Many of his critics claim that Beinart is detrimental to the state of Israel and delegitimizes it.  After speaking with him privately, there is no doubt in my mind that Beinart is pro-Israel, even if he is critical of its policies.  Alan Dershowitz, perhaps the most well respected and commanding American Israel defender, commented on Beinart at the Jerusalem Post conference this past Sunday, stating that while many may disagree with Beinart, he is not an enemy.  He went on to say that there are individuals, including Jews, that want to deligitimize Israel’s very right to exist.  Those are the real enemies.

No matter what your view, Beinart’s comments will definitely make you think.

The following was taken from Jspace.com.  The interview was conducted by Jspace Foreign Affairs Correspondent, Rob Lattin, who also blogs about Israeli and Middle Eastern foreign policy for Foreign Policy Blogs.

The following was taken from Jspace.com.  The article was written by Jspace Foreign Affairs Correspondent, Rob Lattin, who also blogs about Israeli and Middle Eastern foreign policy for Foreign Policy Blogs. 

The Crisis of Zionism seriously questions Israel's future as a democratic country. (Photo: www.Peter-Beinart.com)

Daily Beast writer Peter Beinart recently released his newest book, The Crisis of Zionism, and it is making serious waves in the American Jewish and Israel activist communities.

Beinart’s basic assumption is that Israel’s democracy is currently eroding in large part due to its occupation of the West Bank. If peace negotiations with the Palestinians do not pick up, or the status quo is not changed in the relatively near future, he says, Israeli democracy may cease to exist all together. For Beinart, occupation and democracy are oxymoronic, because the policies in the West Bank, which is under Israeli control, are undemocratic. “Illiberal Zionism beyond the green line destroys the possibility of liberal Zionism inside it,” he writes.

Beinart’s Zionism and his love of Israel are synonymous with democracy. “As a Zionist, I believe that after two millennia of homelessness, the Jewish people deserve a state dedicated to their protection in their historic land … as a partisan of liberal democracy, I believe that to honor that history of suffering, a Jewish state must offer equal citizenship to all its inhabitants,” including the Palestinians, according to Beinart.

As long as settlers keep expanding and face minimal restrictions, Beinart states, they are threatening the existence of a Palestinian state, which in turn means they are threatening the future of Israeli democracy. “One day, maybe five years from now, maybe fifteen, maybe it has already happened, the green line will disappear: West Bank settlers will have grown so numerous and so entrenched within the Israeli government, rabbinate, and army that it will be impossible to remove enough of them to create a viable Palestinians state with a border near the Green line. When that happens, Zionism as a liberal democratic project will die.” Further, for Israel to stay a democracy without removing the settlers, it would have to grant equality to all of its inhabitants, including the 2.5 million Arab citizens of the West Bank and the 1.5 million in the Gaza Strip. This would lead to “Israel … commit[ing] suicide as a Jewish state,” Beinart writes.

“The Crisis of Zionism” places a great deal of blame on American Jewish leadership for not doing more to stand up to Israel’s self-destructive handling of the Palestinian situation, even accusing them directly of not caring about democracy. Beinart says that original Zionist-Jewish leadership in America—particularly Rabbi Stephen Wise and Louis Brandeis—were liberal minded, believed in universal social justice, and placed democracy in Israel as a priority.

“How did a Jewish community famed for its liberalism create a communal leadership so reluctant to defend liberal democracy in the Jewish state? The answer is simple: today’s American Jewish establishment was not born from American Jewish liberalism; it was born as a reaction against it … they do not champion democracy within Israel,” Beinart writes. Throughout the book he accuses AIPAC, Malcolm Hoenlein, Vice Chair of the Council of Presidents of Major Jewish Organization; Abraham Foxman, National Director of the Anti-Defamation League; and David Harris, Executive Director of the American Jewish Committee, of throwing away their liberal values and aggressively marginalizing any voice or organization that expresses any dissent towards Israeli policy.

Peter Beinart is a budding star for the left-wing pro-Israel constituency. (Photo: JewishJournal.com)

Beinart transitions to discuss how Israel and American Jewish leadership justify their policies and marginalize dissent through their purposeful, unlawful use of victimhood. In other words, Israel has the right to do anything it must for security, because its existence depends on it. This is flawed logic to Beinart. While he admits that threats to Israel and clear anti-Semitism do exist, he claims they are blown out of proportion and are not serious enough to warrant the picture that Israel and the American Jewish leadership portray. Beinart states:

“The final reason American Jewish leaders give for why American Jews should not publicly criticize Israeli policy is perhaps the most important because it goes to the heart of the victimhood narrative they have made central to American Zionism. They argue that because Israel’s very existence is being ‘delegitimzed’ around the world, American Jews must stand in its defense, not join the lynch mob. But this rests on a basic fallacy. There are, to be sure, left-wing activists and Islamist militants who oppose Israel’s existence as a Jewish state. But they are marginal compared to the much broader and more influential swath of people who seek to ‘delegitimize’ not Israel, but its occupation.”

Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the book is the very short conclusion.  In it Beinart suggests that one way American Jews can reverse the erosion of Israeli democracy is by boycotting and divesting from products and companies originating in the West Bank.  He is careful to point out that he is not advocating a boycott and divestment movement from Israel, just the settlements. This is the best way for American’s to show Israel that they do not agree with its policies, writes Beinart, and has been proven to be a successful tactic in the past.

Peter Beinart’s book has been met with some praise and a lot of criticism. Beyond the aforementioned themes, it is filled with thoughts about Jewish education in America, President Barack Obama’s ties to Zionism, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s relationship to revisionist Zionism, and so much more. Regardless of one’s beliefs, The Crisis of Zionism offers a provocative outlook on the current environment of Zionism, and will certainly get readers thinking about their ideals and convictions.

Israel’s political system is notorious for its recycling of politicians. However, a new force is emerging, Yair Lapid, the former head anchor of Israeli television station Channel 2. Lapid’s political ambition has been well documented over the years and he will be running for a Knesset seat under the banner of representing the middle class.

Yair Lapid will try and make the jump from television to politics. (Photo: Wikipedia)

The former anchorman is the son of the late Tommy Lapid, once the head of the Shinui political party. Like his father, Yair believes Israel’s main problems lie with the ultra-orthodox community and the current political system, also the two main gripes of Israel’s shrinking middle class.

For Lapid, the two are inter-connected. He believes that corruption in the government is in large part facilitated by the fact that small religious groups can wield incredible amounts of power. At a conference in Israel, Lapid stated, “look how Shas, with its 11 [Knesset] seats, has the entire country wrapped around its finger. Look how United Torah Judaism, which is even smaller than Shas, conquered the Finance Committee … This is the year in which the red line has been crossed. Fifty percent of all first-graders are either ultra-Orthodox or Arab; this means that if we don’t do something, within 12 years 50% won’t enlist in the army or join the workforce–and that will be the end of the Zionist state … The Palestinians don’t have to fight us; they can have a cup of coffee, smoke a cigarette and wait 12 years until the Zionist state collapses on its own.”

