Georgi Vanyan. Photo: Onnik Krikorian

When I first met Georgi Vanyan back in 2009, I couldn’t hide my excitement. For me that middle-aged man who smoked one cigarette after another and had sadness in his eyes, even when he smiled, was equal to a rockstar. I couldn’t believe I was talking to the person who organized Days of Azerbaijan as well as Turkish Film Festival in Armenia, despite regular threats he received and a very little support he had among the Armenian public. He was also the only Armenian I knew, who publicly called Nagorno-Karabakh region an “occupied” territory, not “liberated.”

Our meeting was completely random, we just happened to have common friends in Georgian capital Tbilisi. Nevertheless, we talked for three hours straight, sharing our insights on Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict and possible scenarios for its resolution. He told me about his future project – Azerbaijani Film Festival in Armenia. I said he was out of his mind, but he explained it was “a logical continuation of the previous events,” and that it was worth a try.

So he’s been trying ever since. Vanyan’s Yerevan-based Caucasus Center for Peace Making Initiatives made several attempts to organize Azerbaijani Film Festival in the Armenian capital in 2009, 2010 and 2011. The event got cancelled each time due to the pressure applied on Vanyan and the venue owners.

Last Thursday they tried again in Armenia’s second biggest city Gyumri. The festival consisted of four short films made in Azerbaijan in 2007-2008. However, a group of 50 protesters who reportedly gathered on the city’s Central Square, prevented the event from happening. When the attempt to negotiate with the protesters failed, Vanyan was able to leave the venue only after he publicly announced the cancellation of the festival, according to RFE/RL. Another video released on Youtube, shows Vanyan being assaulted by one of the protesters outside “Asparez” Journalist Club, the event’s venue.

Global Voices reported that in his announcement, Vanyan accused the mayor of Gyumri Vardan Ghukassian of being responsible for the “artificially created tension around the festival as well as possible provocations and violence against the organizers and participants.” The video made by RFE/RL shows Ghukassian leading the protest against Vanyan.

The protest outside "Asparez" Journalist Club on April 12 in Gyumri, Armenia. Credit: www.aravot.am

In his statement released on Thursday night, Vanyan explained that the event had to be cancelled because government and law enforcement bodies failed to guarantee safety for the participants. He also accused the authorities of applying psychological pressure and threatening the organizers with possible bloodshed.

“Later, the organizers of the festival were informed that there were checks installed on the highway from Yerevan to Gyumri and that the bus bringing participants of the festival from the capital would be stopped by hoodlums,” reads the statement.

After the organizers left Gyumri, they joined other participants on the way back to Yerevan and stopped at a roadside restaurant, where the showing of the movies took place with 26 viewers. The majority of them took part in the vote for the Viewers’ Choice award. The next showing is scheduled to April 17 at Helsinki Assembly office in Vanadzor, Armenia.

Several Azerbaijani and Armenian bloggers and social media users expressed their support to Vanyan’s cause. Nevertheless, many underlined that a similar event would not be possible to organize in Azerbaijan either.

Speaking to journalists earlier this week, Head of the Cinematography Department of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism Yusif Sheikhov stated that “due to Armenia’s occupational policy, Azerbaijan is not engaging in any joint activities with the country, and is not planning to do so in the future.” He also added that when it comes to NGOs, which cooperate with the Armenian side, “it’s on their conscience.”

From my personal humble experience in conflict resolution I learned that advocating for peace can be a tough job. Mostly, because the majority of people who live in conflict zones and were affected by wars, do not understand the point of reconciliation. All they know is that they lost relatives, possibly were displaced, or had to flee. What they usually want is for justice – what they perceive as one – to be restored. In conflict zones one can rarely meet sincere peace advocates who would stand up to their own people, and tell them the other side of the story.

In South Caucasus Georgi Vanyan is one of the few.

That’s why in South Caucasus Georgi Vanyan is a rockstar.

Presidents Shimon Peres (left) and Ilham Aliyev in Baku, Azerbaijan in 2009. Credit: AFP

It’s just so hard to launch an international bash these days. Everyone’s a critic. Just ask Azerbaijan.

Preparations for Eurovision, one of Europe’s biggest song contests to be held in May in Baku, are regularly sidetracked either by criticism of the country dismal human rights record, or allegations of the country’s silent involvement in Iran-Israeli nuclear crisis, though the government continues to deny any role.

Last week, Foreign Policy published an article by foreign affairs analyst Mark Perry that suggested Azerbaijan has expanded its military cooperation with Israel. The article quoted anonymous U.S. officials saying that Azerbaijan has granted Israel access to its airbases, or, as one of the author’s high-ranked sources phrased it: “The Israelis have bought an airfield, [...] called Azerbaijan.”

The article also quoted a retired American diplomat who suggested that even though this is most likely a verbal deal, Israel will have no trouble landing its jets in Azerbaijan. According to Perry, the deal might be the same cooperation Israel’s retired Brig. Gen. Oded Tira talked about in December 2006, calling for Israel to “coordinate with Azerbaijan the use of airbases in its territory.” According to a former CIA analyst interviewed for the article, the airbases will probably not be used to launch Israeli attacks on Iran, but for ”follow-on or recovery operations.” Either way, the relationship will put Azerbaijanis in harm’s way..

And, either way, Azerbaijan reacted immediately. The publication of the article was followed by a triple renunciation the next day. Defense ministry spokesman Teymur Abdullayev denied the assumptions, calling the information “absurd and groundless.” Ali Hasanov, Presidential Administration official said the claims are aimed at “damaging relations between Azerbaijan and Iran.” And Arye Gut, spokesman for the International Association “Israel-Azerbaijan” (Aziz) described Azerbaijan’s official position as to never be used against neighboring countries.

On Tuesday, April 3, the Azerbaijani embassy in the U.S. sent a protest note to Foreign Policy, saying the article by Perry is a provocation, according to Radio Liberty.

The official U.S. position on the topic was also clear.  During a daily press briefing in Washington, D.C on Monday, Department of State spokesperson Victoria Nuland stated that she doesn’t possess any information “to indicate that the reports that are out there have any basis in fact.”

Prominent Azerbaijani political analyst Zardusht Alizadeh called Azerbaijan’s possible involvement in an Israeli-Iranian conflict “a brainless decision.”  According to Alizadeh, it can put the country at increased risk, since it will take Iranian army only 12 hours to cross the border

The news broke only a month after Israel announced a $1.6 billion arms deal with Azerbaijan. According to the agreement, Azerbaijan is to buy drones, anti-aircraft and missile defense systems from the state-run Israel Aerospace Industries. The deal came as no surprise given the strong economic ties between two countries. One-fifth of Israel’s oil imports come from Azerbaijan, which makes the Jewish state one of Azerbaijan’s five biggest economic partners in a few short years.

