Senator Kerry and President Obama.

The Cable reports that President Barack Obama and Senator John Kerry (D-MA) are behind a renewed effort to have the Senate ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Kerry, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, has been trying to set up hearings since last year, but Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), the top-ranking Republican in the committee, wanted to delay hearings until after his primary. Some conservative quarters fiercely oppose the treaty, believing that ratification would weaken American sovereignty. Consequently, it seems that Lugar believed that if he pushed for the treaty’s ratification, it could have hampered his re-election campaign. Yet Lugar lost his primary, so now Kerry is free to begin arranging hearings. According to the Cable, the first will be a “24-star hearing,” with six four-star military officers. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta is also expected to testify.

He recently voiced his support for the treaty at the Law of the Sea Symposium last Wednesday, where he remarked in his speech:

“The time has come for the United States to have a seat at the table, to fully assert its role as a global leader, and accede to this important treaty.  It is the bedrock legal instrument underpinning public order across the maritime domain.”

Support for ratification of UNCLOS is also strong from President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the military, industry, and many Democrats and Republicans. President Clinton signed the treaty in 1994 (only for the Senate not to ratify it), and President Bush supported it as well. Today’s administration is particularly keen on ratifying the treaty in order to give the U.S. an upper hand in mediating disputes in the South China Sea and keeping the Strait of Hormuz open. The U.S. would also be able to exercise support for freedom of navigation of the seas through treaty law rather than by relying on customary international law.

While territorial and maritime boundary disputes in the South China Sea between countries like China and the Philippines make the headlines and constitute some of the main reasons for the administration to prioritize ratification now, it is also looking to other regions of the world where UNCLOS will play a major role, namely the Arctic. Panetta said in his speech,

“Accession would ensure our ability to reap the benefits of the opening of the Arctic – a region of increasingly important maritime security and economic interest.  We already see countries that are posturing for new shipping routes and natural resources as Arctic ice cover melts and recedes.  The Convention is the only means for international recognition and acceptance of our extended continental shelf claims in the Arctic, and we are the only Arctic nation that is not party to the Convention. Accession would also preserve our navigation and over-flight rights throughout the Arctic, and strengthen our arguments for freedom of navigation through the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route.”

The U.S. would be the final Arctic littoral state to ratify the treaty. Norway did so in 1996, Russia in 1997, Canada in 1999, and Denmark in 2004. The U.S. has been working to map its Arctic seafloor for some time, so it would not be terribly far behind in submitting its claims once it ratifies UNCLOS. The Arctic Council and UNCLOS are two of the most important forums for multilateral discussion and resolution of issues in the circumpolar north. For the U.S. to not be a party to the latter weakens, rather than strengthens, its sovereignty in the Arctic. Furthermore, along with the other four littoral states, the U.S. has already expressed support for the treaty. The Ilulissat Declaration of May 2008 expresses:

“Notably, the Law of the Sea provides for important rights and obligations concerning the delineation of the outer limits of the continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment, including ice-covered areas, freedom of navigation, marine scientific research, and other uses of the sea. We remain committed to this legal framework and to the orderly settlement of any possible overlapping claims.”

The U.S. will not be truly committed to UNCLOS, though, until it ratifies the treaty. As the issues in the Arctic grow more complex and necessitate multilateral solutions, it becomes more important for the Senate to ratify it soon.

News Links

“Defense leaders push for U.S. to sign Law of Sea treaty to promote security in Asia,” Washington Post

Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship illustration.

The Royal Canadian Navy’s plans to acquire six to eight ice-capable Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS) are facing yet another obstacle. On Tuesday in the Canadian House of Commons, the 2012-13 Reports on Plans and Priorities were tabled. The reports sum up the expected revenue, expenditures, and projects of each government agency and department in Canada. National Defence’s plans and priorities show that the AOPS will be delayed another three years, with delivery now scheduled for 2018. The first ship will not be operational until 2019, and that full operational capability of all of the ships will not be reached until 2023. The Treasury Board gave preliminary approval to the project in May 2007, so by the time the project is finally completed, over fifteen years will have elapsed. This is a very lengthy timeframe and reveals the difficulty that Canada (like most Arctic countries) is having in quickly adapting to the Arctic, where both the operating environment and military needs are changing.

During the 2006 election, Prime Minister Stephen Harper vowed to purchase three armed icebreakers. Those plans were shunted aside in 2008 in favor of the cheaper AOPS, which will cost CAN $3.1 billion to acquire. Another CAN $4.3 billion is budgeted for the ships’ maintenance and operation. In addition to the ships, jetty infrastructures are slated to be constructed in Esquimalt, British Columbia and Halifax, Nova Scotia. The naval refueling station in Nanisivik, Nunavut, which has already been scaled back considerably as I discussed here, will also support the AOPS.

Liberal Senator Colin Kenny, former chair of the senate defence and security committee, spoke out against the AOPS, saying, “They’re just a dumb idea.” He believes that the AOPS project is one of the first places the government should look to make cuts to the defense budget. Kenny continued, “They don’t break ice and they go 16 knots and that’s slower than a fishing boat.” The ships will be able to break through medium, first-year ice, and will not be nearly as powerful as a heavy icebreaker. However, one icebreaker is still in the works for Canada, the CCGS John G. Diefenbaker, which is scheduled for delivery in 2017. All of these ships, and more, are part of Canada’s National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy, in which the country will significantly rebuild its navy and coast guard fleets.

Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy, Vice-Admiral Paul Maddison, wrote in an editorial in Vanguard, “AOPS will not be a complex combatant. It will be armed and equipped for a constabulary role in support of other government departments – a role, however, that will require it to operate effectively, safely and reliably within the Arctic Archipelago during the navigable season, and not merely in the low Arctic, as well as in Canada’s other two oceans at other times of the year.”

Thus, AOPS will mostly be responsible for surveillance in Canada’s three oceans, providing situational awareness, and cooperating with other agencies to enforce Canadian sovereignty. In terms of their offensive and ice capabilities, they are a far cry from an armed heavy icebreaker, but will at the same time have more maneuverability and flexibility. Whether this is what the Conservatives really want in the Arctic is doubtful: were the economy better, they likely would have tried to stick with the original plan for three icebreakers to better project Canadian sovereignty in the Arctic. AOPS, however, is probably more practical for the time being, especially given the non-combative nature of the Arctic and general spirit of military cooperation.

News Links

[1] “Preparing for a unique maritime theatre,” Vanguard

[2] “Armed Arctic vessels face delay in latest procurement setback,” Calgary Herald

Geopolitical Risks

The report encourages the eight Arctic Council member states to take the lead and enact regulations to prevent disasters from occurring up north. Risky situations, however, could arise from the very fact that there are eight countries in the Arctic, all with separate (though sometimes overlapping) interests and strategies. The report notes that “The Arctic is not – nor is it likely to become – a truly single regulatory space, even while the Arctic Council, Arctic states and other interested parties are increasingly forging common approaches to shared challenges” (p. 9). There may be shared challenges, but there is not shared territory. That is why there are geopolitical risks in the Arctic.

