With more than 3 billion followers, Islam is one of the world’s three major monotheistic religions. Divided into two main categories, the majority of Muslims (between 80-90%) are Sunni, and the rest are Shiite. Historically, the biggest difference between the two groups was their belief as to who should succeed the Prophet Muhammad after his death in 632 AD. Whereas Sunnis believed the next caliph (leader of the Muslim community) should be elected by consensus of the ummah (Muslim community), Shiites believed a blood relative of Muhammad should lead the Muslims. Although not the only difference between the two sects, the historical debate over Muhammad’s successor catalyzed the divide between Sunnis and Shiites.

Ruled by Sharia law since the creation of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran has been the not-so-loved poster child for an Islamic government. Despite its name and government policies appearing daily in major media outlets, Iran does not represent the collective Muslim population. With a majority Shiite population, Iran constitutes a small percentage of the ummah.

Iran’s tumultuous relationship with the United States, specifically concerning Iran’s alleged violations of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), guides countries’ views of Iran and consequently the world’s views of Islam as a form of government. However, with its Shiite-ruled government, Iran cannot be viewed as a model for all current and potential future Islamic governments. Although the world may disagree with Iran’s violation of the spirit of the NPT and the government’s exorbitant human rights violations, it is unfounded to assume that Islam is the basis for Iran’s internationally deemed offenses.  It is more likely that a corrupt and politically-realist charged leader is the culprit.

Similarly, it is illogical to associate Iran’s wrongdoings and international image as an Islamic government as representing all Islamic based political groups. Unfortunately, the current political situation in Egypt, which involves an Islamic organization, the Muslim Brotherhood, is leading many to draw correlations between two dissimilar entities.

Founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood is arguably the world’s most influential Islamist organization. Its slogan, “Islam is the solution,” epitomizes the group’s religiosity. To the dismay of many in the international community, the Muslim Brotherhood has proved an influential force in the Egyptian government’s post-Arab Spring reformation.

Hassan al-Banna

In late 2011, The Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party won the majority of seats in Egypt’s Parliament. In early 2012, Saad al-Katatni, a senior member of the Muslim Brotherhood, was elected speaker of Egypt’s Parliament.

 Saad al-Katatni

With the Muslim Brotherhood already playing an influential role in Egyptian politics, the potential for an Egyptian president affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood has elicited international concern over the fate of the Egyptian government. Egypt’s presidential election is scheduled at the end of May. With a Muslim Brotherhood member running for president, many westerners fear Egypt’s evolution into an Islamic regime. Many wonder, “Will Egypt be the next Iran?”

While Egypt undoubtedly has the potential to install an Islamic government, it is unlikely that such a change in the Sunni dominated country would birth an alliance between Egypt and the Shiite Islamic Republic of Iran. The potential for anything exceeding rhetoric expressing solidarity between the two Middle Eastern powerhouses as Islamic regimes is unthinkable given the historic divide between Sunnis and Shiites. The more plausible, albeit equally worrisome, outcome is an Islamic Egyptian government eliminating the country’s 1979 peace treaty with Israel, the Camp David Accords.

While it is undeniable that the Muslim Brotherhood has its share of issues with legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, the future of the organization as the ruling political party in Egypt cannot be based on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s actions. Although it is impossible to look into a crystal ball and declare with certainty that a potential Islamic Egyptian government will not enter into an alliance with the Islamic Republic of Iran, the likelihood, based on the historic divide between Sunnis and Shiites, is about as good as winning the jackpot in Vegas.

Some days, as ordinary as they may seem, become revolutionary in our personal and professional life.  June 20, 2009 was such a day for me; and perhaps for many other Iranians. It was the day that a girl was shot to death in the streets of Tehran allegedly by forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI); they still take no responsibility for this murder. That day I was travelling to collect microfinance-related interviews from Bangladeshi families in remote villages. It was raining hard and already a week that we had set out into the heart of the country. While trying to understand Bangladesh, I would sometimes run off to a corner and wipe off a tear or two as I could not help but worry about my friends who were protesting in the streets of Tehran. I kept hearing bad news: “He got beaten up.”, “Did you hear they arrested her mom?”, “She had to run away from the plainclothes, fell down and was injured. Hospitals don’t take her.”

June 20, 2009 was different. It was a day when a part of me died with Neda. I felt as though life was a tough choice to make every second. As soon as I heard the news, I asked the driver to stop in the nearest village so that I could find some internet access and watch the video of her death. After searching for a long time, I was finally at a place where they claimed to have internet access. The video wouldn’t load. The internet was too slow. I finally managed to watch a few seconds of it; the part when blood gushed out of her eyes until they stopped. I threw up. The translator who was with me said, “Oh no, the water must have been spoiled at lunch” I looked up and said, “It must have.”

It was time to go to visit a new household in this village to inquire about if and how microfinance had changed their lives. We entered the humble house. They were eager to see us. As I was taking out my camera and getting ready for the interview, the man of the family came to greet me. He said in broken English, “I have heard you are from Iran. You are our Muslim sister. Ahmadinejad is our hero. Who are these rebels who keep coming in the streets and make trouble with the support of the evil America? He is an amazing man. We wish he was our president. He is standing up against the US for all of us. It is about time. Make yourself at home, Iranian sister!”

I tried to look down and to nod. But I was not certain if I could stay calm. I wanted to grab his shirt, look straight into his eyes and say, “I am not your Muslim sister, Iranian sister and I am also one of those ‘rebels’ who would have been in the streets of Tehran, if I could.” I only managed to say, “The story is not as simple as you think in Iran, sir! Thank you for having us at your lovely house. Let us begin our conversation about the microfinance loan that you received.”

On the way back from this family’s house, I stayed silent for hours. I had to think. I had to come to terms with Bangladesh’s love for Mr. Ahmadinejad; and not let their love for him make me hate this whole country. He was or is a hero to them. During my time in Bangladesh, I had many similar encounters. Many invited me to their houses and fed me wonderful food just because I was from the nation of their hero; Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In all the developing countries (Muslim or non-Muslim) that I have been so far, many have stopped me to praise him. Nobody necessarily praises the IRI as a whole; they all praise him.

Having accepted this reality, I can now put emotions aside and ask, “Why is he their hero?” How did Ahmadinejad manage to reach the hearts of millions throughout the world while millions were protesting his re-election in Iran?  It seems that he is a hero because he stands up against the US in defense of Muslims and others who have felt repressed by the West for centuries. His words and bold statements inspired hope and confidence in the heart of many people throughout the world who have, for centuries, felt unjustly unheard by the West.

Not only Ahamdinejad and others who rule over the country have made Iran exclusively their own , they have also made the non-Western world their own. It is not the world that is responsible to know about the reality of the situation in Iran. It is our responsibility to tell them with the voice that appeals to them. We have to learn the art of public diplomacy from Ahmadinejad. We have to speak the language of Muslims and others throughout the world to be heard not as the angry opposition; but as human beings who peacefully claim their land, rights and freedom.

We have to learn from Ahmadinejad. We have to speak out and do so calmly and confidently. As long as we write and talk only in Western tribunes, our voice will be misunderstood in the rest of the world. The world often calls us “westernized” for claiming our basic rights. This is partly the fault of the government and the world. But, it is also our fault. We have forgotten to speak the language of the world. Our struggle has become confined in phrases such as “human rights” that sadly bears negative and seemingly western connotations for many. We have to learn from Ahmadinejad and speak a language that appeals beyond the jargons of human rights. We have to begin to talk in the language of the world. For instance, the world might not appreciate “human rights”, but it certainly understands “justice”. Let us tell our stories in the name of justice instead of human rights. Let us remember that the world goes beyond only the US and Europe. The rest of the world has yet to hear the story of injustices in Iran. If we relate our story to their language and contextualize it from their perspective, they will not walk away with indifference.  Let us learn the art of public diplomacy from Ahmadinejad: appealing to your audience while telling a story of your own.