At the same time, relations between Iran and Azerbaijan have gone down the hill since the beginning of the year.

In January, Azerbaijan’s national security forces foiled a two-man terrorist group that supposedly planned attacks on the country’s prominent Jews for $150,000 from Iranian intelligence. During the following month, authorities arrested 22 people suspected in espionage for Iran. However, human rights groups highly doubt the connection of some of the cases to Iranian conspiracy. One of them is the case of Anar Bayramli, a reporter for Iranian Sahar TV channel, which was repeatedly accused of spreading pro-Iranian propaganda by Azerbaijani authorities, who has been sentenced for two months of pre-trial detention on drug possession charges.

The mutual hostility increased in February when Iran‘s authorities summoned the Azerbaijani ambassador and presented him a protest note following a Times of London’s report. The article quoted an anonymous, Baku-based Mossad agent saying that Israeli intelligence has increased its presence in Azerbaijan in recent years to be closer to Iran.

It seems like Azerbaijan has a lot on its plate these days. Pretty soon the country will be welcoming tens of thousands of tourists coming to see their favorite singers, eat some delicious local food, take pictures in the Old Town and root for their countries. It will be a fun time for both Azerbaijanis and their guests.

However, those who believe, that Azerbaijani government is playing a dangerous game of hostility with its southern neighbor doubt that the country will be able to maintain necessary security. Especially in extreme situations such as Eurovision.

From left to right: Etibar Salmanli, Jamal Ali, Natig Kamilov at the protest on March 17 in Baku, Azerbaijan. Credit: Free Photoreporters Union

The sanctioned peaceful protest that took place in Azerbaijan’s capital Baku on Saturday, March 17 resulted in arrest of three activists. Members of Bulistan band Jamal Ali, 24, and Natig Kamilov, 24, and another activist Etibar Salmanli, 25, were arrested after a fight that broke during Ali’s performance. The singer has used strong language in his song, displeasing some protesters. During the fight he has also insulted President Ilham Aliyev’s late mother. Young men were sentenced to five to ten days of detention on charges of “petty hooliganism” and are allegedly subject to torture under custody.

After the court hearing on Saturday, the activists’ attorney Anar Gasimli spoke to RFE/RL. According to Gasimov, Kamilov and Ali were assaulted during the arrest. Kamilov’s nose was bleeding and he felt weak, while Ali had bruises on his body and face. The lawyer has also said he took pictures of Ali’s injuries but is not yet willing to share it with press.

According to Amnesty International’s report issued on Tuesday, Ali, Kamilov and Salmanli are still held in Sabail police station, even though there were supposed to be transferred to a corrective detention facility. The band members Ali and Kamilov are being held incommunicado and, according to friends, were assaulted by the police officers while in custody. Lawyers and family are not allowed to visit the detainees.

The Court of Appeal will hear the case of Ali, Kamilov and Salmanli on Wednesday, March 21.

Baku Police Department reported that the protest gathered up to 400 people, while the organizers claim the number to be much bigger. The protesters called for Azerbaijani government to stop corruption in education system, release political prisoners and end the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Their Facebook page listed more than 1,000 attendees and the Twitter campaign was held under #17Mart hashtag. RFE/RL, Lenta.ru and other media outlets have posted pictures from the protest.

UPDATE: According to RFE/RL, Jamal Ali testified he has been tortured by the police officers during the hearing on this case in the Court of Appeal on Wednesday.

“I said they beat me the last time, then they brought me in and beat again. Now that I said that, they will take me back and beat again,” said the singer in his testimony at the court. According to him, the police officers used sticks to beat the soles of his feet for two hours on March 19. Ali has also asked to be released in the court.

Natig Kamilov said he was also beaten and forced to write a testimony under dictation.

“I wrote whatever they told me. I wasn’t feeling well. They told me to write that I cursed. And I did. Then there was a pause and I used it to write that I didn’t,” Kamilov also said the detainees are provided with food once, sometimes twice a day.

Etibar Salmanli said he only signed his testimony because the police officers promised to release him as soon as he did when he was brought to the precinct on Saturday.

Attourney Anar Gasimli requested a 10-minute one-on-one meeting with his client Ali, which he was not given for four days. However, the motion was denied after a police officer addressed the court, saying Gasimov can meet Ali only if he submits his cell phone, which the lawyer said was against the law.

The Court of Appeal denied motions to release the detainees on fine and confirmed the verdict by the Sabail Court.

The type of torture used against Ali called foot whipping, or bastinado, was widely used in Ottoman Empire, China and Asian countries. Due to the clustering of nerves in the feet, this method is “effective” because it causes pain without leaving any marks.

Khadija Ismayilova, left center, shaking hands (credit: RFE/RL Dragan Milojevic)

It was bound to happen, although I prayed that it wouldn’t. But at least one web site in Azerbaijan has now released the blackmail video involving well-known correspondent Khadija Ismayilova. In response, Khadija has issued a public statement, quoted in an RFE/RL article, saying that she will not be deterred:

“If they meant to stop me by this, I can assure you they have been wrong. They failed to do so,” she said. “I continue doing my investigations. I will publish my investigations as soon as I finish the story. If they meant to stop me, they have failed. If they meant to defame me, they have failed, because I have received the full support of my friends.”

As I’ve said previously, Khadija is an extraordinarily courageous journalist, and as a friend of hers, I am saddened and disturbed by this very personal and vicious attack.

Interestingly, the RFE/RL piece alleges that the url for the site that posted the video “falsely suggests a connection with Azerbaijan’s opposition Musavat (Equality) party,” which if true would be an attempt to smear both Khadija and Musavat.

Turan News Agency in Baku reports that the editor of Yeni Musavat, the party newspaper, says that the site has no relation to his newspaper or the party.

In other news, I have been told by an Azeri source close to the opposition that President Aliyev is about to release virtually all political prisoners who were arrested and convicted for a variety of charges during Azerbaijan’s “Arab Spring” unrest last year.

Normally I don’t publish rumors, but it makes sense, and will be a major story if it pans out. Presidential pardons are often granted during holidays, and the Azeri “Novruz” celebrations are beginning soon. My source says the president has already signed the release order and believes that the reason for the urgency is the increasingly negative commentary from the international press on Azerbaijan’s human rights situation prior to the Eurovision Song Contest, to be held in Baku in May of this year.

We will see what develops in the next 48 hours.

Also today, Ruslan Bashirli, who was convicted in a sensational trial in 2006 for plotting to overthrow the government, is reported to have written a letter to President Aliyev asking for a pardon. Bashirli, a founding member of the Yeni Fekir (New Idea) youth group, was arrested in 2005, along with two co-defendants.

The key evidence against Bashirli was video footage that appeared to show him bragging to associates—and so-called “Armenian agents”—in Tbilisi that he was working with the National Democratic Institute (NDI) to overthrow President Aliyev’s government.