Two of the discussed risks seem to be quite unlikely. The first is that terrorists will target Arctic installations with “substantial commercial and environmental risk,” such as a research station in Svalbard or an offshore oil platform. Given the difficult nature of operating in the Arctic for an established company, it would be much more tricky for terrorists to reach a remote installation and successfully carry out an attack. Granted, security in the way of border patrols and customs agents would be minimal, if not non-existent. Yet a significant amount of defense is already provided by the adverse conditions of the Arctic.

The second unlikely geopolitical risk is that military tension between Arctic states could potentially compromise Arctic installations. Since some of countries main interests in the Arctic involve getting companies to successfully operate in the region, it is unlikely that military conflict would break out – and even then, countries would presumably (and hopefully) keep private installations unrelated to the conflict out of the line of fire given the vast expanse that is the Arctic theater.

The two more interesting and slightly more plausible scenarios are as follows:

1. If either the U.S. or Canada were to grant exploration licenses for oil and gas drilling in any of the 21,500 square kilometer disputed area of the Beaufort Sea and companies actually began drilling, political tension could arise. This would undoubtedly have negative consequences for involved companies.. The map below shows the area under contention, but it could actually expand in size depending on the territory Canada claims as its continental shelf. It is due to submit its claims to the U.N. Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf by 2013. The U.S. and Canada have actively disputed the area since the 1970s. Essentially, the U.S. draws its maritime boundary based on the equidistance principal, in which a line is drawn out from the coastline so that each point on the line is equidistant from each country’s coast. By contrast, Canada simply extends the straight border between Alaska and Canada into the sea, based on the 1825 Treaty of Saint Petersburg. This treaty, which settled the boundaries between Russia and the UK’s claims in the Pacific Northwest, eventually fell under the domain of the U.S. and Canada once those two countries gained sovereignty over the relevant territories. Today, in the Beaufort Sea, each country’s perspective naturally grants it more area. At some point, the countries will want to develop whatever oil and gas resources lie within the sea, provided that it is still a commercially attractive venture. Then, the U.S. and Canada will finally have to decide how to settle the boundary. One only has to look to Norway and Russia’s actions in the Barents Sea to see that boundary settlement opens the doors to oil and gas development. Companies will probably shy away from exploring disputed parts of the Arctic, especially when there are so many more areas that fall squarely within a country’s sovereign territory waiting to be developed.
   

   Disputed Area of the Beaufort Sea

2. If Svalbard authorities (or Norway) allowed oil and gas drilling around the archipelago on terms that signatories believed violated the Spitsbergen Treaty of 1920, which governs Svalbard to this day, tensions could arise as well. This would adversely affect companies involved in exploration. Currently, the main dilemma is that Norway views Svalbard as falling within its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), as it constitutes part of its continental shelf. That means the country should have exclusive rights to Svalbard and the seabed around it. Yet Article 3 of the treaty states that the signatories shall have “equal liberty of access and entry for any reason or object whatever to the waters, fjords and ports of the territories” of Svalbard, and that “they shall be admitted under the same conditions of equality to the exercise and practice of all maritime, industrial, mining or commercial enterprises both on land and in the territorial waters.” The fact that all signatories have equal rights to carry out industrial activities on and around Svalbard does not jive with the concept of an “exclusive” economize zone.Already, fishing around the archipelago has been a subject of tension for countries like Russia and Spain with Norway. Were oil and gas drilling to occur, a potentially much more serious conflict could arise. Yet one can hope that if exploration  ever moves forward, countries will cooperate in the way that Norway and Russia are doing. Rosneft and Statoil have just announced that they will partner together to drill in the Barents Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk.

Environmental Risks

The April 20 Trebs oil spill in the Nenets Autonomous District in Russia’s Arctic is one example of the risks of oil drilling up north. 2,000 tons of oil have contaminated some 8,000 square meters of land, and it is possible that they affected another 6,000 square meters as well. As it stands, the situation does not look so bleak: much of the oil spilled onto snow, much of which must be recovered by hand. It is a painstaking process, but once gathered, the snow be melted and burnt for fuel. As of May 5, 1,713 of the 3,000 cubic meters of oil-contaminated snow have been removed. The same is not possible when the oil is a thick slick floating in the Arctic Ocean. Had the oil spill occurred offshore, it could have been much worse. The Lloyds report notes, “Managing risk in the offshore Arctic and insuring it is likely to be costly.” That is because the stakes are so high. Offshore oil spills can eat away at a company’s profits, but it is really the people and ecosystem which will suffer the most. The report advocates ecosystem-based management that looks at the cumulative effects of development, rather than just the effects of a one-off project. This is a smart recommendation, but hard to put in place when budgets in many Arctic regions are touch and go, and projects depend on the whims of capitals down south.

As the Lloyd’s report demonstrates, there are plenty of opportunities in the Arctic, but plenty of risks as well. The risks and rewards are not equally borne: Indigenous peoples and the environment will shoulder more of the former, while companies will win more of the latter. The report states that up to $100 billion stands to be invested in the Arctic, but the risks of everything from oil spills to shipwrecks to geopolitical tensions are much harder to quantify.

The Canadian Forces have just commenced one of their annual sovereignty exercises in the Arctic, called Operation Nunalivut. 150 Canadian Forces personnel from the Navy, Air Force, Army, and Canadian Rangers are participating. This year, the exercises are taking place around Cornwallis Island and on the western portion of Devon Island in Nunavut.

Personnel perform medical rescue simulation.

Sovereignty and search and rescue (SAR) training compose a large portion of the operations this year. Royal Canadian Navy divers dove under six feet of ice in Gascoyne Bay to simulate a medical rescue. Two Royal Canadian Air Force CC-138 Twin Otters also performed ski-landings to resupply a temporary camp in Viks Fiord. Another exercise helped Canada look into the dangerous past of the Arctic: sailors cut a hole into the ice with heated saws to submerge a remotely operated vehicle to survey the world’s northernmost shipwreck, the HMS Breadalbane, which sank down into the murky depths in 1853.

Two divers swim under the ice in Gascoyne Bay, Nunavut.

Participants are also testing new communications capabilities for Op Nunalivut. For the first time, rangers can communicate through a chat program that connects them both to headquarters in Resolute and Yellowknife, thousands of miles away in the Northwest Territories. Before, phone and radio were the only options. Lt.-Col. Glen MacNeil observed to CBC, “If the person in a deployed forward headquarter is talking to, let’s say Yellowknife, then we can see what they’re saying in Resolute Bay. So we have an all-informed net. So if anything is going on or we need something to happen, we can immediately communicate over that mechanism. It’s great in terms of situational awareness.” Canada’s Arctic region is vast but unpopulated, with only a little over 100,000 people living across the whole region. That means it’s much harder (not to mention uneconomical) to create widely distributed communications networks, unlike in a place like Norway, where the northern area is much smaller and more densely populated. As such, the chat network could represent a big leap forward for communications in the Canadian North.

