Photo Credit: The Telegraph

The following is a guest post from James A. Goldston, Executive Director of the Open Society Justice Initiative

Strasbourg – The United States government has been trying for close to a decade to hush up what it did to Khaled El-Masri, a German citizen whose story of mistaken identity, abduction and abuse marks one of the low points of the CIA’s post 9/11 “war on terror”.

This week [May 16] El-Masri will finally have his day in court—not here in America, where judges have resolutely declined to hear cases like this one, but at the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

El-Masri, a German national, was seized by security officers in Macedonia on December 31, 2003, while crossing the border from Serbia by bus. On Washington’s request, he was held incommunicado for 23 days, then turned over to the CIA at Skopje airport. He has described how he was violently beaten by his American captors, and brutally subdued for a long flight to Afghanistan, via Baghdad:

“The pain from the beatings was severe. I was terrified and utterly humiliated. My assailants continued to beat me, and finally they stripped me completely naked and threw me to the ground. My assailants pulled my arms back and I felt a boot in the small of my back. I then felt a stick or some other hard object being forced in my anus. I realized I was being sodomized. Of all the acts these men perpetrated against me, this was the most degrading and shameful.”

And yet this was only the beginning. Dressed in a diaper, blindfolded, and with a bag placed over his head, El-Masri was chained to the floor of a disguised CIA plane, and flown to Kabul. He was kept for four months in a putrid, unheated cell in a secret US prison known as the Salt Pit. When he launched a hunger strike to protest his mistreatment, he was forcibly fed by hooded men who dragged him from his bed, bound his hands and feet, tied him to a chair, and stuffed a tube up his nose through which liquid was sent. He was never charged with a crime or given access to his family, a lawyer or German consular officers.

In fact, as Chancellor Angela Merkel declared in December 2005 after meeting with then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the CIA blundered in seeking El-Masri’s capture. As became clear shortly after his forced disappearance commenced, El-Masri was the victim of mistaken identity: wrongly detained because his name resembled that of an Al Qaeda suspect.

But El-Masri was imprisoned long after Washington realized its error. It was only on May 28, 2004, that El Masri was reverse-rendered to Albania, where he was told not to tell anyone what had happened to him, then placed on a commercial flight back to Germany.

Although official inquiries by the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the German Parliament have all pointed to U.S. responsibility, Washington has never publicly admitted what happened. To the contrary, U.S. officials sought to block German and Spanish criminal inquiries, and obtained dismissal of El Masri’s attempts to secure judicial redress in U.S. courts on the grounds that “state secrets” precluded consideration of his claims.

The case now before Europe’s judges, which formally charges the government of Macedonia for collaborating in this chain of abuse, represents El-Masri’s last chance at legal accountability.

It is unfortunate that, eight years on, the U.S. government has yet to rectify one of the most horrific instances of unlawful excess in the Bush Administration’s war on terror. For so long as Washington maintains a policy of—in President Obama’s famous words— “look forward not backward,” it will fall to courts in other countries to uphold the rule of law.

During one of the darkest days of his detention in Afghanistan, El Masri was warned: “Where you are right now, there is no law, no rights, no one knows you are here, and no one cares about you.” This week’s hearing is an opportunity to prove otherwise.

James A. Goldston, Executive Director of the Open Society Justice Initiative, represents Khaled El-Masri in the European Court of Human Rights.

Photo: Nadezhda Chipeva

The following is a guest post by By Zeljko Jovanovic, director of Roma Initiatives at the Open Society Foundations.

The United States announced earlier this year that it would become an official observer to the Decade of Roma Inclusion 2005-2015. This is an international initiative that gathers governments and international and nongovernmental organizations into a concerted effort to improve the well-being of one of Europe’s most vulnerable minorities—the Roma, or gypsies—who have for centuries endured racism, discrimination, alienation, slavery, and sterilization efforts as well as a Nazi extermination campaign during World War II.

Washington’s decision to join the Decade of Roma comes at a crucial moment. While the Decade of Roma Inclusion has done much to initiate reform in European countries, it has little time left to meet its declared goals.

More than 10 million Roma live in Europe and I am one of them. My people still languish at the bottom of Europe’s social pecking order. They continue to suffer abysmal poverty rates as well as official and institutional discrimination in the areas of education, health, and housing. Roma joblessness is about eight times higher than that for people who are not Roma.

Violent attacks on Roma individuals, including murders and fire-bombings by neo-Nazis and others, have taken place in Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and other countries. Most violence against the Roma, however, goes unreported due to the fear and mistrust Roma have for the justice systems in the countries where they reside.

Popularly, Roma are still reviled as thieves and burglars and used as scapegoats in the press and by right-wing political leaders seeking votes. Just a few weeks ago, for example, a right-wing Swiss magazine saw fit to splash across its cover the photo of a five-year-old Roma boy pointing a gun point blank at the reader; the headline read “The Roma Are Coming,” and the story discussed “crime tourism.”

The European Union has made a political commitment to support social inclusion of Roma. Last year, Brussels called upon European Union member-states to submit national strategies to further integration of the Roma into society. But European Union taxpayers are supposed to pay for the components of these strategies geared toward improving the Roma’s socio-economic position. Obtaining the necessary funding will require political leaders to look racism in the face and do the right thing.

Unfortunately, the economic crisis has been accompanied by unchallenged and racially motivated expressions of hatred that have spread from the extremes of political discourse and into the mainstream. The politics of hatred that promotes exclusion has been legitimized through democratic elections in some European countries and now has the potential to affect policy.

Neither the European Union nor the governments of its individual member-states have dared to address this issue in any meaningful way. Intergovernmental agencies, the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe lack sufficient leverage to press the European Union governments to meet the challenge on a scale that would provide the Roma with a sense of security.

For this reason, Washington should not merely act as a passive observer of the Decade of Roma Inclusion’s efforts. It should act as a catalyst for advancing the work of the initiative’s member states and organizations and for encouraging more organizations and countries—especially, Germany, France, and Italy—to join.

In its bilateral diplomatic dealings, Washington should press the governments of the European countries, and especially the European Union countries, to take legislative, policy, and judicial steps to ensure respect for the rights of the Roma people.

The United States should raise the issue of the security of the Roma minority with the European Union as a whole and with European Union member-states bilaterally and it should support human rights organizations in ways that will give them a stronger voice in pressing for respect for the rights of the Roma. The United States should also establish direct, regular communication links with Roma civic and political leaders and cooperate with them about racially motivated killings, violence, discrimination and police misconduct.

The United States should encourage the European Union to make development of a Roma-integration strategy a prerequisite for Serbia, Macedonia, Turkey, and other European Union candidate-member countries.

The United States was the deciding factor in achieving Kosovo’s independence and in ending Serb oppression of its Albanian majority. But Kosovo’s Roma, Ashkelije, and Egyptian and other non-Serb minorities have been left out of talks about the country’s future. The United States should press the government of Kosovo to work together with representatives of the Roma, Egyptian, and Ashkelije, and other minorities in establishing and meeting benchmarks on reintegration, property rights, and education and employment opportunities.