In Bashirli’s purported letter to President Aliyev, available at News.az, he confesses to wrong-doing and denounces his former political allies while expressing admiration for the president’s achievements:

“I have already served six years and seven months of the punishment. Over this time I have understood my responsibility for the crime and acknowledged my guilt. At that time I was hot-tempered and influenced by powers that disliked you and us.

“Analyzing my past over these years, I understood my faults. Of course, your positive activity in recent years had a big role in this. The achievements in domestic and foreign policy are obvious. No one can deny them.”

This is major shift in worldview, and comes a mere three weeks after a similar letter was supposedly written by Elnur Israfilov, a young man convicted for his participation in the April demonstrations. Like Bashirli, Israfilov was not only contrite in his letter, but blamed others for manipulating him:

“I have been engaged in actions aimed at disturbing peace, obstructing transport, violating the normal functioning schedule of enterprises, offices and organizations at the instigation of my uncle Mammad Ibrahimli. He has engaged me and simple people like me in order to fulfill his reckless intentions.”

I talked to his uncle via Skype in February, who told me that the letter was written in a style that suggested it was dictated or authored by someone else, and alleged that former political prisoner and journalist Eynullah Fatullayev had convinced Israfilov to write it.

My Azeri source tells me that Bashirli’s family have traveled to Baku in anticipation of his impending release in the next day or two. Pro-government ANS TV has been playing up the Bashirli story today, perhaps suggesting that they know that a pardon will be granted.

Khadija Ismayilova (credit: RFE/RL, Courtesy Image)

Azerbaijan’s best-known journalist (who also happens to be Azerbaijan’s best journalist, period) alleged yesterday that she is being victimized in a blackmail attempt. Khadija Ismayilova, who writes for a number of publications and hosts the popular “After Work” radio show for RFE/RL’s Baku bureau, made the allegations after receiving a letter containing photographs of a very personal and “intimate” nature.

According to Khadija, the envelope was postmarked in Moscow, and contained not only embarrassing photographs, but a note which read, “Whore, behave. Or you will be defamed.”

I’ve actually suspected long before now that something like this would happen to Khadija, given her tireless investigative journalism, which has included exposés of corruption at the very highest level of Azerbaijan’s government.

And her efforts have been noticed – by international organizations such as the German ZEIT Foundation, which recognized Khadija earlier this year, and Azerbaijan’s ruling family.

In a revealing exchange between President Aliyev and former US diplomat Matthew Bryza, the president complained bitterly to Bryza in 2008 about the RFE’s tone toward his administration in general and Khadija in particular:

“The President said that Radio Liberty has selected people only from the opposition to work in their bureau here. He said that the local editor Khadija Ismayilova is a long-time opposition activist who considers herself to be an enemy of the government.”

Dirty tactics against perceived opponents, as Khadija herself has pointed out in the last 24 hours, are not at all unusual in Azerbaijan, where honest, independent journalism is an exceedingly hazardous undertaking. Readers not aware of modern Azerbaijan’s distinction in this area might familiarize themselves with the murder of opposition journalist Elmar Huseynov in 2005 or the killing of Rafiq Tagi last year, or prosecutions of journalists such as Sakit Zahidov and Eynullah Fatullayev.

While the mysterious blackmail letter sent to Khadija was apparently from Moscow and not Baku, this is surely beside the point. The intent, if the letter is what Khadija claims it to be, is to silence one of Azerbaijan’s most courageous voices.

Authoritarian governments and their allies often resort to this sort of crude tactic to send a chilling message to political opponents and journalists. Vladimir Putin’s Russia, for example, has seen the release of a number of explicit, sexually-oriented videos of people such as Russian Newsweek editor Mikhail Fishman and satirist Viktor Shenderovich. Both men appeared on separate tapes with the same woman, who had managed by 2010 to entrap at least six opposition figures in this way. Fishman appeared on the tape to be using cocaine while enjoying the company of the scantily-clad young woman, since then identified as Ekaterina Gerasimova.

Back in Azerbaijan, Lider TV (owned by a cousin of President Aliyev) aired a similar tape last year of two opposition activists engaged in compromising sexual behavior, coincidentally during Azerbaijan’s “Arab Spring” unrest.

And in late 2010, Lider broadcast video tape of opposition newspaper editor Azer Ahmedov having graphic sex with someone other than his wife. Incredibly, Lider hyped the tape and urged viewers to watch the uncensored segment, which they referred to as “The Naked Truth of the Opposition,” on its “Seda” news program.

In a bizarre bit of political analysis, the announcer ponderously told viewers that the video was a result of “asymmetric policy from the West,” adding that “we have to show this to the Western world, especially to France, so they know that their methods are very close to our opposition.”

Yes, I know that’s a bagful of non sequiturs, but it’s also a typical example of the multi-year slander campaign against opposition parties that has rendered them a mute and ineffective force.

And now it’s Khadija’s turn. Never mind that she has a right to privacy, and never mind that she has already had to endure a number of hurtful insults over the years from a variety of sources.

Robert Coalson reports for RFE/RL that “at least two newspapers in Azerbaijan” are in possession of the photos. Mr Coalson does not say how they obtained the photos, but added at press time that “no one has published them.”

Inshalla, no one will.

Below is Khadija’s public statement on this incident, translated into English and available at Azerireport.com:

“On March 7 I received a letter to my home address with threats and blackmail. It includes some photos of intimate character and a threat.

It says if I don’t stop working I will be hugely embarrassed. This threat is not a surprise for me. I have been doing investigative journalism for a long time. My investigation included the secret business of president Ilham Aliyev’s family and documented the facts of corruption on the highest level, disclosed the offshore businesses of members of the ruling family.

Currently I am working on several investigative reports. I have sent inquires to the Government offices about businesses of ruling family.

For a long time my journalistic activity has been the source of concern for the government . I have been a subject of attacks and slander in pro-government newspapers. I have been absurdly accused of having Armenian relatives and working for foreign intelligence.

Till now many of my colleagues have been subjected to blackmailed with discrediting information and I have been expecting new dirty blackmailing moves from people who are stealing the public money. I was envisioning this and was ready to face it. After receiving a letter today I am convinced and determined that I can withstand any blackmail campaign against me. I will continue my professional activity and work. Because the journalist that respect its profession can not act otherwise.

I would like to repeat that this is not the first time that these acts of blackmail have been used against fellow journalists. The motives of these acts are very well know to public. It is done to silence people who are outspoken. There are a serious crimes behind these acts.

I may face more of these disgusting and dangerous steps against me. The Government must investigate these events. Taken into account the nature of my investigations and the source of criticism and attacks against me, I hope the president will carry responsibility for what may happen and provide protection for my security.