USA: 2011 Fleet Arctic Operations Game

Meanwhile, the U.S. is “behind the power curve regarding the Arctic” according to Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Bob Papp. The U.S. Naval War College’s War Gaming Department recently carried out an operations game in which it found that the Navy is woefully unprepared and ill-equipped for activities in the Arctic. Without any heavy icebreakers, it must rely on other countries for that capability. Walter Berbrick, assistant research professor in the War Gaming Department, stated, “We have limited capability to sustain long-term operations in the Arctic due to inadequate icebreaking capability. The Navy finds itself entering a new realm as it relates to having to rely on other nations.” Previously, the Navy mostly just had to rely on the Coast Guard, to whom it gave its last icebreaker, the Glacier, to the Coast Guard in 1966. That year, it decided to hand over all icebreaking operations. Coast Guard

Captain Craig Lloyd, chief of response for the 17th Coast Guard District in Alaska, remarked, “It’s very likely that whatever operation goes on up there would be a joint operation.” This parallels many other activities in the Arctic, whether they be oil and gas exploration or mapping of the sea floor. Countries, corporations, and scientists all have to band together to get work done. The scale and expense of Arctic activities make cooperation almost a necessity.

The U.S. falls behind other countries, including Canada, in terms of its communications infrastructure in the north. Dana Goward, director of marine transportation systems management for the Coast Guard, stated, “If you’re in Barrow [Alaska] and two people pull out iPhones at the same time, service goes down.” At the International Polar Year Conference in Montreal last week, I listened to a speech given by Steve Maclean, president of the Canadian Space Agency. He said, “Without a doubt, two of the most pressing challenges in Canada’s North are communications and weather.” The CSA, along with other space agencies like NASA, is trying to tackle those challenge by putting up more satellites in space that are focused on the circumpolar region. Maclean later continued that the Arctic needs more infrastructure, and “like any road or bridge, these satellites are an integral part of that infrastructure.” (The full text of his speech is available here).

While it’s hard to imagine the NASA Administrator giving a speech about the connection between outer space and the Arctic, many of Canada’s agencies and departments have a view towards the region. In fact, the U.S. is the only Arctic country lacking an Arctic strategy, and it shows in the military’s lack of preparedness. Though Canada’s capabilities in the Arctic have many holes of their own, and though Stephen Harper has left many promises unfulfilled up north, the country is still miles ahead of the U.S.

Lieutenant-General Walter Semianiw, Commander of Canada Command, said, “Sovereignty operations like Op Nunalivut 2012 allow the Canadian Forces to regularly demonstrate a visible presence in the region. As part of the Canada First Defence Strategy, we maintain the capacity to exercise control over and defend Canada’s Arctic territory, and to provide assistance to other government departments and agencies when called upon.” Canada might soon have to provide assistance to the U.S., too.

News Links

“Canadian Forces Highlights the Success of its High Arctic Operation,” Marketwatch

“Officials: Coast Guard behind in Arctic Race,” Navy Times

“‘Games’ find Navy ability lacking in the Arctic,” Kodiak Daily Mirror

“Northern wreck,” Owen Sound Sun Times

Ambassador Ronald Jumeau speaking at IPY 2012. (c) Mia Bennett

I’ve just returned from the first day of proceedings at the International Polar Year 2012 conference in Montreal. Entitled “From Knowledge to Action,” the conference features panels, plenaries, action forums, indigenous exchange forums, and poster sessions about the current state of the poles. Reflecting the conference’s title, speakers are emphasizing how to implement the knowledge that scientists and researchers learned during the last IPY, which ran from March 2007 to March 2009. As a start, research and results should be made easily accessible to the public. This has been done with cartographic data on http://map.arcticportal.org, for instance. Working with indigenous peoples to combine their knowledge and experience in the Arctic with scientific observations is another approach that many IPY participants are taking, too.

Finally, polar experts are trying to determine how to communicate the critical nature of climate change and its consequences to the public and politicians, for many see the Arctic and Antarctic as desolate, uninhabited, and above all, disconnected from the rest of the world. But as Ronald Jumeau, the Seychelles’ Roving Ambassador for Climate Change and Small Island Developing States, stressed during his talk, “As the poles melt, we drown.” He added, “Global linkages indeed: if I, a Seychellois islander of the Indian Ocean, feel it important to be with you here to add my few remarks on the global linkages of what climate change is doing to the North and South poles — I could have easily been a Pacific, Atlantic or Caribbean islander — it means these linkages stretch to every corner of the planet.”

The full text of his moving speech is available here, and it pretty much sums up my main takeaway from the conference. The poles may be some of the most remote places on earth, but they’re at the forefront of climate change. Without a doubt, what happens there will first impact the people who live there, but the rest of the world will feel the consequences soon. Ironically, it’s those who are the farthest away from the ends of the earth, in the low-lying islands around the equator, that are most vulnerable.

I’ll be writing more about the talks I attended in the coming days. In the meantime, if you’re not at the conference, you can watch webcasts from IPY 2012 here simply by creating an account.

Swedish Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao.

On Monday, a deputy Chinese foreign minister, Song Tao, announced that Sweden, the current chair of the Arctic Council, supported his country’s bid for permanent observer status in the multilateral organization. He stated, “China applauds Swedish support for China to be an observer to the Arctic Council.” Tao was speaking at a briefing on Premier Wen Jiabao’s upcoming eight-day trip to Iceland, Sweden, Germany and Poland. He added, “We hope to work together with relevant countries, including Iceland and Sweden, to contribute to peace, stability and sustainable development in the Arctic.”

Wen’s visit to Iceland is significant, as it will be the first trip made by a Chinese premier to the country in 40 years. Wen will meet with officials to discuss ways to improve economic and scientific relations between the two countries. Geothermal energy and research on the aurora borealis are two subjects slated to be discussed. Shipping could also very well be on the table, as China is interested in Arctic shipping routes, and Iceland seeks to take advantage of its strategic location between Europe and North America to turn itself into a transshipment hub. In Sweden, Wen is expected to sign an agreement to create a sustainably developed industrial park.

Right now, six countries currently have permanent observer status: France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and the U.K. Permanent observer status grants countries invitations to all Arctic Council meetings and a better ability to contribute to discussions. If China were to attain this position, it would be the first Asian country to do so. Both Japan and South Korea have also applied for permanent observer status. Countries must meet many criteria in order to earn acceptance, including recognizing “Arctic States’ sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic.” While China has ratified UNCLOS, to the chagrin of some of the Arctic littoral states, Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo expressed in 2010, “The Arctic belongs to all the people around the world as no nation has sovereignty over it.” Yet his next sentence seemed focused on keeping China’s involvement research-oriented, as the country will likely not be making any territorial grabs. He continued, “China must play an indispensable role in Arctic exploration as we have one-fifth of the world’s population.”

