John R. Bradley

From John R. Bradley, the Middle East correspondent and writer who correctly predicted the Egyptian revolution, comes a new message about the Arab Spring: “everything we have been told about it is wrong”. John R. Bradley sat down with Reza Akhlaghi, Senior Writer at FPA, to discuss his latest book: ‘After the Arab Spring: How Islamists Hijacked the Middle East Revolts’
Published by Palgrave Macmillan

Your book paints a bleak picture of what is coming the Middle East’s way following the Arab Spring. Much of what you say in your book runs counter to Robin Wright’s overarching argument in her acclaimed book ‘Rock the Casbah’, in which she essentially says that Arabs increasingly defy religious extremism and the doctrines of Islamic fundamentalism as espoused by Bin Laden and Ayatollah Khomeini. Whereas in your book, in sharp contrast to Wright’s, you argue that what will emerge from current developments in the region is Islamic extremism and wholesale defeat of the liberal and intellectual class in the Arab/Muslim world. Can you elaborate on this central argument?

I wouldn’t dispute the assertion, however odd it might be, that “Arabs increasingly defy religious extremism and the doctrines of Islamic fundamentalism as espoused by Bin Laden and Ayatollah Khomeini.” In fact, I would argue–and always have argued in my books–that the vast majority of Arabs have never had any interest in being terrorists, and that it’s patently absurd, to the point of being offensive, to suggest otherwise even rhetorically. Moreover, what exactly did Bin Laden and Khomeini have in common? Precisely nothing as far I can see. In any case, even to accept that argument does not by default mean we should assume Arabs are embracing the classic Western values of liberalism, pluralism, and freedom of expression. That’s an almighty conclusion to jump to, and it has no basis in logic. It’s like saying because they believe the sky is blue they, by extension, believe that sand is orange. Moreover, the argument is just hot air anyway, because it’s not justified by any of the facts on the ground.

For a start, these revolutions–or more accurately these lousy failed revolutions and military coups–were not motivated by a thirst for free-and-fair elections, but by economic desperation and the question of personal dignity. Now, obviously, no one wants to be tortured for speaking his or her mind, whether they are in Paris or Tunis. But to suggest that people of other cultures who speak other languages and have other belief systems and distinct social and political histories merely want to be like us in the West is far too simplistic, and to me smacks of cultural imperialism of the kind that the likes of Robin Wright are always guilty of. Why on earth wouldn’t they want to be just like us? But they don’t. And perhaps, just once in a while, we should have the humility to ask: why on earth should they?

In Tunisia you will find almost no one who has a bad word to say about Habib Bourghiba, the authoritarian post-independence leader who ruled from 1956 to 1987. And in Egypt, Gamal Abdul Nasser–who, like Bourghiba, restricted freedom of the press and democratic and civil institutions–is widely adored. I’ve lost count over the past two decades how many ordinary Tunisians and Egyptians I’ve asked about this, and their responses have always been the same: they are loved because they respected the dignity of their people and were not personally corrupt, and during their rule it was not difficult to bring food to the table. The question of whether or not they were elected has never entered into the discussion.

You argue that democracy, not its values, is a great friend of Islamists who may have no regard for democratic values but can greatly benefit from them particularly in the form of strong voter turnout who, based on your assertion, are the most active segment of the electorate in the Arab world. To quote directly from your book “In the Arab world, when the gift of democracy is unwrapped, it is the Islamists who spring out of the box”. Once in power, why should Islamists disregard democracy and derail the democratic process in their respective countries with no fear of socio-economic consequences particularly in an interconnected world and an increasingly interdependent global trade system?

I don’t argue that there is a contradiction between political Islam and the democratic process. I don’t in fact see any contradiction at all between the two. Have democratic elections not been a reality in Iran for the past three decades? A less frequently asked, but far more pressing, question is whether liberalism and creative dissent, the lifeblood of any culture worth living in, can survive the democratic triumph of Islamist fundamentalism. And the answer, as the case of Iran also tells us, is equally and categorically: no. The Arab Spring marks the last, tragic gasp of any hope for free expression and legal protection of personal liberties in the Arab world, as we understand those concepts in the West. The Islamists are for democracy as a system of government and a method of change but–and here comes the conversation stopper–only insofar as it is compatible with Islam. The Quran remains the sole authoritative basis for legislation, whose earthly manifestation are the scholars who interpret it so that the state’s function is essentially executive in nature. To put it in a nutshell: Islam is the answer to everything, the final authority, and the sole source of legitimacy of government.

So ask the Islamists anything about maintining close ties to the West and peace treaties with Israel and they’ll tell you just what you want to hear. But Islamicizing their societies from below, not reassessing foreign policy or banning elections, has always been their top priority, and while they accept for the most part the deomcratic process, they put in safeguards that no legislation can be introduced which contradicts the Sharia (however it is interpreted). On the question of freedom of expression and personal behavior, there is, therefore, always the massive qualifier of “local customs” and “Islamic norms” from the committed Islamists. Consider, for example, the response of Rachid Ghanouchi, the leader of Tunisia’s notoriously moderate Ennahda party, to the violent attacks on secular artists in his country during the past year. “Art is linked to the values and traditions of each society,” he said, “and no one should take away freedom of expression through art, as long as it reflects those traditions (my emphasis).” In other words: provided they do not bulge, or threaten to bulge, or threaten to lead to behavior that bulges, out of the cultural straitjacket of whatever he and self-appointed scholars like him think of as Islam.

Hazem Saleh Abu Ismail, a Salafi presidential candidate in Egypt and vocal supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, at least did us all a favor last month by cutting through the nonsense. When asked to elaborate on the importance of personal liberties and individual rights in countries governed by Islamic law, he was gobsmacked: “If you claim that Allah considers your personal freedom, show me your reference,” he said. “Nobody has ever said that—except for people who have no understanding of Sharia.”

Why do you think that the Arab/Muslim youth care little for democratic values and that the only reasons they took to the streets were poverty, hunger, and lack of access to descent jobs? Do you think they will get that from the Islamists whom you argue will be ruling them in a new post-Arab Spring Middle East?

Let’s look at what’s actually happened during the last year. When the first deadline for voter registration passed in July, a paltry 16 percent of Tunisians had bothered to register. We were constantly told that there was an 80 percent turnout for the elections, but that was 80 percent of the 50 percent who eventually registered after the deadline was extended. In other words, there was a 40 percent turnout. In Egypt in March, there was a turnout of just 41 percent for a crucial referendum on a new constitution that would determine the country’s future. Again, that’s 41 percent of registered voters, meaning–because millions of Egyptians aren’t registered–only about 20-25 percent actually turned out. An extensive study by researchers at Oxford University last month found that only 16 percent of Libyans are now in favour of Western-style democracy, as opposed to 60 percent who prefer authoritarian rule.

There are two reasons this reality is not reflected in the Western media’s appalling coverage of the so-called Arab Spring. The first is that, because of the continued influence of Edward Said’s Orientalism, no one wants to sound like some reactionary old Orientalist labeling the Arabs as culturally and politically distinctive, because it easily lends to charges–however unfounded–that they are being labeled inferior. The second is that the Western “experts” like Robin Wright home in on a tiny little band of English-speaking bloggers, activists, human-rights campaigners and so on. The Muslim Brotherhood always dismisses this group as “an out of touch, irrelevant, Westernized elite;” and while I don’t usually have much time for what the Muslim Brotherhood has to say, on this question they are absolutely right. In Egypt, for example, the parties set up by the revolutionaries got just 2 percent of the vote, as opposed to 77 percent for the Islamists–25 percent of which went to the Salafi party,Al-Nour, that openly campaigned on the promise of doing away with elections if they were voted in.

In the face of all this overwhelming evidence to the contrary, how much longer can the absurd happy-clappy, Facebook, picnic-in-the-park narrative of the Arab Spring continue? I suppose until all the pundits who got it completely wrong from the outset have no choice but to admit the fact. And that means it will likely continue forever. But now that it’s obvious the revolutions have created a security vacuum and clearly failed to alleviate the economic woes and human rights abuses that spawned them—indeed, in the case of Egypt and Tunisia, quite the opposite—the Islamists offer something seductive in the absence of meaningful solutions: a simple answer, Islam is the solution. The Islamists certainly don’t have viable economic policies. But nor do those in charge of Western democracies.

In Tunisia and Egypt before the Arab Spring, youth unemployment was about 30 percent. But in Spain it was 50 percent, and in Greece, Italy and Portugal it was 45 percent. How then was a quick and messy transition to democracy ever going to solve that problem, whoever was elected? The Islamists instead offer solace in the face of these frankly insurmountable problems. The terrible price that the ordinary people of these countries will have to pay for that solace will only gradually become evident to them, as it did to the historically very liberal and tolerant Iranian people.

I guess this could be called the $4 billion question, both literally and metaphorically. What was the rationale for the Saudi leadership, as you claim in your book, to give $4 billion to the new post-Mubarak military regime in Cairo? You also assert that this infusion of cash was followed by “indirect threats” to the interim military regime. What were some of those “threats”?

Actually, while they promised $4 billion, only about $500 million has materialized. There’s nothing odd in that. Only about 10 to 20 percent of aid ever pledged by any donors for whatever cause ends up being sent. The Saudis were only interested in gaining leverage, and one way of doing that is by holding out the carrot of economic aid for the bankrupt military to run after. Then, as you suggest, there’s the stick. This mainly came in the form of threatening to change the kingdom’s labor laws in a way that would have resulted in the expulsion of millions of Egyptian expatriate workers from Saudi Arabia, which would have had an immediate and devastating impact on the Egyptian economy. That didn’t happen, either. In any case, the Saudis can now relax: the Egyptian military clearly is not in any way itself revolutionary, and the Wahhabis have installed, through extensive funding, their Muslim Botherhood and Salafi proxies in Egypt’s new parliament. One thing we can be certain of is that they will not offer a peep of criticism of the Saudi regime. They never have.

In the new evolving Middle East to be soon dominated, based on your assertion, by Islamic fundamentalists, will and should Israel’s strategic objectives and security calculus change?

At the beginning of the Arab Spring, Israel breathed a sigh of relief. Tunisia doesn’t matter geopolitically one way or another, but Egypt of course does. And in Egypt there was a military coup. The Egyptian military is very pro the 1979 peace treaty with Israel, and its army is funded, trained, and equipped by America. The triumph of the Islamists in Egypt’s parliamentary elections doesn’t change things much vis-à-vis Israel, at least not in the short term. The parliament has limited powers, and all this talk about the Muslim Brotherhood taking on the military to push them to hand over to civilian rule is nonsense. With real power comes responsibility and accountability, and while the Muslim Brotherhood may be many things, one thing they certainly are not is stupid. As I’ve already suggested, with the cleanest, most efficient government the world has ever known, it would take a generation or more to cleanse the country of its corruption, brutality, poverty, illiteracy, chronic unemployment, nepotism, and so on. This is one reason the Brotherhood are more interested in forming a coalition with the liberal block in the new parliament than with the Salafis: that way, when the next elections come round, they can blame the liberals for the ills that still plague their nation. And the Brotherhood will avoid direct confrontation with the military because their first priority is not the defense budget or launching wars but imposing Islamist dogma on the Egyptian society, and that is what will preoccupy them during the first parliamentary session.