Khadija Ismayil.”

SELECTED REPORTS AND INVESTIGATIONS

Tracking president’s family business

For more than five years government of Azerbaijan lied to citizens about ownership of the mobile phone operator, naming German Siemens as an owner of Azerfon company, enjoying favorable conditions in the market, not available for competitors. The investigation reveals that president Aliyev’s daughters were behind Azerfon through shell companies in Panama.

http://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan_president_aliyev_daughters_tied_to_te…

President Aliyev’s family and the illegal privatization of the public airport

The investigation conducted with Ulviyya Asadzade documented how President IlhamAliyev’s family was involved in the illegal privatization of the public bank and other parts of state owned Azerbaijan Airlines company, to benefit the Aliyev family. The government never publicly announced the privatization. The report was declared “the best investigation of Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty in 2010” among the 28 language services of the radio. http://www.rferl.org/content/Aliyevs_Azerbaijani_Empire_Grows_As_Daughter_Joi…

Barcelona of Iranian Turks

The feature highlights Iranian football team “Trakhtur”, which became a symbol of Azerbaijani turks’ struggle in Iran for cultural and linguistic rights. The story reports about arrests of ethnic rights champions, human rights movement and activists, using the stadium as a platform for voicing their problems.

http://www.azadliqradiosu.az/content/article/1951947.html

Hidden infant mortality – the deaths caused by poverty in oil rich Azerbaijan

Radio documentary about infant mortality. The investigation reveals infant mortality cases, never appeared in official statistics explaining difference between government figures and independent assessment.

http://www.azadliqradiosu.az/content/article/422047.html

Shady electricity bid winner got presidential support

Investigation about corruption in tender procedures of contracting Turkish company Barmek for the Baku city Electricity Supply Management. The investigation revealed that the company obtained the contract thanks to the previous agreement among presidents of Azerbaijan and his friend, former president of Turkey.

http://www.echo-az.com/archive/2002_01/247/facts.shtml

Untold stories of BTC pipeline

Report about political games around BTC pipeline, negotiations behind the scenes, and never disclosed alternative plans of energy routes.

http://www.echo-az.com/archive/2002_09/426/facts.shtml#2

Rioters burn building in Quba, Azerbaijan (credit: CNN iReport)

Thousands of protesters took to the streets early today in the northern Azeri city of Quba in what became a scene of violence as police fired tear gas and clubbed demonstrators. Radio Free Europe reports that four people were injured, according to authorities, and I have been told that a videographer from an opposition news agency was taken to a local hospital.

The catalyst for the demonstration was the leaked remarks by Rauf Habibov, the local governor, who apparently told associates that Quba residents are “traitors” for selling their land for as little as “thirty or forty manat.” (An Azeri manat is worth roughly USD$1.27 at current exchange rates.)

According to one source, videographer Rashad Aliyev was taken to a hospital for injuries he sustained during the melee, but I am attempting to confirm that. Information is somewhat sporadic from Quba just now.

Despite attempts by the governor to apologize for his unguarded remarks, the demonstration quickly spiraled into a riot, with protesters smashing windows at government buildings and, according to RFE/RL, setting fire “to a house thought to belong to Habibov.”

Dramatic video of a vigorously burning building – perhaps the residence of the governor – can be seen here, courtesy of CNN iReport.

A photo of a man identified as videographer Rashad Aliyev shows something interesting.

Injured reporter in Azerbaijani riot (credit: IRFS)

Note the man in the background, right of center, holding up a poster of Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev. This has provoked a good deal of discussion on Azeri internet forums today, and the two favorite theories are that either the man is displaying the poster as an “insurance policy” against assault by police or that he is a government “plant,” symbolically distancing the administration in Baku from the events in Quba. Personally, I don’t have a theory, but offer the oddly dissonant picture for your consideration.

There are several extraordinary elements to this outbreak of violence:

First, it is spontaneous. There was no planned demonstration, it was not a facebook-organized “People’s Day” or “March 11” event. The Quba incident was totally out of the blue.

Second, it was viral and attracted thousands of participants almost immediately. Thus, the demonstration was almost certainly larger than anything the opposition tried to arrange last year when some thought that Azerbaijan was ripe for an Arab Spring revolution. (Note: I wasn’t one of those people.)

Third, it was not, at least on its face, anti-Aliyev. And its goals were not ambitiously over-arching. These people didn’t protest and burn down a house because they want to throw out the Aliyev government. They were reacting to a specific, limited set of circumstances: the intemperate comments of a foolish and arrogant apparatchik.

Fourth, the riot happened not in Baku, but in a “region,” which is Azeri-speak for any province (“region”) outside of the Absheron peninsula, where Baku is located. One of the tactical errors that the opposition typically makes (not that I’m giving them advice) is to focus their efforts on the capital city. As one Azeri opposition leader (now residing in the US) told me today, “We have to encourage protest actions throughout the country: in the regions, in the villages and cities, not just Baku. This is the key.”

Finally, today’s event may be a tipping point in the making. I say this because the reaction to the governor’s idiotic and callous remarks was breathtakingly swift and the violence that followed was both surprising and carefully targeted. This implies pent-up anger, and where it exists in one region, it may emerge in others.

We will see in the coming days how these events resonate in the rest of Azerbaijan, but it is certainly not the kind of publicity the government wants less than three months prior to the Eurovision Song Contest, to be held in Baku in late May. The riot comes on the heels of international condemnation of widespread evictions of citizens from their homes in the city center to make way for Eurovision venues. (More on that story on this blog in the coming days.)

And in a hard-hitting television broadcast last week, the American network CNBC aired a segment on Azerbaijan’s ruling family for the premiere of its new “Dirty Money” series.

So how will the central government handle this black eye? If they really want to defuse the situation (and they do), then the first step will be to relieve the governor of his duties. That has to be done immediately if the government wants to gain a semblance of control.

The president might consider acknowledging that systemic corruption and oil riches which benefit a small group of Azeri oligarchs are the root causes of a situation where people feel compelled to sell parcels of their land for a lousy $40. The governor calling them “traitors” is just stunning, and in another place and time would be precisely the sort of thing that sparks a revolution.

In an interview today with Voice of America, former political prisoner Emin Milli, currently in graduate school in London, called for mass protests tomorrow at noon across Azerbaijan. But this evening there seemed to be limited support for Milli’s proposal on facebook among opposition party figures.

Addendum: a number of press reports indicate that the governor of Quba has been removed from office, and Azadliq newspaper, an organ of the opposition Popular Front Party, claims that a state of emergency has been declared in Quba and the city has been sealed off by police.

Alla Djioyeva (photo: RFE/RL)

After being hospitalized last Thursday under mysterious circumstances, the winner of November’s South Ossetian presidential election had, as of yesterday, told the press that she may leave politics and is reportedly considering asking for asylum in an unnamed country.