To achieve this role, China is building strong ties with several Nordic countries including Denmark, Iceland, and Sweden. With Denmark and Iceland, China is focusing on resource development. With Sweden, more cooperation is done in the areas of research and the environment. The glaring absence among China’s Scandinavian partners is Norway. Ever since China imprisoned political activist Liu Xiaobo, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2010, relations have been tense. Beijing froze political ties with Oslo, and bilateral trade dropped significantly. In light of the lack of constructive dialogue between the two countries, it is unclear whether Norway supports China’s quest for permanent observer status. This could be problematic for China, as the permanent members must agree unanimously to accept new observers. Yet in Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre’s speech to the Storting (Norwegian Parliament) in February 2012, he announced, “Norway continues to support China’s application for permanent observer status on the Arctic Council. We hope to have a dialogue with China on this issue, as we have with other candidate countries.” If Støre’s comments are an accurate reflection of where Norway’s policy with China now stands, though, perhaps there a realistic path for the country to permanent observer status does exist.

Regardless of whether China can gain permanent observer status at the next Arctic Council meeting, to be held in Sweden in 2013, it is still busy expanding its capabilities and involvement in the circumpolar north. China is building a second research icebreaker, which should be ready in 2014. It will be able to break through ice more quickly than the sole member of its existing fleet, the Xuelong, which it purchased from the Ukraine in 1994. With two icebreakers, it will have one more than the U.S., which currently only has the USCGC Healy. Possessing just one icebreaker not only curtails a country’s ability to conduct simultaneous operations at both poles. It also undermines claims to legitimate polar power status.

News Links

“China, seeking a voice in Arctic affairs, says it has Swedish support for Arctic Council role,” Washington Post

“Norway to freeze China out of Arctic?”, The International Institute for Strategic Studies

“China’s new icebreaker scheduled for use in 2014,” China.org

General Walt Natynczyk greets other generals in Goose Bay. (c) Chris Harbord/CBC

On Thursday and Friday, the chiefs of defense from all eight Arctic states met at a Canadian military base in Goose Bay, Newfoundland and Labrador to discuss forging closer ties up north.  This was the first time that generals from Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the U.S. convened. The meeting will now become a yearly event in order to improve cooperation in the remote and inaccessible Arctic. Representatives also had opportunities to meet with Canadian Rangers and local community leaders.

Nunatsiaq News quoted Canadian General Walter Natynczyk as saying, “I am very pleased with the discussions amongst the eight chiefs of defence just completed in Goose Bay. This is the first time the northern chiefs of defence have had the opportunity to meet, as a forum, to discuss issues unique to our respective regions. We were able to gain an understanding of the unique challenges each faces with regards to emergency response and for support to our civilian authorities.”

The chiefs of defense agreed to cooperate more closely on search and rescue operations, which builds upon the signing of the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement by the members of the Arctic Council last May. A further understanding between generals to forge closer ties in the Arctic also comes at a good time, at it was just announced at a security and cooperation conference in Murmansk that traffic along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) increased 20% in 2011 over the previous year. Participants from all eight Arctic countries attended this conference as well.

In Murmansk, Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev’s remarks were similar to themes of Goose Bay conference. He stated, “We see the changes occurring in the Arctic and the need to understand and see the threats and challenges that come with it. We see that the Arctic is becoming more open to navigation. It is the more cost-effective way, so it will be used. After our last meeting, the amount of traffic along the NSR increased by 20%. We need to ensure security in the Arctic – we need infrastructure and Coast Guard cooperation.” Currently, ships are escorted through the NSR by Russian nuclear submarines, of which there are six active ones. Discussions at the conference focused on the future of Russia’s fleet and on making amendments to their maritime code. Currently, while Russia views the NSR as internal waters, the State Duma is considering a bill (“On Amendments to Some Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation Concerning the State Regulation of Commercial Navigation Along the Routes Lying in the Water Areas of the Northern Sea Route”) to allow a higher volume of foreign ships to sail through the passage. Currently, most shipping is still internal, bringing resources like oil, minerals, and timber to Russia’s northern oblasts.

U.S. Coast Guard Rear Admiral Cari Thomas attended the conference in Murmansk and spoke about her country’s role in improving shipping safety in the Arctic. She stated that the U.S. “has been involved in helping to advance ship safety standards and will continue to do that in a number of areas.” Thomas added, “We’re working very closely with the IMO on a foreign code, construction standards, on watchstanding, [...] and on ice navigation. She also brought up the incident of the sinking of a Carnival cruise ship off the coast of Italy a few months ago, noting “how catastrophic that would be” if it took place in the Arctic. Even worse possibly is the threat of an oil spill along the already-polluted Kola Peninsula, as neither Murmansk nor nearby Severomorsk have the capability to respond to such a disaster.

The fact that the generals of all eight states met together further demonstrates that cooperation, rather than conflict, is the name of the game in the Arctic. No single country – not even Russia, with its sizable but aging nuclear fleet – has enough capabilities or infrastructure to respond to disasters in the Arctic by itself. The costs of getting almost anything done in the circumpolar region are so high that countries need to cooperate, whether on oil and gas exploration, mapping the sea floor, or search and rescue operations.

News Links

“Arctic generals agree on closer ties,” Toronto Star

“Russia taking on Northern sea route as Bellona raises alarm over Norwegian vessels under escort of nuclear icebreakers,” Bellona

“The Arctic is open to all,” Voice of Russia

“Removing stumbling blocks from the Northern Sea Route: Russia plans to pass a new law to develop shipping in the Arctic,” Oil and Gas Eurasia

The Alaska Dispatch quotes Begich as saying during the panel, “Alaska is going to be the tip of the spear in resolving this rapidly, which won’t be a fun situation…It takes public infrastructure resources. We have to convince people Alaska is not like California. It’s north, it’s big and we are an Arctic nation.” Begich is right in this regard, because unlike most Canadians, Americans do not generally view their country as an Arctic nation.

The panel is the first in a series designed to study how Alaska can prepare itself to handle increased ship traffic. As the extent of Arctic sea ice decreases over time, particularly in the summer, there will be increased oil exploration, tourism, shipping, and possibly militarization – and hence, more traffic. Consequently, Alaska will need to have more search and rescue ships and infrastructure in place to support such a maritime boom. To get the most out of any new port, the Dispatch reports that many of the panelists supported public-private funding and allowing the port to have multiple uses, such as for both tourist ships and Coast Guard cutters. With the sheer cost of construction and operations in the Arctic, this is really the only feasible way to create a thriving port that meets the needs of many sectors.

