It takes a Keurig machine 30 seconds to brew a cup of coffee. This is the combined time two people have to make it to a bomb shelter in Sderot, a southern city in Israel.

Imagine fifteen seconds being the difference between life and death.

On May 3^rd, the Alumni Community of Birthright Israel in collaboration with Artists 4 Israel hosted a bomb-shelter exhibit in New York City.  Mounted on a truck, a model bomb shelter made stops at Hunter College, Baruch College, and outside the United Nations to provide the public with a rare opportunity to experience life in a bomb shelter while watching footage from rocket attacks on Sderot.

There are more than 200 bomb shelters in Sderot, and although they are meant to provide safety, they are also a constant reminder of the state of war that permeates every aspect of life in a town that is in many ways a battlefield. Since January 2001, more than 10,000 rockets have been launched toward Sderot, resulting in the deaths of 28 Israelis.

After an alarm sounds, signaling an attack, people have fifteen seconds to make it to a bomb shelter. If unable to reach a shelter, the consequences can be fatal. Death is a possibility as is post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), a type of anxiety disorder triggered by traumatic events. According to the Sderot Bomb Shelter Museum, 93% or more of the children in Sderot have symptoms of PTSD.

Using a mock bomb shelter to bring Israel’s reality to New York City, the campaign aimed to raise awareness about rocket attacks in Israel. Outside the United Nations, an organization created after World War II to maintain international peace and security, the majority of people passed the exhibit without stopping. When asked if they wanted to experience what life is like in a bomb shelter, without mention of a country affiliation, most declined. Many of the intergovernmental organization’s employees said they could not get involved in anything political. Despite the good intentions of the United Nations, it is plausible that many of its employees may need to broaden their understanding of various issues before being able to vote on resolutions and helping to form government and international policies.

I stood on the sidewalk and watched as volunteers attempted to spark interest in the exhibit. After nearly two hours, less than a dozen people dared to experience life in a bomb shelter. I was one of them.

There was no welcome mat gracing the entrance of the gray container. The stairs creaked as I made my way to the doorway and crossed the threshold from sunlight into a confined space with black walls and blaring sounds of rocket attacks. It was anything but pleasant.

Standing alone in the structure, my mind wandered from the footage looping on the corner-mounted television. Looking at the dark, bare walls and listening to the siren, I tried to imagine if I was physically capable of making it to a bomb shelter in fifteen seconds.

I run, on average, fifteen miles a week. However, I stretch first. I wear comfy clothes and running shoes, and I have the “run” playlist on my iPod to keep me company. Like many female New Yorkers, unless I am heading to the gym, I do not leave my house in sneakers, and only on rare occasions will you find me wearing sweatpants in public. Thus, I concluded that on the average day, there is absolutely no way I would be able to locate and get to a bomb shelter.

The news footage ended, and I exited the room as quickly as I entered. I descended the stairs and made my way to the street where people were laughing, drinking lattes, and walking dogs, and I could not help but think that if a siren suddenly sounded those people would need more than fifteen seconds to figure out where to go.

“No child should have to grow up in a bomb shelter” is the unofficial slogan used by the event’s organizers to illustrate how living in constant fear of rocket attacks leads to a culture in which many childhood memories include seeking refuge and perhaps extensive stays in a bomb shelter.

Natalie Solomon, one of the exhibit’s organizers, explained how the demonstration’s message is not about politics. She said:

“I don’t know what I think about the peace process. I don’t know how to solve any of this stuff going on. I’m not taking a political stance. What I am saying is that I know that in the past two months more than 1 million Israelis in the south of Israel have lived with constant rocket barrage coming, and as an individual who cares about human life that concerns me.”

Although the situation in Israel is undoubtedly political, it is important to understand that the main issue should be the unnecessary violence and fear that is part of peoples’ lives: Israelis, Palestinians, and others who needlessly suffer.