Modeled after a similar movement in Egypt, Mad Graffiti Iran’s simple albeit powerful medium, stenciling, was a means for average people worldwide to show their solidarity with Iranians’ struggle for fundamental human rights. Social media was the platform for the global invite to join Mad Graffiti and acted as a forum to exchange ideas during the campaign, which took place from April 1st to April 7th. The movement’s organizers provided information about political prisoners, instructional videos to create stencils, and locations of embassies and other places to stencil their messages. Participants were encouraged to post photos and videos of their artwork on the group’s Facebook page.

Among the four stencils provided by the movement was Bahai 7, which aimed to raise awareness about persecuted minority groups. In 2008, Iran arrested seven members of the Baha’i faith. In 2009, they were charged with spying for Israel and sentenced to 20-years imprisonment. Collectively, they have spent more than 10,000 days incarcerated

In coordination with Mad Graffiti, United for Iran launched a global campaign to free the seven imprisoned Baha’i members. Twelve international cities including Washington DC, Paris, and Berlin used mobile billboards to educate the masses about the unjustly imprisoned Baha’i members.

 Mobile Billboard in Washington, DC

Two stencils provided by the movement were of female political prisoners Nasrin Sotoudeh, a leading human rights lawyer, and Bahareh Hedayat, a women’s rights activist.

Arrested in September 2010 on charges of conspiring to harm national security, Nasrin Sotoudeh was sentenced to 11 years in prison. She was barred from practicing law and leaving Iran for 20 years. More than 20,000 supporters have united with Amnesty International’s campaign to free Nasrin.

In December 2009, months after the highly contested Iranian presidential election, Bahareh Hedayat, a well-known student activist was arrested for the fifth time in four years. The following year Hedayat, a leading member of Iran’s pro-democracy student movement, was sentenced to 9.5 years imprisonment for her participation in peaceful protests and other civil activities. Currently, the Free Bahareh Hedayat Facebook page has just over 5,000 likes.

By raising awareness about human rights issues in Iran the Mad Graffiti Campaign and United For Iran Movement are among many grassroots efforts provoking people worldwide to question government actions and demand change.

Although Human Rights Day is celebrated each December to commemorate the signing of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, human rights violations occur daily. As such, it is crucial that we not only celebrate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights but that we as global citizens work daily to ensure that its provisions are upheld.

The majority of Kurds are Sunni Muslims, and since the 1979 Islamic Revolution brought a Shiite regime to power in Iran, Kurds have experienced religious exclusion and oppression. During the 1990s, a fleeting amicable relationship between the Kurds and Iranian government existed, but the relationship soured after Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005. Ahmadinejad’s detention, torture, and execution of Kurds provoked mass riots and protests. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), that same year, Iran executed ninety-five Kurds. The UNHCR reported 117 Kurds executed in 2006, 317 in 2007, and approximately 370 in 2008.

Kurds’ struggle to attain independence in Iran raises questions about the state’s right of sovereignty. Simultaneously, the Iranian government’s oppression and mistreatment of Kurds undermines the government’s legitimacy. Although states are legally the sovereign of their territory, it is arguable that all affected parties in Iran would benefit from a similar setup to that in Iraq. Operating as an autonomous region in Northern Iraq, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) seems to be an ideal compromise for Kurds seeking independence and a federal government wanting to protect its sovereignty. In this model, the KRG manages the domestic affairs of its territory. The Iraqi Government controls all aspects of international affairs. Although the answer to Iran’s Kurdish quandary may not mirror the Iraqi model, it is imperative for the Iranian government to realize that the solution to its Kurdish issue is not jailing, torturing and/or condemning opposition to death.

Currently, there are at least twenty-one Kurdish political prisoners on death row. The mid-March transfer of one of Iran’s Kurdish death-row inmates to Semnan Prison provoked Amnesty International to report a fear for the prisoner’s imminent execution. Arrested in September 2009, Habibollah Golparipour was sentenced to death in March 2010 after being convicted of moharebeh, translated to mean enmity against God, a capital offense in the Islamic Republic. Golparipour’s arrest and subsequent conviction resulted from his alleged membership in and activities with the Party For Free Life of Kurdistan (PJAK), a banned Kurdish resistance group.

Despite protests and petitions to free Golparipour after his arrest and sentencing more than two years ago, the international community has not stirred in response to recent news. Just shy of 4,000 “likes” on Facebook, the petition to save Golparipour from death has not been updated in two years. A YouTube video of a surprised kitten, uploaded one month after Golparipour’s arrest, has more than 250,000 “likes” and continues to garner daily comments. It is indeed a sad commentary on our world’s priorities.

Launched in Israel on March 16, 2012 by Ronny Edry and his wife Michal Tamir, a Facebook phenomenon rose from the posting of one picture advertising a simple message: Love.

Edry’s photograph attracted a like-minded Israeli audience that created similar posters. The media-generated messages made their way to the streets of Iran, and Iranians responded in kind.

In response to mass support for the Facebook photo campaign, Edry uploaded a YouTube video starring the world’s most important actor –the average person. With more than half a million supporters, similar videos and photographs continue to circulate on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Pinterest, and other social-media platforms.

Now in its third week, the movement includes Iranians, Israelis, Americans, and others who are taking it upon themselves to work to achieve something governments talk about but have yet to make sufficient efforts to attain: world peace.  People from all backgrounds are overlooking the differences that many argue make countries incapable of compromise. Instead, people are embracing their shared connection as humans who desire a bright future for themselves, their countries, and the world.

Full of posts and images uploaded by Iranians, the Iran Loves Israel webpage portrays Iran as something other than an intolerant and war-driven society, something starkly different from the images conjured in recent months by major news sources. At the core of the Iran Loves Israel movement is a humanistic mission statement that evokes feelings of solidarity and hope.

“The people of Iran, like our counterparts in Israel, are vibrant, creative, and forward-thinking. We need a transparent arena where ideas can be exchanged, thoughts developed, and discourse inspired by our similarly ancient cultures. Although many countries in the Middle East suffer from debilitating international stereotypes, we can unite to transform the media’s image of us as violent and intolerant aggressors to loving and cooperative partners. As we go through the crucible of our inherited animosities, we can burn away our superficial differences and together emerge with a greater understanding of humanity.”

“We don’t hate you,” is the simple, yet powerful statement at the forefront of the worldwide movement. However, despite its hopeful message, the very idealist notion of a peace treaty between Iran and Israel resulting from the Israel Loves Iran and Iran Loves Israel campaigns is unlikely.

While the Israel Loves Iran movement developed and continues to grow in the streets of Israel’s cities, members of the Iran Loves Israel campaign hide behind the anonymity of shadows and signs in their videos and photographs.

This is not a testament to Iranians lacking desire for change. Rather, it is the result of fear. Whereas Israelis do not fear the repercussions from standing up against their government, Iranians do.

As the Islamic Republic of Iran’s human rights abuses continue to be a central issue for the international community and the United Nations Human Rights Council, it is no wonder that Iranians fear brutality, imprisonment, and execution.  Although expatriate Iranians may feel comfortable showing their faces in conjunction with the Iran Loves Israel movement, it is understandable that many living in Iran are afraid to take more than a virtual stance against their government.

The ultimate question is whether a movement to change government policy can be successful if its supporters remain faceless. Despite inherent obstacles preventing immediate alterations in Iran’s domestic and foreign policies, the movement does have potential. Just as Rome was not built in a day, effective change cannot be achieved in a short time. However, with the backing of the international community, Iranians continued efforts have the potential, in the long-term, to yield positive results.

So here we go again. Nine years after the invasion of Iraq, the mainstream press marches in step to the melodies of our Pied Pipers of war — politicians and media pundits beholden to a world view that perpetually pits the United States against a host of irrational bad guys. The latest target of the “bomb our way to a more peaceful world ” lobby is our old ally Iran.