Lapid has no immediate illusions of grandeur and has stated that he will not run for the Israeli premiership. Instead, he told an audience at Tel Aviv University that if elected to the Knesset he would seek to become education minister. He has also repeatedly stated that a Lapid-led party will not contain any politicians currently in office. There were recently rumors that the ousted former Kadima leader, Tzipi Livni, might try to partner with him, but Lapid quickly dismissed the notion via Facebook when he wrote, “no serving politician will be in my party. All over the world, when politicians fail they are replaced by new people with new ideas.”

With all the buzz surrounding Lapid’s political aspirations, controversy was inevitable. Over the last year and a half there was some uncertainty over whether he would be able to run for office. There was question of whether he would be subject to a pending law dubbed the “Lapid Law,” under which he would be forced to take a six month “cooling off” period before being allowed to begin political activities. The law got its nickname from the fact that many saw it as an attempt by the current administration to neutralize Lapid’s political momentum. But the law ended up shelved and Lapid was deemed free to run.

Unlike the Arab Spring, Lapid’s rise does not reflect a youth awakening; something many pundits say is necessary for the sort of transformation of the Israeli political system Lapid is campaigning on. Speaking to Jspace on the question of youth involvement in Lapid’s rise, Jerusalem Post reporter Yaakok Lappin said, “Lapid does not represent a voice of youth, but rather, a voice of the frustrated and hard working middle class who feel that their contributions to the state are going unrewarded. Lapid is playing on the middle class’s anger at the political system, which diverts funds to the Haredi world and to settlements but does not appear to give anything back to the secular professionals who are the backbone of the economy.”

On whether Israeli politics can expect more non-political figures to start becoming involved in government Lappin stated, “[Lapid] is part of a growing phenomenon of journalists joining politics, including Shelly Yechimovitch, former high profile media pundit and now head of the Labor Party, and Nitzan Horowitz, former Channel 10 news man and now a high profile Meretz Knesset Member. Lapid’s entry into politics does seem to represent the entrance of a new breed of political player—someone who has not been involved in politics for most of his or her life, and someone who feels compelled to join the system to fight corruption, social injustice, and political dysfunctional.”

As with any new politician, it is unclear what the future holds for Lapid. In January Israel Radio released a poll stating that a Lapid-led party could win as many as 15 seats in the 120-seat Knesset. At the beginning of February, however, the Times of Israel reported a survey that had him winning only six. He has been criticized for declaring his intentions too early, as his momentum and energy may wane in the exhausting Israeli campaigning process.

On the other hand he has been hailed as the “Knesset’s Next Big Thing.” As Israel hosts some of the most dynamic and complicated political systems in the world, will Yair Lapid be able to reform it? No one knows. But as the United States has seen, new politicians with favorable platforms do not always work out as planned.

Source: The Washington Independent

The Israeli/Palestinian conflict, long entrenched in the Executive and Legislative branches of the American government, is finally working its way deep into the Judicial as well.

This week the Supreme Court ruled, 8-1, that the lower courts could make a decision on the issue of placing Israel as the country of birth in the passports of American children born in Jerusalem.

For a more thorough background on the proceedings, read here.

The high court itself chose not to rule on the specifics of the case, simply saying that it would be appropriate for lower courts to hear, and rule, on such cases. This decision (well, this decision approving the right of future decisions) stems from a 2002 law stating that American Jews born in Jerusalem could list Israel as their country of birth.

Congress passed this aforementioned law, but the American embassy in Tel Aviv (more on that in a moment) refused to honor it, saying that the status of Jerusalem remains unresolved.

Of course this ruling raises many questions, both real and absurd. Is Jerusalem in Israel? As long as there is a Jewish state, it will control a piece (if not the whole) of Jerusalem. Even before the Six Day War in 1967 unified the city under Jewish rule, Israel controlled a large part of the city. While many assume that the Green Line is no longer attainable as a border between two future states, even should some massive outside power decree that it be so, Israel would still control a large section of Jerusalem, and will presumably still consider it its capital city.

During arguments, Justice Sonia Sotamayor raised the following question: “What happens if there is a peace accord tomorrow, and Israel gives up any claim to sovereignty over Jerusalem?” The day that Israel gives up “any claim to sovereignty over Jerusalem” is the day that there is no more Jewish state. Should Peter Beinart be elected Prime Minister of Israel tomorrow on a platform of “peace no matter what,” Israel will still control a piece of Jerusalem. That is simply not in question. So long as their is a Jewish military and a Jewish government, there will be a Jewish presence in Jerusalem.

Barring an unthinkable military solution enacted either on, or by, the Jews of the region, the only real alternatives to the Jews controlling a part of Jerusalem would be a bi-national, one-state solution or the designation of Jerusalem as an international city. The former point would mean a diplomatic or legislative end to the Jewish state and is a non-starter for Israel. The latter point – well, most Israelis would say that this would be the equivalent of “internationalizing” New York or Washington, DC.

When this current crop of GOP Presidential candidates recently spoke to the Republican Jewish Coalition, there were several promises to move the American embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Newt Gingrich was not the first candidate running for office to make such bold promises. Both Bill Clinton and George W. Bush made similar promises on the campaign trail. President Obama also hinted at it. And yet the embassy remains in Tel Aviv. Israel may be the world’s only nation where virtually no other nation on earth is willing to place its embassy in their designated capital city. Currently, only two states have their embassies in Jerusalem: Costa Rica and El Salvador. Not exactly trend setters in the field of International Politics.

Israel continues to populate East Jerusalem with Jews, making the ratio in the city more and more Jewish. They are constantly expanding the infrastructure of the Jewish parts of the city. All in all, they are working very hard—and for the most part, very successfully—to make Jerusalem a Jewish city by changing the “facts on the ground.”

The irony is that the best way Israel has of legitimizing its claim of ownership of this ancient city that was home to David and Soloman and which has been the rallying cry of Jews for millennia, is to make peace with the Palestinians. Israel can hold Jerusalem indefinitely, but it cannot truly claim it. The lower courts very well may decide that an American born in Jerusalem may have Israel printed into their passport. But the question has been up in the air for ten years already, and it may take another ten before the first printing takes place. And even then, how debasing for a nation to watch its most important partner and ally hem and haw as to whether or not its capital is legitimate.