Finally, the United States should encourage governments to undertake consistent and robust legal action against the perpetrators of acts of discrimination and violence. Combating racist attacks on the Roma should be a matter of expressed government policy.

To this end, the Department of State should appoint a special envoy on combating racism and discrimination against Europe’s Roma–just as the Department has appointed the Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Anti-Semitism.

A special envoy would work closely with the Roma community—which includes doctors, lawyers, journalists, civic and political leaders— who have made great contributions to communities across Europe.

Racism against the Roma people is one of the key challenges in Europe today. It erodes the notion of democracy that ensures universal values of humanity, peace, and prosperity for all. The United States role in the Decade of Roma raises hope of all of us that it will, in the words of Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, “address the plight of Roma on behalf of a freer, fairer and more inclusive Europe.”

Zeljko Jovanovic is director of Roma Initiatives at the Open Society Foundations.

Photo by Michiel Van Balen

For the past year, far from the front pages of Western newspapers, the southern African country of Malawi has faced increasing political and economic turmoil, mainly at the increasingly oppressive hand of President Bingu wa Mutharika. So when news hit Twitter yesterday that the septuagenarian president had collapsed from a massive heart attack, it was understandable that many Malawians tweeted the news with happiness. But as the reports between news agencies started to conflict – at the time of this writing, local news sources are reporting that Mutharika has died while Western news agencies are reporting he is in critical condition – a mood of uncertainty took over as people started to take in the Mutharika’s complicated legacy and the real possibility that the turmoil is very far from over.

There was a time when news of Mutharika’s demise would have met a very different response. When he was elected to office in 2004, it was hoped that his high education and World Bank credentials would help boost a country better known for severe poverty. The election itself was seen as an important step in consolidating Malawi’s democracy and Mutharika’s approach of fiscal responsibility and economic reform pleased foreign aid donors. Supported by generous aid and blessed with favorable harvest conditions for several years, he encouraged food security with wide subsidies for small farmers which lowered the number of Malawians living under the lowest poverty level. Thus, when he ran for a second term with Vice President Joyce Banda in 2009, the ticket easily won the election by a wide margin. For a while, the fairy tale continued. In January 2010, Mutharika announced that the once food dependent nation would send 150 tons of rice to post-earthquake Haiti and became the first leader of Malawi to chair the African Union, both points of pride for many Malawians. But even as some lauded the progress Malawi had made, others warned it might not be as golden as it seemed.

Poor harvests in late 2010 along with the continuing consequences of the global economic crisis and declining exports soon started to impact Malawi’s economic success story as the population struggled under growing inflation and significant rises to the cost of living. Mutharika began to falter politically too as he tried to groom his brother, Peter Mutharika, to succeed him in the presidency over his vice president, leading him to fire Banda from her position in the ruling party and try to oust her from the vice presidency in December 2010. Although the courts upheld the constitution and prevented Banda’s dismissal from the government, she was left out of the most recent cabinet and her newly formed opposition People’s Party has faced numerous crackdowns by the government.

Yet all this merely marked the calm before the storm. Crackdowns on the press and freedom of assembly increased in the first six months of 2011 but major protests would not come to the streets of Malawi until July when, like so many other protests movements last year, they were met with a heavy hand by the government. In three days of protesting, police killed 19 demonstrators and injured hundreds more. Although Mutharika appealed for calm, the cycle of pro-reform protests being met with a harsh government response and new draconian laws became common. The result has been a significant drop in Malawi’s international rank in human rights, press freedom, and political freedom leading to suspension of much needed aid from Britain and the US.

With that background, it is understandable that some people treated the news of Mutharika’s apparent death with relief. Whether Mutharika is dead or alive, it appears clear that he will not be able to continue to perform his presidential duties. Malawi’s constitution is clear on the line of succession; Banda should assume the presidency. But as she is no longer a member of the ruling party and does not have the support of the cabinet or the parliament, it is unclear if this will happen. Even if Banda does take office, how long she will choose or be allowed to stay is debatable.

With elections not scheduled until 2014, Malawi is now facing a completely unclear political future with a legacy of new laws and police methods that firmly place the security of a few over the rights of most. In other words, everything is on the table. As a result, Malawi may be facing its biggest challenge yet if it doesn’t want to lose all the progress it has made since establishing multi-party democracy in 1994.

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UPDATE #1 – The drama deepens

A day later and international news agencies are now reporting that Mutharika has died as confirmed by unnamed medical staff and cabinet members. However, the Malawi government isn’t giving it up that easily. The official position of the government remains that Mutharika is in critical condition.

Then there is the small issue of the constitution. Banda, Malawi’s Chief Justice and civil society groups all called for a smooth transition as laid out in the constitution which would give Banda the job. News also came that most of the cabinet agreed to back Banda. But there are members of the cabinet who disagree. At a press conference late in the day, Malawi’s Minister of Information, Patricia Kaliati, claimed that not being a member of the ruling party made Banda ineligible to succeed to the presidency and it was up to the cabinet to decide how to proceed. She was joined by the ministers for health, sports and local government. Again, they declined to give the condition of Mutharika but claimed that there was no need for Banda to take the office as “there was no vacancy.” There are also rumors that several ministers are seeking an injunction to prevent Banda from swearing into office, although it is unclear if actual papers have been filed with any court.

It should be noted that the president and vice president are directly elected by population and there is no mention in the constitution of party affiliation impacting the right to stay in office or give grounds for impeachment. This is not stopping them from making the argument, but given the wide support Banda appears to have, it appears unlikely that the courts would uphold any attempt to block her from assuming the presidency unless circumstances drastically change. However that does not mean that a protracted power struggle couldn’t destabilize Malawi further. As a young democracy, how this constitutional crisis plays out could have lasting ramifications for the country’s democratic prospects.

Finally, new details have emerged about the chaotic hours following Mutharika’s collapse. Andrew Evans of National Geographic offered a firsthand account of life in Lilongwe as news broke of the president’s death and the general lack of sadness over his demise. Also, medical sources from Kamuzu Central Hospital where Mutharika was treated have cleared up the mystery about why he was flown to South Africa even after it was clear that he could not benefit from further treatment. Apparently the power shortages Malawi has been suffering through for months meant that the state hospital lacked the basic electricity to keep his body refrigerated, let alone allow a proper autopsy to be performed. That is a pretty long fall from Mutharika’s days at the World Bank and yet oddly seems fitting for the end of his autocratic reign over Malawi.

UPDATE #2 – Start of a new era

Joyce Banda was sworn in as Malawi’s new president on April 7. She becomes the third female head of state for Africa after Empress Zewditu of Ethiopia and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf of Liberia.