An alarming number of American legislators are promoting a preemptive military solution to the Iran nuclear problem. Unfazed by a decade of war that has contributed to the depletion of the national treasury and the loss of thousands of American lives these proponents for kinetic action are becoming more vocal by the day. Leader of the pack, Senator Carl Levin, recently called for a military blockade of Iran, a clear act of war that would likely yield a retaliatory response. President Obama expressed concern about the swelling pro-war wave stating recently –

“I’m reminded that the decision that I have to make in terms of sending our young men and women into  battle, and the impacts that has on their lives, the impact it has on our national security, the impact it has on our economy. This is not a game. There’s nothing casual about it. And when I see some of these folks who have a lot of bluster and a lot of big talk”.

According to a New York Times article published a few days ago, American intelligence agencies continue to believe that there is no concrete evidence that the Iranian regime has even decided to build a nuclear bomb. The officials said that their assessment was largely reaffirmed in a 2010 National Intelligence Estimate and that it remains the consensus view of America’s 16 intelligence agencies. So if intelligence experts assess that the Iranians are likely only “thinking about it” why all the pre-game hype surrounding Iran? Are we forgetting that Iran is a developing country that spends less than 10% of what the U.S. spends annually on combat arms.

Though by every metric Iran does not pose a serious threat to the United States, the press merrily plays along with the pro-war orchestra rarely challenging the dominant “the Iranians are out to get us!” mantra. Not to mention the fact that Iran has not invaded any other country in the modern era nor does it possess the power projection capacity the pundits would like us to believe. Israel, our closest ally in the region is more than capable of defending itself, and by the way, Israel does have the trump card in this game – an active nuclear weapons program.

Listening to the “war is imminent” commentary one would think that Iran already had a couple of nuclear tipped missiles in stand-by mode with the coordinates of Israeli cities dialed in. Why does the press corps continue to check its brain at the doors of congress, neglecting to ask even the most rudimentary questions that would yield responses revealing glaring holes in the Pied Pipers’ story line. Sadly, lessons have not been learned from our Iraqi misadventure and corporate media editorial rooms have not broken the bad habit of going along with the flow when it comes to matters of war and peace. Indeed, the press continues to favor the more sensational strands of journalism – scaring the masses and abdicating their responsibility to;

- Facilitate the airing of diverse opinions and contrary points of views
- Fact check and to investigate
- Keep public officials accountable

It has been said that the press is the “fourth power”, keeping the executive, legislature and judiciary powers honest. Americans deserve a more critical media, one that acts responsibly in matters of war and one that makes a serious efforts to question the establishment. Americans deserve a media that is not afraid to ask the Pied Pipers of war tough questions – our lives might well depend on it.

Sources: Defense spending data is from Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation (2009). Image: IndependentWorld.com.

While US and Israeli leaders were talking tough on Iran at last week’s AIPAC Policy Conference, reports and rumors began swirling that Iran may very well be closer to the bomb than previously believed. Some foreign intelligence agencies are now beginning to say that in 2010, Iran may have been involved in an experimental detonation of a uranium bomb in North Korea.

The accusation was first made public by senior German defense figure, Hans Ruhle, and first appeared on the website of the German newspaper Die Welt. Ruhle headed the planning department of the German Defense Ministry from 1982 to 1988.

Ruhle told Die Welt, “Intelligence services have observed a close degree of co-operation between North Korean and Iranian experts over a period of years for the preparation of a nuclear test.”

On why Iran would coordinate with North Korea, Ruhle said, “What if Iran were prepared to do a nuclear test? And if it were done not on Iranian territory, but instead without looking back at world opinion, done where nuclear tests always took place, where people stood ready to export nuclear expertise and technology in exchange for hard currency–in North Korea?”

Jspace reached out to several security experts to find out more about the Iranian-North Korean connection and the joint test. Danielle Pletka, Vice President of the Foreign and Defense Policy Studies Department at the American Enterprise Institute, a Washington DC-based think tank, told Jspace News, “I believe there is some certainty that Iranians were present at one of the nuclear tests … the challenge is understanding why Iranians were present. Were the norks [North Koreans] testing for Iran? Or with Iran? It requires much more intel to know that, and I’m not aware of any to indicate for.” North Korea openly acknowledged that they tested nuclear weapons in 2006 and 2009.

The Israeli online intelligence and security news service, Debkafile, which is known to at times report over the top conspiracy theories, reported that it was possible that the tested bomb was a “dirty bomb.” A dirty bomb is one that has a regular-sized explosion, but disseminates radioactive material in to the air.

Commenting specifically on the issue of a dirty bomb, Michael Eisenstadt, Director of the Military and Security Studies Program at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, another Washington DC-based think tank, told Jspace News, “Radiological weapons are greatly overrated. And the Iranians don’t need North Korea to test one of these for them. They involve a small conventional explosion that would disseminate radioactive material over a couple of city blocks at most.”

He continued, “These stories have legs only because people don’t understand what radiological weapons are … I have no idea whether it happened or not, but the risk posed by radiological weapons are greatly overstated. Anything having to do with radiation puts people in a panic. And Iran doesn’t need North Korea’s help with this … but I suppose it could have happened.”

While security experts are fairly certain there has been coordination on the nuclear front between Iran and North Korea, the level of coordination is largely unknown. However, the whole situation begs the question of how President Barack Obama and Israeli leadership will respond. If the speeches given at AIPAC were any indication, the development of strategies for an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities is likely being sped up.

President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (AP / Pablo Martinez Monsivais)

Anyone casually following the news of Israel recently would assume that the question is not if, but when, Israel will attack Iran. No Israeli leader seems to be able to speak publicly without mentioning the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program and Israel’s need to prevent it from moving forward.

President Obama just gave an exclusive interview to Jeffrey Goldberg, who wrote the book (well, article) on Israel invading Iran, seemingly to convince him, Israel, and the American Jewish voters that he will stand up to Iran. His most memorable quote from the article was the simple warning to Iran that he “doesn’t bluff.”

The U.S., along with long-coveted international support, has only recently upped the ante when it comes to biting economic sanctions being levied against Iran. President Obama is asking for time to gauge their effectiveness. Prime Minister Netanyahu is not sure that there is enough time left.

It is clear that the two states, for similar and deviating rationales, do not want to see a nuclear armed Iran. Bibi believes, or deserves an Oscar for his portrayal of someone who believes, that a nuclear armed Iran is a guarantee of a second Holocaust. He has made it clear that this will not happen on his watch.

President Obama, despite what some of his critics currently duking it out for the GOP nomination claim, also does not want to see the annihilation of Israel. This much he has made clear, not only in words, but in deeds. But his fears of a nuclear armed Iran go beyond that. President Obama has staked out a platform of non-proliferation. While his policy has stalled significantly to date, a nuclear armed Iran all but ensures a nuclear arms race in the most volatile region on the planet.

If Iran becomes a nuclear power, there is every reason to think that Turkey, Saudi Arabia and potentially Jordan and/or Egypt will believe it necessary to follow suit. This is not good for Iran, this is not good for Israel, this is not good for the region, and this is certainly not good for the U.S. Non-proliferation concerns aside (in other words, forget the philosophical concept of less nukes good, more nukes bad), a nuclear armed Middle East is a sure to push that Doomsday Clock forward by a couple of minutes. If it strikes midnight, we are all toast, and it’s currently at 11:55pm. Presumably that midnight hour is something that most rational people might want to prevent.

The major difference between Obama and Netanyahu when it comes to a nuclear armed Iran is where they draw their line in the sand. Netanyahu draws his line at nuclear-capable, while the U.S. feels there is slightly more breathing room. There is still a red line resting firmly before nuclear armed. How far before is less clear.

Several prominent Israeli leaders, including a number of past heads of Israeli intelligence agencies, have come out against attacking Iran. But Israel as a state has been very clear on their commitment to using military force to prevent the nuclear arming of Iran should it come to that.