At present, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (ACE) and the Alaska Department of Transportation & Public Facilities are working together to determine the best sites for a deepwater port in Alaska. Through research and mapping, they are trying to find locations along the state’s 927-mile long Arctic coastline that would “that would be a long-term vital asset to national security and to the State’s economy.” [1] The port would be the northernmost one for the US Coast Guard, Navy, and NOAA, and it must be at least 35 feet deep in order to accommodate Coast Guard icebreakers. In their request for capital from the state of Alaska, the ACE identified three main ways in which a deepwater port could contribute to the economy:

1. <<The possibility of an Arctic port becoming a direct shipping point for resources developed in the western and northern regions of Alaska.
2. A major strategic American commercial and military port along the Arctic Coast as vessel traffic increases.
3. A major infrastructure asset to any future potential endeavors to produce oil and gas from deepwater reserves in the Arctic Ocean.>>

The first point would be an important development, particularly for the oil and gas industry. Fossil fuels would no longer need to be shipped through the Trans Alaska Pipeline in order to be shipped elsewhere. Instead, they could be shipped directly to the burgeoning markets in China, South Korea, and Japan, whose appetite for oil has increased by 33% since it shut off 53 of its 54 nuclear reactors.

One reason that the western Arctic lags in terms of development behind the Russian Arctic is that there aren’t any deepwater ports. The Northern Sea Route is therefore much better positioned to benefit from increases in shipping volume. The only deepwater port in Alaska is in Dutch Harbor, all the way in the Aleutian Islands in the state’s southwestern region. Additionally, the USCG’s northernmost station is on Kodiak Island, which is 940 air miles away from the northernmost point in Alaska at Point Barrow. The distance of the current ports and stations from the Arctic complicates search and rescue efforts and lengthens the amount of time that research vessels need to spend in transit rather than doing actual research in the Arctic.

An article in Alaska Business Monthly states that the sites which ACE is considering are Nome, Kivalina, Kotzebue, Port Clarence, Cape Darby, Cape Blossom, Red Dog, St. Michael, Prudhoe Bay, Chukchi Sea, Beaufort Sea and Bering Straits. This fall, the group should be whittled down to four remaining contenders, and the study should be completed by the end of 2014. Let’s just hope that whatever site is ultimately chosen, it does not fall the way of Nanisivik, the planned deepwater naval facility on Baffin Island that the Canadian government recently announced will be a shadow of the original plans once it is actually, if ever, built.

View Potential Deepwater Alaska Ports in a larger map

In the meantime, the Economist mentioned in its piece on cooperation in the Arctic, “Cosy amid the thaw,” that Norway and Iceland are considering constructing transshipment ports to take advantage of their positions near the end of the Northern Sea Route. A transshipment port is a place where cargo from large ships is sorted and placed onto smaller vessels for onward shipment to multiple destinations. Kirkenes, Norway and Vopnafjörður, Iceland are two possible locations for this sort of activity. Transshipment probably would not occur in Alaska since it is not located along any major trade routes for the time being. Instead, direct shipment ports need to be developed along its Arctic coast.

Transshipment Ports West of the Northern Sea Route (c) Arctic Portal

Sources

[1] Arctic Ports Study Funding Request

The new CAD $50 bill, with an icebreaker.

In early March, a few outspoken voices in Iceland, a country not known for its stable economy in recent years, floated the idea of switching from the krona to the Canadian dollar. The leader of the opposition Progressive Party, Sigmundur Gunnlaugsson, said, “If we are going to adopt another currency, then the Canadian dollar looks very promising.”

Canada’s ambassador to Iceland, Alan Bones, told RUV, the Icelandic National Broadcasting Service, that his government would be open to discussing the issue. Yet a few days later, his speech at a meeting of the Progressive Party was cancelled, reportedly by Ottawa.

Later, Gunnlaugsson told the Icelandic daily, Morgunbladid, “It’s not like we are fighting for the adoption of the Canadian dollar. We are simply trying to generate a debate about the various possibilities Iceland has…It’s one thing for the government to focus on the euro but a seriously bad thing that it tries to stop any debate about other possibilities.”

Yet the debate doesn’t seem to have gotten very far. On March 20, Iceland’s minister of economic affairs seemed to put a stop to the talk of adopting the loonie, as he said in an interview with the Wall Street Journal that it is “not a ridiculous idea in my mind, but neither is it for the time being something we are considering as the government.”

Iceland is in the midst of a national debate on their economic future. One of the main issues at hand is whether the country should join the EU. In a 2010 survey published by the European Commission’s Eurobarometer (PDF), 54% of people were opposed to the idea that “Iceland’s future should be as part of the EU,” whereas only 30% were in favor. Icelanders had more positive feelings towards adopting the euro, with 39% in favor, and only 46% against. Alas, Iceland cannot have the euro without joining the EU (though it can do things the other way around, like Sweden and the UK). Iceland appears to be looking for economic stability without the strictures that come with EU membership. In the survey, for instance, people feared that upon joining, Iceland would lose control of some of its natural resources and that its food producers would face more competition from other EU producers.

Those in Iceland who want to adopt the Canadian dollar, the loonie, mention the similarity between Iceland and Canada’s economies. They claim that Iceland is more similar to Canada than the EU since the two countries rely heavily on exports of natural resources. While Canada exports large amounts of oil, timber, and other commodities and Iceland exports a lot of fish and, indirectly, energy (through aluminum smelting), trade between the two countries is minimal. Iceland is much more integrated with the EU, so it would seemingly make more sense for it to adopt the euro as attractive and stable as Canada’s economy might be. But having Iceland and Canada share currencies could lead to greater trade and closer ties between the two countries. Only Greenland lies between Canada and Iceland, and it’s not terribly far from Reykjavik to Canada’s Maritime Provinces. Until recently, Iceland Express even used to offer non-stop flights to Winnipeg, Manitoba. The largest group of people of Icelandic descent outside of Iceland happens to live in the nearby town of Gimli, which was founded in 1875.

Another country whose currency Iceland could consider using is Norway. Relations between the two countries date at least to the Norwegian settlement of Iceland in the ninth century. Strong ties continue into the present day as well. After the U.S. left Keflavik Air Station in 2006, Norway agreed to provide Iceland with surveillance and patrolling of their air space during peace time. The economies of Norway and Iceland are more similar and integrated than those of Canada and Iceland, too: Norway exports a lot of natural resources, namely oil and fish products, and it is Iceland’s fifth biggest trade partner (Canada is twelfth on the list). According to the Eurobarometer survey cited above, Iceland feels closest to Norway, followed by Denmark, Sweden, Canada, and then the U.S. Thus, perhaps Iceland should consider adopting the Norwegian krone.

It would be interesting if two Arctic countries used the same currency. Currently, all eight of them use different ones. The U.S. uses the dollar, Canada the Canadian dollar, Russia the ruble, Finland the euro, Sweden the krona, Norway the krone, Denmark the krone, and Iceland the krona. Of all of those countries, Canada is making the biggest attempt to promote its Arctic region on its currency, as its newly redesigned $50 bill has an image of the CGCS Amundsen, a research icebreaker, on the reverse. Bank of Canada governor Mark Carney even made a comparison that was a bit of a stretch between Arctic exploration and the new bank note. “Just as the work of scientists on the Amundsen is expanding the frontiers of Arctic research, this new polymer series is expanding the frontiers of bank note technology,” he said.