More generally, Israel is putting all its hopes on its undeclared and bizarre, but very real, alliance with Saudi Arabia, which, despite spewing anti-Semitic venom of the kind not seen since the Nazis, poses no military threat to the Jewish state. The Saudis are also aligned with Washington and hate the Iranian mullahs like the plague. Along with Qatar, Saudi Arabia has led a region-wide counterrevolution, shoring up pro-Western Persian Gulf monarchies as well as those of Jordan and Morocco, and backing the Muslim Brotherhood and its franchises in Tunisia, Syria, and Yemen. The question we can’t answer at this stage is whether the Saudis, through their funding and Wahhabi doctrine, will be able to control the Islamist groups taking power everywhere in relation to their relations with the West and Israel, in the same way the House of Saud has more or less been able to control their own Wahhabi religious establishment.

Do you think a new Middle East dominated by Sunni Arab governments will experience a Sunni-Shiite conflict?

On the government level yes. The main reason Washington has backed the Saudi-led counterrevolution, which is to say the move by Sunni Islamist parties to fill the post-Arab Sring vacuum, is to contain Iran. But ordinary Arabs have little time for such distinctions, despite the anti-Shia propaganda campaigns they have been bombarded with over the past five or so years. If Israel and America attack Iran, ordinary Arabs will side with the latter. It will be interesting to see how the Saudi- and Qatari-aligned Sunni parties throughout the region will try to box themselves out of that corner.

What, in your opinion, would it really take to see Kant and Sartre being taught at Saudi universities?

A miracle of the kind the world has never seen before.

As we mourn Anthony’s loss, we hope his legacy will remain a great source of inspiration for all those who aspire to write and report on that complex place called Middle East. We invite you all to visit Anthony’s personal website to explore more about his great works and fabulous journey in journalism: http://anthonyshadid.com

God bless Anthony’s soul.

Reza Akhlaghi

The sudden changes in the region have been reflective of an immense buildup of frustration, distrust, and cynicism among an increasingly connected and well-educated Arab youth, who have lost faith in political and economic management systems they see fraught with corruption. Their continuous rage against Middle East’s incumbent dictators brings a key question: Will the new emerging governments become democratic or will they be aligned mainly with religious extremists whose political movements and participation in public life have been suppressed under decades-old Western-back military and monarchical dictatorships?

What started as hopeful developments in North Africa against lifetime presidential dictatorships and leaderships of Ben Ali, Mubarak, and Gadaffi, is slowly and clearly shaping as a great victory for Islamist parties with chances of success for secularism on the wane. Whether or not the domination of Islamist groups and parties over Middle Eastern politics will be a long-term trend is clearly questionable, but their successful emergence as key power brokers in a new Middle East appears to be assured.

In Tunisia, where the first post-uprising and free elections were held in late October, the Ennahda, believed to be a moderate Islamist party, won over 40% of the vote, securing over 90 seats in the country’s 217-seat parliament. Since then Ennahda has formed a coalition government with two other secular parties.

In Egypt, where the post-Mubarak political jolt has been followed by continuous aftershocks against the ruling military elite, the December 15 elections have resulted in a landslide victory for Islamists, securing over 72% of seats in the parliament. The two key winning parties are the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and the Al-Nour (“The Light”) Party, Egypts largest Salafist party that was born out of Al-Daawa Movement in Alexandria. The Salafists are believed to enjoy great financial and logistical support from the House of Saud. The Saudis are also active in Egypt’s publishing industry, sponsoring and subsidizing publications that promote their extremist version of Islam (Vahabism).

In Libya, where the revolution became possible with significant support from NATO’s military muscle, the post-Gadaffi political power structure under the National Transitional Council (NTC), is still being shaped with elections set for June or July 2012 and presidential elections slated for 2013. Libya’s Islamist groups, including Al-Qaeda sympathizers, were heavily involved in the armed resurrection against Gadaffi, so their presence, and subsequent success, in the elections is expected to be heavy given their brutal suppression and treatment under Gadaffi’s rule.

And as to Syria, the country seems drifting toward full-blown civil war with significant logistical support to dissidents first and foremost by Turkey and the Saudis. More on Syria in a bit.

Emerging New Rivalries

In 2011 the Middle East became witness–vis-à-vis the Arab Spring–to a brewing rivalry that seeks to claim the leadership torch in the region. Turkey and Saudi Arabia are two key power brokers active in cementing new relationships with newly established governments born out of Arab Spring. Qatar is another emerging player, bent on raising its regional and international profile.  Qatar has used its financial muscle to pressure dictators like Gadaffi and Assad into succumbing into demands of their people while silently condoning the repression of pro-democracy protesters in Bahrain. Qatar, however, is part of what could be a slowly emerging new bloc of Sunni governments in the region with potential to become a counter balancing act against Iran.

Turkey, whose “zero problem” foreign policy doctrine was debunked by the Arab Spring, spent much of 2011 repositioning itself in the new Middle East as the region’s incumbent dictators with whom Ankara enjoyed increasingly close ties were removed from power one after another. Turkey is currently the chief power broker behind efforts to topple the Assad regime. The Syrian National Council was announced in Istanbul in early October and senior defectors from the Syrian army conduct military planning and operations from the Turkish border city of Hakkari against the Assad regime. Turkey has been also sending trade delegations to Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, promoting trade ties with the new leaderships of these countries. While Turkish efforts and diplomacy, particularly with regard to Syria, have raised eyebrows in Tehran, Tehran needs Turkey. Iran is becoming increasingly reliant on Turkish trade routes as international sanctions against Tehran become more forceful and biting.

For Iran 2011 was a year marked with economic and diplomatic failures as well as intensification of economic sanctions that are set to get hardened over the next few months, raising further tensions between Iran and the West. The intensification of sanctions against Iran could have two outcomes. The first outcome could be continued intransigence on the part of Iran and the West as Iran views tough sanctions as bullying by the West and the West, for its part, views Iran uninterested in diplomacy even under economic pressure. This outcome, unfortunately, could set the ground for an inevitable military confrontation.

The second outcome that the West could be seeking from sanctions is intensified factional infighting and internal strife as Iranians feel the heat of economic sanctions and find the government’s foreign policy responsible for their economic woes, leading to the emergence of a new political force in Iran, in the form of a coup d’état, by a specific faction within the ruling elite say the Revolutionary Guards. If the latter were to take place, it is expected that chances of military confrontation with the West will be dimmed significantly.

Israel and Regional Uncertainties

With Islamist parties on ascendancy and religious sentiments expressed without the fear of repression, Israel’s security becomes a pressing question for policy makers in Israel. One question remains whether the prevailing anti-Israeli sentiment in Arab societies will translate into official policy by the newly established Islamist governments with potential for confrontation with the Jewish state.

Israelis have lost one of their key regional allies (Turkey) and been involved in efforts to contain and slow Iran’s nuclear program and its impact on the security and geopolitical standing of the Jewish state. In this environment, Israeli policy makers would find the emergence of an Arab bloc primarily made of Islamists particularly worrisome. For Israel accommodating Middle East’s new Islamists could be a challenge that requires astute diplomatic maneuvering on multiple fronts.

Best Books on Middle East & Person(s) of the Year

I was asked by the Foreign Policy Association to name some of the best books on the Middle East and name the region’s person(s) of the year. Some of the best books on the Middle East that I had a chance to read and would highly recommend are as follows:

The Shah, by Abbas Milani,
Palgrave Macmillan: 488 pp.

A detailed biography of the last Persian emperor who was toppled in the Iranian revolution of 1979. The book is written in a captivating prose by Dr. Abbas Milani of the Iranian Studies Program at Stanford University. It offers a portrait of the Shah and his life and policies and the implications they had for the Shah, the Peacock Throne of Persia, and the region. I think it should be a required reading for anyone who wants to develop an in-depth understanding of today’s Middle East. The book is free from personal and ideological biases, making it all more interesting a read.

Rock the Casbah: Rage and Rebellion Across the Islamic World by Robin Wright,
Simon & Schuster: 320 pp.

Written by the preeminent Middle East reporter, who is presently a fellow at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the U.S. Institute of Peace, Robin Wright offers a different side of the new Middle East in which extremism is being rejected and women have decided to demand for their rightful place in Muslim societies. Wright makes the voice of those Muslims heard that we hardly get a chance to hear.

Assassins of the Turquoise Palace by Roya Hakakian,
Grove Press 322 pp.

A book by Roya Hakakian, Iranian-American poet/journalist, that puts on display the Mykonos restaurant affair, a true story about the assassination of four members of an Iranian opposition group in Berlin. The Mykonos affair led to the subsequent arrest of suspects and their prosecution by German prosecutors, whose tireless and fearless efforts culminated in the indictment of Iran’s top leadership in the assassination. The book reads like a riveting international thriller that keeps the reader glued to its pages irrespective of the reader’s knowledge of Iranian affairs.

I think the persons of the year are undoubtedly the incredibly brave protestors in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Syria, and Bahrain who fearlessly opposed truly brutal dictators and overcame fear as an impediment to their fight for freedom. As Islamist parties come to the fore of Arab politics, a key question in the mind of many in the region and beyond begs for answer: Once in power, will the Islamist parties respect the democratic process and value human dignity and women’s rights?

Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati

2011 began with yet another governmental crisis for Lebanon, as the ministers affiliated to the March 8 coalition walked out of Premier Saad Hariri’s cabinet, forcing its collapse. With impeccable (and, no doubt, carefully calculated) timing, the representatives of Hizballah, its Shiite frenemy AMAL, and the Free Patriotic Movement, led by the revenchard General Michel Aoun, announced their withdrawal from the “government of national unity” just as Hariri was posing for pictures with Barack Obama at the White House.

This decision, they announced, had been taken because of the cabinet’s refusal to cease cooperation with the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), established by UN Security Council Resolution 1757 to investigate of the assassination of Saad’s father, Rafiq, on Valentine’s Day 2005.

Only in June, after six months of governmental hiatus, was the Sunni billionaire Najib Mikati, nominated by March 8 as a consensus candidate for the premiership, finally confirmed in his position.

The months since, meanwhile, have been marked by the partisan sniping and compromises typical of Lebanese politics. Three issues, in particular, have dominated political discussion.

The first of these was the electricity plan put forward by the FPM, and its energy minister Gebran Bassil, Aoun’s son-in-law and heir-apparent. First suggested in 2009, but put on the back-burner until Aoun’s camp was better able to impose its demands in Mikati’s cabinet, this promised to end both Lebanon’s sempiternal power shortages, and the immense losses provoked by an inefficient energy sector. On the one hand, Bassil insisted, his plan would raise production to 4000MW by 2014, insuring round-the-clock electricity for all Lebanese – a vast improvement on the current situation, where most outside the capital, provided only with a few hours of power by the state, are forced to fall back on thriving private generator suppliers. On the other, a restructuring of Electricité du Liban, the state-owned energy supplier, would cut losses from $4.4b in 2010 to zero in three years.