Despite promises from Newt Gingrich to the contrary, the day that Israel makes peace with the Palestinians is the day that the embassies of the world start looking for real estate in Jerusalem. And it goes without saying that the Palestinians will forgo their claims to Jerusalem about as easily as the Jews will. (In other words, never!) So it could be argued that every stone laid and every Jewish family moved from West Jerusalem to East Jerusalem, is one more step towards Jerusalem as a Jewish city, and more step away from international recognition of Jerusalem as a Jewish city.

Elie Wiesel famously wrote that “Jerusalem is above politics.” If only that were true.

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President Barack Obama and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (AP / Pablo Martinez Monsivais)

Anyone casually following the news of Israel recently would assume that the question is not if, but when, Israel will attack Iran. No Israeli leader seems to be able to speak publicly without mentioning the Islamic Republic’s nuclear program and Israel’s need to prevent it from moving forward.

President Obama just gave an exclusive interview to Jeffrey Goldberg, who wrote the book (well, article) on Israel invading Iran, seemingly to convince him, Israel, and the American Jewish voters that he will stand up to Iran. His most memorable quote from the article was the simple warning to Iran that he “doesn’t bluff.”

The U.S., along with long-coveted international support, has only recently upped the ante when it comes to biting economic sanctions being levied against Iran. President Obama is asking for time to gauge their effectiveness. Prime Minister Netanyahu is not sure that there is enough time left.

It is clear that the two states, for similar and deviating rationales, do not want to see a nuclear armed Iran. Bibi believes, or deserves an Oscar for his portrayal of someone who believes, that a nuclear armed Iran is a guarantee of a second Holocaust. He has made it clear that this will not happen on his watch.

President Obama, despite what some of his critics currently duking it out for the GOP nomination claim, also does not want to see the annihilation of Israel. This much he has made clear, not only in words, but in deeds. But his fears of a nuclear armed Iran go beyond that. President Obama has staked out a platform of non-proliferation. While his policy has stalled significantly to date, a nuclear armed Iran all but ensures a nuclear arms race in the most volatile region on the planet.

If Iran becomes a nuclear power, there is every reason to think that Turkey, Saudi Arabia and potentially Jordan and/or Egypt will believe it necessary to follow suit. This is not good for Iran, this is not good for Israel, this is not good for the region, and this is certainly not good for the U.S. Non-proliferation concerns aside (in other words, forget the philosophical concept of less nukes good, more nukes bad), a nuclear armed Middle East is a sure to push that Doomsday Clock forward by a couple of minutes. If it strikes midnight, we are all toast, and it’s currently at 11:55pm. Presumably that midnight hour is something that most rational people might want to prevent.

The major difference between Obama and Netanyahu when it comes to a nuclear armed Iran is where they draw their line in the sand. Netanyahu draws his line at nuclear-capable, while the U.S. feels there is slightly more breathing room. There is still a red line resting firmly before nuclear armed. How far before is less clear.

Several prominent Israeli leaders, including a number of past heads of Israeli intelligence agencies, have come out against attacking Iran. But Israel as a state has been very clear on their commitment to using military force to prevent the nuclear arming of Iran should it come to that.

A new poll came out this week however, that had some surprising findings on the subject. While Israel as a state may be prepared to attack Iran, Israel as a people are decisively not, at least not without American support. Despite years of saber rattling on the part of the Netanyahu government in the hopes of convincing the world that this needs to happen without hesitation, he has apparently not convinced anywhere near a plurality of Israelis on the subject. According to the poll, a whopping 81% of Israelis do not favor attacking Iran without American consent and support. Pretty decisive numbers to say the least. And it is worth mentioning that the Israelis are not a people prone to worrying what others think about them. They have typically acted in their own best interests without spending too much time worrying about international public opinion. The poll also found that if America were to approve the strike, two thirds of Israelis would support moving forward.

The Jewish state was created to protect the Jewish people from a world that had failed it (depending of course on who you ask). The very fact that Israelis are willing to put such a massive decision on any other country, even such a tested and true ally, says a lot about the actual risk that most Israelis feel from Iran. If they honestly believed that Iran was seeking a nuclear weapon and that once they had achieved said nuclear weapon, they would immediately strap in onto the nearest warhead and send it off towards Tel Aviv, they would probably be a lot less concerned with what anyone, allies or otherwise, thought of their plans. A more in-depth study would have to be done to fully understand the psyche of the Israeli people on the issue, but it is clear that a nuclear armed Iran is not keeping them up nights the way that some in the Israeli government would have the world believe.

With that in mind, maybe Prime Minister Netanyahu and his cabinet should spend less time trying to convince the world that Iran must be attacked immediately to ward off imminent genocide, and more time taking the pulse of their constituents. Sometimes a leader speaks for his people. And sometimes he needs to stop speaking, and start listening.

Follow me on twitter @jlemonsk

John R. Bradley

From John R. Bradley, the Middle East correspondent and writer who correctly predicted the Egyptian revolution, comes a new message about the Arab Spring: “everything we have been told about it is wrong”. John R. Bradley sat down with Reza Akhlaghi, Senior Writer at FPA, to discuss his latest book: ‘After the Arab Spring: How Islamists Hijacked the Middle East Revolts’
Published by Palgrave Macmillan

Your book paints a bleak picture of what is coming the Middle East’s way following the Arab Spring. Much of what you say in your book runs counter to Robin Wright’s overarching argument in her acclaimed book ‘Rock the Casbah’, in which she essentially says that Arabs increasingly defy religious extremism and the doctrines of Islamic fundamentalism as espoused by Bin Laden and Ayatollah Khomeini. Whereas in your book, in sharp contrast to Wright’s, you argue that what will emerge from current developments in the region is Islamic extremism and wholesale defeat of the liberal and intellectual class in the Arab/Muslim world. Can you elaborate on this central argument?

I wouldn’t dispute the assertion, however odd it might be, that “Arabs increasingly defy religious extremism and the doctrines of Islamic fundamentalism as espoused by Bin Laden and Ayatollah Khomeini.” In fact, I would argue–and always have argued in my books–that the vast majority of Arabs have never had any interest in being terrorists, and that it’s patently absurd, to the point of being offensive, to suggest otherwise even rhetorically. Moreover, what exactly did Bin Laden and Khomeini have in common? Precisely nothing as far I can see. In any case, even to accept that argument does not by default mean we should assume Arabs are embracing the classic Western values of liberalism, pluralism, and freedom of expression. That’s an almighty conclusion to jump to, and it has no basis in logic. It’s like saying because they believe the sky is blue they, by extension, believe that sand is orange. Moreover, the argument is just hot air anyway, because it’s not justified by any of the facts on the ground.