Alla Dzhiolyeva, 62, was transferred on Monday from intensive care to a “regular ward” in a Tskhinvali hospital after sustaining either a stroke or a “hypertensive crisis” during a police  raid at her party headquarters on Thursday.

Her supporters allege that she and other party members were roughed up during a melee instigated by police, who have said that they entered the building to bring Dzhioyeva in for questioning pertaining to “a coup attempt” and demonstrations late last year.

Witness accounts of the incident vary, with some saying that Dzhioyeva was struck in the head with a rifle butt, leading to her collapse and hospitalization. The South Ossetian de facto government claims that Dzhioyeva suffered a “hypertensive crisis” due to stress after police entered her party headquarters.

Dzhioyeva’s electoral victory in November was subsequently overturned by the South Ossetian Supreme Court. Since then, the breakaway republic has been in a state of political chaos, with a new election scheduled for March 24. But Dzhioyeva announced that, in defiance of the court’s decision, she would hold an “inauguration” ceremony on the 10th of February, a day prior to the police raid.

A number of demonstrations followed the court’s decision, with police firing automatic rifles into the air to disperse protesters during at least one rally. Dzhioyeva won an upset victory in November over Anatoly Bibiolov, the Moscow-backed candidate

What took place in party headquarters during the raid may never be known unless a video tape turns up. An aide to Dzhioyeva told the press that the candidate had been assaulted by police, who claimed that she was “faking it” when she complained of illness during the incident.

Alla Djioyeva in hospital (photo: Pik TV)

Her condition was upgraded from “grave” to stable in the last few days. As of press time, she is reportedly still hospitalized in Tshkinvali, the South Ossetian capital.

Ruing her brief career in politics, Dzhioyeva told the press from her hospital bed that she never realized that politics “was such a dirty game.” The television footage can be seen here, courtesy of Pik TV.

This may be a coordinated series of attempted attacks against Israeli embassy assets, and the speculation from some sources is that the explosion in India and the bomb in Georgia are tied to the fourth anniversary of the assassination of Hezbollah deputy leader Imad Mughniyah, for which Hezbollah blames Israel.

Last year at this time, the Israeli Counterterrorism Bureau warned against travel to all three South Caucasus countries as well as a number of other states.

However, Isabel Kershner and Michael Schwirtz in the International Herald Tribune imply that the incidents could “represent Iran’s first confirmed retaliation for a series of recent attacks in Iran aimed at killing Iranian atomic scientists and sabotaging Iran’s nuclear disputed program, the source of rising tensions between Iran and the West.”

I don’t know what their source is, but it seems unlikely that these attacks—random in their nature and not targeted against specific individuals—are linked to Israel’s efforts to undermine Iran’s nuclear program.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu seems to subscribe to the Hezbollah hypothesis himself (at least publicly), and the Israeli press likewise is focusing on the anniversary of Mughniyah’s death rather than a tit-for-tat strategy tied to the deaths of Iranian nuclear scientists.

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu (credit: Asianews)

Israel’s foreign minister Avigdor Lieberman told the press today that “We know exactly who is responsible for the attack and who planned it, and we’re not going to take it lying down.”

For its part, the Iranian Foreign Ministry announced that the explosion in New Dehli (which injured the wife of an Israeli diplomat) and the similar bomb in Tbilisi were the work of Israel, in an effort to “tarnish Iran’s friendly relations” with India and Georgia.

Georgia and Iran enjoy cordial relations, and in May of 2010, the Iranian government announced its intention to build a hydroelectric plant in Georgia, despite the reservations expressed by the US Department of State in a confidential message to the US embassy in Tbilisi in December of the previous year.

Rafiq Tagi. Credit: APA.AZ

There is no real progress to report on the investigation into the murder of Rafiq Tagi, although as I mentioned shortly after his death, a number of theories—some of them rational, others not—cropped up immediately on social networking sites and internet forums.

My guess is that Tagi was killed by Islamists who were incensed by a piece he had authored shortly before his death. A number of Azeris have scoffed at this theory, pointing out to me that the Iranian fatwah against Tagi was announced years ago, and he had somehow survived since then with no attempts on his life.

Their various theories are unconvincing and overly elaborate, including one favored by many in the opposition: that the assassin was from Azerbaijan and the motive was to sow discord amongst the secular and religious forces who have been more or less united in their opposition to the Aliyev government.

A major proponent of this theory is political analyst Arastun Orujlu, with whom I spoke via Skype in December. While acknowledging that he didn’t “have the facts to blame anyone” in particular, Orujlu speculated that the aim of the attack on Tagi was to weaken the secular and religious opposition factions and blunt the momentum for regime change:

“I cannot imagine that someone in Iran killed Rafiq Tagi. This is something internal. They calculated that after the killing of Rafiq Tagi the secular part of the society, especially the atheistic part, would blame the religious community. And it happened!

“Both sides were blaming each other – the religious community and the liberals…I think now that this mistrust has become much bigger than before. So an Arab Spring has a much smaller chance of succeeding today than before.”

Khadija Ismayilova has written a very insightful piece for Eurasianet on what Tagi’s violent death may mean for public discourse in Azerbaijan. Among other things, Khadija’s article traces how Tagi’s murder has exposed and intensified the fissures between secular writers and political figures and more conservative elements from Azerbaijan’s religious community. (This doesn’t necessarily mean that Khadija agrees with those who posit that Tagi’s murder was designed to to drive a wedge between the two communities. She is laying out for her readers how Tagi’s death has resulted in a schism; these are two different things.)

Meanwhile, Elnur Majidli, the principal organizer of last year’s 11 March “Great People’s Day” has announced a similar effort for 2012. Majidli, who is studying law in France, was charged last year with attempting to overthrow the government after launching the 11 March Facebook page. The Azerbaijani government eventually suspended its prosecution of Majidli.

He tells me that this year’s strategy is more nuanced than in 2011, with a “campaign” planned “in stages”:

“The next stage is the Great People’s Movement currently with 1500+ members and the material is shared among 40,000 members…The movement is strongly supported by the opposition parties in Azerbaijan. Last year we broke the silence in the political atmosphere of the country and I believe this year people will [be] more ready to support and follow through with the movement. I believe this year the end result of the movement and demonstrations will be much more fruitful.”

That remains to be seen, of course. The opposition is in a state of near disarray thanks to the long-term program to discredit it and vigorous police tactics at rallies last year, coinciding with the Arab Spring movement in the Middle East. After talking to a number of opposition youth figures, I’m not sensing a groundswell of support for this year’s iteration of the Great People’s Day Movement,  although it’s still early. A new political variable is the 2012 Eurovision Song Contest, to be held in Baku in late May, and it is unclear as to whether protests will be held to coincide with the competition.