Banda has an impressive resume as a women’s right advocate and is responsible for raising the profile of gender issues throughout the country. However while she remains a popular figure regardless of the tumultuous politics she has been involved with over the last two years, there are still doubts about whether she will be able to navigate the economic crisis Malawi finds itself in.

This post originally appeared on CIVIC From the Field

I’ve been in Jalalabad this week, in eastern Afghanistan, where people are very concerned about their safety and future. One doctor told me, “When I leave in the morning, I am not sure I will see my son again.” Civilians live in fear of roadside bombs, suicide attacks, targeted assassinations, and kidnappings. Government officials are afraid to leave the provincial capital. And they should be. In December, the Attorney General was attacked, and just this week a judge was kidnapped and later killed by an armed group.

What comes next for these Afghans? And when?

I see a perfect storm brewing. The Koran burnings, the tragic massacre of seventeen civilians in Kandahar and the increasing number of “green-on-blue” incidents have strengthened calls from within both the U.S. and Afghanistan for a swifter transition to Afghan-led security. So while President Obama vows to stick to the timetable of late 2014, there’s talk that these events and deteriorating relations between the two governments will hasten the withdrawal of international forces.

A speedier transition may be encouraging to an American public now firmly opposed to continuing the war, but it could be detrimental for Afghan civilians, left under the protection of a security force that is not ready to keep them safe. Even if the timetable stands, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) may not be prepared or equipped for the daunting task in front of them.

By the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)’s own assessments, fewer than 45% of Afghan forces are “effective with advisors,” meaning that even with steady mentoring most Afghan troops and police are not able to do their job effectively. And as of last month only 1% of Afghan forces are considered capable of conducting security operations without ISAF’s assistance”—an alarming statistic given that Afghans are increasingly taking the lead in security operations including those unpopular and sometimes deadly night raids.

In Jalalabad, the people I met are not confident in the ability of Afghan forces to provide security. In fact, many see the ANSF as part of the problem. One individual I spoke to working on development projects along the Afghan – Pakistani border told me that Afghan troops have engaged in theft and abused civilians near his projects. He told me that people often don’t report these incidents out of fear of retribution.

But civilians are also killed or injured in incidents that don’t amount to a violation of the law. According to the U.N., most civilian harm attributed to the ANSF is incidental. Civilians may be caught in the crossfire of ground engagements with insurgents, or hurt during “escalation of force” incidents, whereby nervous Afghan forces escalate force in responding to a threat with lethal fire.

To better protect civilians, ISAF has recently put in place processes to track, investigate, analyze and respond to civilian casualties. While international forces still harm civilians, their efforts have led to an overall decrease in civilian casualties caused by their operations.

In comparison, Afghan security ministries do not have any similar mechanisms to track, investigate, analyze or respond to civilian casualties. As ISAF learned, establishing a civilian casualty tracking mechanism is critical to developing best practices and identifying problematic trends to be corrected through training. In addition, a civilian casualty-tracking unit could also be a focal point for investigations into alleged abuse, and thus strengthen accountability within the ANSF.

Afghan security officials I meet with claim their forces do not and will not harm civilians because they understand local dynamics better than international forces. This is dangerously naïve. While Afghan forces are certainly better positioned to understand the situation around them, civilian casualties are an unfortunate—if not inevitable part of war—especially when militaries with less experience, training and equipment are waging battle. Without processes in place and a mindset that prioritizes civilian protection, Afghan troops will likely act with less concern for civilians.

Recently, representatives from ISAF and the Afghan government have stated their commitment to establishing an Afghan system for tracking civilian casualties. These are heartening words that must be met with action. It will take time to implement such a system and get buy-in from commanders. And for it to work, Afghans will need to own the process. As one insider told me, “it was hard enough to get NATO forces to be proactive about preventing and responding to civilian casualties.” Getting a less experienced military behind it may prove even more difficult.

Still, ensuring Afghan forces are prepared not to harm their own people during combat is necessary and urgent, as calls for a swifter security transition mount. Afghan officials should move now, this minute, to establish policies and procedures to prevent civilian casualties through tracking and investigations, correct for abuses and “make amends” if and when civilians are harmed. The US and allied nations should do their part by providing technical assistance and prevailing on their counterparts in Afghan ministries to put these mechanisms in place. But in the end, it’s the Afghan leadership – both military and political — that have obligations to the civilians they’re supposed to keep safe and those they harm. Taking on these responsibilities in a more meaningful way should start now.

Image Courtesy of ISAF Media

Timbuktu weather report April 3-7, 2012 from www.weather.com

It’s getting hot in Mali. Every day this week Timbuktu temperatures will top 100 degrees (F). This is typical for the season in the land-locked Saharan country, but a drought that has been building for months means Malians will feel the heat more than ever.

Even before the coup, the rebellion, the sanctions, Malians were struggling to maintain their herds, farms and water supplies. Over 200,000 refugees have fled the north, heading to food-insecure Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso and to destinations within Mali. Since January the mounting Tuareg rebellion—and the ensuing embassy travel warnings—effectively killed the economically essential tourist trade. Today the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has closed the borders and imposed sanctions on the country. Hunger will soon join heat, and devastating consequences may follow.

As covered last week in this blog, less than two weeks ago mid-ranking Malian army officers seized power, claiming the democratically elected government of Amadou Toumani Toure was insufficiently supporting the army’s efforts to quell rebellion in the north. International pressure mounted against the junta, and while coup-leader Captain Amadou Sanogo attempted to appease ECOWAS ahead of a Monday deadline to reinstate constitutional order, rebels took over three major northern cities: Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu. “The trigger happy NCOs of the Malian Army are now too busy trying to legitimize their coup to even think of fighting the rebels,” wryly noted Tuareg scholar Baz Lecoq. ECOWAS leaders were unconvinced by Sanogo’s unsubstantiated claim on Sunday that he would reinstate the constitution and begin the transition back to the democracy.

So while coup leaders squabbled and struggled to legitimate themselves in the south, northern rebel leaders took advantage of the leadership vacuum and won major prizes in the north. But despite their more effective actions, significant squabbles have erupted in the rebel camp as well.

The largest and most well-known Tuareg rebel group, the MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) says it is ready to negotiate—though with whom, given the lack of credible government in the country, is a legitimate question. MNLA’s stated goal is to establish an independent homeland for the nomadic Tuaregs (called Azawad for Tamashek speaking Tuaregs). They considered Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu to be central military targets, so maintaining their hold on these cities can be an important step towards their larger goals. But even their immediate victory is being challenged by Ansar Dine, an Islamist rebel group that aims to institute Shari’a law in the north. They have already made inroads towards this goal: forcing hairdressers to remove photos of unveiled women in Kidal and Gao, and calling nervous local imams to meet in Timbuktu.