For a start, these revolutions–or more accurately these lousy failed revolutions and military coups–were not motivated by a thirst for free-and-fair elections, but by economic desperation and the question of personal dignity. Now, obviously, no one wants to be tortured for speaking his or her mind, whether they are in Paris or Tunis. But to suggest that people of other cultures who speak other languages and have other belief systems and distinct social and political histories merely want to be like us in the West is far too simplistic, and to me smacks of cultural imperialism of the kind that the likes of Robin Wright are always guilty of. Why on earth wouldn’t they want to be just like us? But they don’t. And perhaps, just once in a while, we should have the humility to ask: why on earth should they?

In Tunisia you will find almost no one who has a bad word to say about Habib Bourghiba, the authoritarian post-independence leader who ruled from 1956 to 1987. And in Egypt, Gamal Abdul Nasser–who, like Bourghiba, restricted freedom of the press and democratic and civil institutions–is widely adored. I’ve lost count over the past two decades how many ordinary Tunisians and Egyptians I’ve asked about this, and their responses have always been the same: they are loved because they respected the dignity of their people and were not personally corrupt, and during their rule it was not difficult to bring food to the table. The question of whether or not they were elected has never entered into the discussion.

You argue that democracy, not its values, is a great friend of Islamists who may have no regard for democratic values but can greatly benefit from them particularly in the form of strong voter turnout who, based on your assertion, are the most active segment of the electorate in the Arab world. To quote directly from your book “In the Arab world, when the gift of democracy is unwrapped, it is the Islamists who spring out of the box”. Once in power, why should Islamists disregard democracy and derail the democratic process in their respective countries with no fear of socio-economic consequences particularly in an interconnected world and an increasingly interdependent global trade system?

I don’t argue that there is a contradiction between political Islam and the democratic process. I don’t in fact see any contradiction at all between the two. Have democratic elections not been a reality in Iran for the past three decades? A less frequently asked, but far more pressing, question is whether liberalism and creative dissent, the lifeblood of any culture worth living in, can survive the democratic triumph of Islamist fundamentalism. And the answer, as the case of Iran also tells us, is equally and categorically: no. The Arab Spring marks the last, tragic gasp of any hope for free expression and legal protection of personal liberties in the Arab world, as we understand those concepts in the West. The Islamists are for democracy as a system of government and a method of change but–and here comes the conversation stopper–only insofar as it is compatible with Islam. The Quran remains the sole authoritative basis for legislation, whose earthly manifestation are the scholars who interpret it so that the state’s function is essentially executive in nature. To put it in a nutshell: Islam is the answer to everything, the final authority, and the sole source of legitimacy of government.

So ask the Islamists anything about maintining close ties to the West and peace treaties with Israel and they’ll tell you just what you want to hear. But Islamicizing their societies from below, not reassessing foreign policy or banning elections, has always been their top priority, and while they accept for the most part the deomcratic process, they put in safeguards that no legislation can be introduced which contradicts the Sharia (however it is interpreted). On the question of freedom of expression and personal behavior, there is, therefore, always the massive qualifier of “local customs” and “Islamic norms” from the committed Islamists. Consider, for example, the response of Rachid Ghanouchi, the leader of Tunisia’s notoriously moderate Ennahda party, to the violent attacks on secular artists in his country during the past year. “Art is linked to the values and traditions of each society,” he said, “and no one should take away freedom of expression through art, as long as it reflects those traditions (my emphasis).” In other words: provided they do not bulge, or threaten to bulge, or threaten to lead to behavior that bulges, out of the cultural straitjacket of whatever he and self-appointed scholars like him think of as Islam.

Hazem Saleh Abu Ismail, a Salafi presidential candidate in Egypt and vocal supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, at least did us all a favor last month by cutting through the nonsense. When asked to elaborate on the importance of personal liberties and individual rights in countries governed by Islamic law, he was gobsmacked: “If you claim that Allah considers your personal freedom, show me your reference,” he said. “Nobody has ever said that—except for people who have no understanding of Sharia.”

Why do you think that the Arab/Muslim youth care little for democratic values and that the only reasons they took to the streets were poverty, hunger, and lack of access to descent jobs? Do you think they will get that from the Islamists whom you argue will be ruling them in a new post-Arab Spring Middle East?

Let’s look at what’s actually happened during the last year. When the first deadline for voter registration passed in July, a paltry 16 percent of Tunisians had bothered to register. We were constantly told that there was an 80 percent turnout for the elections, but that was 80 percent of the 50 percent who eventually registered after the deadline was extended. In other words, there was a 40 percent turnout. In Egypt in March, there was a turnout of just 41 percent for a crucial referendum on a new constitution that would determine the country’s future. Again, that’s 41 percent of registered voters, meaning–because millions of Egyptians aren’t registered–only about 20-25 percent actually turned out. An extensive study by researchers at Oxford University last month found that only 16 percent of Libyans are now in favour of Western-style democracy, as opposed to 60 percent who prefer authoritarian rule.

There are two reasons this reality is not reflected in the Western media’s appalling coverage of the so-called Arab Spring. The first is that, because of the continued influence of Edward Said’s Orientalism, no one wants to sound like some reactionary old Orientalist labeling the Arabs as culturally and politically distinctive, because it easily lends to charges–however unfounded–that they are being labeled inferior. The second is that the Western “experts” like Robin Wright home in on a tiny little band of English-speaking bloggers, activists, human-rights campaigners and so on. The Muslim Brotherhood always dismisses this group as “an out of touch, irrelevant, Westernized elite;” and while I don’t usually have much time for what the Muslim Brotherhood has to say, on this question they are absolutely right. In Egypt, for example, the parties set up by the revolutionaries got just 2 percent of the vote, as opposed to 77 percent for the Islamists–25 percent of which went to the Salafi party,Al-Nour, that openly campaigned on the promise of doing away with elections if they were voted in.

In the face of all this overwhelming evidence to the contrary, how much longer can the absurd happy-clappy, Facebook, picnic-in-the-park narrative of the Arab Spring continue? I suppose until all the pundits who got it completely wrong from the outset have no choice but to admit the fact. And that means it will likely continue forever. But now that it’s obvious the revolutions have created a security vacuum and clearly failed to alleviate the economic woes and human rights abuses that spawned them—indeed, in the case of Egypt and Tunisia, quite the opposite—the Islamists offer something seductive in the absence of meaningful solutions: a simple answer, Islam is the solution. The Islamists certainly don’t have viable economic policies. But nor do those in charge of Western democracies.

In Tunisia and Egypt before the Arab Spring, youth unemployment was about 30 percent. But in Spain it was 50 percent, and in Greece, Italy and Portugal it was 45 percent. How then was a quick and messy transition to democracy ever going to solve that problem, whoever was elected? The Islamists instead offer solace in the face of these frankly insurmountable problems. The terrible price that the ordinary people of these countries will have to pay for that solace will only gradually become evident to them, as it did to the historically very liberal and tolerant Iranian people.