Majidli’s Facebook page complements a multi-media web site called “Etiraz,” in English and Azeri, with news and commentary.

Finally, as reported widely in early January, career diplomat Matthew Bryza, US ambassador to Azerbaijan, has left Baku and will not be re-nominated. Bryza was named ambassador by President Obama at the end of 2010 during a Senate recess, necessitated by the fierce resistance instigated by a number of Armenian interest groups and led in the Senate by Robert Menendez (D – New Jersey) and Barbara Boxer (D – California).

Thus Bryza’s tenure in Baku was from the beginning subject to the whims of the Washington political process, and despite a well-argued letter of support addressed to the Senate (and signed by people such as Robert Kagan, Thomas Pickering, and R. Nicholas Burns), Bryza was not re-nominated.

An informed Washington source, who probably doesn’t want his name revealed, told me that re-nomination is at this juncture not an option: “It is way too late for that. The administration appears to just have dropped the ball and not even pushed with Menendez and Boxer, as suggested by the failure to push for a vote. If they wanted to persuade anyone they had a year to do it. [Bryza] has left Baku and it’s over.”

I won’t rehash the litany of complaints lodged against Bryza, but will simply say that there is zero evidence that he has ever been less than objective and thoroughly dedicated in his previous role with the OSCE Minsk Group. In my view, he did an excellent job in attempting to hammer out a final agreement over the frozen Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and it’s a pity that he has been robbed of a chance to truly leave his mark as ambassador to Azerbaijan.

Speaking of US ambassadors to Baku, I’d like to close by apologizing to former ambassador Anne Derse for something I wrote last year (not that she is ever going to read this).

In February of last year, I posted an article on this blog in which I dismissed allegations coming from PanArmenian.net that the US Department of State had concluded that former Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrossian, among others, was personally profiting from the sale of narcotics in the Caspian region.

The source, according to the Armenian news site, was a Wikileaks cable released by Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten.

So I did some digging, talked to some sources, and called the Baku UNODC (UN Office on Drugs and Crime) branch, which was mentioned in the PanAmenian.net article. Notably, the specific source of the sensational allegations against the former president was redacted in the Aftenposten’s version of the cable.

Aftenposten, like the New York Times and other press outlets, has a policy of redacting the names of sensitive State Department sources, and for good reason: these people, many of whom are citizens of host countries, have in some cases taken risks in order to give US embassy contacts their unique perspectives. Removing the names of these sources is something I fully agree with on ethical grounds.

But curiously, Aftenposten has, in a seemingly random fashion, also redacted information, not simply the names of protected sources. And it was Aftenposten who released the cable I referred to in my blog post.

Here is the Aftenposten version of the relevant portion of the cable:

[TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN ] observed that Armenia is “starved for hard currency,” and alleged that UNODC as well as Azerbaijani officials believe that senior Armenian political and government officials, including former President Tar-Petrossian, are personally profiting from this trade. (Note: [TEXT REMOVED BY AFTENPOSTEN ]. End Note).

Since September of 2011, the unredacted versions of all 250,000+ cables are now widely available. Here is the complete version of the cable I referred to in my story, with the name of the UN source removed by me:

[Name removed] observed that Armenia is “starved for hard currency,” and alleged that UNODC as well as Azerbaijani officials believe that senior Armenian political and government officials, including former President Tar-Petrossian, are personally profiting from this trade. (Note: [Name removed] is an ethnic Azeri, and his lurid assertions about Armenia need separate confirmation…)

The “note” at the end is critical, since it shows that the US embassy was, quite properly, skeptical of the source’s “lurid assertions.” Had I been aware of the contents of the redacted segment, I would not have leapt to the conclusion that “neither [Derse] nor anyone at the embassy injected a note of skepticism prior to sending the message to Washington.”

While the main focus of the post is still valid, namely that US embassy personnel have never alleged that former Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrossian was complicit in the regional narcotics trade, I was dead wrong about Ambassador Derse’s assessment of the accusations coming from the UNODC source.

Jabbar Savalan (credit: Turkhan Karimov)

News out of Baku courtesy of Radio Free Europe and the viral Azerbaijan rumor mill is that Jabbar Savalan was released from prison today (26 December) in a general amnesty granted by President Aliyev. As noted earlier on this blog, clemencies for political prisoners are not uncommon, and usually take place to coincide with some national holiday or festival such as the Novruz celebration in the Spring. This amnesty affected roughly 90 convicts, I am told, although evidently Jabbar was the only political prisoner to enjoy a clemency.

I’ll try to get an interview in the coming days, although talking to the foreign press might be something Jabbar is reluctant to do, given the sensitive nature of his trial and conviction.

The raft of Facebook activists and opposition party figures arrested and sentenced to prison terms this year has damaged Azerbaijan’s international image and we may well see further amnesties granted prior to the 2012 Eurovision Song Contest, due to be held in Baku in May.

And there was much more, of course. Distilling 2011, then, would be less fruitful than an admittedly impressionistic look at some of the more significant events of the year.

Jabbar Savalan (photo: Turkhan Kerimov)

Let’s start with the civil unrest in the early months of 2011, which led to arrests for many and imprisonment of a select few but revealed much about the government’s fears and its strategy. As in Armenia, opponents of the government sought to ignite widespread protest, modeling themselves after the Arab Spring. But unlike the demonstrations in Armenia (where something akin to democratic pluralism is much more in evidence than in Azerbaijan), the rallies were relatively small and the government response was swift and harsh. The “Great People’s Day” of March 11, for example, saw a meager turnout, a quick roundup of protesters by police and a number of arrests. More rallies followed in March and April, with hundreds of arrests and in some cases, criminal charges.

Great People's Day protest, Baku (photo: Abbas Atilay)

As in Egypt and elsewhere in the Muslim world, Facebook and Youtube were used as tools for organizing protests, but despite the claims of the participants, Azerbaijan was hardly teetering on the edge of regime change.

Those charged with creating public disorder and similar crimes connected to protests in April include prominent Musavat Party figure Arif Hajili and nine others who were convicted and are now serving time.

The strategy of the government in the past couple of years looks something like what we’ll call “general harassment and targeted prosecution,” where the prosecutor’s office brings charges against Facebook activist X or independent journalist Y or opposition political figure Z. The charges might be drug possession (Savalan) or hooliganism (Emin Milli and Adnan Hajizade) or, let’s say, interfering with election officials. The suspects are detained prior to trial while an “investigation” takes place (e.g. Savalan, Hajiyev, Milli, Hajizade and Khural newspaper editor Avaz Zeynalli).

Then coincidentally, the defense counsel is disbarred – thus sabotaging the defendants’ cases. (Among those disbarred this year while involved in politically sensitive cases were Osman Kazimov, Khalid Bagirov and Elchin Namazov.)

