinking. But if Mugabe&#8217;s death was a myth, <a href="http://mg.co.za/article/2012-04-13-the-nine-lives-of-mugabe">the concerns about his succession</a> are not.</p>
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		<title>Sports and Community Building in Africa and the Global South</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/04/04/sports-africa-politics-globalization/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=sports-africa-politics-globalization</link>
		<comments>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/04/04/sports-africa-politics-globalization/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 04 Apr 2012 23:45:19 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Derek Catsam</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=58857</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
<a href="http://www.ohio.edu/sportsafrica/communitybuilding/index.htm"></a>


If you are going to be anywhere near Athens, Ohio and the beautiful campus of Ohio University this weekend I strongly encourage you to attend this conference (I&#8217;m not certain if it is an enticement to say that I am on the program, but I am, in fact, <a ...]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div align="center">
<div align="center"><a href="http://www.ohio.edu/sportsafrica/communitybuilding/index.htm"><img src="http://www.ohio.edu/sportsafrica/graphics/symplosium12/banner0.png" alt="Title" width="600" height="74" border="0" /></a></div>
</div>
<div align="center"></div>
<div style="text-align: left;" align="center">If you are going to be anywhere near Athens, Ohio and the beautiful campus of Ohio University this weekend I strongly encourage you to attend this conference (I&#8217;m not certain if it is an enticement to say that I am on the program, but I am, in fact, <a href="http://www.ohio.edu/sportsafrica/communitybuilding/program.html">on the program</a>).</div>
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		<title>Senegal: Continuing Into the Light</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/04/03/senegal-continuing-light/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=senegal-continuing-light</link>
		<comments>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/04/03/senegal-continuing-light/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Apr 2012 16:58:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Derek Catsam</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[West Africa]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=58723</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[
[Mackie Sall, BBC Africa]
It has been a few days since the dust cleared in Senegal. The recent presidential election was quite remarkable. After a first ballot could not establish a majority candidate the two finalists, sitting President Abdoulaye Wade (who ran for another term despite constitutional prohibitions against doing so) ...]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><img src="http://news.bbcimg.co.uk/media/images/59440000/jpg/_59440481_014236981-2.jpg" alt="Mackie Sall, Vicorious (BBC)" width="304" height="171" /></p>
<p>[Mackie Sall, BBC Africa]</p>
<p>It has been a few days since the dust cleared in Senegal. The recent presidential election was quite remarkable. After a first ballot could not establish a majority candidate the two finalists, sitting President Abdoulaye Wade (who ran for another term despite constitutional prohibitions against doing so) and former Wade protege Macky Sall, engaged in a runoff. Ten days ago the Senegalese people went to the poll, they supported Sall, and Wade yielded the stage. And it all happened <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/world/africa/president-concedes-race-in-senegal.html?_r=1&amp;ref=world">peacefully in a free and fair election</a>.</p>
<p>This latter bit is remarkable. Wade <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/01/open-letter-abdoulaye-wade-vous-netes-pas-letat/">had begun to show</a> some of the characteristics of the Big Man who believed that he was so vital to his country that only he could see the way forward and that the will of the people was only an inconvenience that he could massage and manipulate. In the first round of elections there were rumblings of discontent, hints of violence, worries that Senegal, the most stable state in West Africa and one of the most stable on the continent by most reckonings, might go the way of Kenya and Cote d&#8217;Ivoire after recent elections led to politically-driven chaos.</p>