A new poll came out this week however, that had some surprising findings on the subject. While Israel as a state may be prepared to attack Iran, Israel as a people are decisively not, at least not without American support. Despite years of saber rattling on the part of the Netanyahu government in the hopes of convincing the world that this needs to happen without hesitation, he has apparently not convinced anywhere near a plurality of Israelis on the subject. According to the poll, a whopping 81% of Israelis do not favor attacking Iran without American consent and support. Pretty decisive numbers to say the least. And it is worth mentioning that the Israelis are not a people prone to worrying what others think about them. They have typically acted in their own best interests without spending too much time worrying about international public opinion. The poll also found that if America were to approve the strike, two thirds of Israelis would support moving forward.

The Jewish state was created to protect the Jewish people from a world that had failed it (depending of course on who you ask). The very fact that Israelis are willing to put such a massive decision on any other country, even such a tested and true ally, says a lot about the actual risk that most Israelis feel from Iran. If they honestly believed that Iran was seeking a nuclear weapon and that once they had achieved said nuclear weapon, they would immediately strap in onto the nearest warhead and send it off towards Tel Aviv, they would probably be a lot less concerned with what anyone, allies or otherwise, thought of their plans. A more in-depth study would have to be done to fully understand the psyche of the Israeli people on the issue, but it is clear that a nuclear armed Iran is not keeping them up nights the way that some in the Israeli government would have the world believe.

With that in mind, maybe Prime Minister Netanyahu and his cabinet should spend less time trying to convince the world that Iran must be attacked immediately to ward off imminent genocide, and more time taking the pulse of their constituents. Sometimes a leader speaks for his people. And sometimes he needs to stop speaking, and start listening.

Follow me on twitter @jlemonsk

http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/24/battle-for-power-in-iran/9ojx

Mehrzad Boroujerdi is Associate Professor of Political Science at Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs where he also serves as the Founding Director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program and Founding Co-Director of the Religion, Media and International Relations Program.

Karim Sadjadpour is an associate at the Carnegie Endowment. Iranian politics and society; Iran‘s nuclear program; Iranian foreign policy; and Iran‘s role in Iraq.

Ali Alfoneh is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. His research areas include civil-military relations in Iran with a special focus on the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in the Islamic Republic.

Mehdi Khalaji is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on the politics of Iran and Shiite groups in the Middle East.

John R. Bradley

From John R. Bradley, the Middle East correspondent and writer who correctly predicted the Egyptian revolution, comes a new message about the Arab Spring: “everything we have been told about it is wrong”. John R. Bradley sat down with Reza Akhlaghi, Senior Writer at FPA, to discuss his latest book: ‘After the Arab Spring: How Islamists Hijacked the Middle East Revolts’
Published by Palgrave Macmillan

Your book paints a bleak picture of what is coming the Middle East’s way following the Arab Spring. Much of what you say in your book runs counter to Robin Wright’s overarching argument in her acclaimed book ‘Rock the Casbah’, in which she essentially says that Arabs increasingly defy religious extremism and the doctrines of Islamic fundamentalism as espoused by Bin Laden and Ayatollah Khomeini. Whereas in your book, in sharp contrast to Wright’s, you argue that what will emerge from current developments in the region is Islamic extremism and wholesale defeat of the liberal and intellectual class in the Arab/Muslim world. Can you elaborate on this central argument?

I wouldn’t dispute the assertion, however odd it might be, that “Arabs increasingly defy religious extremism and the doctrines of Islamic fundamentalism as espoused by Bin Laden and Ayatollah Khomeini.” In fact, I would argue–and always have argued in my books–that the vast majority of Arabs have never had any interest in being terrorists, and that it’s patently absurd, to the point of being offensive, to suggest otherwise even rhetorically. Moreover, what exactly did Bin Laden and Khomeini have in common? Precisely nothing as far I can see. In any case, even to accept that argument does not by default mean we should assume Arabs are embracing the classic Western values of liberalism, pluralism, and freedom of expression. That’s an almighty conclusion to jump to, and it has no basis in logic. It’s like saying because they believe the sky is blue they, by extension, believe that sand is orange. Moreover, the argument is just hot air anyway, because it’s not justified by any of the facts on the ground.

For a start, these revolutions–or more accurately these lousy failed revolutions and military coups–were not motivated by a thirst for free-and-fair elections, but by economic desperation and the question of personal dignity. Now, obviously, no one wants to be tortured for speaking his or her mind, whether they are in Paris or Tunis. But to suggest that people of other cultures who speak other languages and have other belief systems and distinct social and political histories merely want to be like us in the West is far too simplistic, and to me smacks of cultural imperialism of the kind that the likes of Robin Wright are always guilty of. Why on earth wouldn’t they want to be just like us? But they don’t. And perhaps, just once in a while, we should have the humility to ask: why on earth should they?

In Tunisia you will find almost no one who has a bad word to say about Habib Bourghiba, the authoritarian post-independence leader who ruled from 1956 to 1987. And in Egypt, Gamal Abdul Nasser–who, like Bourghiba, restricted freedom of the press and democratic and civil institutions–is widely adored. I’ve lost count over the past two decades how many ordinary Tunisians and Egyptians I’ve asked about this, and their responses have always been the same: they are loved because they respected the dignity of their people and were not personally corrupt, and during their rule it was not difficult to bring food to the table. The question of whether or not they were elected has never entered into the discussion.

You argue that democracy, not its values, is a great friend of Islamists who may have no regard for democratic values but can greatly benefit from them particularly in the form of strong voter turnout who, based on your assertion, are the most active segment of the electorate in the Arab world. To quote directly from your book “In the Arab world, when the gift of democracy is unwrapped, it is the Islamists who spring out of the box”. Once in power, why should Islamists disregard democracy and derail the democratic process in their respective countries with no fear of socio-economic consequences particularly in an interconnected world and an increasingly interdependent global trade system?

I don’t argue that there is a contradiction between political Islam and the democratic process. I don’t in fact see any contradiction at all between the two. Have democratic elections not been a reality in Iran for the past three decades? A less frequently asked, but far more pressing, question is whether liberalism and creative dissent, the lifeblood of any culture worth living in, can survive the democratic triumph of Islamist fundamentalism. And the answer, as the case of Iran also tells us, is equally and categorically: no. The Arab Spring marks the last, tragic gasp of any hope for free expression and legal protection of personal liberties in the Arab world, as we understand those concepts in the West. The Islamists are for democracy as a system of government and a method of change but–and here comes the conversation stopper–only insofar as it is compatible with Islam. The Quran remains the sole authoritative basis for legislation, whose earthly manifestation are the scholars who interpret it so that the state’s function is essentially executive in nature. To put it in a nutshell: Islam is the answer to everything, the final authority, and the sole source of legitimacy of government.

So ask the Islamists anything about maintining close ties to the West and peace treaties with Israel and they’ll tell you just what you want to hear. But Islamicizing their societies from below, not reassessing foreign policy or banning elections, has always been their top priority, and while they accept for the most part the deomcratic process, they put in safeguards that no legislation can be introduced which contradicts the Sharia (however it is interpreted). On the question of freedom of expression and personal behavior, there is, therefore, always the massive qualifier of “local customs” and “Islamic norms” from the committed Islamists. Consider, for example, the response of Rachid Ghanouchi, the leader of Tunisia’s notoriously moderate Ennahda party, to the violent attacks on secular artists in his country during the past year. “Art is linked to the values and traditions of each society,” he said, “and no one should take away freedom of expression through art, as long as it reflects those traditions (my emphasis).” In other words: provided they do not bulge, or threaten to bulge, or threaten to lead to behavior that bulges, out of the cultural straitjacket of whatever he and self-appointed scholars like him think of as Islam.

Hazem Saleh Abu Ismail, a Salafi presidential candidate in Egypt and vocal supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, at least did us all a favor last month by cutting through the nonsense. When asked to elaborate on the importance of personal liberties and individual rights in countries governed by Islamic law, he was gobsmacked: “If you claim that Allah considers your personal freedom, show me your reference,” he said. “Nobody has ever said that—except for people who have no understanding of Sharia.”