These are, to say the least, ambitious – if not overweening – claims, and many have expressed doubts that they can be put into effect. But more contentious for the March 14 opposition were the financial details of Bassil’s plan. While his demand that $1.2b be handed over to the Ministry of Energy and Water to finance the first phase of this overhaul, and his initial refusal to countenance the creation of a regulatory body to supervise the energy sector (a point he eventually conceded to PM Mikati), were perceived by his opponents as political malfeasance of the most blatant kind, his apparent preference for turning to Iran, rather than Arab countries, to secure the $1b of foreign aid included in the funding package was seen as a further sign of March 8′s love affair with the Islamic Republic.

After a long summer of claims and counter-claims, deadlocks and breakdowns, during which Aoun, in one of his cantankerous weekly press conferences, called on the Lebanese people to invest the chamber of deputies to make good their demands for functioning services, the cabinet finally reached agreement on a draft law in early September. This, though, has not put an end to the enduring debate over electricity and its uses. One of the most enduring complaints of ordinary citizens, the lack of regular power seems an apt symbol for the state’s failure to provide even the most basic amenities to its charges, and for the parasitic forms of capitalism which thrive upon this absence.

The second of these issues is, as has become customary, the STL, and its ongoing tribulations. In June, after many announcements, delays, and rumors, the office of the Prosecutor, Canadian judge Daniel Bellemare, issued its indictment against Mustafa Amin Badreddin, Salim Jamil Ayyash, Hussein Hassan Oneissi, and Assad Hassan Habra, for charges relating to the assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri. Perhaps unavoidably, this announcement – expected, discussed, dismissed, and feared by the Lebanese for so long – proved somewhat of an anticlimax. As many had expected since the controversial claim by Germany’s Der Spiegel that Hizballah, and not the Syrian regime, had engineered and executed Hariri’s killing, this document implicated individuals associated with the Party of God.

But it did not, as many had feared, prompt violent reprisals. On the contrary, the party’s MPs and cadres have continued to deride the tribunal as a “politicized and unconstitutional” instrument of “American-Israeli” influence, as Nasrallah reiterated on 1 December, whose claims are based largely on unfounded speculation, distortion, and sheer untruths. The Prosecution’s case, in this respect, has hardly been bolstered by its professed reliance on circumstantial evidence – and in particular, extensive use of records of cell phone usage. This may, or may not, prove sufficient in a court of law – but in the arena of Lebanese political debate, a world little concerned with the niceties of legal procedure at the best of times, such evidence can all too easily seem a flimsy sign of the STL’s continued failings.

What is more, the tribunal continues to await the delivery of the four accused, which the Lebanese state has so far proved unable, or unwilling, to apprehend. This failure was briefly brought into sharp relief by the publication in Time Magazine of what appeared to be an interview with one of the four accused, who allegedly claimed that “the Lebanese authorities know where I live, and if they wanted to arrest me they would have done it a long time ago. Simply, they cannot”. Though doubts were later cast on the veracity of these words when the author of the piece, Nicholas Blanford, was forced to admit that he had not conducted the interview himself, they certainly hit a raw nerve with the Lebanese government. In particular, they irked PM Mikati, keen to stress his own commitment to the STL in the face of accusations by the Future Movement that his decision to present himself as a candidate for the premiership made of him a “two-faced and two-tongued” traitor to the cause of the international tribunal, the Hariri hegemon, and by extension the entire Sunni community.

Mikati had a further opportunity to demonstrate this commitment in November, when the issue of Lebanon’s $32.6m contribution to the budget of the STL again raised its head. Declaring on Twitter that “STL financing is a means to a bigger end: justice, stability and Lebanon’s continuous respect of its international commitments”, Mikati threatened to resign if the cabinet did not agree to this payment by the end of the month, before dramatically announcing on 30 November that he had used the Prime Minister’s budget to pay the required sum.

Seemingly the most surprising event of the year, this decision was welcomed and criticized in equal measures by figures on both sides of the political divide. While many praised Mikati – the man of the year simply for his apparent ability to withstand the slings and arrows pelted at him from both sides of the political divide for so long – for his desire to preserve Lebanon’s stability at all costs, others took him to task for what they regarded as a dangerous precedent – a peremptory assumption by a single individual of the executive powers invested by the constitution in the cabinet as a corporate body, and one which, as blogger Elias Muhanna has pointed out, highlighted the extensive “discretionary spending powers” at the PM’s disposal.

However, Mikati’s urgency – and the willingness of Hizballah and its allies to acquiesce in this unorthodox arrangement, which spared them the need to vote on the funding of the STL in the cabinet or parliament – also highlight several other trends which have become apparent in recent months.

The first is the lack, besides Mikati himself, of credible alternatives to the Hariri family, and close associates like Fouad al-Siniora, as potential contenders for the premiership and the leadership of the Suni community. That both Hizballah and the Syrian regime are all too aware of the dearth of suitable candidates may explain their seemingly paradoxical eagerness for Mikati to honour Lebanon’s commitments to the STL, thereby keeping him safely in place.

Mikati, in turn, has been driven by a desire to present himself as a competent, efficient, calm alternative to the Hariri family – a man who might be perceived by both the Lebanese public, and more particularly the Sunni community, and the international community as a capable, safe pair of hands, committed to Lebanon’s relationship with the West, but unwilling to burn his bridges with Hizballah. Mikati certainly is thinking ahead to the 2013 parliamentary elections, and the possibility of building a power base outside his hometown of Tripoli. But he is also acting under the pressure of current events – and, in particular, his desire to alleviate the damage done to Lebanon’s standing on the international scene by its refusal to countenance sanctions against Syria at the UN and the Arab League.

Indeed, Mikati’s behaviour suggests that he is aware not just of the diminished dominance of the Future Movement, hobbled by Saad al-Hariri’s relative political inexperience and continuing absence from Lebanon, but also of the profoundly divisive effects of events in Syria on a fragmented Lebanese political scene.

This is the third issue to have dominated discussion in Lebanon over the last few months. March 8 has adopted a dual rhetorical stance on events in Syria, eerily reminiscent of the strategy adopted by the Syrian regime itself. On the one hand it has consistently sought to belittle the swelling opposition to the government of Bashar al-Assad, Aoun declaring in one press conference in August that “anyone who enters Syria will see that it is calm – where is Damascus? where is Aleppo?”. On the other, it has portrayed this opposition as a “terrorist” uprising against a legitimate state, driven by decisions taken “outside Syria” to pressure the country to “cut its ties to Iran, Hamas, and Hizballah, and to enter into negotiations with Israel” – just one more nefarious move in a vast scheme to decapitate all resistance to Israel. As Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah put it in a speech marking ‘Ashura on 6 December, “there are some who don’t want civil peace or stability and want to destroy Syria”, establishing an “Arab regime that is ready to rubber stamp anything for the US and Israel”.

March 14, meanwhile, has seen the Syrian uprising as a source of political capital – though one which has perhaps yielded fewer benefits than it might have hoped. While the Lebanese Forces and the Kata’ib have portrayed the rise of a concerted opposition to the Assad regime as another manifestation of the fervour for democracy sweeping the region – a fervour which began, in their eyes, in Beirut’s streets in March 2005 – the Future Movement has sought to stress its solidarity with “the Syrian revolution and the Syrian people”, as Saad al-Hariri put it on Twitter yesterday.

The clearest demonstration of this was at the rally the Future Movement held on 28 November in Tripoli – not coincidentally, not only Mikati’s hometown and political base, but also the Lebanese city with the closest connections to Syria. While this gathering’s ostensible purpose was the celebration of Lebanon’s Independence Day on 22 November, it was marked by orchestrated signs of support for the Syrian opposition, from the unfurling of a pre-Baath Syrian flag, recently adopted as the emblem of the revolution, to banners reading “Syria will be free from Bashar and his thugs”.

The Future Movement clearly hopes to galvanize the sympathy of Lebanese Sunnis for their coreligionists across the border in embattled Homs and Hama. But the party, and its partners in March 14, are also pinning their hopes for change in Lebanon on the fall of the Assad regime. As another of the banners in Tripoli read: “GAME OVER Bashar and Hassan Nasrallah”.

The logic underlying such proclamations is clear. Should the Assad regime collapse, a government rather less well-disposed to Iran and Hizballah will come into power, as the figurehead of the Syrian National Council, Burhan Ghalioun recently made clear in an interview to the Wall Street Journal; this will starve Hizballah and AMAL of one of their key sources of regional support, and cut off their supply routes to Iran; and this will, in turn, change the balance of forces within Lebanon.

Whatever the strength of such reasoning, it is clear that the Future Movement and its allies are not so much seeking to free Lebanon entirely from foreign influence, as looking to external forces to influence the country’s domestic power relations. In doing so, they are not just following a time-honoured tradition of Lebanese politics, but also proving the political pragmatists they are. For it is certain that prospects for Lebanon in 2012 will continue to depend to a large extent on the situation of its neighbours – and, in particular, the fortunes of the Syrian regime.

The following is a contributing piece from guest writer Ladan Yazdian. Ms. Yazdian is a foreign affairs and Middle East specialist. She holds a BA and an MA in political science. She is currently a Ph.D. student at Virginia Tech, working on global security, foreign policy, international relations, and human rights.

In the wake of the spate of recent Arab uprisings, Iran has tried to reframe these movements as Islamic awakenings inspired by its own 1979 Islamic revolution. Strategically, it is logical that the Islamic Republic would be watching the latest developments with concern, due to potential regional instability that could force Iran to change its geopolitical calculations. More importantly, just as the effects of the Iranian uprising resonated throughout the Arab world, so too will the Arab-inspired events of the region undoubtedly have a marked influence on the democratic aspirations of the Iranian people.

Iran’s diverse civil society and non-violent resistance, which reached its peak in the aftermath of the disputed 2009 presidential elections, are still the most fundamental threat to the regime’s existence. These concerns manifest themselves in the Islamic Republic’s inconsistent political postures towards the countries in turmoil, most notably Yemen, Bahrain, Egypt, and Syria.

The Arab uprising will naturally force Iran to reshape its foreign policy calculations in the Arab world and the greater region from a geopolitical perspective. Iran is concerned that any freedoms gained by the nations in surrounding countries will spur its own people into rejuvenating their own resistance. Iran’s foreign policy is considered by Western nations and neighboring countries to be aggressive due to Iran’s history of supporting non-state actors and pariah regimes that operate outside the accepted bounds of international law as well as those that are deemed more susceptible to Iran’s influence. Let’s look at key states in the region that are experiencing internal revolt.