I guess this could be called the $4 billion question, both literally and metaphorically. What was the rationale for the Saudi leadership, as you claim in your book, to give $4 billion to the new post-Mubarak military regime in Cairo? You also assert that this infusion of cash was followed by “indirect threats” to the interim military regime. What were some of those “threats”?

Actually, while they promised $4 billion, only about $500 million has materialized. There’s nothing odd in that. Only about 10 to 20 percent of aid ever pledged by any donors for whatever cause ends up being sent. The Saudis were only interested in gaining leverage, and one way of doing that is by holding out the carrot of economic aid for the bankrupt military to run after. Then, as you suggest, there’s the stick. This mainly came in the form of threatening to change the kingdom’s labor laws in a way that would have resulted in the expulsion of millions of Egyptian expatriate workers from Saudi Arabia, which would have had an immediate and devastating impact on the Egyptian economy. That didn’t happen, either. In any case, the Saudis can now relax: the Egyptian military clearly is not in any way itself revolutionary, and the Wahhabis have installed, through extensive funding, their Muslim Botherhood and Salafi proxies in Egypt’s new parliament. One thing we can be certain of is that they will not offer a peep of criticism of the Saudi regime. They never have.

In the new evolving Middle East to be soon dominated, based on your assertion, by Islamic fundamentalists, will and should Israel’s strategic objectives and security calculus change?

At the beginning of the Arab Spring, Israel breathed a sigh of relief. Tunisia doesn’t matter geopolitically one way or another, but Egypt of course does. And in Egypt there was a military coup. The Egyptian military is very pro the 1979 peace treaty with Israel, and its army is funded, trained, and equipped by America. The triumph of the Islamists in Egypt’s parliamentary elections doesn’t change things much vis-à-vis Israel, at least not in the short term. The parliament has limited powers, and all this talk about the Muslim Brotherhood taking on the military to push them to hand over to civilian rule is nonsense. With real power comes responsibility and accountability, and while the Muslim Brotherhood may be many things, one thing they certainly are not is stupid. As I’ve already suggested, with the cleanest, most efficient government the world has ever known, it would take a generation or more to cleanse the country of its corruption, brutality, poverty, illiteracy, chronic unemployment, nepotism, and so on. This is one reason the Brotherhood are more interested in forming a coalition with the liberal block in the new parliament than with the Salafis: that way, when the next elections come round, they can blame the liberals for the ills that still plague their nation. And the Brotherhood will avoid direct confrontation with the military because their first priority is not the defense budget or launching wars but imposing Islamist dogma on the Egyptian society, and that is what will preoccupy them during the first parliamentary session.

More generally, Israel is putting all its hopes on its undeclared and bizarre, but very real, alliance with Saudi Arabia, which, despite spewing anti-Semitic venom of the kind not seen since the Nazis, poses no military threat to the Jewish state. The Saudis are also aligned with Washington and hate the Iranian mullahs like the plague. Along with Qatar, Saudi Arabia has led a region-wide counterrevolution, shoring up pro-Western Persian Gulf monarchies as well as those of Jordan and Morocco, and backing the Muslim Brotherhood and its franchises in Tunisia, Syria, and Yemen. The question we can’t answer at this stage is whether the Saudis, through their funding and Wahhabi doctrine, will be able to control the Islamist groups taking power everywhere in relation to their relations with the West and Israel, in the same way the House of Saud has more or less been able to control their own Wahhabi religious establishment.

Do you think a new Middle East dominated by Sunni Arab governments will experience a Sunni-Shiite conflict?

On the government level yes. The main reason Washington has backed the Saudi-led counterrevolution, which is to say the move by Sunni Islamist parties to fill the post-Arab Sring vacuum, is to contain Iran. But ordinary Arabs have little time for such distinctions, despite the anti-Shia propaganda campaigns they have been bombarded with over the past five or so years. If Israel and America attack Iran, ordinary Arabs will side with the latter. It will be interesting to see how the Saudi- and Qatari-aligned Sunni parties throughout the region will try to box themselves out of that corner.

What, in your opinion, would it really take to see Kant and Sartre being taught at Saudi universities?

A miracle of the kind the world has never seen before.

Even as the European and U.S. economies slid over the past few years, Israel’s financial footing remained fairly stable. In fact, last year protests erupted to lower housing prices in the Gush Dan area, even though prices reflected demand for Tel Aviv residencies.

Today’s paper includes two more items that reflect positive growth in the Israeli economy:

• Israeli-made chocolate bars are more affordable in the United States than in Israel; and
• A new report indicates that the Israeli market “‘produced better risk-adjusted returns than all other developed stock markets in the past decade”

Those two items — on the micro and macro levels — suggest the thriving economy continues and has no indications for an about face.

Does all this positive financial news and historical resilience and ingenuity really make Israel a safe economic bet, though?

Absolutely not, for two major reasons.

On the political level, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has faced mounting criticism for his handling of the economy, with many Israelis desiring a more populist leader that can increase wages and decrease the costs of consumer goods.

A large portion of the Israeli population has not benefited from the upswing in the Israeli economy, leaving them saddled by higher out-of-pocket costs but little increased revenues.

Further, the improved economy might reflect increased foreign investment in Israel, which contributes to the paradigm of local Israelis lacking spending power in the country’s main metropolises of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. Similarly, frustration from local Israelis has mounted over the years, as foreign investors purchase apartments in these hubs for use during holidays, creating miniature ghost towns within certain neighborhoods for most of the year.

This external investment has inflated prices outside the comfortable spending limit of average Israelis and leading to the protests on housing costs and  other commodities, thus creating volatility.

Secondly, the security situation in Israel could change overnight, sending the economy into the gutters.

The, for now, rhetoric-war between Israel and Iran has not impacted the Israeli economy, but actual hostilities would assuredly drop housing costs in the major hubs, spike oil prices, and potentially increase costs for goods purchased from others in the region — notably Turkey.

Even increased utilization of Iran proxies Hezbollah and Hamas to launch assaults could devastate the Israeli economy in the north and south, not to mention drastically reduce tourism.

The detrimental impact of hostilities on the Israeli economy has been demonstrated within the last decade, such as during the intifada and the Second Lebanon War. Even after Operation Cast Lead, tensions with Turkey increased and threatened the trade partnership between the two countries.

All that said, though, the Israeli economy has faced tough economic, security and political times in the past and has always been resurrected to shine even brighter.

The tenacity, ingenuity and intellect of Israelis is sure to keep the country’s economy strong long into the future, but recent short-term economic gains could be easily wiped by the exceptionally volatile nature of the country and its predicaments.