Why do you think that the Arab/Muslim youth care little for democratic values and that the only reasons they took to the streets were poverty, hunger, and lack of access to descent jobs? Do you think they will get that from the Islamists whom you argue will be ruling them in a new post-Arab Spring Middle East?

Let’s look at what’s actually happened during the last year. When the first deadline for voter registration passed in July, a paltry 16 percent of Tunisians had bothered to register. We were constantly told that there was an 80 percent turnout for the elections, but that was 80 percent of the 50 percent who eventually registered after the deadline was extended. In other words, there was a 40 percent turnout. In Egypt in March, there was a turnout of just 41 percent for a crucial referendum on a new constitution that would determine the country’s future. Again, that’s 41 percent of registered voters, meaning–because millions of Egyptians aren’t registered–only about 20-25 percent actually turned out. An extensive study by researchers at Oxford University last month found that only 16 percent of Libyans are now in favour of Western-style democracy, as opposed to 60 percent who prefer authoritarian rule.

There are two reasons this reality is not reflected in the Western media’s appalling coverage of the so-called Arab Spring. The first is that, because of the continued influence of Edward Said’s Orientalism, no one wants to sound like some reactionary old Orientalist labeling the Arabs as culturally and politically distinctive, because it easily lends to charges–however unfounded–that they are being labeled inferior. The second is that the Western “experts” like Robin Wright home in on a tiny little band of English-speaking bloggers, activists, human-rights campaigners and so on. The Muslim Brotherhood always dismisses this group as “an out of touch, irrelevant, Westernized elite;” and while I don’t usually have much time for what the Muslim Brotherhood has to say, on this question they are absolutely right. In Egypt, for example, the parties set up by the revolutionaries got just 2 percent of the vote, as opposed to 77 percent for the Islamists–25 percent of which went to the Salafi party,Al-Nour, that openly campaigned on the promise of doing away with elections if they were voted in.

In the face of all this overwhelming evidence to the contrary, how much longer can the absurd happy-clappy, Facebook, picnic-in-the-park narrative of the Arab Spring continue? I suppose until all the pundits who got it completely wrong from the outset have no choice but to admit the fact. And that means it will likely continue forever. But now that it’s obvious the revolutions have created a security vacuum and clearly failed to alleviate the economic woes and human rights abuses that spawned them—indeed, in the case of Egypt and Tunisia, quite the opposite—the Islamists offer something seductive in the absence of meaningful solutions: a simple answer, Islam is the solution. The Islamists certainly don’t have viable economic policies. But nor do those in charge of Western democracies.

In Tunisia and Egypt before the Arab Spring, youth unemployment was about 30 percent. But in Spain it was 50 percent, and in Greece, Italy and Portugal it was 45 percent. How then was a quick and messy transition to democracy ever going to solve that problem, whoever was elected? The Islamists instead offer solace in the face of these frankly insurmountable problems. The terrible price that the ordinary people of these countries will have to pay for that solace will only gradually become evident to them, as it did to the historically very liberal and tolerant Iranian people.

I guess this could be called the $4 billion question, both literally and metaphorically. What was the rationale for the Saudi leadership, as you claim in your book, to give $4 billion to the new post-Mubarak military regime in Cairo? You also assert that this infusion of cash was followed by “indirect threats” to the interim military regime. What were some of those “threats”?

Actually, while they promised $4 billion, only about $500 million has materialized. There’s nothing odd in that. Only about 10 to 20 percent of aid ever pledged by any donors for whatever cause ends up being sent. The Saudis were only interested in gaining leverage, and one way of doing that is by holding out the carrot of economic aid for the bankrupt military to run after. Then, as you suggest, there’s the stick. This mainly came in the form of threatening to change the kingdom’s labor laws in a way that would have resulted in the expulsion of millions of Egyptian expatriate workers from Saudi Arabia, which would have had an immediate and devastating impact on the Egyptian economy. That didn’t happen, either. In any case, the Saudis can now relax: the Egyptian military clearly is not in any way itself revolutionary, and the Wahhabis have installed, through extensive funding, their Muslim Botherhood and Salafi proxies in Egypt’s new parliament. One thing we can be certain of is that they will not offer a peep of criticism of the Saudi regime. They never have.

In the new evolving Middle East to be soon dominated, based on your assertion, by Islamic fundamentalists, will and should Israel’s strategic objectives and security calculus change?

At the beginning of the Arab Spring, Israel breathed a sigh of relief. Tunisia doesn’t matter geopolitically one way or another, but Egypt of course does. And in Egypt there was a military coup. The Egyptian military is very pro the 1979 peace treaty with Israel, and its army is funded, trained, and equipped by America. The triumph of the Islamists in Egypt’s parliamentary elections doesn’t change things much vis-à-vis Israel, at least not in the short term. The parliament has limited powers, and all this talk about the Muslim Brotherhood taking on the military to push them to hand over to civilian rule is nonsense. With real power comes responsibility and accountability, and while the Muslim Brotherhood may be many things, one thing they certainly are not is stupid. As I’ve already suggested, with the cleanest, most efficient government the world has ever known, it would take a generation or more to cleanse the country of its corruption, brutality, poverty, illiteracy, chronic unemployment, nepotism, and so on. This is one reason the Brotherhood are more interested in forming a coalition with the liberal block in the new parliament than with the Salafis: that way, when the next elections come round, they can blame the liberals for the ills that still plague their nation. And the Brotherhood will avoid direct confrontation with the military because their first priority is not the defense budget or launching wars but imposing Islamist dogma on the Egyptian society, and that is what will preoccupy them during the first parliamentary session.

More generally, Israel is putting all its hopes on its undeclared and bizarre, but very real, alliance with Saudi Arabia, which, despite spewing anti-Semitic venom of the kind not seen since the Nazis, poses no military threat to the Jewish state. The Saudis are also aligned with Washington and hate the Iranian mullahs like the plague. Along with Qatar, Saudi Arabia has led a region-wide counterrevolution, shoring up pro-Western Persian Gulf monarchies as well as those of Jordan and Morocco, and backing the Muslim Brotherhood and its franchises in Tunisia, Syria, and Yemen. The question we can’t answer at this stage is whether the Saudis, through their funding and Wahhabi doctrine, will be able to control the Islamist groups taking power everywhere in relation to their relations with the West and Israel, in the same way the House of Saud has more or less been able to control their own Wahhabi religious establishment.

Do you think a new Middle East dominated by Sunni Arab governments will experience a Sunni-Shiite conflict?

On the government level yes. The main reason Washington has backed the Saudi-led counterrevolution, which is to say the move by Sunni Islamist parties to fill the post-Arab Sring vacuum, is to contain Iran. But ordinary Arabs have little time for such distinctions, despite the anti-Shia propaganda campaigns they have been bombarded with over the past five or so years. If Israel and America attack Iran, ordinary Arabs will side with the latter. It will be interesting to see how the Saudi- and Qatari-aligned Sunni parties throughout the region will try to box themselves out of that corner.

What, in your opinion, would it really take to see Kant and Sartre being taught at Saudi universities?

A miracle of the kind the world has never seen before.

The following is an announcement by Amnesty International.

(New York) – Iran has unleashed a wave of repression in the lead up to parliamentary elections this week, Amnesty International reports today, targeting everyone from students, lawyers, religious leaders and bloggers to political activists and their relatives. The authorities have launched a new “cyber army” and blocked internet and social media networks to cut off access to the outside world.

“The Iranian authorities have unleashed their ‘cyber army’ in an effort to cut off their citizens’ access to information,” said Suzanne Nossel, executive director of Amnesty International USA. “Meanwhile those who dare express any unapproved thoughts on the internet can expect to be slapped with a prison sentence of more than a decade. The Iranian government is going to extraordinary lengths to impose a total information blackout on the Iranian population.”