Yemen – Iran‘s priority in Yemen has been centered around countering and reducing Saudi Arabia’s influence. In the absence of a strong leadership in Egypt and Iraq, Iran finds a powerful rival in Saudi Arabia and the alliances it creates with the West and GCC countries. The latter have been active in resolving Yemen’s eight-month old conflict.
The crisis in Yemen has become more complicated as Ali Abdullah Saleh remains in Saudi, recovering from wounds caused by an explosion in his presidential compound. The Pro-government forces, Yemeni Republican Guards, are battling on at least two fronts; against protesters around the capital city of Sanaa, and against armed separatists and Al-Qaeda jihadists in and around the southern province of Abyan. Suicide bombings in the south have turned some tribes against Al-Qaeda, which is currently operating in Yemen under the name Ansar Al-Sharia, or the Army of Islamic Law, with the intention of establishing an Islamic state in Yemen. Aside from Al-Qaeda, anti-government opposition parties, not seemingly united in their demands, have nonetheless attempted to form a council with the intent of pressuring Saleh into relinquishing power.

Meanwhile, it appears as though Iran prefers that the Yemeni opposition groups, anti-Saleh tribes, and youth movement groups form a coalition with the Al-Houthi against Saleh’s American-backed government. Iran may feel that it has sufficient influence on the Al-Houthi and other youth opposition groups, and can nudge them towards the formation of a national council and present a serious unity government before possible return of Saleh into power or his potential replacement.

Uniting the opposition, however, has thus far proven unsuccessful as the council was rejected by more than half of its members as well as by the separatist groups in the south and the Al-Houthi Shia group in the north.
Supporting the Yemeni opposition would help Iran exert influence over the strategic Straight of Bab-el-Mandeb in the Red Sea; undermine the role of Saudi Arabia and the United States; and make up for any loss it might experience with Syria and Bahrain, should the Syrian regime collapse.

Bahrain – Inspired by the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt, the opposition in Bahrain took to the streets to demand better political representation and government concessions for the country’s Shia community. Bahrain’s royal family and the government attributed the unrest to extremists and accused the protesters of having a sectarian agenda supported by Iran. From the very onset of the unrest, the Islamic Republic’s media outlets, such as Press TV and Al-Alam, as well as pro-government Farsi websites, strove to keep the spotlight on Bahrain’s uprising.

Similar efforts have been made to undermine talks between the Sunni-led government and the majority Shia opposition bloc. Major opposition group Al-Wifaq, which had previously agreed to participate in the talks, later reneged, increasing speculation that the Islamic Republic is intent on sabotaging the national dialogue backed by the United States.

In Bahrain, Iran has sought to make the American presence costly while seeking influence within the opposition under the mantra of protesting injustice against the Shia community, which would be expected from Iran. The Islamic Republic has long had issues with the territorial and political leaning of the island’s royal family. In recent years, the Bahraini leadership has complained about Iran’s attempts at fomenting unrest within its Shia community for Iran’s own political gains aimed at countering the Saudi influence.

Egypt – The uprising in Egypt has been instrumental in inspiring the people of Libya, Syria, and Bahrain, but it has thus far failed to bring about closer diplomatic ties between Egypt and Iran. Despite the interim Egyptian government’s initial interest and the friendly response from Iran’s foreign ministry, the Egyptians have been reluctant to normalize relations with the Islamic Republic following the fall of Hosni Mubarak.

The unprecedented passage of two Iranian naval ships through Egypt’s Suez Canal into the Mediterranean Sea last year has not helped in raising the confidence level between the two countries. In the current political climate, Egyptians seem to try to keep their close ties with the Arab world rather than entering into an uncertain relationship with the Islamic Republic. Egypt’s ambivalence stance in restoring full–scale diplomatic relations with Iran comes amid accusations that the Iranian embassy has been actively seeking to open communication channels with all Egyptian political groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood. This has fueled speculations that Iran may be attempting to promote the type of political Islam that many feared would govern the post-Mubarak Egypt.

Syria - More than five months into the uprising, the conflict with the Assad regime has turned into a bloody stalemate. The resilience of the Syrian people has forced world leaders to recalibrate their positions towards Syria. According to Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Ramin Mehmanparast, however, for Iran “Syria is an exception”. With two security pacts currently in place, Syria is Iran’s key strategic Arab ally in the region. In exchange for its role in the partnership, Syria has received political and economic benefits and support during the massive uprising that has engulfed the country. There has been significant military cooperation between the two countries in addition to bilateral support for proxy elements in Lebanon.

Iran has been accused of advising Syria on repression methods aimed at crushing dissent. This in turn has angered Syrian activists, who during the protests, demonstrated their displeasure towards the Iranian government by burning Islamic Republic flags and pictures of Ayatollah Khamenei.

Iran’s main objective in keeping the Syrian regime in power, besides having an ally and supporter, is to maintain access to the Levant region and Israeli borders via Hezbollah. Iran is aware, however, that the fall of Assad would have serious regional repercussions. Knowing that it cannot indefinitely buttress a weakened Assad regime, Iran has asked the Syrian regime to listen to the demands of its people, while discrediting the opposition, labeling them as agents of the West.

The Islamic Republic’s foreign policy has been held hostage by its perpetual anti-Western stance, which has considerably limited its ability to actively participate in the global arena. The double-standard seen in Iran’s policy toward the Arab Spring is not new. The political ideology to which the Islamic Republic subscribes does not deter it , for example, from taking the side of Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, or remaining silent when there are mass killing of Muslims in China or Chechnya. Such actions, combined with sectarian meddling and the perception that Iran does not promote peace in the Middle East, has, according to a new IBOPE Zogby International poll, seriously damaged Iran’s reputation in the Arab world.

The Islamic Republic is correct in viewing recent events in Arab countries with trepidation and concern. These uprisings may very well pose a fundamental problem for the core of the Iranian regime and raise hopes that the era of autocracy is over as Arabs across the region struggle to participate in their political affairs. In addition, the resilience of the Arab people can energize and inspire the citizens of other countries in the region in their struggle against dictatorship and totalitarian regimes.

In this new wave of Arab awakening, every country that has risen against injustice has its own unique set of circumstances. Taken as a whole, however, even if these movements do not lead to democracies, they raise hope for ushering in a new era of increased participation and greater government accountability, a prospect that the Islamic Republic is not ready to accept.

Prime Minister Netanyahu told his cabinet that Israel doesn't want war in Gaza.

Israel reserves the right to defend its people and territory and should continue to go after those in Gaza caught launching mortars and rockets, regardless of who they are and any cease fire put in place.  However, a full-scale invasion, which some Israeli politicians and citizens are calling for, would be ill-advised.  The Middle East is a different place than when Israel launched Operation Cast Lead.  Unlike in 2009, Egypt, who is now trying to be the unofficial mediator for all things related to the Palestinians, would likely break off formal ties with Israel as a result of any kind of invasion. Turkey would probably follow suit.  And what if Hezbollah got involved in attempts to boost its popularity?  For the sake of regional stability, Israel cannot afford an invasion.  It also cannot allow itself to fall into even deeper isolation than it already has.  Instead, it should continue to work on its security around the Sinai, including offering assistance to help Egypt with its Bedouin problems; continue to develop more batteries for Iron Dome, and continue its attempts to mend relations with both Egypt and Turkey.

Islamic Jihad and the Popular Resistance Committees have launched over 80 rockets into Israel over the last week, killing six Israelis.

Returning to Bibi, his aid’s comments reflect several things.  First, Bibi has thought about and understands what I wrote above.  Second, he doesn’t want to give the Palestinians any political ammunition going into their push for UN recognition in September.  And third, on a more individual level, he is well aware of the potential domestic repercussions of a botched or merely unsuccessful invasion.  Unless substantial amounts of rockets continue to hit and paralyze massive amounts of Israel’s population in the next week or two, an invasion of Gaza will lead many to accuse him of trying to further distract the public from their social protests.  Bibi’s seat as Prime Minister is more than warm and there is already talk of early elections.  The unnecessary death of Israeli soldiers, in the wake of social protests, would all but guarantee the end of his premiership.  Currently, the only reasonable argument for an invasion would be to secure the power of deterrence.  At the moment, however, this shouldn’t be a priority, especially because it’s clear that the enemy is far inferior militarily.

Regardless of what the overriding factor was in Bibi’s decision to play it cool, it was the right move.  The hope is that by putting away some pride in the short term, Israel will benefit in the long term.  But, as the world has seen over the last year, things can change in the Middle East in the blink of an eye.

The state’s crackdown seems more futile with each passing week. The Alawite grip on power in Syria seems to be slipping away and the events could foreshadow a similar path in Lebanon.

Imagine a future where Lebanon’s Shia have managed to conquer Lebanon with brute force. The situation seems hardly possible, but Syria faced a similar situation forty years ago. Syria’s Alawites, who comprise only 15% of the population, managed to subdue the nation under Hafez Assad in 1970.

It’s not impossible to imagine something similar in Lebanon. One thousand reasons could be given why this would never happen, but surely the same could be said of Syria all those years ago. While success is unlikely, an attempt is possible.

The Shia are Lebanon’s largest minority, and as such they wield significant political power. Beyond that, Hizballah is considered to be the most powerful fighting force in the country. They have strongholds in the south and in the southern suburbs of Beirut, but do not always feel at home in the cosmopolitan capital.

Lebanon’s Shia for years occupied the bottom of the socio-economic spectrum. Long ago they realized that the only way they would get anything in Lebanon is if they took it with force, as the merchant-class Christians and Sunnis in Beirut would never give up anything willingly. This is the genesis of the Amal Movement in the 1970’s, and later Hizballah.

While it’s impossible to know whether Hizballah will ever gain a monopoly on power in Lebanon, perhaps we can learn something about what their trajectory might look like by considering the Alawite experience in Syria. Consider the following excerpt from a report from the International Crisis Group, “The Syrian People’s Slow-motion Revolution”:

Yet, the sectarian survival instinct upon which the regime relies could backfire. The most die-hard within the security apparatus might well be prepared to fight till the bitter end. But the majority will find it hard to keep this up. After enough of this mindless violence, this same sectarian survival instinct could push them the other way.

After centuries of discrimination and persecution at the hands of the Sunni majority, Alawites and other religious minorities concluded that their villages within relatively inaccessible mountainous areas offered the only genuine sanctuary.

They are unlikely to believe their safety is ensured in the capital (where they feel like transient guests), by the Assad regime (which they view as a temporary, historical anomaly), or through state institutions (which they do not trust). When they begin to feel that the end is near, Alawites might not fight to the last man. They might well return to the mountains. They might well go home.

Hassan Nasrallah

Partly due to Hizballah’s helps, Lebanon’s Shia have come a long way over the past 40 years. Today the sect wields real power, both politically and militarily. The can bring down the government, as they did this year, and they can take over the capital, which they did in 2008.

But something doesn’t seem right. Hizballah’s actions are becoming more aggressive towards the state, especially since the indictments in the Hariri Tribunal were made known. This week, Hassan Nasrallah announced that the state would never be able to arrest members of Hizballah.