<p>Instead, <a href="http://af.reuters.com/article/topNews/idAFJOE82P00D20120326?cid=nlc-dailybrief-daily_news_brief-link17-20120326">Wade gave way</a>, acknowledging the triumph his successor, Sall, who ran a smart campaign throughout the election process and who has now emerged from the shadows cast by his one-time mentor, the formidable Wade. And in stepping down, Wade managed to augment his own reputation as a statesman even if he never should have put the country in this position to begin with. Sall, meanwhile, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17508098">has declared a &#8220;New Era&#8221;</a> and has <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/04/201242114017981810.html?cid=nlc-dailybrief-daily_news_brief-link20-20120403">taken the oath of office</a>. We don&#8217;t know <a href="http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/81170">what a Sall administration will do</a> down the road. We cannot declare <a href="http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/81177">what it might mean for the region</a>, though we might want to think that Senegal offers a lesson and an example for its neighbors. But the Senegalese can at least <a href="http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/81172">rejoice about the state of their democracy</a> right now. And for the time being, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-17595457">that joy</a>, and the promise it could foreshadow, should be enough.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>Revolution in Cairo/The Brothers (2011)</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/27/revolution-cairothe-brothers-2011/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=revolution-cairothe-brothers-2011</link>
		<comments>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/27/revolution-cairothe-brothers-2011/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 Mar 2012 18:35:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Sean Patrick Murphy</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[North Africa]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=58296</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[These two short pieces are Frontline mini-documentaries about the situation in Cairo during the Arab Spring, where youth movements used social media to coordinate demonstrations against the government of then-President Hosni Mubarak. The April 6 Youth Movement started in 2008 when it fought for textile workers who were on strike. ...]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>These two short pieces are Frontline mini-documentaries about the situation in Cairo during the Arab Spring, where youth movements used social media to coordinate demonstrations against the government of then-President Hosni Mubarak. The April 6 Youth Movement started in 2008 when it fought for textile workers who were on strike. It’s leaders, all around 30 years old, found the tactics used during the strike would work on the political and social arenas.</p>
<p><iframe src="http://www.youtube.com/embed/nK5beGhkNLg" frameborder="0" width="425" height="350"></iframe></p>
<p>They even went to Serbia to learn from the leaders of Otpor! (Resistance!) about how to use nonviolence effectively against police tactics. The Egyptian police showed how out of touch they are when it comes to social media when they tried to get an April 6 organizer to give them the password to his Facebook page. There is no password needed to view a Facebook page, it’s just out there. The events that happened in Egypt (as well as Tunisia, Yemen, and Libya) could be called this generation’s Youthquake, the social and cultural movement from the 1960s.</p>
<p><a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/RIC.jpg"><img class="wp-image-58297 alignright" title="RIC" src="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/RIC-235x300.jpg" alt="" width="235" height="300" /></a>The second segment, <em>The Brothers</em>, concerns the leaders – especially the young leaders – of the Muslim Brotherhood. The dilemma the Brotherhood faces is what would happen if one of their own was elected president? Many Egyptians fear a situation like in <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/04/04/iraqi-political-tensions-alarm-arab-neighbors/">Iran</a> in 1979, where a popular uprising was hijacked by religious extremists.</p>
<p>The head of the youth arm of the Brotherhood does two telling things while before the camera. One, he urges a follower who is brandishing his <em>Koran</em> to put it away. Second, he makes it clear that his group is fundamentally hostile to Israel and does not recognize its right to exist. These shows are short (about 25 minutes each) but interesting and informative.<br />
<em></em></p>
<p><em>Revolution in Cairo/The Brothers</em> is available to rent.</p>
<p>Murphy can be reached at: Lojano@comcast.net</p>
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		<title>Constitutional Reforms in Morocco: Outlook for Youth Rights</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/23/constitutional-reforms-morocco-outlook-youth-rights/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=constitutional-reforms-morocco-outlook-youth-rights</link>
		<comments>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/23/constitutional-reforms-morocco-outlook-youth-rights/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 23 Mar 2012 18:26:57 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>FPA Administrator</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[North Africa]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=57922</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The following is a guest post by Leila Hanafi.