The organization’s new 71-page report, We Are Ordered To Crush You: Expanding Repression of Dissent in Iran, says anything from setting up a social group on the internet, forming or joining an NGO, or expressing opposition to the status quo can land individuals in prison.

The report documents a wave of arrests in recent months that it said lays bare the hollowness of Iran’s claim to support protests in the Middle East and North Africa.

Iran’s security forces – including a new cyber police force – can now scrutinize activists as they use personal computers in their own homes. A new and shadowy “cyber army” reportedly linked to the Revolutionary Guards, has carried out attacks on websites at home and abroad, including Twitter and the Voice of America.

“In Iran today you put yourself at risk if you do anything that might fall outside the increasingly narrow confines of what the authorities deem socially or politically acceptable,” said Ann Harrison, Amnesty International’s interim deputy director, Middle East and North Africa program. “This dreadful record really highlights the hypocrisy of the Iranian government’s attempts to show solidarity with protesters in Egypt, Bahrain and other countries in the region.”

In the wake of protests called by opposition leaders Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi in February 2011, the Iranian authorities steadily cranked up repression of dissent and the situation has worsened over the last few months in the lead up to the parliamentary elections Friday (March 2).

The report finds that in recent months a wave of arrests have targeted lawyers, students, journalists, political activists and their relatives, religious and ethnic minorities, filmmakers, and people with international connections, particularly to media.

Opposition leaders Mousavi and Karroubi – defeated presidential candidates in the 2009 election – have been under de facto house arrest since February 2011. While Mehdi Karroubi’s wife was released in July 2011, Zahra Rahnavard, Mir Hossein Mousavi’s wife, remains under house arrest with her husband.

Electronic media is seen as a major threat. In January a senior police officer said Google was an “espionage tool,” not a search engine. The same month, the recently established Cyber Police required owners of internet cafés to install CCTV and to register the identity of users before allowing them to use computers.

Blogger Mehdi Khazali was this month sentenced to four and a half years in prison, followed by ten years in “internal exile,” and a fine for charges believed to include “spreading propaganda against the system,” “gathering and colluding against national security,” and “insulting officials.” It is not clear whether his “internal exile” will in fact be served in prison.

Having been originally charged in 2011 and released on bail, he was arrested again in January. He is being held in Tehran’s Evin Prison, where he has been on hunger strike for more than 40 days in protest at his detention, raising fears for his health.

Harassment, arrest and imprisonment of human rights defenders, including women’s rights groups, has also intensified and several NGOs have been shut down.

Abdolfattah Soltani, a founder member of the Centre for Human Rights Defenders, was arrested in September and is held in Evin Prison awaiting the outcome of his trial on charges which include his acceptance of an international human rights prize. He has been threatened with a 20-year sentence.

The pressure on independent voices has extended to those outside Iran.

Earlier this month, the BBC said family members of its Persian language service had been subjected to harassment, including one who was arrested in January and held in solitary confinement and others whose passports were confiscated.

Amnesty International said the attacks on dissenting views come against a backdrop of a worsening overall human rights situation in Iran.

There were around four times as many public executions in 2011 as in 2010, a practice that Amnesty International said was used by the authorities to strike fear into society.

Hundreds of people are believed to have been sentenced to death in the past year, mainly for alleged drugs offenses. Iran continues to execute juvenile offenders – a practice strictly prohibited under international law.

Amnesty International called on the international community not to allow tensions over Iran’s nuclear program or events in the wider region to distract it from pressing Iran to live up to its human rights obligations.

“For Iranians facing this level of repression, it can be dispiriting that discussions about their country in diplomatic circles can seem to focus mainly on the nuclear,” said Harrison.

Contact: Suzanne Trimel, Phone: 212-633-4150
Email: strimel@aiusa.org

As we mourn Anthony’s loss, we hope his legacy will remain a great source of inspiration for all those who aspire to write and report on that complex place called Middle East. We invite you all to visit Anthony’s personal website to explore more about his great works and fabulous journey in journalism: http://anthonyshadid.com

God bless Anthony’s soul.

Reza Akhlaghi

Houshang Hassan-Yari sat down with Reza Akhlaghi, senior writer at Foreign Policy Association, to answer the above questions and discuss what’s in store for the greater Middle East.
Dr. Houchang Hassan-Yari is Professor of international relations and strategic military studies at Royal Military College of Canada.

In the current geopolitical climate involving Iran and the West marked by loud and reciprocal threats, intensifying sanctions, non-dollar trade paradigms, and an apparent shadow war, what do you think is in store for the region as it pertains to Iranian-Western rivalries?

Hassan-Yari: I think the current situation cannot continue for too long. If there is no peaceful solution in the nuclear issue of Iran, the cul-de-sac will be opened in another way. The war will be the most plausible. Iran is very much isolated in the region.
The United States and Israel have been successful in creating an association between the Iranian nuclear program and nuclear weapons. They were also able to join the vast majority of Arab countries to their perception of the danger that Iran poses to stability in these countries. The sum of U.S. efforts and concerns of the militarily weak Arab regimes have resulted in the necessity to contain a dangerous Iran. If there is a rivalry between Iran and West in the Middle East, it is clearly favourable to the West.

Iran has recently conducted a number of naval and air drills in the Persian Gulf in the course of which it has put on display new surface-to-sea and surface-to-surface missile capabilities. It has also threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz. How do you assess Iran’s military capabilities in countering U.S. Navy presence in the Persian Gulf and in closing the Strait of Hormuz? What do you think would galvanize the U.S. and its allies into concrete military action against Iran?

Hassan-Yari: In this climate of distrust and suspicion which prevails in the Persian Gulf, a miscalculation by the parties involved could lead to a war that nobody wants. The threat of Iran to close the Strait of Hormuz, a threat that is taken lightly by the Iranian authorities, will lead to war.
Any aggression aiming international navigation in the Strait may trigger hostilities. It seems to me that the majority of the Persian Gulf Arab countries want to settle once and for all the “Iranian issue”. The problem is that they are unable to do so themselves. This is where the utility of American military power comes in. In other words, Arabs are pushing Americans to a war they want but cannot perform. Israelis also are in a similar situation.

Since taking office, and in particular during his second term, the policies of President Ahmadinejad and his administration have been synonymous with the rise of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Iranian politics and economy. Given the prominence of the IRGC in the socio-political and economic management of the country, has it been an effective and capable force in formulating various policies and in executing those policies?

Hassan-Yari: President Ahmadinejad is only one factor that facilitated the rise in the status of the IRGC. The indispensable actor that greatly opened the door to the predominance of the IRGC in all aspects of Iranian life is the leader himself. The latter could not do so under Mohammad Khatami because of the popularity and the resistance of the reformist president. We should not forget that Ahmadinejad is one of them and owes his presidency largely to the intervention of the IRGC in the electoral process of 2005.
The multifaceted IRGC is not a homogenous force. Nor is it a force formed to formulate and implement policies for the common good. The main concern of the Force is to protect the leader and the revolution as it intends to do. Everything it does in the field of security, political, economic and social serves this purpose. In other words, its allegiance is first and foremost the Leader.
Dependency of political power to the military force of the IRGC has forced the former to give exclusive mega contracts to latter in all economic sectors. But as the Guardians do not have expertise in all these areas, they often fail to deliver a good quality product. However, the poor quality of their work was never an obstacle to prevent the IRGC to receive new contracts worth billions of dollars.
Their imprint is deeply engraved in all aspects of life from sport to aviation to missile technology to nuclear programme of Iran.

Recent statements made by former high-ranking officials and parliamentarians (Hossein Alaei of IRGC and Emad Afrough of Majles) appear to be part of a new paradigm in directly challenging the clerical establishment. Do you think these statements signify a new rupture in Iran’s power structure? If that is the case, how could this new rupture play itself out in the upcoming Majlis elections?