In the longer term the question remains as to what the MNLA intends to do with their advances. Mali is an impoverished land-locked country with few proven natural resources. The Tuareg-dominated north is open, barren desert. Mali’s agriculture is concentrated in the South, and droughts have been recurring with increasing frequency in the northern region. The Tuareg lifestyle is nomadic, and spans the Sahara. Some observers wonder if the Tuareg’s intention is not in fact to secede, but to negotiate for more resources, improved rights and greater autonomy within the Malian state. If they do in fact attempt secession they may face fierce international opposition from African countries loath to change borders and fearful of rebellion spreading to Tuareg populations in neighboring states.

But while the rebel groups and the junta grab at land and power, Malian civilians are left vulnerable to violence, drought and hunger. The sanctions will only make the situation worse. Fuel supplies will quickly dwindle, leading to price spikes for gas and food. Infighting in the north, on top of the conflict between the rebels and the army may lead to civilian casualties and further refugees. Political instability may soon become a full-on humanitarian disaster.

Bottle of ink for voter identification at polling station in Dakar, February 2012 (Reuters)

It’s been quite a week in West Africa.

As mentioned earlier this month, Mali is facing its share of troubles since the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in neighboring Libya. Observers knew that the return of Tuareg fighters from Libya would likely increase tensions in northern Mali and perhaps lead to a new Tuareg rebellion. However the events of the last week, where a group of soldiers overthrew the democratically elected government just a month before elections were scheduled, still took most analysts by surprise.

Part of that may be because the wary eye of the outside world was focused on yesterday’s run-off election in Senegal. Back in January, the Constitutional Council allowed incumbent President Abdoulaye Wade to use a legal loophole to defy term limits and run for a third term while also disqualifying his most popular rival, international singer Youssou N’Dour, from running in the election. Needless to say, this turn of events infuriated the opposition and brought renewed critical attention to Senegal, a country typically seen as an island of democratic stability in a region better known for conflict. Several heavy-handed and violent incidents between government forces and opposition protesters did little to relieve fears of an outbreak of major election violence. Although voting in the first round was largely peaceful, as no candidate received the necessary votes needed to avoid a run-off, the potential for post-election violence remained as a major concern for the region.

Mali, however, presented a completely different situation. President Amadou Toumani Touré first became a national figure as the leader of Mali’s last military coup, which ended the dictatorial regime of Moussa Traoré in 1991. However instead of retaining power, Touré handed over power to the democratically elected civilian government the following year. After leaving political and military life, he returned to win the presidency through the ballot box in 2002 and 2007. Yet unlike Senegal’s Wade and even with a growing conflict in the north, Touré made clear he would not try to pursue a third term and would leave office peacefully. The first round of elections was scheduled for late April and while expected to be fiercely competitive, they were not expected to be violent.

Yet in the span of a few days, the fate of democracy in Senegal and Mali took very different turns. While Mali suffered a surprise military coup, the second round of elections in Senegal passed without incident and with Wade peacefully conceding defeat to his rival, Macky Sall. As news of the results came in, Senegalese civilians took to the streets to celebrate the apparent triumph of democracy. As Khadija Patel put it on Twitter, “Abdoulaye Wade has conceded defeat… Take a bow, Senegal. You spoke, he listened.”

Meanwhile, the fate of Mali’s twenty-year-old multiparty democracy remains unclear. Although the new military regime claims that it will hand over power to a democratically elected government, they have also stated there is no set timetable for that process and have suspended the constitution and dissolved government institutions in the meantime. On Thursday, presidential hopeful Soumaila Cissé posted on Facebook that his home had been attacked by armed men hours after the coup, yet another worrying sign of what may be in store for Mali.

The timing of the military coup, purportedly to oust the Touré’s “incompetent regime” and its handling of the Tuareg rebellion in the north, seems odd as the regime was about to end anyway. However as Alex Thurston points out, military coups almost by definition suggest the belief of the military that civilians are unable to cope with the situation at hand, and therefore elections are of no use to fixing the perceived crisis. But with Tuareg rebels vowing to take advantage of the current chaos in Mali and continuing clashes, it may be that the coup will only make matters worse for the military in trying to quell the growing rebellion.

So democracy stumbles in Mali while it prevails in Senegal. In the end, perhaps it shouldn’t be that much of a surprise that the stars aligned in this way. President-elect Sall is due to take office next week in Dakar but most attention on the region will likely stay with Mali as international condemnations of the coup continue to come in, human rights groups urge the ruling junta to respect the rights of the population, and analysts struggle to understand the possible consequences and solutions to the coup for one of the region’s most established democracies.

Yes, it’s been quite a week for West Africa.

A boy plays above Fedya's camp. Photo by Allyn Gaestel

Last Spring, while living in Port-au-Prince, I pitched a story about mounting food insecurity to an editor. “Interesting,” the veteran Caribbean reporter said, “maybe go down to that spot in Cité Soleil where they sell mud cakes? Get some color?”

The image of poor Haitians eating dirt in the country’s most notorious slum has intermittently illustrated hunger-stories for years, peaking during food crises. Finding it cliché, I opted against recycling the vignette.

But one golden afternoon soon after, I was in a sprawling tent camp at the edge of Cité Soleil with Fedya, a pregnant 16 year old. She wanted to take a walk, so she led me through the camp, hips swaying heavily, shoulders regally thrown back, wrists clutching her accompanying friend in periodic giggle outbursts. Bypassing corn and mangos, she stopped at a vendor selling five-cent snacks. Precisely and daintily she started munching on a mud cake.

“What is it?” I asked.

“It’s good, try it,” she said, “there’s butter, and earth.” I took a piece; the silty, buttery smooth substance stuck to the roof of my mouth.

Fedya was unquestionably food insecure. Crashing with friends, jobless, partner-less and with her mother hours away, she had gangly, bony limbs that accentuated her nearly bursting belly. But she treated her mud cake like a snack, not a meal. She said the dirt was clean and nutritious, and was imported to the city from the fertile central plateau.

Geogaphy, or the consumption of dirt is widespread internationally, particularly among pregnant women. Some scientists compare supplemental dirt consumption to pre-natal vitamins, saying they provide nutrients like calcium needed for fetal development. Fedya’s craving may well have been spurred by her insufficient diet, which consisted mostly of starches like rice and spaghetti.

Malnutrition is the new frontier in the fight against hunger. The dire consequences of hunger are not solely addressed with more calories, but with better calories, and this is particularly true for pregnant women. Over half of pregnant women around the world are anemic, which can lead to maternal mortality, pre-term delivery, and low birth-weight among babies. Small mamas typically produce small babies, and food insecure households generally raise malnourished children, despite mothers’ best efforts.

Over 500,000 women in developing countries die every year around pregnancy and childbirth and being malnourished makes women more vulnerable to deadly complications.

Fedya survived her delivery, transforming from a quiet teenager to a protective mother in a matter of hours. But at the hospital, as she lay waiting for the doctor to stitch her torn perineium, her first and loudest complaint was of hunger pains.