If Iceland adopts the euro, loonie, or even the krone, it will lose control of monetary policy. However, seeing as former Prime Minister Geir Haarde is on trial on charges of negligence during the 2008 financial meltdown, many Icelanders would probably see this as a good thing.

News Links

“Canada and Iceland: a loonie idea,” The Economist

“Progressive Party supports adopting the Loonie,” Go Iceland

“Iceland Canadian Dollar: Nordic Country Not Considering Adopting Loonie, Government Says,” Huffington Post

Nanivisik: Some things will never change… Image (c) CBC

In August 2007, Prime Minister Stephen Harper announced plans to build a deep water port at Nanisivik, where remnants of an old port and airfield from the area’s nickel mining days would serve as the foundations for further construction. New docking and refueling facilities were to be built, thus turning Nanisivik into an important site in the High North for the Canadian Forces. Two years’ worth of fuel could be stored and there would also an airport, a telecommunications network, offices, and living quarters. The project was budgeted at CAD $100 million.

Though nobody lives in this corner of Baffin Island, its strategic placement along the Northwest Passage and the preexisting infrastructure made the government choose to construct a deep water port in Nanisivik rather than in the territorial capital of Iqaluit. Many had hoped this town of nearly 7,000 would receive a badly needed port, including Western Arctic Member of Parliament Dennis Bevington. Nunatsiaq News interviewed Bevington, who stated that a port in Iqaluit “would be vital infrastructure that could help the people of the Arctic reduce their costs and build a prosperous territory.” I interviewed Bevington by phone for a story on Northern infrastructure that I wrote for the magazine ReNew Canada in December 2010, and he expressed a similar sentiment about the port. I asked whether increasing military presence in Northern Canada was best way of improving infrastructure, and he said:

“Well, I think in some ways, what we’ve seen so far is that the military investments are not really designed to assist the development of community infrastructure or much needed Northern infrastructure. They are stand-alone investments. The government did that when it announced a deep-sea port in Nunavut at Arctic Bay, when what is really called for in Nunavut is a better port for Iqaluit. If the military had put that port in Iqaluit, we would have gotten combined use that could have been very valuable. We can’t afford separate investments in military infrastructure in the North. We need to have these things work for multiple purposes.”

Yet now, due to the downsizing of plans for the Nansivik Naval Facility, even the soldiers who will one day pass through might not have anything to write home about. In a letter to the Nunavut Impact Review Board on February 24, the Department of National Defence (DND) explained that the facility will only serve as a refueling station in the summer, and on top of that, fuel capacity will be halved. There will also be no accommodations to speak of, for there will only be one, unheated building. The telecommunications network will go undeveloped, too. Employees working at Nanisivik will have to use walkie-talkies or cell phones instead. The airfield will no longer be modernized, as the DND will rely on the Arctic Bay Airport, 13 miles to the south. In 2010, this airport became the region’s primary one after the territorial government lengthened its runway.

Arctic Bay Airport

In the House of Commons yesterday, Bevington spoke out against the government’s history of empty promises in the Arctic:

“Mr. Speaker, the Prime Minister’s promised Arctic naval base at Nanisivik has been downgraded to a fuel cache and an unheated shed.

In 2006, the Prime Minister promised to build a deepwater port at Iqaluit that could be used by the military. This would be vital infrastructure that could help the people of the Arctic reduce their costs and build a prosperous territory. Instead of photo ops and empty rhetoric, the government should have focused on getting the job done for northerners.

When is the government going to realize that the best way to protect the Arctic is by helping the people who call it home?”

The Honorable Julian Fantino, Associate Minister of National Defence, responded rather unconvincingly, “Mr. Speaker, Canada’s north is central to our government’s vision for Canada and the future. We continue to develop the Nanisivik station to serve as a docking and refuelling station for the Royal Canadian Navy and other government vessels operating in the north. Through our northern strategy, our government continues to increase Canada’s presence and sovereignty in the Arctic.”

The facility at Nanisivik, or what remains of it, is slated to open in 2016, three years behind the initial target of 2013. As of now, it should still be able to service the six to eight Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships the government is still planning to obtain.

The irony of it all is that while Bevington decried the downsizing, nobody is really outraged that the facility might not be built. That’s because Northerners will not reap too many benefits from its construction; instead, the military stands to be the main beneficiary. Were Iqaluit to have been selected as the construction site for the deepwater port, local support would have been much stronger and it would have been much more politically difficult for the government to backtrack. Now, it’s unclear whether anything will be built at all, what with the delays and cutbacks.

On the bright side, perhaps this incident will cause the government to focus more on investing in infrastructure that will either help either the local economy in the North or have dual-use purposes for both civilians and the military. The high costs of construction and the short length of the construction season make these the only sensible things to do. A report by the Federation of Canadian Municipalities issued in 2010 entitled “On the Front Lines of Canada’s Northern Strategy” spells out in great detail what is necessary for bringing the North up to speed with the South. The report concludes, “Well-managed military investments and commitments coordinated with northern municipal leaders can re-enforce local aspirations and activities and quality of life for Canada’s northern communities; poorly planned and hastily undertaken, they can and do have severe and negative impacts on northern communities and residents.”

The Nordic countries are declared the “gold standard” when it comes to integrating military and civilian investments. One key example is in Norway, where the military headquarters were moved to Bodø in November 2010. This demonstrates the government’s strong commitment to the North, which has a positive impact on both strategy and people. For instance, the Bodø Main Air Station, Norway’s largest, permits both civilian and military usage, making the country’s High North more accessible to all.

Bodø Air Station. (c) Herzi-1981

The real question Harper should be asking himself is, if Canada doesn’t use the Arctic, is it going to lose it? Probably not, but the North could continue to fall farther and farther behind in terms of development compared to both Canada’s South and other Arctic regions in the world.

News Links

“DND backtracks on Arctic naval facility,” CBC

“Nunavut’s incredible shrinking naval facility,” NunatsiaqOnline

“Western Arctic MP criticizes government plants for Nanisivik naval port,” NunatsiaqOnline

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), a research agency housed within of the U.S. Department of Defense, is looking to develop new remote sensing technologies in order to monitor the Arctic both above and below the ice and enhance regional maritime security. DARPA tends to support high-risk, high-reward projects with a futuristic bent. It has funded endeavors such as self-driving cars, weapons systems, and prosthetic limbs. For its Assured Arctic Awareness program (AAA), DARPA has budgeted $4 million to award to researchers with ideas on how to harness the difficult northern conditions to their technologies’ advantages. Awards will range from $250,000 to $500,000 for 6 to 9 month efforts, and testing will occur in laboratories simulating the Arctic environment.