The profound unrest the world witnessed throughout the Middle East and North Africa over the past year has prompted some Arab governments to introduce a series of dynamic and responsive measures via reforms. At the very heart of the unrest, echoed from ...]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>The following is a guest post by Leila Hanafi.</em></p>
<div id="attachment_57924" class="wp-caption aligncenter" style="width: 616px"><a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/Morocco.jpg"><img class="size-full wp-image-57924 " title="Morocco" src="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/Morocco.jpg" alt="" width="606" height="403" /></a>
<p class="wp-caption-text">Protesters in front of Morocco&#39;s Parliament building, Feb. 2011 (Abdelhak Senna/AFP/Getty Images)</p>
</div>
<p>The profound unrest the world witnessed throughout the Middle East and North Africa over the past year has prompted some Arab governments to introduce a series of dynamic and responsive measures via reforms. At the very heart of the unrest, echoed from the Maghreb to the Gulf, was the demand for constitutional reform to promote a more democratic political order that it is both credible, and, equally important, recognized as legitimate by the people. These reforms are designed to ensure that governments are accountable and to empower average citizens to play a more active role in policy-making processes. From the outset, popular unrest in much of the Arab world was triggered by outdated constitutional mandates that denied citizens many basic human rights.</p>
<p>Morocco, the first country to successfully engage its citizens by rewriting its constitution after the start of the Arab Spring, has been commended for its willingness and ability to incorporate the demands of its population.  The country’s recently amended constitution has the potential to satisfy popular calls for increased freedoms, fundamental rights, transparency, political reforms, as well as social justice. The King of Morocco, Mohamed VI, announced the constitutional reforms in recognition of youth led demonstrations throughout the nation in a speech given on March 9, 2011. However, the true measure of the success of Mohamed VI’s efforts, of course, is directly related to how the reforms are implemented and the impact they make on the lives of average Moroccans.</p>
<p>The population of Morocco, not unlike other Arab nations, is noted for its “youth bulge”- a demographic of more than half of the population currently under the age of 30. Now, one year after the protests began on the streets of Casablanca and just months after a new government was formed, Moroccans are eager to see how the newly constructed constitution will advance the rights of this key demographic.</p>
<p>Consequently, it is imperative to encourage the participation of engaged youth in civil society, political parties and processes, and to reaffirm that their voices are vital for the future of the country.  Often the majority of Moroccan youth feel excluded from these arenas, with some experts concerned that continued youthful frustration could possibly culminate in civil unrest on the same streets where peaceful protests were held not so long ago. While high levels of unemployment and a stifling global economy have created a sense of collective pessimism, it is hoped that broad political and economic reform will effectively foster the potential of young human capital. The unique makeup of the youthful Moroccan population may then be considered a demographic gift.</p>
<p>Moving forward, it is important not to be content with the words inscribed in the new constitution, but, more importantly, their realization.  It is a common view that a major challenge for Morocco’s newly formed government is how successful it will be in implementing the reform that many of the politicians promised throughout the campaign period. As the King himself observed in his July 30, 2011 Throne Day Speech, “No constitution, however flawless it may be, is an end in itself. It is rather a basis upon which a new political pact can be built and capitalized on to uphold the rule of law, human rights and good governance, and bolster development, through efficient, credible institutions.”</p>
<p>One of the key lessons learned from the uprisings in Morocco, and indeed throughout the Arab world, is that governments need be mindful of the crucial role that civil society, including academics, NGOs, and women and youth groups, play in the political processes. Any tangible steps made in the ongoing development of Morocco cannot be successful without the healthy marriage of good governance and the active participation of its citizens.</p>
<p>Prospects for reform in Morocco will depend not just on the King and the redistribution of power, but also on the ability of citizens to voice their opinions and to participate in discourse on decisions that affect them. To improve rule of law in Morocco, and, consequently, strengthen access to justice and promote transparency and state accountability, it is essential to enhance the capability of civil society groups and leaders to promote a strong and fair legal framework, and, ultimately, greater confidence in the constitution as a blue print for future legislative reform. As rightly put by President Zoellick of the World Bank, in a recent address, “governance will not happen without the active participation of citizens. Institutions, however reformed, need citizens to keep them accountable. An important role here should be played by civil society to improve the enabling environment for social accountability.”</p>