Malian refugee in Niger. Photo courtesy of UNHCR / H. Caux

Just as the food crisis and famine in the Horn of Africa becomes manageable for aid groups, another crisis begins on the other side of the continent in the Sahel region of West Africa. On the edges of the Sahara Desert, drought is not uncommon, but is becoming more frequent with major food emergencies in 2005, 2008 and 2010. This time, the ongoing consequences of the war in Libya for migrant workers, a Tuareg Rebellion in Northern Mali that started in January, and the recent unrest in Nigeria and Cote d’Ivoire have contributed to lower incomes and higher food prices throughout the region, leaving an estimated 10 – 14 million people in need of food, a number that could increase to over 20 million, according to aid groups.

The good news is unlike the famine in the Horn of Africa, this food crisis is garnering attention much earlier in the crisis cycle; if coupled with quick action, it may mitigate some of the worst effects of the emergency. The bad news is the outbreak of fighting in Mali is pushing thousands of refugees over the border into neighboring countries whose own resources are severely strained.

Rebellions among the Tuareg, Malian and Nigerien governments are nothing new- several have occurred in the last century. But in past years, former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi served as a pacifying force in the region for Tuareg  frustrations, while at the same time arming and using them in his own military forces. This is why many analysts carefully watched the situation as pro-Gaddafi Tuareg fighters began returning to Mali at the end of the revolution in Libya, and it appears that the fears of what could happen are coming to pass.

The new rebellion would threaten stability in the region regardless of the circumstances, but coupled with the regional food crisis, countries simply do not have the resources to cope with the estimated 28,000 refugees that have already left Mali. This means that despite the early attention the food crisis has gained, unless a concerted aid plan is enacted, the Sahel Food Crisis could still result in a major humanitarian disaster.

Just before dawn on February 8th, helicopters carrying dozens of French and Afghan troops landed in a remote village in Kapisa province located in northeastern Afghanistan. The soldiers searched the villagers’ homes, reportedly looking for weapons caches. Several hours later, a group of young boys were out herding cattle nearby when the commander of the ground operation called in an airstrike. The boys had stopped to light a fire to keep warm from the brutal Afghan winter temperatures when the bombs struck them. All of the eight boys, who were as young as eight years old and no older than eighteen, were killed.

Abdul only broke his stoic appearance once during our interview to fight back tears. His account of the details of the incident was clinical, but Abdul’s emotions emerged when I asked about his son. “He was a very kind person…my heart is broken,” he said. Aja Mal—Abdul’s son—liked school, and aspired to study in Europe or the United States.

According to Abdul, three generals from the US-led security assistance force (ISAF) came to his village to express their condolences several days after the tragic event. The US, British, and French Generals told him and the other villagers that they didn’t intend to kill the boys, and promised to compensate those who had lost their loved ones. A week later, ISAF’s top commander, General John Allen, expressed his “sincere condolences” and affirmed that ISAF will continue to do everything possible to “ensure the safety of the Afghan population.” To date, Abdul has not received any compensation or assistance for the death of his son.

When I asked Abdul what he wants from ISAF, he was firm but fair. He is willing to accept ISAF’s condolences, provided it is followed by the financial compensation or assistance promised to him by the Generals that visited his village. “In Afghanistan, if someone comes to your home [to apologize] you do not get revenge on them,” he explained. “But we also request them to help the families of those killed…If they don’t help our families, we take it as a sign that they did this intentionally. And then people will raise their guns to fight them.”

An Afghan police officer working alongside international forces, Abdul offers an interesting perspective given reports of distrust and outright animosity between international and Afghan forces. “I told them [ISAF], you are our mentors. As long as you [make] such big mistakes, how can you train our forces to be good professionals and to help our country?” Abdul noted.

Abdul echoes the sentiments of other Afghans I have spoken with, who are understandably upset with the increasing rate of civilian deaths in Afghanistan. Even while the vast majority of civilian casualties are caused by insurgents, many Afghans think ISAF should be doing more to prevent civilian harm, and are more critical when international forces kill civilians – even if by mistake.

While ISAF officials were quick to express their regrets in the wake of the Kapisa incident, the international force is still not certain their actions killed the boys. According to ISAF, a secret informant told coalition forces that insurgents were planning to attack the French and Afghan troops in Kapisa. Through binoculars and other “optical equipment,” the troops claim to have spotted “adult sized” men carrying weapons and moving in a tactical fashion. The French forces on the ground reportedly attacked the insurgents, which was followed by an air strike ordered by the ground commander. After the engagement, ISAF reports that the French troops found the young boys amongst other dead bodies, but are still not certain who is to blame for their deaths.

It has now been three weeks since Aja Mal and the other boys were killed. Still, the families of those killed have not received anything from ISAF beyond spoken condolences. Unfortunately, the disparate narratives of the incident leave me cynical about whether Abdul or any of the other families will receive compensation from ISAF. CIVIC’s past research has found that ISAF often does not compensate individuals killed or injured in “hard cases,” where it is not clear that international forces are to blame or where ISAF is not convinced those killed were civilians. The reason is that compensation is often perceived as an admission of fault or responsibility.

Yet, in these so-called “hard cases,” ISAF may gain more by simply providing timely compensation. Fact-finding is incredibly difficult in war zones, and many times investigations will not be determinative in establishing the truth. Waiting for a long drawn-out investigation to finish may anger or alienate the victims, and undermine the positive impact of any compensation eventually issued.

Ex gratia (meaning “by favor” and thus not obligatory) payments need not necessarily be an admission of fault or responsibility. While questions remain over exactly what happened in the Kapisa incident, ISAF is better off making a judgment call and issuing timely compensation to the families of those killed. The ages of these young boys lead me to doubt that they were belligerents. Even if international forces were not responsible for the boys’ deaths, compensation would be an expression of good will. It could also help mitigate tensions amongst Afghans – whom have already decided that ISAF is to blame for the incident – and ensure that Abdul and the other families are compensated for their tragic loss.

This post originally appeared on CIVIC From the Field

Photo courtesy of Erica Gaston/OSI

Protester in solidarity with Khader Adnan in the West Bank

Sixty-six days. At this hour, that is how long Khader Adnan has gone without food to protest his detention without charge by the Israeli government.

Unless you follow events in the Middle East closely, it is possible this is the first time you have heard of Adnan, or only heard of his in the last few days as Western media outlets finally started to pick up the story. In many ways this is understandable; after all, Adnan is not the most sympathetic of characters. A 33 year old father of two and baker in the West Bank town of Arraba, he is also a member of Islamic Jihad, a small Palestinian group dedicated to the establishment of an Islamic state in the Holy Land. It is this last detail that led to Israeli forces raiding his house in the early morning hours of December 17. But, instead of being charged with any crime, Israel has placed him in “administrative detention”, a decades-long policy that allows the government to hold prisoners without charge for six months and can be infinitely renewed.