Nasrallah has been vocal in his support for Syria, which badly exposes him as a hypocrite who is grossly out of touch with the Arab tide of history. This was after proclaiming support for protestors in Tunisia and Egypt.

He has also maintained steadfast support for Iran, which also continues to oppress its citizens. Because of these patently opportunistic and self-serving stances, Hizballah’s credibility on the Arab street has to be plummeting, particularly amongst Sunni Arabs.

How long can this keep up? Can Hizballah count on the unconditional support of the common Shia? Is there a limit to what they will accept? Hizballah’s support for authoritarian regimes, coupled with its ultra-aggressive posturing at home, will only lead to growing isolation for the group, and the Shia by extension.

The common enemy in the Middle East used to be the United States, which had supported the likes of Mubarak and Ben Ali for decades. But in 2011, Arabs realized that instead of getting the United States to abandon its support for the region’s dictators, they had to remove the dictators themselves. And they’re doing right now.

Suddenly, corrupt and oppressive regimes became the enemy (whether they supported the US or not) and Hizballah found itself on the wrong side of history. With the region’s political calculus undergoing such significant changes, it follows that Hizballah would alter its strategies accordingly. But they didn’t and in the process revealed themselves to be little more than an outpost of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps, beholden to the Ayatollah instead of their constituents.

The question then becomes whether we will see any daylight developing between Hizballah and the “average Shia”. It’s not clear how unconditional support is for Hizballah amongst the Shia, but there are signs of cracks developing. The downfall of the group’s financial chief, penetration by Israeli spies, support for brutal regimes in Iran and Syria, isolation from Sunnis, and isolation from the world in general… both the group and the sect are under tremendous pressure.

The whole situation seems to be coming to a head. There are just too many highly-volatile moving pieces. It’s likely that Hizballah can count on its sectarian constituents if push comes to shove; the Shia won’t have any choice. The shoves will be coming from the Sunnis and the Shia will likely close ranks and band together in the event of a civil conflict.

But it is unclear how far rank and file Shia will go in support of the Party of God. Perhaps a look at the fate of Syria’s Alawites over the last 40 years can give some clues.

The indictments come at a particularly tense time for Lebanon, both internally and externally. The country is divided over the newly formed Mikati government. Syria, yielding tremendous influence in Lebanon, faces escalating domestic instability. Iran, Hizballah’s chief patron, is undergoing a strangely public power struggle between the President and the Supreme Leader.

Perhaps the timing is just a coincidence, but the indictments seem to come when they would do maximum damage. Sunnis in Lebanon, already concerned with the treatment of Sunnis in Syria under the Assad regime, are upset about being marginalized by the new Hizballah-led government. The indictments of Hizballah members in the murder of a prominent Sunni politician, will likely further stoke flames.

Hizballah knew for months that its people would be named and launched a public relations campaign to discredit the tribunal as an “Israeli plot”. On the surface, the group appears to be in a strong position, having made significant political gains in the past year. Yet the Assad regime, a key supporter, is dealing with its greatest internal challenge in 30 years, and the opposition March 14 coalition is planning to retake the government.

Internally, Hizballah is rumored to face significant morale and counterintelligence problems. The group is said to be infiltrated by spies and they just recently reported they had uncovered members working  with the CIA. It is unclear how Hizballah will react to the news of the indictments if the group feels backed into a corner.

Submission could signal weakness, defiance could trigger animosity and further isolation from Arab Sunnis. This last bit is very important because if Assad were to fall and a Sunni-led regime were to take its place, Hizballah would be cut off from Iran and face significant isolation in the region.

How Hizballah reacts could rest on the fate of the Assad regime. If the group thinks Assad is likely to stay, they might stand firm. If they think Assad’s day are numbered, they may acquiesce to the new political reality.

It must be remembered that Hizballah is still the most powerful military force in Lebanon and is very strong in the new government. These two factors should buy the group some time as it tries to formulate a strategy. However, given the increasing Sunni frustration in Lebanon and the challenged position of the Assad regime, the clock is ticking.

]]> http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/06/30/indictments-issued/feed/ 0 http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/06/12/lebanon-waits-out-the-crisis-in-syria/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=lebanon-waits-out-the-crisis-in-syria http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/06/12/lebanon-waits-out-the-crisis-in-syria/#comments Mon, 13 Jun 2011 01:28:54 +0000 Patrick Vibert http://lebanon.foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=1326 As the current civil crisis rages in Syria, Lebanon and others await the outcome.  Coinciding with the so-called Arab Awakening throughout the Middle East, demonstrations that started earlier this year in Syria have continued to build. The protests have been met with force by the government.

The Tunisian and Egyptian governments fell quickly in the face of demonstrations, but subsequent revolts stagnated or flamed out completely. Battles still rage in Syria, Libya, and Yemen. However other countries, particularly the Gulf, saw uprisings squelched before they became a problem for the regimes.

Syria did its best to stomp out the flames of dissent before they could spread. The Bashar Assad regime broke up protests, arrested thousands of demonstrators, and allegedly recruited Iranian protest-breakers to put down the unrest. Today Syria is beset with conflict, both internally and externally.

It seems the more violence is used against the people of Syria, the less likely they are to submit. The United States and many European nations have condemned the use of state violence against peaceful protestors. Bank accounts of the Assad regime have been frozen, and resolutions criticizing Damascus have been drawn up. There may be an official charge brought by the ICC.

The Iranian regime, not exactly on firm footing itself, is watching and waiting. Tehran has been on the defensive since massive protest swept the nation after the disputed 2009 election. The protests were squashed, but the situation remains tense. Adding to trouble is the power struggle between Ayatollah Khamenei and President Ahmedinejad.

Syria is key to Iranian foreign policy. Syria gives Iran a foothold in the Arab world, a way to transfer weapons to Hizballah, and way to directly menace Israel. If the Alawite regime in Damascus is replaced with a Sunni regime, particularly one closer to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, it would be a huge blow to Tehran and could lead to a level of international isolation the regime has never seen.

Hizballah has been relatively quiet through this. Aside from the odd demonstration to show support, Hizballah’s leadership must be aware that exhibiting approval for Assad’s killing of his subjects, especially Sunnis, is bad for business. The Party will likely wait out the crisis like everyone else, while trying to maintain Syrian holdings in Lebanon in the process.

The crisis in Syria is also a large reason why Lebanon has been unable to form a cabinet just yet. Assad’s handpicked Prime Minister-elect Njiab Mikati has been unable to coerce and horse trade his way to a new government without the full strength and support of Damascus. Until the conflict in Syria is settled one way or another, it is understandable that Lebanese politicians are unwilling to make a deal based on political realities that may not be in place next month or next year.

Over all of this, the Hariri indictments loom. Hizballah members are expected to be named, with arrest warrants to follow. However, this is not guaranteed. The powers that be (the United States) are currently the biggest supporters of the Hariri tribunal (STL) and are the biggest reason it has not gone away. At the time it was set up, the STL was meant ostensibly to find Hariri’s killers, but also to punish Syria, who is the consensus prime suspect.

With the regime on the defensive it may not be necessary for the US to play the STL card. (It’s not clear just how much say in the matter the United States actually has, but it is likely enough to get it squashed or move it forward depending on the needs of Washington.) Whatever the case, it is strange that we have not seen an indictment yet, and if one is handed down in the near future, it could add a whole new dimension to the conflict.

Today, tanks, helicopters and soldiers approached the northern town of Jisr al-Shughour, and Assad’s forces began shelling. The situation is a grim reminder of Hafez Assad (Bashar’s father) razing of the town of Hama in 1982 after similar unrest. Thousand were killed and the unrest was put down; Hafez never faced another test to his power.

Today, 11 years into the rule of Bashar Assad, the world waits to see if he is capable of the same.

The protest movement in Syria continues to grow, with thousands of demonstrators taking to the street on Friday for a “day of rage”. We have seen similar days of rage in the other Arab countries that have undergone or are undergoing revolutions. The people of Syria, at first demanding reforms, are now openly calling for an end to Bashar Assad’s entire Baathist Alawite regime.

Syria is viewed by many as the linchpin of the Middle East. Damascus is involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the US-Iran conflict, and the Iraq War. When there is talk of regime change in Syria, many ears turn toward the conversation. On this topic there is no shortage of interested parties, but perhaps none more so that Israel and Hizballah.

Hizballah has counted on Syrian support for over 25 years. Syria’s previous leader, Hafez Assad, considered the group a tool to be used when necessary, but to be kept at bay and in check at all times. Under Assad Junior however, the Party of God has enjoyed much more influence and flexibility. Over the years Syria has used its formidable political power in Lebanon to ensure the interests of the group.

Iran also enjoys a close relationship with Hizballah. Hizballah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah has sworn allegiance to the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. The group acts as Iran‘s insurance policy against Israel and the West. In return, Hizballah is showered with weapons (light arms and medium-range rockets) and cash (reportedly in excess of $100 million per year). Cash is easy enough to move, but the weapons must come through Syria, so the whole arrangement is predicated on Syrian cooperation.

If the regime in Damascus is replaced by a Sunni group, the country is simply less likely to continue its close relationship with Iran, and this has to be troubling for Hizballah. A Sunni-led Syria, particularly with a moderate Islamist tone, would likely turn southwest towards Egypt in terms of regional associations. The two countries were actually united into one for a brief period of time in the late 1950′s under the banner of Pan-Arabism (the country was named the “United Arab Republic”).

When protests began to take their toll on Tunis and Cairo, Hizballah came out in favor of the protesters. After all, those movements were attempting to remove key US allies from power. The Party never anticipated that the Arab Intifada would spread to Syria, where Bashar Assad had touted his resistance to Israel and the West as the reason his people loved him and would never revolt.

Hizballah’s support for those movements is proving uncharacteristically short-sighted. Hizballah’s roots are in helping the oppressed and disenfranchised of Lebanon (historically, the position of the Shiites) and supporting Bashar Assad in his bid to oppress and disenfranchise the people of Syria seems incredibly transparent and self-serving.

After Hizballah successfully expelled Israel from Lebanon in 2000 (with help), the group was shown a rare degree of respect from Sunnis, who had been worn down by years of failure to do the  same from their own lands. That support spiked when Hizballah repelled the IDF for 34 days in 2006.  As the first Arab group to enjoy such success, it didn’t really matter that they were Shia.

But over the years, that glow has worn off. Now Hizballah is seen by many as a tool of the Iranians, who are both Persian and Shiite. Today, the Arab world is undergoing a major awakening of sorts, and Hizballah has chosen to fight against the tide of revolution. This is what Barak Obama refers to as “being on the wrong side of history”.

Hizballah risks looking hypocritical by supporting the Assad regime, yet it must consider what it would mean for the Shia of Lebanon to have Sunnis take over in Damascus. Israel is in the same boat: Assad might not be the optimal choice, but he is probably better than the alternative.