DARPA is looking outside its agency walls for new ideas. John Kamp, a deputy program manager for DARPA, stated in a press release, “We seek to increase the diversity of contributors, including environmental research organizations, academia, traditional defense contractors and others.”

With AAA, DARPA is primarily concerned with developing technologies for under-ice and surface awareness. Under the sea ice, DARPA is especially interested in anti-submarine warfare technologies. Above the water, the agency aims to be able to track surface targets such as ships and ice. New technologies should be able to monitor a broad swath of area, such as the “entire summer ice extent or Northwest Passage.” The government has also set out the following thresholds and goals for new developments.

In its announcement, DARPA highlights distributed remote sensing (DRS) as one possible technology that could be applied in the Arctic. According to Distributed Remote Sensing for Naval Undersea Warfare: Abbreviated Version, which was published by the Naval Studies Board in 2007, DRS involves “a sensor field involving a number of fixed and/or moving nodes to conduct surveillance, detection, and localization of submarines or mines; communications links to transmit data from the sensor subsystem to a processing facility or unit; and a communications center to receive results from the processing facility or unit, to combine them with other intelligence for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and, in a time of hostilities, to cue available attack assets to locations where targets can be found more precisely and attacked or neutralized” (p. 1).

DRS and the other technologies DARPA hopes to investigate differ from many of the systems currently used to monitor the Arctic, which often rely on planes, satellites, ships and submarines. For instance, a NASA operation that’s in its fourth year, IceBridge uses daily flights from Thule and Kangerlussuaq, Greenland to Fairbanks, Alaska to survey sea ice. IceBridge requires a pilot to fly the plane across the western Arctic for a few hours a day, whereas DARPA aims to be able to monitor the Arctic autonomously and continuously, without interruption. These technologies will also differ from satellite-based remote sensing, since the actual sensors will be located in the Arctic. DARPA envisions that significant cost-savings could be achieved if traditional methods are forsaken given the vast distances in the Arctic that make the region expensive for manned missions to study.

Based on the agency’s announcement, it seems that the U.S. is preparing for a more militarized Arctic without actually sending its troops and ships there, let alone its mothballed icebreakers. Unmanned detection systems, robots, and distributed remote sensing are preferred over expensive manned platforms and bases. Whereas Canada is busy building its High Arctic Research Station and Nanisivik Naval Base and Russia is investing in new types of equipment for civilians and soldiers to use up north, the U.S. is investing in more futuristic remote surveillance technologies. If the Arctic remains a place where the military situation generally remains on the defense and no offensive warfare capabilities are needed, then DARPA’s investments could play out in America’s favor. New technologies could have civilian applications, such as maritime safety and sea ice monitoring, whereas a naval facility is less flexible unless it is built with a dual civilian-military purpose in mind.

Jonathan Hayward/The Canadian Press

I will be on vacation until March 19. In the meantime, check out Eye on the Arctic and the Barents Observer to stay up to date on northern happenings.

See you in two weeks!

Putin meets with reporters. (Alexei Druzhinin, RIA Novosti)

It is widely known that Russia and Canada are not the best of friends in the Arctic. They are the first and second largest countries in the region, and both base their Arctic policies heavily on the concept of sovereignty and the sanctity of territory. In part due to the lukewarm relations between the two countries, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has urged the creation of a joint scientific council with Canada in which potential continental shelf disputes could be discussed. There are no official disputes now, but one could occur if both Russia and Canada claimed an extension of the continental shelf more than 200 miles from their coastlines. Then, these two claims could overlap around the North Pole. Russia was the first country to submit its claims to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in December 2001, but they were rejected, and it has yet to submit its revisions. Canada has until next year to make its claims, so there remains some time before any disputes actually become official. In fact, Canada has a more defined and longstanding dispute with its southern neighbor, the U.S., over the Beaufort Sea.

Putin expressed his desire for a joint council in an interview with the editors of several international newspapers near his residence in suburban Moscow. Though the fact that Putin seeks a diplomatic forum seems positive for Arctic relations, there was an undercurrent of defensiveness to his comments. The Global and Mail reports that he stated, “The border of the continental shelf needs to be determined by scientists.” Later, he added, “You needn’t suspect us of some kind of unilateral action. Yes, we have been exploring the shelf. What’s wrong with that?”

Yet even if Putin’s comments might seem somewhat passive-aggressive to a Canadian, the fact of the matter is that Russia has been, and continues to, play by the rules. They managed to successfully resolve their maritime boundary dispute with Norway, although the latter country admittedly has invested a lot of time and resources into improving bilateral relations. Russia is now making an overture to Canada, but Stephen Harper probably won’t be as receptive as Jens Stoltenberg.

If the council doesn’t pan out, there is still one other arena in which Canada and Russia could meet in a friendly manner. John Stackhouse, Editor in Chief of the Globe and Mail, asked whether Putin would make a trip to Canada to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of a series of Soviet-Canada hockey matches. Putin responded that he had just invited several veteran Canadian hockey players to Russia, and that a reciprocal gesture would be “most welcome.” Hockey diplomacy, anyone?

News Links

“Geologists Ship Out, Hoping to Claim Piece of Arctic for Canada,” Science Insider

• Light and heavy Arctic surface-effect ships: 458 million rubles/$15.7 million
• Ground effect vehicles for the Far North: 70 million rubles $2.4 million
• High-speed sea and river catamarans (“Alligators”): 25 million rubles/$857,000
• Floating Production Storage Offloading vessels (FPSOs): 40 million rubles/$1.37 million

This directive to advance Russia’s northern air and maritime capabilities is part of the Development of Civilian Marine Engineering program, which started in 2009 and will last until 2016. With this program, Russia is attempting to revitalize the domestic shipbuilding industry to benefit both its military and civilian sectors, and particularly Arctic offshore oil development. Russia wants more equipment in the Arctic, and it wants it built at Russian ports – not abroad.

Industrial policy in the area of shipping is often a sensitive topic. When President Ronald Reagan ended the commercial shipbuilding subsidies in 1981, production moved to shipyards in places like South Korea, Japan, and China, where subsidies are still in effect, and the EU, where they were discontinued in 2000.  Most of Russia’s civilian ships are imported, and even the military ships the country builds often take longer than normal to construct. This results in the fleet receiving ships later than anticipated, making them become outdated more quickly, which Global Security describes in more detail. If Russia is to design more equipment at home, it will have to make sure that the actual development and construction process is made more efficient, too – a difficult task given the heavy hand of the Kremlin’s involvement.

Light and heavy Arctic surface-effect ships

By far, the majority of the tenders are being issued for the three- and ten-ton surface-effect ships. The heavy version will be able to carry up to thirty people and stand up to waves up to 2.5 meters high. They will also have cushions of pressurized air that allow the vehicles to overcome obstacles up to one meter high. Hovercraft, which are similar to surface-effect ships, have been used in Alaska for some time; a few years back, the Smithsonian had a small exhibit with a model AP.1-88 hovercraft that used to deliver mail to eight remote villages in the western portion of the state. Today, a company called Alaska Hovercraft, owned by Lynden, Inc., specializes in shipping in far-flung areas, like Alaska, western Canada, and Russia. The company leases and sells commercial-size hovercraft to move both people and cargo.