Hassan-Yari: What Alaei, Afrough and other rightwing moderates (Principalists /Ossoulgarayaan) pose as a question today are after-shocks of the popular protests of 2009 and the tremors of the recent Arab awakening. These individuals are also very sensitive to preserve intact the legacy of Ayatollah Khomeini which is fast eroding since the coming to power of Ahmadinejad and the unconditional support he received from the Leader. They attempt to salvage the Islamic Republic by returning to the values of the 1979 Revolution. They directly challenge the entourage of the Leader and indirectly the Leader himself who has created a propitious environment for the growth of political immorality and toadyism.
This new phenomena is certainly a break with the established order since coming to power of Ayatollah Khamenei in 1989. It is expected to expand gradually as the gap in the conservative camp is widening, a situation that Khamenei is incapable of controling effectively.
A number of scenarios for the outcome of Majles election could be envisaged. If the elections are carried by the camp of Ahmadinejad, the status of the leader will be further weakened and the consequences could be fatal to the Republic as we know it today. A possible victory by the leader’s entourage should not be interpreted as the return to normality.
I think that a return to the former situation when the leader was not objectionable is impossible without resorting to brutal force. Even then, the lull is only temporary. The sanctity of the Leader is broken and with it the unchallenged position of the clergy close to the government. It is quite possible that we witness a return of the clergy in its religious schools leaving power to the ‘civilian’. In Iran, people break the personality before breaking the person.

Iran and Israel seem locked in a strategic rivalry that has gone through different stages, each stage with its own narrative. What are the key aspects of this strategic rivalry that have made the U.S. an indispensable player in it? Do you envision a point at which security establishments from the U.S., Iran, and Israel would decide to negotiate (most likely secret negotiations) as a way out of the current atmosphere of brinkmanship to avert a potentially large-scale regional conflict and save the global economy from spiralling down a path of sever instability?

Hassan-Yari: First, on Iran-Israel rivalry. From the perspective of the Iranian political elite in power, this rivalry has a clear ideological pronouncement. It goes back to the Ayatollah Khomeini’s epoch and the pre-1979 revolutionary romanticism when Iranian islamists received their military training in Lebanon and sympathized with the Palestinian cause. For them, Israel is a colonial creation, artificial and usurper. It is an illegitimate entity, so to disappear. For Israel, Iran was an opportunity to lessen the Arab pressure.
Since the advent of the Islamic Republic in Iran, this rivalry has taken on new dimensions. Israel remains not only as an ideological enemy, but also a military obstacle that challenges Tehran’s supremacist claim on the regional leadership. In addition, since the Israeli danger to Iran‘s nuclear program has become more pressing, Tehran uses its Lebanese and Palestinian allies to keep Israel concerned about its own safety and away from the Iranian border.
On the other hand, Iran is the only country in the Middle East that poses a challenge to the qualitative predominance of Israel’s powerful military machine in the region. In the final analysis, if Israel can live with a non-militant Iran, Tehran cannot co-exist with a ubiquitous ‘Zionist danger’ in the region. This is where the United States enters into the equation as a moderating force. While Washington would prefer a more cooperative Iran, it seeks to remain the final arbiter of the regional game. It seems that neither Iran nor Israel want their regional importance overshadowed by the American omnipotence.
In regard to a possible “ménage à trios”, Iran-Israel-U.S., in the field of regional security, this hypothesis seems very unrealistic under current conditions. If the United States and Israel can provide manageable compromise to Iran over its security considerations without losing face, the latter, on the contrary, has everything to lose by entering into this game that goes against its identity as “defender” of the dispossessed. The only situation, in which the Islamic Republic will make painful compromise, is if it concludes that its own survival is at risk by persisting in its belligerent posture in regional and international security issues.

Russian officials have repeatedly made it clear that they are fiercely opposed to any military confrontation between the West and Iran. From geo-political and geo-energy perspectives, what are at stake for Russia? Do you think a political tilt by Iran toward the West would change the geo-political equation in Eurasia/Middle East?

Hassan-Yari: Russian resistance to any military intervention in Iran is not a matter of principle, nor is it aimed at preventing another catastrophic war in the region. The Russian calculation is based on geopolitical considerations. Russia is still looking for the lost place of the Soviet Union on the world stage. Any U.S. military intervention in the region further isolates Russia. It is also in this context that we must understand the resistance from Moscow to any foreign military intervention in Syria. For Russia, this is a zero sum game. In addition, an isolated Iran strengthens the position of Russia as an intermediary between this country and the West. Iran’s isolation and demonization has helped Russia develop advanced military and commercial relations with Iran. The same is true for China, with more emphasis on the economic relations with Iran.
A dominant U.S. presence in Iran could compromise Russian’s not too comfortable authority in the Caspian Sea basin. One of the reasons for creating the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation was to counterbalance the U. S. presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The fall of the Islamic Republic could revive the spectrum of Soviet containment through a new security belt connecting Europe to Turkey, Iran and Afghanistan.

This year Russia and Iran started doing trade in their respective national currencies, replacing the U.S. dollar and Euro. Similarly, trade has been taking place between Iran and China in Chinese Renminbi and between Iran and Japan in Japanese Yen including for the sale of Iranian oil. Do you think the exclusion of U.S. dollar and Euro from trade by these trade partners could hold geopolitical implications? If so, in what ways?

Hassan-Yari: Since the day after the revolution Iran has tried to to break free from the yoke of the dollar, without much success. The currencies of Russia and China are not convertible, which reinforces the dependency of Iran on Russians and Chinese. It’s an ironic situation because Iran claims to want to break from the grip of the U. S. dollar and to free itself of turbulence of American imperialism by creating more dependency on secondary powers like Russia and China. In its business dealings with Moscow and Beijing, Iran is forced to buy Sino-Russian merchandise. However, the quality of those goods does not meet consumer expectations in Iran. The continuation of this trade policy increasingly limits Iran to two or three unreliable suppliers who put their own national interests ahead of Iranian welfare in any dispute with Americans. Russia in particular has demonstrated that it is not a feasible partner. There is no other country in the world that has hurt Iranian interests as much as Russia since the 19th century.
The recent currency crisis that deeply hit the value of Iran’s Rial showcased the significance of dollar as a safe currency for ordinary Iranians. During the crisis, no one was looking for Russian or Chinese currency. It is also ironic that some ministers in Iran use the dollar as reference when they talk about their non-petroleum exports, the value of the national economy or foreign investment. The language that the average Iranian better understands is that of Dollar, not the Rouble, or the Yuan. In addition, the Central Bank of Iran often manipulates the value of dollar to regulate the amount of liquidity in circulation.
The exclusion of U.S. dollar and Euro from trade by Iran and its trade partners could hold geopolitical implications if Euro Zone dismantles itself and if China decided to dispose its massive dollar reserve. Among some other possibilities one can invoke the unlikely scenario of the Arab oil producers to join the Russia-China-Iran trio in replacing dollar by other currencies. Iran’s economy is too small to have a geopolitical impact on the dollar.

How stable is the regime of Bashar Al-Assad in Syria? How Iran could be impacted by Assad’s fall?

Hassan-Yari: Assad’s regime is extremely weak. It has reached a point of no return and condemned to disappear. Its fall will have major implications for the safety and security of the Islamic Republic as well as the rest of the Middle East. The survival of the Syrian regime is so crucial to the Iranian theocratic system that it forced Tehran to denounce the Syrians protesting against Damascus as agents of Zionism and imperialism while praising Arabs in other countries as Islamist followers of Iran’s Islamic revolution. This position has highlighted the contradiction in the official discourse of the Iranian leadership by substantially weakening its claim to the universality of the Islamic revolution.
Syria is the only strategic ally of Iran in the Arab world. It also acts as a bridge between Iran and Lebanon. It gives Iran direct access to Israeli territory through the Hazbollah and some Palestinian groups. The fall of the Assad regime will also weaken the position of Shiite militants in the region. A regime change in Damascus further limits Iran’s ability to intervene on the regional scene. It will deprive Islamic Iran of a vital window to breathe. Finally, it will make Iran even more vulnerable in facing a possible foreign military attack. Within Iran itself, it will strengthen the resolve of opponents of the Islamic regime.