Israel has been at war with Syria since the Jewish State declared independence in 1948. In 1967, Syria lost Lake Tiberius and the Golan Heights to Israel, and the bulk of Syrian foreign policy over the years has been dedicated to getting it back. It’s the primary reason Syria supports Hizballah: to use the group as a tool against Israel. Land for Peace.

Syria is one of the few supporters of Iran, which has also been hostile to Israel over the years. Tehran refers to Israel as “the Little Satan” and supports groups like Hamas and Hizballah. Since 1979, the Ayatollah and Company have been under intense pressure from the West, and during that time Syria has been the only country standing between Iran and total global isolation.

It seems Israel would be on board with a change in leadership in Damascus: Syrian support is critical to Hizballah and Iran, Israel’s two greatest threats. However, the Israelis are understandably nervous about all of this.

Israel is already concerned with the intentions of the new leaders of Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood seems to be making solid gains. Will Eqypt’s peace treaty with Israel be reconsidered? It’s doubtful, but when combined with the potential blossoming of relations between Syria and Egypt, two historic foes, it’s unclear whether it is better to see Assad stay or go.

Israel can’t really support the protesters publicly, as doing so could paint the revolt as an Israeli invention, but it should not do anything to stand in their way. This includes closed-door meetings in Washington. Their fear of the unknown is understandable, but in the long run the spread of democracy in the Middle East should be good for Israel.

For now, Israel and Hizballah can only wait and see how far the revolution in Syria will go.

Basil Assad

These are troubling times for Lebanon. Even for a country under the thumb of Damascus, things seem to be out of their control. The most anyone can do is just wait and see.

Since 1963, Syria has been under control of the Baath party.  Hafez Assad took power in 1970 and ruled the country with an iron fist until he died in 2000. His son, Major Basil Assad, had been groomed to take his place, but the young man died in a car accident in 1994 at the age of 31. The regime was forced to go with Plan B.

Bashar Assad

“Plan B” was Basil’s younger brother, Dr. Bashar Assad. Bashar was studying ophthalmology in London when his brother died and he was forced to return to Damascus and enlist in the army. Bashar Assad was never supposed to be “the guy”. Bashar took power upon his father’s death, insulated by a wall of mostly Alawite men chosen by Assad Sr. to facilitate his son’s ascension.

The Alawites are considered to an offshoot of Shia Islam. In the early part of Hafez Assad’s reign, he was met with challenges from Syria’s Sunni majority, who believe the Alawites to be infidels. In 1973, Lebanon’s most prominent Shiite leader issued a fatwa declaring Alawites to be a full part of the Shiite family. In return, Sadr received support in developing his Amal militia, a precursor to Hizballah. (Assad also threw his support behind Sadr’s friends in Iran when they overthrew the Shah in 1979.)

After those shaky few early years, the next internal challenge Assad faced was the revolt of the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1980′s. The unrest came to a head in 1982, when Assad’s forces surrounded the Muslim Brotherhood stronghold of Hama. The army razed the town killing thousands in the process. For the rest of Assad’s reign, he would not face another serious challenge from within.

As the protests in Syria continue to spiral, the memory of Hama is in the minds of the protesters. When Bashar Assad took power in 2000, he was considered to be a “reformer”, a characterization still maintained by the West, including US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. It was unclear whether Bashar was capable of playing by what Thomas Friedman famously termed “Hama Rules” in his book From Beirut to Jerusalem.

With the unrest growing and spreading to the capital, it seems we are learning the answer. The city where the protest began, Deraa (sounding eerily similar to “Hama”) is currently under siege. Deraa is surrounded by the military. Water, electricity, and food supplies have been cut.

But there is a difference between a siege of a town and its complete destruction. If Bashar Assad gives the order to shell Deraa into oblivion, we will know that he is capable of playing by Hama Rules.

The protest that started in Deraa have spread to the rest of the country. Thousands of people are in the Damascus calling for the removal of the regime, a scenario that was previously unthinkable.

To date, over 450 people have been killed. The cycle is a familiar one, repeated many times throughout the Great Arab Intifada: people protest, the government cracks down, people are killed, protest grow following funeral and Friday prayers, repeat.

The implications of the unrest in Syria for the region and beyond are many. Starting with Lebanon, refugees from Syria have already started pouring over the border to escape the violence. Sunni Lebanese politicians have been accused of encouraging the protests and even funding the opposition. Syria holds tremendous influence in Lebanon and what is felt in Damascus will surely be felt in Beirut.

Lebanon was already in a tenuous political position when the protests started. Hizballah had just supplanted Saad Hariri as Prime Minister with their own man, Nijab Mikati. As a result, Mikati is still in the process of forming his new cabinet of ministers and Lebanon is forced to weather the current crisis without a government.

The situation seems to be a tinder box. It’s alarming to think about the prospect of the United Nations Hariri Tribunal releasing handing down its indictments right now. Even without that, it’s conceivable that Assad could unleash one of his many proxies in Lebanon to start trouble as a distraction or misdirection.

That scenario is unlikely however, because the only distraction big enough to avert the world’s eyes from another Hama-style massacre would be for Hizballah to start hurling rockets at Israel. In the wake of the damage done in the 2006 War combined with all the political gains Hizballah has made since then, the group would likely balk at the idea of starting another fight with Israel at this point.

The West, led by the United States, has tried to enact sanctions against Syria in the UN Security Council, but faced resistance from China and Russia, as well as Lebanon, who is currently serving as a non-permanent member. Russia and China have their internal concerns and are understandably weary about encouraging international interference in what they see as the domestic affairs of the state.

The unrest in Syria has many implications for the Middle East and beyond. For the Lebanese, the result is a new sense of powerlessness over their destiny. Its one thing for a state to have its own problems, but what do you do when your overlord is convulsing?

The billion dollar question right now is what will happen if the Assad regime falls? This is a strategic question for the West, but the outcome will have vast consequences for Lebanon. Suppose a Sunni regime ascends to power; will that translate to the Sunnis in Lebanon wielding more power? How will the other sects react to this scenario? Suppose the new regime is hostile or neutral towards Iran; what will the mean for Hizballah, whose weapons and cash from Iran are shipped through Syria? Will Hizballah then become isolated in Lebanon? How would they react to the isolation?

Iran is in a similar situation. If the Assad regime is replaced by one that is less sympathetic to their needs, and perhaps closer with other Sunni Arab countries like Egypt or Saudi Arabia, the Islamic Republic will face a whole new level of international isolation. In this perceived zero-sum game, any loss for Iran is seen as a gain by the West. The loss of such a crucial ally combined with a deteriorating internal situation could make Tehran more pliable to the demands of the by the United States.

King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia though is in an odd position. On one hand Iran is their arch enemy, and the casting off of the Assad regime would surely be a significant blow to the Ayatollah. Some analysts have put forth the idea that thwarting Shiite Iran is the key national security issue of the Kingdom (see: Bahrain, Lebanon, and Yemen).

But on the other hand, the Saudi royal family does not wish to see another dictator removed from power in the Middle East, as it increases the chance that they could be next.  Both Iran and the Arab Intifada pose existential threats to the regime in Riyadh, but it seems the Saudis have deemed the Intifada the more immediate threat.

Israel also has a great deal to be concerned with. Syria lost the Golan Heights territory to Israel in the 1967 War and the two have been in negotiation for its return ever since. Damascus under the Assads maintained a hostile-yet-predictable stance towards the Jewish State over the years and it seems that Tel Aviv is in no rush to see another regime, possibly under the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood, take its place.

Were this to be the case, Israel could find itself boxed in by two countries under the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood. The last thing Israel wants to see is an emergent- and possibly hostile- Syria and Egypt united under political Islam, which could threaten Israel’s national security and weaken their hand significantly when trying to arrive at a final solution over Palestine.

Khaled Meshaal and Ahmedinejad

Just last week, Hamas merged with the Palestinian Authority in a move that some analysts attributed the Hamas’s insecurity concerning the unrest in Syria. Hamas has enjoyed the patronage of Syria for years, and it’s leader-in-exile, Khaled Meshaal, lives in Damascus. Were Hamas to lose that support, the group could be dramatically weakened. The move to merge with the PA is understandable on the grounds that they risk losing relevance should the Assads be removed from power.

The United States is watching the unrest in Damascus closer than perhaps any of the other Arab revolts. The key to Syria’s power has always been geography: it borders Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, and Iraq. The Assads in particular have deftly exploited this position, gaining enough concessions to remain in power for forty-plus years.

As the United States deals with a myriad of foreign policy obstacles and issues in the region, Syria is always in the picture. The new Cold War with Iran; the safety and security of Israel; the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; the emergence of Turkey; maintaining the balance of power between the Sunnis and the Shia…Syria is close to every single issue. The outcome of the unrest will have enormous consequences for the United States, especially if the Assad regime falls.

Syria represents a growing concern for the region. The Assad regime has plugged Alawite loyalists into every meaningful post in the military, security, and intelligence apparatus. For revolutions to succeed swiftly, the protesters need the help of the military, or at least their neutrality. This was the case in Egypt and Tunisia. But in Libya and Bahrain, we have seen what happens when the will of the people is opposite that of the military.

If the regime can quell the unrest with violence, it does. If not, the country descends into chaos and civil war. Right now, it looks like the demonstrations in Syria will continue to grow, especially since the rate of protesters being murdered continues to increase. At the same time, the goal of the Syrian military is to protect the regime, and that is unlikely to change. Unfortunately, steadily increasing cycles of violence are likely in the near-to-medium term.

As a side note, it is interesting to consider the possibility of jihadis coming to fight the Assad regime if the country descends into civil war and the conflict is perceived by the region’s Salafi warriors as “a battle to protect good Sunni Muslims from the heretical Alawite murderers”. Damascus has fostered extremist groups in the region for so long, the irony of them coming home to roost is delicious to ponder.

For now, all eyes are on Syria to see what will happen next. The prospect of the downfall of the Assads has vast implications for the Lebanon and the Middle East. With the removal of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Zine el Abidine Ben Ali in Tunisia, and the likely removal of Ali Abdullah Saleh in Yemen and Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, we could see the end of 125 years of despotic rulers in the Middle East. This has been a remarkable year for Arabs, and it’s only April.

Since Hizballah began participating in Lebanese elections in the 1990′s, the group has steadily risen in power. Hizballah is currently one of the most influential political groups in Lebanon. In January of this year, the group withdrew it’s allied MPs, collapsing pro-Western government led by Saad Hariri.

Now Lebanon is in the process of forming a new government, this time led by Syrian-approved billionaire businessman, Nijab Mikati. Although there have been challenges in forming the new government, the look of it will be decidedly pro-Hizballah. It seems with this development Hizballah has reached some sort of watershed that makes Washington very uncomfortable.

Lebanon is now perceived by America and the West as being led by Hizballah (as much as any one group can actually lead Lebanon). In the current political context of Hizballah’s hostility towards Israel and Washington’s Cold War II with Iran, this is unacceptable for US policymakers. Now for them, to aid the LAF is to aid Hizballah.