This is not the first time Adnan had been arrested and placed in administrative detention. Since 1999, he has been arrested and detained seven times with his total time in detention being over three years , but never charged with any crime. This is not uncommon and is the reason why so many activists find administrative detention to be repugnant; with no guarantee of due process, there is no guarantee that Israeli forces will not abuse the power that has been given to them and that true criminals are the only ones targeted.

However this time Adnan decided enough was enough. The day after his arrest in December, Adnan started his hunger strike in protest of this policy and the indignity he claimed it represented. For whatever reason, this campaign struck a nerve within the region. Solidarity campaigns emerged in the West Bank and around the world. Other prisoners are reported to have joined in his fast. Soon, “Charge him or release him” became the common rallying cry in the online campaign for his release, a demand echoed by human rights groups such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the Carter Center amid growing calls for the international community to act. After all, if he is the terrorist and public safety threat that the government claims he is, there should be enough evidence to actually charge him with a crime. Not only is this appropriate in a fair and just legal system, but it would also help authorities navigate the two possible negative consequences Israel currently faces: the likely public backlash over his death in detention or the possible encouragement other prisoners would receive to repeat Adnan’s tactics if he was released. Instead, Israeli officials have kept him shackled to his hospital bed even as his health deteriorated to the point where medical experts believe he may be past the point of no return.

Yesterday, on the sixty-fifth day of his fast, Adnan set the record for Israel’s longest hunger strike. In doing so, he has brought international attention not just to his situation, but to the entire policy of administrative detention and the conditions that Palestinian prisoners face in Israeli jails. Later today the Israeli Supreme Court will hold a session considering Adnan’s appeal and decide his fate. In doing so, they will likely be deciding more than just whether he remains in prison, but by extension whether he will live or die.

So sympathetic or not, it appears that Adnan may be fighting the right fight here, and one that is long overdue. In a letter to the public delivered via his lawyers he wrote, “I starve myself for you to remain. I die for you to live. Stay with the revolution.” These words may be important to keep in mind as Tony Karon points out, it is unclear what role in the public imagination Adnan will take on following this, but the winds of change can come from unexpected places. Just ask Tunisia, where a desperate act by a common fruit vendor overthrew one of the most stable governments in the region.

Mitt Romney in Iowa

When speaking about US foreign policy during the Republican Primary debates, Mitt Romney often returns to a familiar theme: his belief that troop levels in Afghanistan should be determined through close consultation with the commanding generals on the ground. It is both a criticism of President Obama’s June 2011 decision to begin drawing down troop levels in Afghanistan, and a blueprint for what kind of Afghan engagement we could expect under a Romney presidency. “I want those troops to come home based upon not politics, not based upon economics, but instead based upon the conditions on the ground determined by the generals,” said Romney in the June 2011 GOP debate in New Hampshire. He has since revisited the idea during the August Iowa debate, November CBS foreign policy debate, and November CNN national security debate.

Most of his Republican colleagues agree with him (Ron Paul being the lone voice of dissent), but Romney is both the presumptive presidential nominee and the most fervent advocate of this strategy. Combine this with the “peace through strength” rhetoric that he is so fond of, and one must wonder whether a Romney presidency would lead to the kind of dangerous and futile escalation of military force in Afghanistan that has characterized much of the last decade.

While President Obama has not been immune to this policy of deferring to the military on questions of troop levels in Afghanistan, he appears to have learned his lesson in 2009 after incoming ISAF commander General Stanley McChrystal publicly expressed his recommendation that the US increase forces in Afghanistan by some 30-40,000 troops. Obama decided to buy into the McChrystal strategy and increase troop levels by 30,000, but the general put him in a difficult position by publicly voicing a recommendation before discussing it with the Commander-in-Chief.

So why shouldn’t we let the military dictate troop levels in Afghanistan? After all, it seems reasonable that the commanders who are in the thick of the fighting would know what they need to accomplish the mission. First we must consider that the mission has been in a constant state of flux ever since the first US attacks on Afghanistan in 2001. Each general arrives with a different strategy and different tactics, secure in the belief that he can do the job better than his predecessor.

The political strategy from Washington has been equally erratic, changing from year-to-year within the Bush and Obama Administrations. But a lack of strategic continuity is not the biggest issue. The major problem is that the commanding generals are trained from the very outset of their military careers to think that the mission can always be achieved. They are not attempting to mislead us; it is simply that losing is not part of the psyche of the top military brass. It is difficult for them to accept that most of the challenges we face in Afghanistan do not have a military solution, and in fact greater troop levels often exacerbate tensions and fuel the insurgency. There is a legitimacy deficit that no military strategy — whether it is counter-insurgency or traditional counter-terrorism — can overcome, but you will never hear a top general request fewer resources or ask for a more limited strategic mandate.

Indeed, as Rory Stewart made abundantly clear in his July 2011 TED Talk, incoming commanding generals have tended to be rather optimistic about what they think can be achieved in Afghanistan. For a decade, we have heard that this will be the “decisive year” as a new commander arrives and thinks — just as his predecessor did — that with the right resources, strategy, and personnel, things will be different.

Rory Stewart at TED Global

So, a brief history of such assertions: in 2003, US Army General Dan McNeill, commander of Coalition Forces, Afghanistan and later the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), said that “most parts of the country will soon begin to realize some reasonable degree of security and stability. Without question [2004 would be a] decisive year.” In 2004, US Lieutenant General David Barno explained the strategic shift that he believed would turn the tide of the war, stating that “there [had previously been] no major planning initiated to create long-term political, social and economic stability in Afghanistan. What we’re [now] doing is moving to a more classic counterinsurgency strategy here in Afghanistan. That’s a fairly significant change in terms of our tactical approach out there on the ground.” General John Abizaid, Barno’s commander, agreed that 2005 would surely be a “decisive year”.

In 2005, when Lieutenant General Karl Eikenberry assumed command, he expressed concerns that the “institutions of the Afghan state remain[ed] relatively weak,” but was confident that 2006 would be a turning point. In 2006 British Army Lieutenant General Sir David Richards (commanding general of ISAF) was even more pessimistic about the situation he was inheriting, describing it as “close to anarchy.” However, he too was sure that his new strategy of “establishing bases rather than chasing militants” would make 2007 the “decisive year” for the Taliban.

In 2007 General Dan McNeill returned for a second tour in Afghanistan, assuming command of ISAF. His previous experience did little to inspire caution about what could be achieved in Afghanistan, and McNeill fell into a familiar pattern. He first described the dismal situation he was to inherit in Afghanistan: “[there were] shadows cast by former power brokers or warlords…lack of effective governance…a lack of unified effort amongst the international community and lack of effective police. We’re not trained, we’re not equipped, we don’t have the requisite number of helicopters, and we’re not manned to do [counter-narcotics].” And then outlined his new plan to change things by: “shift[ing] to a more ‘kinetic strategy’ (i.e. a strategy focused on military force over counter-insurgency tactics) including aerial bombardment.”