<p>Innovation and progress are never a solitary process. Morocco must open to the world, tirelessly expand economic development, encourage the education of its young people, increase rights for women and enact the reforms that encourage equality and transparency. This desire is not held solely by any one demographic, one party or one group. The opportunity for prosperity and an improved quality of life is something that all Moroccans want.</p>
<p>&#8211;</p>
<p><em>Leila Hanafi, a Moroccan-American national, is an international lawyer and former Staff Attorney and Programs Manager at the World Justice Project. Leila was recently recognized as the Moroccan-American Law Personality of the Year by Morocco World News. Previously Ms. Hanafi held numerous positions at the World Bank where, as one of the Bank&#8217;s youngest professionals, she worked on operations, finance, poverty reduction, and legal reform. She was the winner of the highly competitive World Bank Middle East and North Africa Innovation Fund Prize, through which she led a legal empowerment initiative for young Moroccan women. Ms. Hanafi serves on the Board of several organizations in the field of international law and development, including the United Nations Association YPIC, the Moroccan-American Legal Empowerment Network, and the Moroccan Center of International Mediation and Arbitration. Ms. Hanafi is an Honors graduate from American University and Georgetown University in Washington, DC.</em></p>
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		<title>It is Crucial to “De-Nairobify” Somali Affairs</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs</link>
		<comments>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 22 Mar 2012 20:30:33 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Abukar Arman</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Horn of Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Augustine Mahiga]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International community]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mogadishu]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nairobi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[peace]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political participation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Somalia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[UN]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=57868</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/45562_images-2/" rel="attachment wp-att-57908"></a> 
For a number of years, Nairobi (Kenya) has been the de facto capital of <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">Somalia</a> after the State has disintegrated into anarchy. It has been where Somalis sought refuge, re-started their lives, and networked with the rest of the world. By the same token, it ...]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/45562_images-2/" rel="attachment wp-att-57908"><img src="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/45562_images1.jpg" alt="" title="45562_images" width="300" height="208" class="alignnone size-full wp-image-57908" /></a> </p>
<p>For a number of years, Nairobi (Kenya) has been the de facto capital of <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">Somalia</a> after the State has disintegrated into anarchy. It has been where Somalis sought refuge, re-started their lives, and networked with the rest of the world. By the same token, it has been where almost all of the eighteen or so failed “reconciliation” conferences were concocted, and Somalis found the funding and the nourishment for the indigenous political demons that kept them divided and at war with one another for over two decades.</p>
<p>Yet, to this day—at least from the <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">international community</a>’s point of view—all initiatives related to peace, security, humanitarian, and development must be conceived, crafted, and executed via Nairobi; Through a network of international institutions and organizations with sullied reputation of money squandering, laundering, and rewarding corruption with more contracts. And so long as this continues, so too would the status quo.</p>
<p>Like Vienna (Austria) during the Cold War, Nairobi became a magnet that attracts both the positive and the negative. It is a place where a few good apples are found- those Somali patriots who are committed to work to bring an end to the misery of their people. It is also a place where many rotten ones are found- those who callously sellout everything about their country and people. Nairobi is where the buyers meet the sellers. Moreover, the city is one of the major hubs for security experts, “dealmakers” and deal breakers. It is also the center where around a $1 billion that is donated annually on behalf of <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">Somalia</a> is managed and mismanaged. It is where corrupted technocrats and other colorful characters compete for geopolitical strategic advantages or for crude economic exploitation. The city is also the center for a new breed of diplomats known as “gorilla diplomats”.</p>
<p>In dealing with countries such as <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">Somalia</a>, these types of diplomats are granted the flexibility and authority to make decisions without any direct involvement of their Foreign Ministries. This, needless to say, has its positives and negatives. One of the positives might be their less bureaucratic decision-making capacity. One of the negatives might be the inadvertent creation of diplomatic despots who haphazardly assert authorities far exceeding their professional titles. Against this backdrop, the Special Representative of the Secretary General for <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">Somalia</a>, and the head of the United Nations Political Office for <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">Somalia</a>, Dr. Augustine Mahiga, had the liberty to nose dive into the intra-Somali politics of contention in his recent interview by <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">Somalia</a> Report.</p>