There has long been a fear in Washington that US weapons meant for the LAF would end up in the hands of Hizballah, which is likely why the LAF never received high-powered or high-tech weapons from the US government. Though the US appropriated tens of million of dollars in aid over the years, most of it was in the form of light weapons, ammunition, and vehicles. In other words, nothing that could inflict serious damage on Israel.

It is questionable just how much Hizballah would be interested in pilfering US arms from the LAF. Iran and Syria already provide Hizballah with weapons, much of it far more potent than LAF supplies. In addition, Hizballah would have little use for tanks or helicopters, which do not match up with its guerrilla-style warfare and could be easily destroyed by the Israeli military.

Hizballah is more interested in rockets or missiles that are potent-yet-portable. The Katyusha rockets they launched at Israel by the thousands in the 2006 War fit this mold. They can be set up, launched, dismantled, and stowed in minutes. Not much of what the US has donated to Lebanon in the past matches this description.

With Hizballah’s strategy of having it’s members serve in the LAF, it’s unclear if the two can even be regarded as wholly seperate entities. According to Stratfor, “(Hizballah) makes it a point to discharge a portion of its recruits after they serve two years in the military wing and then enlists them in the Lebanese army. This allows Hizballah to both control the composition of the army’s ranking officers and influence specific operations.”

Military aid to Lebanon has been under scrutiny for several years now. Many in Washington became concerned with the issue after Saad Hariri’s visits to Syria and Iran‘s President Ahmedinejad’s visit to Lebanon, where he was welcomed in Shiite neighborhoods by throngs of supporters. In December 2010,  US Congress lobbied against a proposed sale of French anti-tank weapons to the LAF. It seems the collapse of the Hariri government was the last straw.

The decision to withdraw support for the LAF will not be without consequences for the United States. Many Lebanese already feel that Hizballah is their best option for protection against Israel, which has invaded twice in the last thirty years, and occupied Lebanese territory from 1982 to 2000.

Making matters worse, many of the arms used against the Lebanese in the 2006 War with Israel were of American origin. In 2009, Lebanon received $60 million in US military assistance. Israel received $2,380 million for the same period.

America’s declining influence in Lebanon leaves the door open for Syria and Iran to increase their presence there. One possible solution could be to continue the military support at past levels while encouraging relationship-building between senior officers in the US military and the LAF. This was the case in Egypt, which was fortunate for the US when the Mubarak regime crumbled.

The same situation might not play out in Lebanon, but at least Washington would have some sort of inside track on events there, with the possibility of influencing them. The way things are now, America appears to be leaving Lebanon to the wolves, namely Israel, Iran, Hizballah, and Syria.

]]> http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/04/04/us-stops-military-aid-to-laf/feed/ 1 http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/03/16/hariri-and-hizballah/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=hariri-and-hizballah http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/03/16/hariri-and-hizballah/#comments Thu, 17 Mar 2011 03:05:18 +0000 Patrick Vibert http://lebanon.foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=1245 rally in Beirut to commemorate the six-year anniversary of the group’s founding. In front of a crowd of thousands, Hariri questioned the usefulness of heavily armed non-state actors in Lebanon, and said that the Lebanese state should have a ...]]>

Saad Hariri

Last Sunday, Saad Hariri’s March 14 coalition held a rally in Beirut to commemorate the six-year anniversary of the group’s founding. In front of a crowd of thousands, Hariri questioned the usefulness of heavily armed non-state actors in Lebanon, and said that the Lebanese state should have a monopoly on the use of force. Hariri was referring to Hizballah, the only Lebanese group to retain its weapons after the Civil War ended in 1990.

The issue of Hizballah’s arms is highly controversial in Lebanon. Lebanon has a sizable population of Shia Muslims (estimated around 40% of the country’s total population), a historically disenfranchised lot who credit their recent political ascension in large part to Hizballah, its strategies, and its weapons. Lebanese Shia might agree that no other group should be allowed to have weapons in competition with the state, but when it comes to the Party of God, they find the concept acceptable.

Lebanon’s Shia did not get where they are today by the goodwill of the Christians and the Sunnis; they got there by Hizballah’s use of force, cunning, and ruthlessness. However, the amount of MP’s allocated to the various sects is still skewed in favor of the Christian parties and, all things considered, the Shia still have a long way to go to achieve an equitable share of seats in parliament in relation to their numbers.

Lebanon’s whole political system, from the National Pact (1943) to the Taif Accords (1989) to the Doha Agreement (2008) is based upon harmony between the sects. As time has gone by, it has become clear that these are only band-aids to Lebanon’s real political problem: the system does not reflect the demographic reality. The Christians (and to some extent the Sunnis) know their numbers have dwindled (due to emigration and lower birthrates), yet they are reluctant to change the Lebanese government to reflect this shift because they will be the ones to lose out.

The Daily Star’s Michael Young recently wrote an interesting article on this topic, proposing that March 14 should offer the Shia additional political powers in exchange for Hizballah relinquishing their weapons. Young stopped short of calling for a one-man-one-vote system, where each sect would have an accurate representation in the government, but the move could force Hizballah to choose between its weapons and its people.

Young calls Hizballah’s weapons “the elephant in the room”, but in Lebanon elephants abound*. The outdated and unfair political allocations are the deeper problem, because as long as there is a disparity between population and power, there will always be insecurity in the form of weapons to make up the difference.  This mis-allocation will continue to haunt Lebanon until a more representative system takes its place.

*The STL is one, Syrian influence is another.

Saad Hariri’s call for Hizballah to disarm occurs when March 14′s power and influence is at a low point. Hizballah, fearing some of its members would be fingered by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (the hybrid UN-Lebanese body tasked with investigating the assassination of Rafik Hariri), wanted Hariri to withdraw his support for the Tribunal. When Hariri refused, Hizballah and its allies maneuvered to oust him as Prime Minister. Ironically, up until the time he was pushed out of office, Hariri’s government publicly supported Hizballah’s weapons as an integral part of Lebanon defenses.

The time to call for Hizballah to disarm was when March 14 was in power, when dealing from a position of relative strength. However, March 14 had only won by a slim majority in the June 2009 parliamentary elections, and without a clear mandate from the people, they needed the help of the opposition to form a government. Hariri knew he needed Hizballah’s help and it would have been political suicide to make enemies with them straight away after taking power.

Throughout his term in office however, that reality never changed. Now Hariri is fighting for his political life and calling for Hizballah to lay down their arms will likely sit well with his constituents as he tries to re-energize his base.

—

In light of the unrest sweeping the region, it is interesting to ponder what the current state of Lebanon’s Shiites would be today had Hizballah never existed (if Israel and the PLO had never invaded). It is not hard to imagine this marginalized group taking to the streets and to demand reform, similar to the Bahraini Shia today. Would then Lebanon be in a more stable position in which to reform, or would the powers that be use force to maintain the status quo? As with current day Bahrain, the answer is probably closer to the latter than the former, with the reason being that any political advancement by the Shia is seen by Sunnis and the West as a win for Iran, a preconception that has led to disaster in the region for the United States.

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Hassan Nasrallah

Speaking of which, no discussion of Hizballah’s arms is complete without mentioning Iran. Hizballah is part of Iran‘s national security strategy. The group’s stronghold of South Lebanon abuts with Israel and represents the “tip of the spear” for Iran should Israel attempt military action on Persian soil. The reality is, whether true or not, Israel and Iran represent existential threats to each other and their foreign policies reflect this. As a result, Iran has supported Hizballah with hundreds of millions of dollars in cash and arms since helping to form the group in the early 1980′s.

If Hizballah were to disarm, it would be effectively abandoning its duty to keep Israel in check, thereby increasing the likelihood of Israeli military operations against Iran. For Tehran, losing Hizballah would be a nightmare. For Hizballah’s part, the group would be hard pressed to replace the financial support of Iran, nor does it want to. One of Hizballah’s stated “pillars” of existence is to resist Israel, and the group has many times pledged its allegiance to the Ayatollahs of Iran.

—

Right now, Hariri is trying to rally his political base by calling for Hizballah to disarm. He knows this is what a large portion of the people want to hear. But what good is having a huge rally for your cause when Hizballah could do the same the very next day. We already know Lebanon is divided and that each side can produce large crowds at their rallies. If Hariri really wants to disarm the group, he would have to create to space between Hizballah (the Party of God) and the Shiites themselves.

Michael Young’s aforementioned strategy is closer to this: offer Hizballah weapons for power and let the Shia watch The Party make their choice. If Hizballah chooses to disarm, great. If they choose to keep their weapons at the expense of increased political power for their people, then their hand will be played for the world to see.

The problem is that both the Christians and the Sunni will have to give up power in order the achieve it. Unfortunately, no one in March 14 seems to be thinking about what makes Lebanon more stable in the long run and every day that goes by sees Hizballah increase its power.

In the past, Lebanese politicians have called for Hizballah’s arms to be folded into the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). If major political concessions and adjustments aren’t made in the near future,  one day we could be hearing Hassan Nasrallah calling for the LAF to be folded into Hizballah.

]]> http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/03/16/hariri-and-hizballah/feed/ 1 http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/02/18/fresh-from-prison-escape-sami-shehab-attends-hizballah-rally-in-beirut/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=fresh-from-prison-escape-sami-shehab-attends-hizballah-rally-in-beirut http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2011/02/18/fresh-from-prison-escape-sami-shehab-attends-hizballah-rally-in-beirut/#comments Fri, 18 Feb 2011 20:01:28 +0000 Patrick Vibert http://lebanon.foreignpolicyblogs.com/?p=1227 Last April, an Egyptian court sentenced 22 alleged members of a Hizballah cell to prison for spying and planning attacks on tourist sites. The leader of the cell was Sami Shehab, a.k.a. Mohammed Yousef Mansoor. Hizballah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah publically confirmed that Mr. Shehab was a Hizballah ...]]> Last April, an Egyptian court sentenced 22 alleged members of a Hizballah cell to prison for spying and planning attacks on tourist sites. The leader of the cell was Sami Shehab, a.k.a. Mohammed Yousef Mansoor. Hizballah Secretary General Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah publically confirmed that Mr. Shehab was a Hizballah operative, but he denied the men were spying or plotting attacks. Narsrallah claimed that Shehab was in Egypt on a logistics mission, trying to secure arms for Hamas and smuggle them into Gaza.

Nevertheless, Shehab was tried, convicted, and sentenced to life in prison. The Mubarak regime took Hizballah’s activities in Egypt as a direct challenge to their authority. Nasrallah had accused Egypt of complicity in Israel’s policies in Gaza. After Shehab’s arrest, Nasrallah openly called for the Egyptian people to revolt and remove the Mubarak regime.

Yesterday, Sami Shehab was at a Hizballah rally in Beirut giving the victory sign with both hands. Shehab faced spending the rest of his life in Al Natrom prison, north of Cairo, but less than a year later he was a free man. How did this happen?