Finally, the defendants are convicted, an outcry from the international community ensues, and eventually the cases reach the Azerbaijani Supreme Court, which inevitably rules in favor of the prosecution.

On 29 November, the Azerbaijani Supreme Court sustained the lower court’s conviction of Savalan. And yesterday (6 December), the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Bakhtiyar Hajiyev, who was convicted earlier this year on charges of evading military service.

Both men can look forward to serving a substantial portion of their sentences, although there is a chance they and others convicted this year will be released in a “magnanimous” gesture by President Aliyev prior to the 2012 Eurovision Song Contest, to be held in Baku in late May.

(Azerbaijan’s Eurovision 2011 victory may well be a godsend to a number of Azerbaijan’s political prisoners – the authorities will find it awkward if the international press goes digging into Azerbaijan’s human rights record during the competition. Best to send people like Savalan and most of the others home at least a month prior to the commencement of Eurovision, although my guess is that there will be one or two still languishing in prison by late May. The government will find it even more awkward if the opposition stages protests just before and during the competition…)

I haven’t touched upon a number of other issues, such as the sensational trial and conviction of Movsum Samadov, the head of the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan, for plotting to overthrow the government. Samadov got a twelve-year sentence in October, and six other Islamic Party members were also convicted.

There were two subtexts here: one was the struggle on the part of some segments of Azeri society against the government-imposed ban on hijabs in public schools. (It was “no accident,” Samadov’s supporters say, that his legal troubles began shortly after he publicly opposed the ban. As explained in an excellent article available at the IWPR web site, Samadov’s wife saw a cause-and-effect relationship at work: “When [the education minister] decided not to admit girls wearing hijab to the schools, my husband spoke up and said he couldn’t do that, that we’re Muslims and you can’t force us to remove our hijab,” she said. “Two days after that, my husband was arrested.”)

The other subtext is Azerbaijan’s dicey relationship with Iran. It didn’t take much of an inferential leap to conclude who would benefit from an Islamist takeover of the government (unlikely as that may be), and Iran’s rhetoric toward Azerbaijan seems to have become more strident in 2011. According to one theory, a conviction of Samadov and his associates should be construed as a message from Baku back to Tehran.

(I’m not theorizing myself on the prosecution of Samadov and his associates. The above is offered only for your consideration and because it is grist for the mill in Azerbaijan.)

I’ve left a lot out, but 2012 will no doubt prove to be an equally eventful year, unfortunately.

Finally, the good people at the Foreign Policy Association have asked us bloggers to name our books of the year. I’m a bit late, since the FPA have nominated several of them here. But I certainly agree that John Gaddis’s book on George Kennan (George F. Kennan: An American Life, Penguin Press 2011) is a remarkable biography.

Parenthetically, I wrote to Kennan when I was an adjunct lecturer teaching US foreign policy at Lake Forest College in 1991. (When I say “wrote,” I mean a “letter.” Not an ethergramme [a single piece of email], but a real letter.) My question concerned his “Long Telegram,” the most famous single diplomatic cable in history, which he wrote as a young diplomat in Moscow in 1946 when the US foreign service was beginning to understand that Soviet foreign policy was signaling a new and confrontational relationship with the west.

The Long Telegram, his missive to State Department headquarters in Washington, was a masterful 8,000 word examination of the Soviet mindset, and was extraordinarily prescient. The telegram resulted in Kennan becoming something of a legend (not to mention a foreign policy Cassandra).

So in my letter, I told Kennan that I wanted to pose “an impertinent question”: while he was composing the Long Telegram during those lonely hours in Moscow, did he happen to notice the ghost of Sir Eyre Crowe hovering over his shoulder?

Kennan wrote back a charming reply in which he confessed that at that stage of his career, he had no idea who Eyre Crowe might have been! I’ll take him at his word (especially since Gaddis emailed a few weeks ago to say that what Kennan told me is perfectly plausible).

Best wishes,

Karl Rahder

2011 was the year when former Parliament Speaker Nino Burjanadze put the finishing touches on her long campaign to discredit former Parliament Speaker Nino Burjanadze.

Nino Burjanadze (geotimes.ge)

Ms. Burjanadze began her re-branding effort from responsible, clear-headed opposition leader to uncompromising radical after forming her own political party in 2008. The disastrous Russo-Georgian War in the same year fueled her embrace of confrontational rhetoric and what appeared to be acquiescence to occasional violent tactics by her allies at demonstrations.

The arrest of a number of her inner circle on weapons charges in 2009, which Burjanadze referred to as a government “campaign of terror” against her was a blow to her image, as were her visits to Moscow last year in attempt to look statesmanlike.

2011 was probably the final chapter for Burjanadze in her role as opposition leader. Beginning early this year, she called for another round in an endless series of demonstrations against President Saakashvili, whom she has begun to refer to as “a dictator” and a leader who is “terrorizing the people.”

Thus like Armenia (and to a lesser extent, Azerbaijan), Georgia experienced a number of demonstrations in the spring. But the character of the rallies in Georgia was of an altogether different nature, consisting of a hodgepodge of fringe political groups hankering for a fight, which is precisely what they got.

The tragedy at the tail end of the rallies was the random death of two men—a policeman and a bystander—on the evening of 26 May, when they were run down by someone in Burjanadze’s motorcade as it sped away, east on Rustavelli Avenue, at the conclusion of a violent demonstration.

The arrest and conviction of Burjandze’s husband Badri Bitsadze on charges stemming from the violent demonstrations that month probably closes the book on Nino’s political future. Badri, who went into hiding, was convicted in absentia, and his last reported whereabouts were Vienna, where he was spotted by journalists in September.

With Nino excluded as a major political actor, there are now two or three figures poised to lead any unified opposition that may eventually emerge. One is Levan Gachechiladze, who was trounced by President Saakashvili in the special presidential election in 2008. A more serious contender is former Georgian ambassador to the United Nations Irakli Alasania, although he too was easily brushed aside when he ran for mayor of Tbilsi in 2010.

That leaves us with Bidzina Ivanishvili, the “reclusive” (which seems to be the operative term for Ivanishvili these days) billionaire who in November announced his plans to enter politics.

Ivanishvili will be the man to watch in Georgia’s near-term future. Stripped of his (lapsed) Georgian citizenship by the authorities due to his dual Russian-French nationality, Ivanishvili has said that he intends to renounce his dual citizenship and appeal to the president. (That’s a mildly ironic tactic, since Ivanishvili is reported to have blamed Saakashvili for starting the 2008 war with Russia.)

Saakashvili’s allies have attacked Ivanishvili as a tool of Moscow, where he made his fortune, and the police have not at all coincidentally launched a money laundering investigation of the Cartu Bank, owned by Ivanishvili.