As we mourn Anthony’s loss, we hope his legacy will remain a great source of inspiration for all those who aspire to write and report on that complex place called Middle East. We invite you all to visit Anthony’s personal website to explore more about his great works and fabulous journey in journalism: http://anthonyshadid.com

God bless Anthony’s soul.

Reza Akhlaghi

In this episode of Understanding Israel, Israeli Major (res.) and political and military analyst Elliot Chodoff joins me for a conversation about what one can expect from the most recent unity government attempt and what it means to Israel.

Over the last month and a half Israel has found itself in an emerging cyber war with individuals from its neighboring countries.  In this video, I speak with Jerusalem Post reporter Yaakov Lappin about the cyber war’s ramifications, how it might develop in the future, and how Israel is dealing with this increasingly prevalent threat.

If you have any questions or feel you have something to contribute to this conversation either post on the site or email me directly at rob.s.lattin@gmail.com.

Credit: Newsweek/The Daily Beast

There is currently a bill before the Knesset that seeks to offer financial assistance to Haredi youth leaving the ultra-Orthodox world. The proposed law would offer them the same sort of assistance that is currently offered to new immigrants. These benefits can cover everything from tax breaks on homes and cars to tuition remission for University and even a monthly living stipend.

While the bill has not yet passed, it is an interesting commentary on just how far removed Israel has allowed the Haredi community to get from its mainstream community. A star pupil in the Haredi community, should he choose to leave the fold and attempt to study in the secular world, is guaranteed hardships that most mediocre student from the secular world will not face. Primarily amongst these is that the Haredi education, which applies a high importance to studying Torah and Talmud, does not prepare its students for a secular Israeli University.

Haaretz reports that one such student, who has abandoned the Haredi world and is now striving to attend Tel Aviv University’s Law School, first has to qualify for a high school diploma. Their story is not about a lazy boy who could not be bothered to attend classes in the religious world and found an easier way in the secular world. Before leaving his religious community, he was studying at a “prestigious” Yeshiva in Bnei Brak.

There is much talk about how removed the ultra-Orthodox in Israel have become from mainstream Israeli society. Many do not work, very few serve in the military. They are subsidized by the state, both for their studies and their way of life (remember those segregated busses 222 everyone was talking about a few months ago? Those are heavily subsidized by the government). But how far has Israel allowed this community to deviate that to graduate with a religious secondary school education does not make one eligible to even apply to an Israeli University?

At one point in my life, I lived in a small desert town in Southern Israel. While there, I volunteered at a Democratic School. The notion is a strange one, but it is akin to a Montessori School. The students have an equal say to the teachers, and the teachers an equal say to the principal. There were no daily, or semesterly, requirements. If students wanted to spend all day in the sandbox, the art room, or the fully equipped music room, that was their decision to make. They chose when they were ready to learn to read, to do basic math, to learn a foreign language and so on. Needless to say, it was an interesting place to spend some time.

Despite very impressive test results that seem to imply that this outside-the-box education was working more than okay, the school had many problems with the state. The state was uncomfortable with their model. Coming up with issues that the state might have had with such a model would not be difficult. But it is suffice to say that this educational experiment was always under a watchful eye.

This was a school of maybe a hundred children. So the question is, how is Israel not keeping a watchful eye on the schooling the children of a population that makes up such a large number of Israelis? Estimates put the Haredi population in Israel as low one-in-ten and as high as one-in-six. And it must be remembered that this number is their population as a whole. Due to their high birth rates, when broken down by age group, the Haredi make up an even larger sizable proportion to secular children currently studying in an Israeli primary or secondary school. It is reported that as few as 40% of these Haredi schools are even teaching English or math. Israel is currently a leader in the world of hi-tech and innovation. But what kind of society will Israel be in 20 years, if such a large proportion of its population cannot even demand correct change at the market, much less learn how to work a computer?

Israel has a say in the education of the small Democratic School in the south of Israel. They have a say in the education of the Russian and Ethiopian communities of Israel. They have a say in the education of the Israeli Arab community in Israel. For the sake of the ultra-Orthodox, Israel must also have a say in the education of their community. Anything less is a disservice to the hundreds of thousands of children currently trusting their parents, their community and their state, to prepare them for life in the 21st century.

Follow me on twitter @jlemonsk

By comparison, this sounds very similar to what was transpiring with Golda Meir and her policy towards the Arab states in the lead up to the 1973 Yom Kippur War.  Golda felt very empowered and believed that her Arab counterparts wouldn’t dare strike against Israel given the outcome of the 1967 War.  She made comments about wanting to make peace but found reasons to evade it.   Like Bibi, she used Israeli security and strength as an excuse to not engage her enemies.  Like Bibi, she downplayed American pressures to make peace.  So what happened in the end?  She ignored the signs of an impending war and over 2,000 Israeli’s lost their lives.

For the sake of Israel, Bibi (left) needs to have more foresight than the late Golda Meir (right). If not, than Israeli society should vote him out of office in the next election.

It is also worth noting that like Bibi, Meir continually turned a blind eye and found meandering excuses for settlement construction, legal and illegal.

To return to the topic at hand, some believe peace with Egypt would not have been possible without the Yom Kippur War.  However, that suggests that it took a war to get Israeli leadership out of the clouds.  Had Golda and her advisors been more balanced and flexible, they may have accomplished the peace accord without the bloodshed.

There is of course no one definitive answer on how to make peace with the Palestinians; and not everything is within Israel’s, or Bibi’s, control (Hamas).  That does not change the fact, though, that he has proven unwilling to make the tough decisions needed to make progress with the Palestinians.  Bibi, and Israeli society, should reflect on the 1973 Yom Kippur War and take heed in the words of Spanish born poet and philosopher George Santayana, “those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.”

In U.S. politics, GOP presidential candidate Newt Gingrich gave a stunning rebuke to CNN anchor John King during the South Carolina Republican debate last night, drawing applause and a standing ovation from the largely conservative crowd.

Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu might have done the Israeli equivalent, as news reports suggest that he pegged the New York Times and left-leaning Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz  as Israel’s two greatest threats. (While Netanyahu’s alleged comments have been denied, the anti-media rhetoric is most certainly real, as has been demonstrated by a letter from the Prime Minister’s Office declining an invitation to submit an op-ed to the New York Times last year.)

That’s right. Israel, a country surrounded by enemies that want nothing more than to push its citizens into the sea, is scared of “left-wing” journalists. Israel, a nation who’s only regional friends — such as Egypt and Turkey — are quickly turning their backs on it, is terrified of editorial writers. Israelis, a people who have overcome adversity and built a thriving, democratic and Western country in less than a hundred years, is trembling at the thought of a mustached columnist.