The Saudi government has made significant military hardware purchases from the United States. The Saudi diplomacy has been also active in countries impacted by the Arab Spring. How do you assess the future of the strategic relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia and in light of Arab Spring, what are the chances of having a more representative leadership in Saudi Arabia?

Hassan-Yari: The Islamic Republic is not the only country embarrassed by the Arab awakening. The United States and Saudi Arabia have also taken contradictory positions to events in Syria, Bahrain and elsewhere.
The future of the strategic relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia depends largely on the Kingdom’s internal dynamics. A democratic Saudi Arabia will be more independent in its foreign policy. It will also have much less appetite for accommodating dictatorships in surrounding countries.
But since we are not there yet, I cannot envisage any strategic change in the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship, even if there is a few sporadic surmountable bumps.
As for democratic changes in Saudi Arabia, they will be introduced very gradually in the absence of a popular revolution. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia can not remain immune to the political and military changes that inflame its neighbourhood. The question is the degree and level of change that the descendants of Al-Saud are forced to introduce.

The following piece was written by Reza Marashi in Foreign Policy Magazine on January 19, 2012. Mr. Marashi is Director of Research at National Iranian American Council (NIAC) and a former Iran Desk Officer at the U.S. Department of State.  The image in this piece, however, is a choice of FPA.
____________________________________________

by Reza Marashi

An eerily familiar drumbeat of war is intensifying across Washington, just as the United States ends its decade-long adventure in Iraq. The ghosts of America’s neoconservative past have dusted off their Iraq playbook to make the case for war with Iran. Their formula is simple but effective: Portray the Iranian government and its nuclear program as existential threats, insist that a chain of catastrophic events will result from inaction, and minimize the costs and risks of war.

If one looks back, however, neoconservative officials in the U.S. government weren’t alone in their push for war with Iraq. A crucial aspect of selling the war to the U.S. public was support within the Iraqi-American community. Iraqi dissidents living abroad, such as Ahmed Chalabi and Kanan Makiya, as well as supposed whistle-blowers turned known fabricators like the infamous “Curveball,” led a contingent of vocal Iraqis who pushed for steadily more aggressive actions to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime. Their promise that the invasion would be a cakewalk and that U.S. soldiers would be greeted with flowers and candy didn’t quite pan out. Now, the fruits of their labor are clear for all to see — a broken country, devastated by war and sectarian strife, with no discernible end in sight.

Iranian-Americans, in stark contrast with the Iraqi diaspora, have largely opposed a rush to war. This is a fact that I have observed up close, while working in the State Department’s Office of Iranian Affairs and now at the National Iranian American Council, where I maintain close and continuing contact with Iranian-Americans to ensure we accurately represent their views. Together, these two vantage points have crystallized one key takeaway: Iranian-Americans deeply resent the Iranian regime, but prefer U.S. policies that emphasize engagement and de-escalation.

Why have Iraqis and Iranians living abroad reached such drastically different conclusions? For more than three decades, the Iranian-American community has grappled with the paradox of wanting to make Iran a better place — but fearing success as much as defeat. Some worry that contributing to positive changes inside Iran will only strengthen a draconian system, extending its lease on life.

For many Iranian-Americans, this dilemma was resolved by their disastrous historical experience with revolutionary upheaval. Rather than laying the groundwork for democracy, Iran‘s 1979 revolution simply replaced one dictatorship with another. As a result, Iranian-Americans strongly prefer to use the rule of law to alter not only the Iranian government’s behavior, but also the thinking of Iranians inside Iran.

Efforts by the Iranian-American community to promote engagement and oppose military intervention have been consistent and cohesive. The University of California, Berkeley, conducted a scientifically sound opinion survey that found that roughly 70 percent of Iranian-American respondents favored dialogue and negotiations between the United States and Iran. In 2008, the Iranian-American community mobilized this majority into a successful campaign to defeat a congressional resolution that would have taken a decisive step toward war.

The Iranian-American community’s overwhelming support for Barack Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign is also a telling indicator of its political attitudes. For every dollar raised by Republican nominee John McCain from Iranian-Americans, Obama — who was running on a platform that promoted engagement with Iran — raised five.

Iranian-Americans understand from personal experience that abrupt political change is unlikely to produce the desired result. Retired ambassador John Limbert, the deputy assistant secretary of state for Iran during my tenure in Foggy Bottom, reflected poignantly on this understanding in a 1999 speech. “Our liberal-minded Iranian friends,­ whom we counted on to contain the [1979] revolution’s excesses, proved to be helpless in political turmoil,” he said. “They were too much like us: They could write penetrating analyses and biting editorials, but lacked the stomach for the brutality that wins revolutions.”

Despite the fact that a majority of Iranian-Americans favor a more tolerant, pluralistic, and democratic system in Iran, they see little evidence that U.S. efforts to topple the current regime would bring Iranian democrats to power. Within Iran, rampant popular dissatisfaction has yet to evolve into a sustainable and coherent challenge to the system. The Iranian government’s monopoly on violence has prevented such challenges, but has not ended the desire for change. Even the original leaders of Iran‘s Green Movement, which emerged from the country’s contested 2009 presidential election, were attempting to push for peaceful change through the ballot box.

The ongoing death and destruction in Iraq and Afghanistan has made the Iranian-American community even warier about foreign efforts to “liberate” their ancestral homeland. Right or wrong, many in the Iranian diaspora see the U.S. invasion of Iraq as less about nuclear programs or democracy, and more as a gambit to seize oil resources. These conspiracy theories may seem absurd, but behind them lies a deeper reality that is very powerful in the minds of Iranian-Americans.

Few Iranian-Americans would welcome the prospects of a U.S. intervention under the auspices of democracy promotion that, in turn, shattered any semblance of stability and ignited a destructive cycle of conflict. Iran‘s contested 2009 presidential election and the ongoing human rights abuses have left Iranian-Americans searching for new ways to help foster peaceful, indigenous change. Their ideas remain diverse, but there is near-unanimous consent that change should occur without bloodshed.

Like their Iraqi brethren, Iranian expatriates want to change their government — it is their methods that differ. A majority of Iranian-Americans would welcome an improvement of relations between Washington and Tehran because it increases the prospects for positive, peaceful change from within. The watershed event of the Islamic Republic’s nearly 33-year history — widespread protests in 2009 — occurred at the height of Obama’s “mutual interests and mutual respect” initiative. Many of the West’s Iran analysts and experts, both Iranian and American, assert that the regime needs a U.S. enemy for its survival. If true, wouldn’t sustained offers of friendship — which would put the Iranian regime’s domestic agenda at the forefront — provide the biggest threat to the regime?

Engagement with the Iranian government understandably spurs many moral dilemmas for Iranian-Americans. Most, however, understand the alternatives — particularly when juxtaposed with Iraq, where war has resulted in nearly 200,000 Iraqis dead (based on conservative estimates), 1.3 million Iraqis displaced, and decades’ worth of destroyed lives for those still living in a perpetual war zone.

Let’s not kid ourselves: There are Iranian-Americans who support U.S.-sponsored regime change in Iran — and in due time, American neoconservatives will find their kindred spirits. We undoubtedly have our Chalabis and Makiyas — some long-established, some coming of age. But it’s clear that most Iranian-Americans distrust anyone who welcomes foreign armies into the motherland.

There is no arguing that Iran must change. The Iranian government’s human rights record is appalling, people lack basic freedoms, and economic disarray prevents Iranians from managing the present or planning for the future. Few Iranian-Americans are calling for sitting idly by and waiting for the situation in Iran to improve on its own. But it’s a rare voice indeed that is calling for war.