His new political movement, still in incubation, is called “Georgian Dream,” which he will use to spearhead his effort to wrest power from the ruling party in the 2012 parliamentary elections.

Ivanishvili’s platform is still a little unclear beyond the ritual denunciations of the president, of whom he said, “In my view, reality today is such that even his own mother would not vote for Saakashvili.”

His personal web site is here.

Armenia

The biggest story for Armenia was probably the rallies in February through April staged by the Armenian National Congress (HAK) and its leader, former president Levon Ter-Petrossian (often referred to in shorthand as “LTP”).

Levon Ter-Petrossian (photo: Onnik Krikorian)

The demonstrations were designed to force a number of concessions from the government, including the release of detainees held since Armenia’s 2008 civil unrest, the resignation of President Sargsyan, and early elections. The rhetoric borrowed, somewhat superficially, from the Arab Spring template, with LTP speaking of a “Mubarakization” process underway in Armenia.

The rallies never attracted more than 30,000 or so participants, although HAK claimed a turnout of 50,000 at one demonstration in early March.

As of early April, Ter-Petrossian had climbed down somewhat, telling supporters at a rally that he was now demanding merely that President Sargsyan free all “political prisoners,” agree to an inquiry into the 2008 political unrest, and guarantee access to Freedom Square in downtown Yerevan for further demonstrations.

By May, the government had released many HAK supporters who had languished in prison since the violence of 2008, and agreed to establishing the commission that Ter-Petrossian had demanded. While these were two key premises behind the rallies, it was clear then—and after the more recent demonstrations in October—that the president would not resign and that new elections were not in the offing.

To many observers, the rallies constituted a trial balloon for LTP’s efforts to retool himself and become a political force once again. I would tend to agree, and in my view this strategy has failed.

Ter-Petrossian has intimated recently that he hasn’t abandoned the cycle of demonstrations, but some observers believe that his day in the sun is over. Intriguingly, a Wikileaks cable released this year cast the former president in a rather unflattering light.

The cable, written in late 2008 and released this year, details a wide-ranging conversation in Yerevan between LTP and then-US ambassador Marie Yovanovitch, and reveals a sometimes exasperated Yovanovitch expressing her astonishment at charges Ter-Petrossian had leveled against the United States at a rally two weeks earlier:

“[The ambassador] took strong exception…to LTP’s
October 17 speech in which he had argued in the most
provocative terms the exact opposite of what he was now
saying to the Ambassador privately, and had called the
United States “doubly immoral” for allegedly taking unfair
advantage of Serzh Sargsian,s supposed political weakness
to push for a deal counter to Armenia’s national interests.”

Defending himself, Ter-Petrosian told the ambassador that his polarizing comments were meant only to placate his more radical cadres:

“…LTP assured the Ambassador that his rhetoric was meant only
to mollify the radical elements in his opposition movement — to
provide them with a viable explanation for his decision to suspend
protest activities.

“LTP said he “had no other way to get people off the streets
and back in their homes.”

But Yovanovitch wasn’t quite buying it:

“The Ambassador replied that the problem with such
rhetoric — even if it is meant to satisfy LTP’s constituents –
is that the U.S. has no way of knowing what LTP truly thinks, and
that painting the United States in an immoral light on resolving NK
is intellectually dishonest no matter the motive.”

The cable then summed up with a cold, hard look at Ter-Petrossian’s tactics:

“LTP saw support for public rallies dwindling with each passing month,
and was desperate to find a face-saving tactic. Empty-handed after
months of a stridently rejectionist strategy, LTP chose to cloak himself
in nationalism and concoct a conspiracy theory of great power
machinations to cover his political retreat.”

Ter-Petrossian isn’t exactly President Sargsyan’s biggest worry, because it looks like Robert Kocharian, Sargyan’s former ally, is maneuvering for a comeback. And Sargsyan is taking the threat seriously.

Robert Kocharian (mediamax.am)

The dominant theory explaining the recent sackings and resignations of key government personnel, including the mayor of Yerevan, is that the president is engaging in a pre-emptive move to weaken Kocharian’s power base. That may be true, but I’ll leave you with the waggish analysis of Kocharian and Sargsyan from the New Times party leader, who last month dismissed the notion that there is any substantive difference between the two men:

“They are Siamese twins,” he said.

Sheikh Mohammed Fazel Lankarani, a prominent ayatollah like his late father, has written on his site that “Without a doubt, the man who performed the sentence and pleased the Muslims, will receive a great gift from the Almighty.”

The ayatollahs Lankarani, father (l) and son (r): fazellankarani.com

The full text (in Persian) is here. A translation is not available in the English language section of Lankarani’s site, although this English version from the Turan News Agency(available on Azerireport.com) seems to be accurate.

After Tagi’s controversial “Europe and Us” article was published in late 2006, Lankarani’s father, Grand Ayatullah Fazel Lankarani, issued a fatwah on his web site saying that “it is necessary for every individual who has an access to [Tagi] to kill him. The person in charge of the […] newspaper, who published such thoughts and beliefs consciously and knowingly, should be dealt with in the same manner.”

Another cleric from the Iranian city of Tabriz reportedly offered his house as a reward for anyone who killed Tagi and his editor Samir Sadagatoglu, who has told the press in recent days that he fears for his life.

Today (29 November), the US Embassy in Baku issued a statement on Tagi’s murder, referring to it a “heinous crime” and calling on the Azerbaijani government to “devote all necessary resources to bring the perpetrators” to justice.

The statement was curiously late, in my view, coming six days after Tagi’s murder and four days following a much stronger statement from the French Foreign Ministry.

Meanwhile, Tagi’s family have asked the government to provide protection, according to a report from Contact.az.

At Rafiq Tagi's funeral, 24 November

I just wanted to post this powerful photo taken by Aziz Elkhanoglu today at Rafiq Tagi’s funeral.

We may never know who Tagi’s killers were, and the Azeri rumor mill is in full swing. I’ll refrain from repeating the more fanciful rumors, although the Iranian embassy in Baku actually released a press statement yesterday, prior to Tagi’s death, in which they denied any Iranian government involvement in the knife attack and added helpfully that any notion of an Iranian link was designed to create “a negative atmosphere” and was an example of “Zionist-American sabotage” in order to “undermine Iranian-Azerbaijani strategic relations.”

As I mentioned on this blog a few days ago, I had always wanted to meet Tagi for a long chat over tea in Baku. We would have had a lot to talk about, but his assassins would prefer that we live in a world where dialogue with creative and provocative minds is impossible. This is the worst kind of fascism, and there are many areas of the world where the cycle of fear and violence threatens to destroy the fragile social contract that we take for granted in the west but has been ripped apart in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere in our recent past.

All of us are a little diminished today with Tagi’s death, and I wish I could write a fitting epitaph for him. Will update in the coming days with any news.

Rafiq Tagi