The contention that the press and the influence of the media over populations are Israel’s biggest threats is patronizing to Israelis, diminishes the country’s successes, and understates the very real challenge of ensuring bombs don’t rattle Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, the Galil and the Negev at any second.

The New York Times is clearly the “paper of record,” but it has a challenge to overcome its alleged left-wing bias to garner credibility. While Ha’aretz  only captures approximately 6 percent of the Israeli audience, it has a far wider international reach and credibility. The paper is distributed along with the International Herald Tribune, which is, effectively, the international New York Times. Further, Ha’aretz visually looks similar to many credible U.S. papers — like the Washington Post and New York Times – and unlike it’s main competitors Yediot Achronot and Ma’ariv, which both have extensive pictures, graphics and more New York Daily News-type feels.

Ha’aretz and the New York Times clearly have in-roads with the U.S. and international communities and influence public policy, which can impact aid to Israel, pressure on the Arab world, and the prospects of interventions preventing the development of an Iranian nuclear warhead. Therefore, the true threat of these publications are their impact on public officials, which could lead to major changes in Israel-related policies.

However, the allegiance between Israel and its closest friend, the United States, is still rock-solid, where U.S. policymakers have overwhelmingly expressed their support for a safe and secure Israel. Both the New York Times and Ha’aretz have been in business for quite some time and been unable to derail that relationship.

Israelis for decades have been forging that strong bond, which is based on shared values and mutual interests. To suggest that all that hard work can be unraveled by editorial bias discounts the long-standing relationship and mutual concerns, effectively characterizing the two countries’ bond as superficial — which it most certainly is not.

Further, Israelis transformed what was once largely swamp and desert into a thriving economic and military powerhouse that has maintained freedoms and democracy. That achievement, forged from the sweat of the first kibbutz worker to the blood of today’s most recent army draftee, will not be decimated by a few choice journalistic words or the influence of a snarky columnist. Israelis’ perseverance will continue defeating all odds, even if so-called liberal publications sway opinion.

Lastly, the perception of fear from these publications largely undercuts arguments that Iran, terrorists, and Muslim extremists are very tangible threats that could cause the deaths of hundred or thousands of Israelis. From extremists in Egypt transforming a former Israeli ally into a threat to the prospects of a nuclear Middle East to rockets from terrorists on Israel’s borders, the country faces substantial security challenges. Solutions to those problems, whether military or economic, would benefit from policymakers’ accurate understanding of these threats, which are far more dangerous than a bad pun or a critical headline.

The declaration of the “liberal” media being more threatening merely diminishes the correct assertions that these very real dangers could jeopardize Israel’s security at any minute.

Elected officials’ obsession with attacking the so-called liberal media merely skirts the real issues of today, and threatens to downplay the most serious threats facing their country.  Netanyahu has thus far been a champion building international understanding of the true threat Iran and Muslim extremists face to Israel and the world at-large.  He should maintain that path and not let political kowtowing unravel his year’s of effective advocacy on behalf of Israel.

Hamas is gaining popularity in Gaza and the West Bank, at the expense of Fatah and the Peace Process. (Image: vkb.isvg.org)

While neither party may be part of the answer to the Israeli-Palestinian solution, a Hamas victory in the West Bank would put an end to the peace formula altogether.  Fatah is the only reasonable political party that Israel can negotiate a peace treaty with.  As a result, Israel must do all it can to restore the reputation of Fatah and help it win back the hearts and minds of its constituency.  Dennis Ross, a known supporter of Israel and the former special assistant to President Obama, provides some valuable and constructive insight on how Israel can do this in his most recent piece for the Washington Post:

The following was written on January 6, 2012 by Dennis Ross, the former special assistant to President Barak Obama, for the Washington Post:

Dan Meridor, one of Israel’s four deputy prime ministers, said to me years ago that “the peace process is like riding a bicycle: When you stop pedaling, you fall off.” And currently, the Israelis and Palestinians have stopped pedaling.

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas is convinced that this Israeli government cannot make a peace deal — or at least one he can live with — so he imposes conditions on negotiations. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sees these conditions as harsh and unprecedented, and doesn’t want to pay a steep political price just to enter talks.

The Obama administration and the other members of the Quartet — the Middle East mediating group that also includes envoys from the European Union, Russia and the United Nations — want to resume direct talks and this past week held a preparatory meeting with Israeli and Palestinian negotiators in Amman, Jordan. There may be more such meetings, and that is good, because ultimately there will be no peace without negotiations.

But there should also be no illusions about the prospects of a breakthrough any time soon. The psychological gaps between the parties make it hard to resolve their differences and have bedeviled all the work for peace talks over the past few years.

I have been intimately involved in peacemaking efforts over the past 20 years under Presidents George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton and Obama, and I know that Abbas and Netanyahu carry the weight of their peoples’ history and mythology, and face enormous political constraints. But those difficulties cannot be a reason to despair and accept a stalemate, particularly when those who reject peace will exploit any impasse to challenge the very idea of a two-state outcome.

While there may be no early breakthrough on holding negotiations, it is possible to overcome the stalemate. One way to do so — and to validate those Palestinian leaders, such as Abbas and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, who believe in nonviolence and coexistence — is for the Israelis to change the realities on the ground. After all, these Palestinian leaders need to be able to show that their approach is producing a process that will, in time, end the occupation.

What could demonstrate to the Palestinians that the occupation is receding? Examples are not hard to come by. Since the interim agreement of the Oslo process was finalized in 1995, the West Bank has been divided into non-contiguous areas known as A, B and C — with the Palestinians having putative control in Area A and Israel retaining overall responsibility in the two other areas. From the fall of 1995 to the spring of 2002, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) largely stayed out of Area A, which constitutes about 18 percent of the territory and includes all the major cities in the West Bank. According to the Oslo agreements, the Palestinians are to have civil and security responsibility in this area.

But in 2002, at the height of the second intifada and the horrendous suicide bombings that Palestinians were executing in Israel, the IDF began operating in Area A again to try to stop the attacks. Though the intifada ended in 2005 and Palestinian security forces have been generally effective in preventing terror attacks, the IDF still carries out periodic incursions into Palestinian cities to reinforce local security efforts. This grates on Palestinians, reminding them who remains in control.

So, one meaningful step would be either to stop all such incursions in Area A or, if there are continuing security concerns, to phase them out based on the security situation. Gabi Ashkenazi, former chief of staff of the IDF, has consistently said that “as the Palestinians do more on security, we will do less.” A gradual ending of incursions in Area A would certainly be consistent with that axiom.

In Area B, about 22 percent of the West Bank, Palestinian police maintain law and order but are not permitted to deal with terrorist threats. Israel could allow their presence to grow. From my discussions with Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak, I know that he is open to increasing the number of Palestinian police stations and broadening the areas where Palestinian security personnel operate. Now would be a good time to take these steps, as any such expansion would certainly be noticed, and welcomed, by the Palestinian public.