The Russian company Aerokhod produces the ”Khivus-10,” described as a light amphibious air-cushion boat. Aerokhod’s head, Yuri Shamanin, told the Voice of Russia that compared to aircraft, surface-effect ships can spend more time in remote areas. He added, “Limited navigation in ice and the shallow depths on the [continental] shelf just eliminate the use of large vessels.” He believes that “surface effect ships have long proved their reliability in the Arctic.” Certainly, this is not the first time a government has attempted to develop such vessels for widespread use in the Arctic. In the 1970s, the U.S. Naval Ship Research and Development Center published a book entitled, “Research and Development of New Seal Materials for Surface Effect Ships and Arctic Surface Effect Vehicles.” The ships are noisy and can consume a lot of gas, though, so in some cases, small and maneuverable ground-effect vehicles might be more practical.

A surface-effect ship. (c) RIA Novosti

Ground effect vehicles (ekranoplans)

Ground effect vehicles (GEVs) were a specialty of the USSR. They can only fly as as high as their wings are wide. Despite this limitation, they have several advantages over planes. They are faster, can carry relatively heavier payloads, and fly at low altitudes where radars cannot see them. The USSR used GEVs to transport soldiers at 340 miles per hour, generally across the Caspian Sea. The first time the vehicle was spotted by American surveillance satellites, it was dubbed the “Caspian Sea Monster.” Soviet ekranoplans were huge, and much bigger than the variants that are used in Alaska for commercial purposes. The website of Pacific Seaflight, an Alaskan company, shows that they at one point sought to pioneer the use of wing-in-ground effect planes as a type of passenger-ferry service in Alaska’s Inside Passage, where there are no roads between communities. This is a similar situation across much of the Arctic, where communities are scattered across wide distances. Since it doesn’t look like Pacific Seaflight’s plan ever took off, residents still have to rely on airplane flights or the Alaska Marine Highway System, which uses ferries to transport people. Russia is much larger than southeastern Alaska, of course, so ferry voyages would be somewhat impractical due to the length of time involved. Therefore, ground effect vehicles could have both military and commercial purposes in Russia.

High-speed sea and river catamarans, called “Alligators”

Catamarans have been used in the Arctic before. In 2009, a group of Russians sailed the Northern Sea Route on inflatable catamarans.

But the Kremlin is more interested in high-speed catamarans than inflatable ones. Such vehicles have been used by the Australian, American, and Indian navies. The U.S. is currently running the Joint High-Speed Vehicle Program, with 10 JHSV (fast catamaran) ships having been assigned to the Navy. The ships can move up to 35 knots and transports troops, equipment, and vehicles between theaters.

The Norwegian Navy also has six high-speed catamarans, called the Skjold Class Missile Fast Patrol Boats. They are small, and traveling up to speeds of 60 knots, they are also the fastest armed ships in the world. The Skjold ships carry a lot of weapons and are able to engage in combat at sea. Their air cushion catamaran design, which is based on technology used in surface effect ships, allows them to cut through waves more easily, as resistance is reduced. Additionally, the Skjold ships have covert operational capability, which, as Naval Technology points out, is useful given Norway’s topography. They can hide in the country’s many fjords and inlets while still surveilling the coastline. Though Russia’s coastline is different, these ships would still be useful for navigating along its lengthy shores.

A prototype of the Skjold at sea.

Finally, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police also employ a catamaran in their fleet: the RCMP Nadon. In fact, this ship traveled the Northwest Passage in the summer of 2000.

A catamaran in the Arctic. © canadianradioamateur.com

FPSO-class vessels

Floating Production Storage Offloading vessels (FPSOs) process and store hydrocarbons that have been extracted from offshore fields. The oil or gas are then be transferred to pipelines or ships and tankers, which take the resources to shore. FPSOs offer lots of flexibility in that they can moor in one place for a long time, but also sail to other sites. This is particularly beneficial in harsh operating environments like the Arctic, where the weather can quickly take a turn for the worse. If an oil field also ends up not producing a lot of hydrocarbons, the FPSO can simply move to another location. Many FPSOs stay in the same place for years, if not decades, if a field is productive. In one study, 5 out of 6 Norwegian FPSOs planned to stay at least five to ten years longer than originally planned, due to the high productivity of the field and the vessels’ longevity. FPSOs vary widely in price depending on their capabilities. They can cost anywhere from $55-700 million, so the amount Russia is offering seems to be a small investment. Rigzone, which offers a good primer on FPSOs, states that these types of vessels have been used in places like the North Sea, the Mediterranean, offshore Brazil and West Africa, in the Pacific Ocean around Asia. None have been used in Russia before. Most of the country’s oil production still takes place onshore, so the government’s desire to improve its infrastructure and its willingness to consider allowing more private companies to get involved in offshore drilling demonstrates its commitment to opening up this frontier.

Russia’s first Arctic offshore drilling platform, Prirazlomnaya, was towed into place in the Pechora Sea in September 2011, and drilling is expected to begin this year. As Oil and Gas reports, the platform was made using a part of an oil platform that had operated in the North Sea from 1984-2004. But some see Russia as trying to cut corners by using outdated infrastructure. In the cutting-edge industry of Arctic offshore drilling, where safety concerns are supposed to be one of the top priorities, it is worrying that Russia would use an old platform as the foundation of its first venture.

An FPSO at work in the ice near Svalbard.

Conclusion

Russia obviously wants to upgrade its aging Arctic infrastructure, but it is unclear from the case of the Prirazlomnaya platform whether it is willing to pay the price. The amounts it is offering in its tenders are low, too. But though in many areas, Russia has more equipment and infrastructure in the Arctic than countries like the U.S. or Canada, much of it is a relic from the Soviet Union, old, decaying, and poorly maintained. By far and away, Russia is still the leader in nuclear icebreakers, but as we saw, other countries like Norway have sleeker, faster boats which are useful in operating in the less-frozen areas of the Arctic. Revitalizing the domestic shipbuilding industry will also prove a hard task for Russia to accomplish alone. Inevitably, it will have to turn to other countries with more advanced experience to bring it up to speed. Whether the government will allow its shipbuilding and offshore oil industries to welcome foreign investors without too much red tape is the real question.

Results of the tenders will be announced on March 16.

News Sources

[1] http://www.i-mash.ru/news/nov_otrasl/20425-dlja-osvoenija-arktiki-rossii-nuzhny-novye-suda.html

“Russia eyes new generation [of] Arctic ships,” Voice of Russia

“Russia to conquer the Arctic with air-cushioned ships,” Izvestia (in Russian)