In 2008 US Major General Bernard Champoux echoed many of his predecessors, predicting that 2008 would “be a decisive year.” In 2009 General Stanley McChrystal assumed command of ISAF and publicly voiced his opinion that the US should increase troop levels by some 30-40,000. A June 2010 Rolling Stone article profiling McChrystal, in which he and his aides criticized Vice President Biden and the Obama Administration earned McChrystal an early retirement, but not before he stated that, “[his] new strategy [would] improve effectiveness through better application of existing assets, but [would] also require additional resources,” he added that “the Taliban…no longer has the initiative…we are knee-deep in the decisive year”.

General Allen Takes Over as ISAF Commander

General David Petraeus, the commander of CENTCOM, agreed, saying that “for the first time we will have the tools and what’s required in place to carry out the kind of campaign that [is] necessary here with our Afghan partners.” Petraeus was subsequently appointed commander of ISAF upon McChrystal’s retirement (technically a step down from his previous role at CENTCOM). In 2011, Petraeus also retired from the army to assume the directorship of the CIA, he was replaced by US Marine Corps General John R. Allen. Recently, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta announced that US and NATO troops in Afghanistan would transition from a combat role to a “training, assist and advice” role by late 2013, a year earlier than the mandated 2014 schedule. Senator John McCain, as he has so often before, complained that none of the US military commanders had recommended the drawdown, while General Allen cautioned that “the drawdown schedule is more aggressive than anticipated.” Year after year the pattern has remained the same — new generals, new strategies, new resources, same result.

According to Mitt Romney’s website, upon assuming the presidency his foreign policy priorities would include:

Conduct a Full Review of Our Transition in Afghanistan: Conduct a full interagency review of our military and assistance presence in Afghanistan to determine the presence necessary to secure our gains and successfully complete our mission. The review will involve discussions with generals on the ground and the delivery of the best recommendations of our military commanders.

In his first 100 days, order a full interagency review of our transition in Afghanistan. He will review our military and assistance presence to determine the level required to secure our gains and to train Afghan forces to the point where they can protect the sovereignty of Afghanistan on their own. Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan under a Romney administration will be based on conditions on the ground as assessed by our military commanders.

This sounds suspiciously like it might lead to a new troop surge based on Romney’s fairly hawkish views in consultation with generals who are eager to finally “win” in Afghanistan. That outcome would be both harmful to Afghanistan and costly for America.

Baby Doc looks out from the balcony of the elegant Karibe hotel in Port-au-Prince, January 2011

One year ago, Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier made a surprise return to Haiti. As “president-for-life” for the second half of the 1971-86 Duvalier family succession, his rule was notorious for torturous treatment of political prisoners, unexplained disappearances and attacks on the press. Baby Doc was also a chubby sports-car loving playboy, whose glamorous wife spent state funds on furs and jewels. With his return in January 2011, the devilishly clownish dichotomy of the inner and outer workings of the regime picked up where it had left off 25 years before. Duvalier held a press conference in a decadent villa in the hills above Port-au-Prince claiming he had returned to help his people, while within days survivors of his regime’s brutality brought testimonies to the Haitian court accusing him of crimes against humanity.

Alix Fils-Aimé is a survivor who filed complaints in the court documenting the regime’s human rights abuses. He shared his story with this blog, describing near starvation, torturous interrogations, and the disappearances of fellow political prisoners.

Now, after a year of fine dining and hob-nobbing with the country’s elite for the supposedly house-arrested former dictator, and statements proclaiming accountability both a duty and an opportunity for the feeble Haitian courts from international human rights activists and lawyers, the judge has waved his report at journalists and said that Duvalier will not be tried for crimes against humanity, only for misappropriation of public funds. So far the report has not been made publicly available and no explanation has been given aside from a weak reference to passing the statute of limitations. Rights activists reply that prescription does not apply to crimes against humanity or cases concerning disappeared people.

“I had no doubt that the ruling would be such,” Alix Fils-Aimé stated. He described the Haitian court system “like going to the market, you get what your money can buy and sometimes what political influence can get you.” But filing the case was an important exercise for him, bringing light to the issue and putting it firmly in the public record. He said those who had filed complaints are contemplating their next moves, whether it be appealing in the Haitian court or taking the case to a regional human rights court.

Fils-Aimé sees corruption in Haitian courts as both ingrained and temporary. He expected a ruling dismissing his brutal experience, particularly under the administration of Michel Martelly who has political ties to Duvalier-era leaders. “I think everyone, the world over, all our friends and partners, and at the level of organizations, of lawyers and human rights associations, all governments, I think they all are fully aware of the truth, they realize that justice has been denied and realize fully now also that one cannot expect justice for what Duvalier has done, under the current regime.”

But Fils-Aimé says impunity in the Haitian justice system, while entrenched, is not inherent; “Things will evolve and things will be different.”

In an ideal world, the search for justice would always trump the pragmatic workings of politics. However rarely do we live in that world. Instead amnesties are granted in the hopes of a peaceful regime change, dictators are allowed to flee their counties for the permanent and well financed vacations exile while their victims remain to put back together what oppressive policies and violence broke. If enough time passes, as Haiti is now discovering with Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier, those who grossly abused their power can often act like nothing happen. Of course justice is pursued by some countries determined to make sure that past wrongs are answered to, but success in those endeavors typically requires strong support from allied countries or organizations like the UN. Even then, messy politics makes for messy justice; accusations of bias in prosecution and worries about the cost of proceedings given the typically small groups of suspects tried are common, as are serious questions about the value of such proceedings for both victims and the political process. This, and not the ideal version we dream about, is the world we live in.

Recognition of these realities is one of the reasons why the International Criminal Court (ICC) took so long to come into being and is also a constant issue facing the court. In this battle between justice and politics, the biggest debate to date confronting the court is that of Kenya where it is believed high ranking politicians were involved in promoting the post-election violence that gripped the country in early 2008. The possibility of an ICC investigation was part of the agreement reached between President Mwai Kibaki and opposition leader (now Prime Minister) Raila Odinga, but was also contingent on the inability of the Kenyan parliament to pass legislation creating a domestic tribunal to try those responsible for the violence. After parliament failed to pass such legislation, the ICC opened an investigation and yesterday the decision on which of the “Ocampo Six” – the six people deemed most responsible for the violence – would be tried officially came down.

This is where the politics gets messy.  Not only was the post-election violence largely divided on ethnic terms which ended in a fragile peace, but the members of the Ocampo Six were and remain prominent political figures. For example, Uhuru Kenyatta is the current Deputy Prime Minister, Kenya’s wealthiest citizen and the son of the country’s first president, Jomo Kenyatta. On the other side is William Ruto, the former Minster for Higher Education and a prominent opposition politician. Both Kenyatta and Ruto enjoy significant support with their rural constituents and both have stated they would be running in the presidential elections later this year. Politically, these two are positioned on opposite sides of the conflict but may be facing the same fate. Unfortunately, they also have the ability to take down all of Kenya with them. Again, this is the world we live in.