Finally, in Area C, which is about 60 percent of the West Bank, Palestinians’ security and police forces have no access, their economic activity is extremely limited, and Israel retains civil and security responsibilities. There is no practical reason that the Palestinians cannot be permitted dramatically more economic access and activity in this area.

To give one example, there are Palestinian stone masonry factories in Area A, but Palestinians have limited access to the rock quarries in the West Bank, which are in Area C. In a case brought against Israeli ownership of the rock quarries, the Israeli Supreme Court ruled late last month that no additional quarries should be Israeli-owned. That ruling creates an opening for private Palestinian ownership, should any new quarries be established — and there clearly is room for more.

Expanding the Palestinians’ economic opportunities in Area C would do wonders for job creation and the overall Palestinian economy. (In the West Bank, unemployment has come down in recent years but remains at about 16 percent.)

These steps should be feasible from an Israeli standpoint. First, these or similar changes could be implemented without altering the territory’ s political status and could be done in a way that would not put Israeli security at risk, particularly if coordinated closely with the IDF.

Second, Netanyahu has said repeatedly that he does not want to rule over Palestinians and that the stronger their economic base, the better the prospects for peace. These steps would certainly demonstrate that the prime minister means what he says. At the same time, they would signal to Palestinians that independence is possible and that the approach from Abbas and Fayyad — not Hamas resistance or violence — can produce it.

I’m not suggesting to forgo negotiations and their focus on a two-state solution. Talks need to be pursued, and the Obama administration is rightly doing so. The administration is also continuing to assist with institution-building by providing material support for the security, judicial and other sectors of Palestinian society — steps that fit neatly with the kind of actions I am proposing to validate leaders such as Fayyad. At this point, validation of nonviolence will come less from words and more from demonstrations that the occupation is shrinking and will, eventually, end.

The rest of the Middle East is churning, with dictators being toppled and protesters still in the streets a year into the Arab Awakening. Since the demand for free and fair elections has become a symbol of credibility in the uprisings, the pressure on both Fatah and Hamas to hold elections this year is likely to become irresistible. For the past few years, Abbas has said that he would not be a candidate in new elections, but now he is saying he would like those elections to take place in May and plans to depart the political scene afterward. Even if it will not be simple to reach an agreement with Hamas on the terms of elections, Abbas will feel the need to hold them sometime in 2012.

These elections are likely to shape the Palestinians’ identity and whether they continue to accept nonviolence, peaceful coexistence with Israelis and a two-state solution. If there are clear signs that the occupation is diminishing, the positions of Palestinians such as Abbas, Fayyad and their followers who believe in nonviolence will be validated before the elections. This is essential because the alternative is Hamas, which rejects nonviolence and peace with Israel.

In the recent deal with the Israeli government to free kidnapped soldier Gilad Shalit, which gained the release of more than 1,000 prisoners, Hamas was seen as delivering political gain through an act of violence. By comparison, Abbas and Fayyad are not seen as delivering on the issues that matter to the Palestinian public, such as prisoner releases, Israeli withdrawal or a reduction of Israeli control.

For Palestinians, at least, this validation would also shrink the psychological gap between them and the Israelis, inspiring hope that negotiations could actually lead somewhere. It might, thus, also offer the best way to unstick the negotiating track. Even more important, with the changes sweeping the region and a political transition looming for the Palestinians, such a validation may be the only way to preserve support among the Palestinian and Arab publics for a two-state solution.

Dennis Ross, counselor at the Washington Institute, served as a special assistant to President Obama and a senior director on the National Security Council staff from July 2009 to December 2011.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Credit: Reuters

In his NYT op-ed today entitled ‘Don’t Do It, Bibi,’ Roger Cohen issued another stern warning to his favorite target, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu. In his piece, he warns about the grave repercussions if Israel were to attack Iran without political support from the United States.

This article is the latest installment in Cohen’s crusade against Netanyahu and the Likud-led governing coalition in Israel. Cohen solemnly recites all the ways in which Netanyahu has mistreated President Obama before he settles down and proceeds with his analysis of Iran’s nuclear threat.

Cohen argues that Netanyahu has stalled in his negotiations with the Palestinians because he foresees a rabidly pro-Israel Republican nominee beating Obama in the 2012 presidential elections. Yet in the next paragraph Cohen contends that Netanyahu is sorely tempted to bomb Iran before the elections because he and his advisors increasingly believe Obama can win in November.

Now, almost everybody following the Middle East understands that Netanyahu is a savvy politician who is not oblivious to American election cycles. Perhaps even more than most politicians, Netanyahu may be better characterized as “cynical” than “shrewd” in formulating his political agenda. And it may be true that Netanyahu indeed forecasts a Republican victory in 2012, but wants to hedge his bets by bombing Iran’s nuclear reactors while Obama courts the Jewish vote in the swing state of Florida.

However, Cohen makes the same mistakes in this article that he has consistently made throughout his analysis of the Iranian threat.

First, he implies that any attack by Israel would be a massive bombing campaign that would instantly and irreversibly unite all of Iran’s people under their oppressive regime and against the West. For starters, any aerial attack would be limited to the nuclear reactor sites and would probably result in few civilian casualties. With the possible tacit support of the US, in the last few years Israel has already attacked Iran’s nuclear program with a computer virus, assassinated Iranian nuclear scientists, and sabotaged missile bases in Iran that resulted in dozens of Iranian deaths. Meanwhile, less than three years ago Iran’s regime was strongly challenged by its populace. While the theocratic government may have suppressed the mass protests in 2009, there is still a strong anti-regime sentiment among Iranians. Moreover, the “regime” itself is an uneasy coalition between Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei and President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad that is showing highly visible signs of strain. I’m not sure how Cohen can absorb these facts and compute that an attack by Israel “locks in the Iranian Republic for a generation.”

Second (and he is not alone in this truly bizarre line of argumentation), he reckons that Israel’s security is threatened more by the status of the occupied territories than by Iran. I fully agree that Israel must keep striving to find a way to ensure that Palestinians have a fully functioning state. While the on and off again courtship between Hamas and Fatah certainly complicates matters, it is also reasonable to argue that the Netanyahu administration has shown a distinct lack of urgency in its approach toward negotiations with the Palestinians. I am also gravely aware of the risks that any aerial attack by Israel on Iranian reactor sites would entail (although per above I disagree with Cohen about their nature.) However, I struggle to comprehend how the Israeli-Palestinian quagmire, which is grinding toward its 45th year of existence, can be compared to the existential threat posed by the nuclear program of a country whose stated intention is to destroy Israel.