<p>As someone who occasionally freewheels beyond his diplomatic boundaries and subjectively tips the scale in favor of one convenient group to another, Dr. Mahiga pushed the limits with that interview. Without offering any substantiation to his claims, Dr. Mahiga offered this assertion when asked about the Somali politicians:</p>
<p>“There is a palace coup that has taken place in Villa <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">Somalia</a>. The Ala-Sheikh group is back in power, which should not be downplayed. The Ala-Sheikh group by definition never wanted any power sharing, they are against the Roadmap because of its inclusiveness to bring in the regions, to bring in Ahlu Sunnah, to bring in civil society.”</p>
<p>Why this crude accusation, especially when there is only 5 months left from the end of the transitional period?</p>
<p>Considering the timing of the message and the clout of the messenger, this was nothing but a desperate act to give traction to a baseless narrative that was being cooked since the Djibouti Agreement…that there is a clandestine Islamist cabal with sinister motives who are bent on high-jacking the political power. Consumed by that paranoia-based narrative and other erroneous assumptions that all organized Islamist groups, including those who are non-violent who are willing to legally partake in the political process, should not be trusted, Dr. Mahiga unleashes the following rant:</p>
<p>“They (Ala-Sheikh) are not very different than the Shabaab, except that they don’t take up arms. But for them, the fundamentals are the ideological purity, and they’ve reached a point where they have successfully staged a comeback, and they have just created a forum, which they have formed under Farmajo (former Prime Minister): an Islamic organization which they are going to transform into a political party”.</p>
<p>The boogieman, or the Al-Sheikh group that he referenced, are some of the students of the late Islamic scholar, Sheikh Mohamed Moallim during the 70s, 80s, and early 90s.</p>
<p>Contrary to the urban legend surrounding his influence, the Sheikh was in fact a progressive religious scholar who was ahead of his time. He graduated from Al-Azhar University, and his teachings were focused on bringing social and religious reform through non-violent means. He taught that the individual is part of the whole and that his/her actions either contribute positively or negatively to that whole- the society. And that the individual should never resort to bloodshed, or wreak havoc, or cause chaos even when living under an authoritarian government that publicly executed ten Islamic scholars and imprisoned a few others—including the Sheikh—for disagreeing with it.<br />
As an active agent of positive change, the individual must rely on educating one self<br />
(religious and secular) and on educating others, but to never impose his/her views on others.</p>
<p>A few individuals from that school of thought (and other Islamic thoughts) have joined the post Djibouti Agreement Transitional Federal Government. And though they were systematically cleansed out of the political structure through one “re-shuffle” or “accord”, their contribution and legacy stand out.</p>
<p>So, what threat does Dr. Mahiga fear? And even if it were true that that group and their allies in the Daljir Forum (a coalition of several political parties with diverse interests) have “successfully staged a comeback”, what is wrong with that? And more importantly, are we to deduce from Dr. Mahiga’s statements that there is a gatekeeper outside the will of the Somali people who should keep this wrongly implicated group in the periphery?</p>
<p>Considering the broad-based negative reaction his statements have generated and official grievances filed through the UN Secretary General’s office, Dr. Mahiga’s statements are not considered the result of judgment deficit. Rather, they are considered as statements that were deliberately crafted to sow the seeds of suspicion and conflict between certain political parties and groups. And since the groups under this attack were the very same groups that openly advocated for the transfer of all <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">international community</a> offices that deal with the <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">Somalia</a> issue to either Mogadishu or other parts of <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">Somalia</a>, this raises yet another question: Was this a payback for pressuring the UN and other international organization to leave their cozy environment in Nairobi and transfer their operations to Mogadishu- something that Dr. Mahiga had to do a few months earlier?</p>
<p>Be that as it may, the process of “de-Nairobification” must continue. In addition to bringing an end to the costly routine of multiple outsourcing of all projects and services to <a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/22/crucial-de-nairobify-somali-affairs/">Somalia</a>, such decision will bring an end to a detrimental sub-culture that developed since the break up of the State. A sub-culture that lures governmental officials and members of the Parliament to accept invitations and attend private meetings with various colorful foreign characters of multiple agendas at the privacy of their offices, hotel rooms, and residence.</p>
<p>Though this sub-culture has been under scrutiny for the past 18 months, enforcement has been all but effective. Mainly because these non-transparent and questionable freewheeling often takes place away from the government’s radar.</p>
<p>(Image credit: <a href="http://www.africa-confidential.com/article-preview/id/4222/Confused_war_aims_cause_alarm" target="_blank">African Confidential</a>)</p>