So what is more important, justice or politics? By ruling that four of the six charged would stand trial, including Kenyatta and Ruto, the ICC stuck to their mandate and chose justice. Ahead of the announcement there was strong support for the court among Kenyans but also increasing fears that violence could once again break out. So far, that has not happened. But with politicians gearing up for their presidential campaigns and two of the major candidates now getting ready to stand trial for crimes against humanity, yesterday’s decision is only the start of this debate, not the end.

Abuja National Mosque in Nigeria | Photo by Kipp Jones

A series of explosions ripped through Nigeria’s second largest city of Kano on Friday, targeting government and police offices. By Saturday, the militant group Boko Haram claimed responsibility for the deadly attack whose final death toll is not yet determined but is expected to be over 200 people.

Boko Haram was founded in 2002 as an anti-Western Salafi sect in Northern Nigeria. Since then, the group has evolved into a jihadist militia opposing the Nigerian government and all contact with the West. Starting 2009, Boko Haram began to carry out attacks against government outposts and critics of their ideology. But despite their violent past, the group has only recently gained international attention as their attacks grew in size and coordination. A series of attacks in Maiduguri and Abuja in June 2011 followed by the bombing of the UN’s Nigeria headquarters in August moved Boko Haram to the front page of security briefs in the West and rumors of US military advisers being deployed to the region to help the government gained credence. With last week’s bombings, this is unlikely to change.

It would be easy to couch the existence of Boko Haram and their appeal in Northern Nigeria in terms of Muslim versus Christian, especially given Nigeria’s history of religious strife. But while Boko Haram is an Islamist group with an extreme Islamic ideology, their supporters are drawn mainly from the unemployed youth in the more impoverished northern states who are frustrated by government corruption and limited opportunities despite Nigeria’s oil wealth. In some ways the increasing prominence of Boko Haram over the past year tracks with the growth of protest movements around the world. Most of these movements, whether in the Global North or the Global South, focus on public corruption, the lack of accountability, and a quest for personal dignity. However the frustration behind these movements has been channeled in a variety of ways, from protests in Tunisia and Egypt, to riots in the UK and war in Libya. Without addressing these larger issues as well as the religious desires underpinning the movement, the world will be hearing a lot more about the chaos of Boko Haram.

This much is clear. What is unclear is what this all means for the future of Nigeria. Do these attacks mean Boko Haram has officially declared war on Nigeria? If so, will a war on these terms spark a civil war between the predominately Muslim north and the predominately Christian south? Can the country find a compromise that works for all of its diverse population? Expect these question to be repeatedly asked in the media over the next few weeks, but for now, don’t expect any easy answers.

The message from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)—the U.S. led security force in Afghanistan—is that security is improving as a result of these efforts. Last spring, a Pentagon report concluded that President Obama’s strategy had produced “tangible progress” in Afghanistan. More recently, David Rodriguez, former Commander of ISAF Joint Command, wrote “there are indisputable gains everywhere we have focused our efforts.” Talk of progress and security gains has been pervasive in my early Kabul meetings.

But that message stands in stark contrast to what I’m hearing from international and humanitarian organizations. In its mid-year report released in July 2011, the U.N. political mission in Afghanistan reported that “civilians experienced a downward spiral of protection” during the first half of 2011 with civilian casualties higher than at any other time since 2001. Indeed, nearly 1,500 civilians were killed during the first half of 2011, an increase of 15% from the same period during 2010. More recently, the U.N. confirmed significant civilian casualties last month largely due to the twin suicide attacks in Kabul and Mazar-i-Sharif.

ISAF’s rosy assessment of the situation in Afghanistan is also at odds with the most recent U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), which noted that “security gains” have been undercut by “corruption, incompetent governance and Taliban fighters operating from neighboring Pakistan.” The NIE also suggests that the Afghan government “may not be able to survive as the U.S. steadily pulls out its troops and reduces military and civilian assistance.”

To be clear, the Taliban and other armed groups are responsible for the majority of civilian casualties in Afghanistan – roughly 80%, according to the U.N. Despite pledges to avoid killing civilians, armed groups have continued to resort to indiscriminate tactics, including improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks, which combined are responsible for nearly 50% of civilian casualties in Afghanistan, according to the U.N. For the past two years, armed groups have also increasingly resorted to assassinations, targeting public officials and others who cooperate with ISAF and the Afghan government.

Meanwhile, as civilian casualties caused by armed groups have spiked over the past few years, the number of civilians killed or injured by international military forces has gradually declined, largely due to the policies ISAF has put in place to mitigate civilian harm. That being said, Afghans want and expect ISAF and the ANSF to improve efforts to protect them from all acts of violence, regardless of which warring party is ultimately responsible.

Afghans I have met since arriving are very worried about the future. One former government official I spoke with voiced his concern that Afghanistan could slide back into civil war after the bulk of international military forces depart at the end of 2014. Like many others in the country, he isn’t confident that the ANSF will be able to provide security on their own, and he’s concerned about the proliferation of weapons and armed groups.

Why such disparate narratives and assessments of the security situation? One reason could be that ISAF is using different metrics than international and nongovernmental organizations. Counterinsurgent forces tend to examine territory held and the quantity of indigenous security forces trained and equipped to measure progress. And as noted, ISAF has taken very concrete steps to mitigate civilian harm, resulting in fewer civilians killed or injured by international military forces. Meanwhile, the U.N. and nongovernmental organizations are analyzing overall levels of violence and civilian casualties – which have increased over the past several years.

Another reason may be that ISAF is setting a tone for its departure. With the U.S. elections less than a year away, the Obama Administration would like to reassure a war weary public that it has turned the Afghan war around. While not ill – intentioned, the U.S. and its allies may simply be focused on highlighting what they have achieved, including reduced levels of civilian casualties caused by international military forces as well as reinvigorated efforts to improve the quality of Afghan security forces. But the problem still remains – while ISAF has improved its own civilian casualty statistics, the number of civilians harmed or killed in Afghanistan is increasing. Indeed, if “security gains” are to be measured by fewer civilian casualties, then security is deteriorating in Afghanistan.

As international military forces prepare for withdrawal, they should be clear-eyed about the toll the war is taking on civilians and what needs to be done to better protect ordinary Afghans. Over the next six months, I will be taking this message to ISAF on behalf of CIVIC. More specifically, I will be assessing the efficacy of the mechanisms ISAF has put in place to mitigate civilian harm as well as urging the Afghan government to take concrete steps to better protect civilians. I hope we’ll soon be able to agree that security is improving in Afghanistan.

This post originally appeared on CIVIC From the Field.

Photo: Afghan National Army (ANA) doing a route clearence patrol exercise at the Kabul Militairy Training Centre (KMTC).

Released under the Creative Commons License: Courtesy of the U.S. Army.