Shehab had help and was extremely lucky is what happened. He escaped with 17,000 other prisoners being held throughout Egypt when guards abandoned their posts after protest swept the country. Some of the men were political prisoners of the Mubarak regime, some were Palestinians who had snuck across the border from Gaza and were arrested, and some were just ordinary Egyptian criminals*.

*No doubt, with all the police and regime corruption in Egypt, some of the men deserved to be set free. But one shudders to think of the impact 17,000 prisoners escaping would have in America, let alone Egypt which has 1/4 the population of the USA, and 0.00001% of the resources to recapture them. More on this below.

It is unclear whether Shehab escaped on his own with everyone else or if he was broken out, but once he was out he still had to get out of the country. This is where it seems he had help. According to the Kuwaiti daily Al-Seyasseh as provided by JPost, Hizballah requested the help of Syrian intelligence on the matter once they knew Shehab was free:

The Syrian embassy then issued Shehab a new passport – replacing one that “was lost” – which he used to travel from Egypt to Khartoum where members of the Sudanese Hezbollah cell helped usher him to the international airport. From there, Shehab flew to Syria, and crossed over into Lebanon.

Egypt to Sudan to Syria back to Lebanon. Shehab was on television last night waving to a crowd of thousands ecstatic with his escape. It’s doubtful this is the last we will hear from Mr. Sami Shehab.

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AQAP Leaders

In the wake of the Egyptian prison break, it’s interesting to note a similar case in Yemen. Yemen is the poorest country in the Arab world and faces major instability from various factions at odds with the regime in Sanaa. Five years ago, a prison break there ended up having major implications for the region and the United States. From CSIS:

A February 2006 prison break freed 23 militants and enabled the rise of Nasir al-Wuhayshi, who in January 2009 oversaw the unification of disparate Saudi and Yemeni terrorist cells under the banner of al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

The escapees were all convicted terrorists, including the alleged mastermind of the 1994 bombing of the USS Cole. At the time, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld called the escape a “serious problem.” How right he was. The men went on to form one of the world’s most violent and ambitious Al Qaeda cells. Since then, AQAP has attempted attacks on a US passenger jet and mailed bombs to American targets.

It’s unclear if those among the Egyptian escapees are this menacing to US national security, but someone should be looking into it.

The trouble is over the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL), a UN-led tribunal charged with investigating the 2005 assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. At the time, Syria was widely believed to be behind the hit. Massive protests ensued and Damascus was forced to end its 30 year occupation of Lebanon.  After four years of tense stagnation between sectarian rivals, a mostly Sunni-Christian coalition of MP’s, led by the slain leader’s son (Saad Hariri), swept into power in June 2009.

Suddenly Washington had a viable ally in Lebanon. The new Prime Minister, Saad Hariri, was close to the Saudi royal family and known to be pro-Western. In the parliamentary elections of June 2009, Hariri’s March 14 coalition won the majority.  The Obama administration supported March 14 and was pleased with the victory, but by December of 2009 reality had reared its ugly head.

As Saad Hariri tried to form a government, he quickly came to the realization that it would be impossible without Syrian support. At the urging of Riyadh, Hariri traveled to Damascus to make amends with the man he believed behind his father’s death, Syrian President Bashar Assad. Thus, Hariri was forced to publically acknowledge Syria’s “privileged role” in Lebanon. Soon after, Damascus’ tentacles began to repenetrate and Lebanon’s shortly live tryst with sovereignty was at an end.

Over the next year, all the gains made by March 14 were undone and the situation was returning to the status quo. The exception was the STL, which Hariri (and therefore Washington) still had in his pocket. But the focus of the investigation had shifted from Syria to Hizballah, and members of the Shiite militia were expected to be indicted. Washington clung to this, as an indictment against Hizballah would strike a deep blow to the organization, alienating it from the Lebanese people and Sunni Muslims in general.

When it became clear that the focus of the Tribunal was now on Hizballah, the group used all of its leverage to get Prime Minister Hariri to publicly question the STL and to distance himself from it. Short of acquiescing, Hariri promised that if members of Hizballah were named, that they would be considered “rogue elements within the organization” only; he reaffirmed Hizballah’s status as the defender of Lebanon from Israel; and he proclaimed that Hizballah’s arsenal was not up for debate. But he would not disavow the Tribunal.

While Hariri’s concessions were extremely generous, for Hizballah it was not enough. The group wanted the Tribunal to go away. When this didn’t happen, Hizballah played its hand and withdrew its March 8 coalition’s 11 ministers, collapsing the government.

For Saad Hariri, this seemed like a temporary setback. He was still the Prime Minister and his coalition had a majority. He would just begin forming another government. Indeed, at the time of the parliamentary elections in June 2009, he did have a majority. But since then, the political winds had shifted and with it the alliance of Walid Jumblatt, the Druze leader who controlled enough seats to shift majority to minority. When Jumblatt thrust his support behind Hizballah and March 8, Hariri was finished.

Hariri was now a “caretaker” prime minister. Billionaire businessman MP Najib Makati nominated himself prime minister. President Suleiman accepted. The Parliament voted and the new majority confirmed. Suddenly Lebanon had a Hizballah-backed, pro-Syrian Sunni Prime Minister attempting to form a new government.

And that is where we are today. As far as the Tribunal is concerned, indictments from the Special Prosecutor were handed down to the judge, who now has about a month to decide if he wants to issue arrest warrants. Monday marks the six-year anniversary of Rafik Hariri’s murder.

—

These are tumultuous times for US foreign policy in the Middle East. America’s strategy of supporting despots in the name of stability seems to be coming undone. Revolts in Tunisia and Egypt have shown that previously apathetic Arabs would no longer tolerate oppressive and corrupt US-backed regimes. Egypt’s Mubarak and Tunisia’s Ben-Ali had been in power for more than 50 years combined. Now both countries face an uncertain future and that includes their relations with the United States.

In Egypt in particular, America missed a great opportunity. Though Mubarak was popular in Washington and Tel Aviv, he was despised throughout the Arab world by a citizenry that viewed him as a dictator and a puppet of the West. As protests erupted in Cairo and Alexandria, demonstrators were met by state security forces hurling tear gas from canisters labeled “Made in America”.

Now Mubarak is gone and we have to face the Egyptians that have suffered for the last thirty years with our help*. Let’s hope they are not as pissed as the Iranian’s were in 1979, after they over threw another American-backed despised despot, Shah Reza Pahlavi. The United States is haunted to this day by our flawed and short-sighted policies in Iran.

*From the Carnegie Endowment: “As for U.S. security and military aid to Egypt, which is about $1.3 billion annually, it does not aim to strengthen Egyptian military power against any external threat, as this would be contrary to the declared U.S. objective of ensuring Israeli security and maintaining Israeli military supremacy over its Arab neighbors, including Egypt. Instead, this aid is devoted mainly to strengthening the regime’s domestic security and its ability to confront popular movements. This hardly enhances USAID’s popularity among the Egyptian people or educated elites.”

American foreign policy in the Middle East is based on two principles: oil and Israel. For the last 43 years this strategy has been a success, but only when measured against those two principles. The cost has been staggering: bloody, expensive, and unpopular wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; unconditional support for Israel at the expense of the Palestinians, the Syrians, and the Lebanese; and the support for despots throughout the Arab world have may have achieved cheap oil and Israeli stability, but the results could prove to be catastrophic as America loses influence on this key region at an alarming rate.

Since 1994, when the USS Cole was bombed off the coast of Yemen by a fledgling Al Qaeda organization, America has been paying the price for the aforementioned strategy. The talking heads will tell you that that “they hate us for our freedoms” but more informed sources (Robert Baer, Stephen Walt, and Michael Sheuer for example) will tell you that it is American foreign policy that invites such trouble  .

Thankfully, it seems that militant Islamism doesn’t appear to be the answer that Arabs were looking for, as demonstrated by the relatively peaceful protests in Tunisia and Egypt.  But those transitions to democracy came not because of American policies, but in spite of them.  When the dust settles over the next few months, what will we have? The emerging new governments are not guaranteed to be virulently anti-American, but we will have surely lost significant stature.

Tunis and Cairo will not likely continue to be the stalwart allies they were in the past. This doesn’t mean that Egypt will be pulling out of its peace agreement with Israel (which would be a complete calamity), but when US policy makers look to their counterparts in those countries, they will see far fewer friendly faces than they’re used to. The loss of Tunisia is not such a big deal, but Egypt is a country of 80 million people and very strategic in its location.  For America, a healthy relationship with Egypt is critical.

With US military resources stretched thin on wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, America does not project the same might as it once did, especially considering that everyone knows we had to borrow money from China to finance those wars. Now our most powerful ally in the region is Saudi Arabia, another unpopular regime backed by America.

Which brings us back to Lebanon. During most recent political crisis in Lebanon, Riyadh and Damascus were working behind the scenes on a deal that would have averted the current crisis. All sides (Saudi Arabia, Syria, Hariri, and Hizballah) came to an agreement they could live with but it was undone by Washington at the last minute when the Obama administration reportedly refused to let Hariri go through with it. The result was Hariri losing the Premiership and Hizballah taking charge of Lebanon. Hizballah, Iran, and Syria all won; America and Saudi Arabia lost. From Al Akhbar on January 24:

“The second conclusion of this week is that the Saudis, sponsoring the March 14 coalition, have walked yet again into a minefield that exploded in their face. The Saudis repeated, yet again, their experience in Palestine that caused their alienation, their experience in Yemen where they held their breaths and received one blow after the other, their experience in Iraq that made them regionally powerless, and their confrontation with militant Islam that turned them into enemies. And here they are now exiting Lebanon, weak, humiliated, with no one able to lend them a helpful hand.”

Not only did this course of action weaken Hariri, more importantly it weakened Saudi Arabia, whose domestic and regional authority is sure to be called into question in the wake of the Egyptian Revolution. Washington and Riyadh know this, and there is little doubt that precautions are being taken to ensure stability at any cost. As powerful as Egypt is, it does not produce much oil. It is absolutely critical to the United States that Gulf oil continues to flow.

Over the last five years, Hariri has learned a harsh lesson when it comes to seeking support from the America: democracies and despots are supported simultaneously as Washington sees fit. The problem is multiplied exponentially when you consider that countless others across the region have learned the lesson too.

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As Prime Minister-designate Mikati (a close personal friend of Syria’s President Assad) attempts to form his government, Hizballah is in the driver’s seat in Lebanon. March 14 has vowed it will not participate in Mikati’s new government, but it is unclear how long Hariri can keep his coalition together. March 14 has been the most substantial political force in Lebanon to oppose Syria, and it has been a goal of Damascus to see it shatter. Perhaps this is where we are heading, or perhaps March 14 is stalling until the results of the STL are made public.

Whatever the case, the winds of change are blowing in the Middle East. The question is whether Washington can adjust its strategies to capitalize on the new political calculus. Drastic changes need to be made, but as America has demonstrated in the past, it turns like a cruise ship. Hopefully we can avoid the iceberg of history that is clearly in our path.

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