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		<title>Fact Checking Kony 2012: What NBC’s Fact-Finding Mission to Uganda Did Not Tell</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/20/fact-checking-kony2012-nbcs-fact-finding-mission-uganda/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=fact-checking-kony2012-nbcs-fact-finding-mission-uganda</link>
		<comments>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/20/fact-checking-kony2012-nbcs-fact-finding-mission-uganda/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 20 Mar 2012 18:18:18 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Ndumba J. Kamwanyah</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=57725</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/koneyad.jpg"></a>Few days after its release, amid controversies, the 30-minute documentary about Ugandan’s warlord Joseph Kony, viewed by over 80 million on Youtube, went viral online. The NBC Nightly News’ reality check section announced that it was sending a team to Kony’s village in remote Uganda east of Gulu to ...]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/koneyad.jpg"><img class="alignleft size-full wp-image-57739" title="koneyad" src="http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/wp-content/uploads/koneyad.jpg" alt="" width="300" height="169" /></a>Few days after its release, amid controversies, the 30-minute documentary about Ugandan’s warlord Joseph Kony, viewed by over 80 million on Youtube, went viral online. The NBC Nightly News’ reality check section announced that it was sending a team to Kony’s village in remote Uganda east of Gulu to check the facts on the ground.</p>
<p>Surely as promised, after meeting and speaking to some survivors of Kony’s heinous crimes (including one of his former child brides), the NBC Nightly News aired their findings. They found a village still living in fear of Joseph Kony. True the villagers (and Ugandans in general) have good reasons to be terrified of Kony, but NBC (like the non-profit Invisible Children) failed to report that the civilian population of Northern Uganda is also terrified of government forces. The sad but true reality is that Kony might have been indicted by the ICC (indeed that’s were he belongs) for crimes against humanity, yet the Ugandan army under President Yoweri Museveni equally committed atrocities against the civilian population of Acholi districts in Northern Uganda, and other neighboring countries in the DRC, Rwanda, and Central African Republic, all in the name of fighting Joseph Kony and the LRA (Lord’s Resistance Army). Ask any Muganda and privately and he/she would tell you of bombing (pre-and post Kony era) of villages in the Acholiland by the armed forces of Uganda through massive counterinsurgency campaigns and military operation, including one dubbed Operation North in the 80s. He/she would also tell you of forced relocation (by the Ugandan government) of Acholi residents into Teso and Lango camps, in which many of them perished due to deteriorating living conditions in the 90s, all in the name of protecting them against the LRA.</p>
<p>What NBC also does not report is the myriad of local efforts in the Acholi region, as symbolized by the indigenous mechanism of justice and conflict of Mato Oput (of course with its own weakness!) to respond to trauma as well as reintegrate Kony’s combatants, many of whom are former abductees, back into the Ugandan society. These and many other aspects are part of the larger context critics are saying the Invisible Children project has ignored. But more importantly, the NBC fact-finding mission failed to report or check on many questions raised against the IC, especially their program’s impact on survivors and victims of Kony’s brutalities.</p>
<p>While pondering the Kony2012 video, I also thought of Clooney’s Satellite Sentinel Project (SSP), and the Save Darfur project in South Sudan. With all good intention, they all somehow displayed ignorance and naivety with regards to their approach and intervention in Africa. As an African, not only does it makes me cringe, but it also worries me when I see solutions towards Africa’s complex problem are driven by ratings, and the number of celebrity tweets generated.</p>
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		<title>Meet Dr. Futbol</title>
		<link>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/20/meet-dr-futbol/?utm_source=rss&#038;utm_medium=rss&#038;utm_campaign=meet-dr-futbol</link>
		<comments>http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2012/03/20/meet-dr-futbol/#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 20 Mar 2012 17:59:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Derek Catsam</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=57715</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Here is Peter Alegi&#8217;s most excellent YouTube promo for his online Global Soccer course at Michigan State University:
<a href="http://youtu.be/FYdgxlanWJI">Meet Dr. Futbol</a>

<a href="http://history.msu.edu/people/faculty/peter-alegi/">Alegi</a> is the doyen of African football scholars. As you can tell, he also has mad skillz.
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Here is Peter Alegi&#8217;s most excellent YouTube promo for his online Global Soccer course at Michigan State University:</p>
<p><a href="http://youtu.be/FYdgxlanWJI">Meet Dr. Futbol</a></p>
<p><iframe width="560" height="315" src="http://www.youtube.com/embed/FYdgxlanWJI" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe></p>
<p><a href="http://history.msu.edu/people/faculty/peter-alegi/">Alegi</a> is the doyen of African football scholars. As you can tell, he also has mad skillz.</p>
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