I recall having a hard time remembering all the Southern islands of Iran for exams during school years. I remember the name of “Abu Mousa” from those years. I had never thought about this island ever since. When I read the news about President Ahmadinejad’s visit to Abu Mousa, I still did not detect the controversial nature of this official trip. It was only when I logged in Facebook that I realized, “Wow! Iranians are having a patriotic day today!” The homepage was flooded with maps of Iran with “Persian Gulf” in large letter fonts. People seemed angry, patriotic and ready to fight the Arabs to protect Abu Mousa against the claims of the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

Iranians are patriotic and do not want to see what is left of their “Persian Empire”  further shrink. The Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI), namely President Ahmadinejad, seems to have mastered the ability to trigger nationalistic sentiments in the hearts of even the most radical opposition groups. His recent trip to Abu Mousa and his speech for the small population (about 2,000 residents) of this island instigated regional controversy and domestic nationalistic romanticism.

But, why did he make a trip to Abu Mousa now? What was the purpose of this visit that Iranian officials called “a domestic matter within the framework of the President’s provincial visits”?

The most obvious reason could be that Ahmadinejad’s visit to Abu Mousa was for the neighboring Arab countries, friends of the United States and the West to yet again remember Iran’s regional power. This is of importance, because Iran is soon to participate in the second round of nuclear negotiations with five permanent members of the United Nation Security Council and Germany. And, Iran is naturally doing everything possible to enter these negotiations with an upper hand, hence taking all the necessary steps to exhibit its undeniable regional power.

Another less obvious reason could be that the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) at large needs the support and attention of even its opposition in the midst of the aforementioned negotiations. IRI and in particular President Ahmadinejad has been successful in displaying a strong degree of national unity surrounding the issue of nuclear program. To this end, the IRI needed to yet again show off the Iranian national solidarity surrounding a topic adjacent to the nuclear issue. So, Abu Mousa seems to have been chosen as an issue to spark regional tensions and to gently tap on the nationalistic sentiments of Iranians with diverse backgrounds and beliefs. Essentially, IRI needed another nationalistic roar from Iranians to set the stage for the upcoming negotiations.

While there might be many more motivations behind this visit, the stated reasons suffice to justify a trip of this nature. In his speech, Ahmadinejad noted that the people of this island, along with the government, should turn this island into the “stud of the Persian Gulf”. When reading excerpts from his speech, I could not help but to try and put myself in the shoes of the people of this island. Did they feel proud to have President Ahmadinejad as a guest to their island? They welcomed him. Would they welcome a UAE official visiting, too? Territorial disputes aside, how did one of those fishermen in the crowd feel? Did he feel truly Iranian? Did he feel Iran or the UAE should have done more for the island? Did this visit give more confidence to the fisherman?

In my search to find something, at least a little something, about the real people of Abu Mousa, I only came across an IRI Youtube clip that contained a series of interviews with children and adults residing in Abu Mousa along with a short tour of all the facilities built by I the government such as a hospital, university and an Islamic Basij building made in the aftermath of Ahmadinejad’s controversial visit. At least in this clip, the people sounded like most other patriotic Iranians. In their interviews, some called the “little sheikhs” in Abu Mousa as “the guests of the island” who should just remain guests without ownership entitlements. Among the interviews captured in this clip, the response of an eight year old boy named Mousa when asked about his home, Abu Mousa, struck me the most. While playing with the sand, Mousa said, “It has a sea, a park…”

Regardless of its small size and population, Abu Mousa does indeed have geographical strategic value. It is true that we now care deeply about this island and the beautiful water surrounding it all. Yet, very few of us Iranians could claim that we ever really thought about Abu Mousa. But, now all of a sudden we feel blood circulating faster in our body when we hear the name “Abu Mousa”; a small island whose strategic importance we seem to have realized. If not fruitful for Iran’s negotiations with P5+1 or for Iran’s relations with the UAE, let us at least hope that the controversial visit of President Ahmadinejad guarantees a more promising future for the fishermen who eagerly listened to him speak. Let us see who will provide that little boy, Mousa, with employment opportunities a few years down the road. Let us return to this island in some years and talk to Mousa again to see what he really felt in April 2012 when the whole world was discussing his little island. At the end of the day, it is a kid like Mousa—and not only historic and political claims— who should matter in such controversial discussions.

(1) http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=edyjFvESL8E

(2) http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2012/04/120412_l38_iran_reax_uae.shtml

(3) http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/01/world/middleeast/dispute-over-island-of-abu-musa-unites-iran.html?_r=2

(4) http://www.roozonline.com/persian/news/newsitem/article/-d6accd4b1c.html

(5) photo: http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/news/gulf-states-to-meet-on-iranuae-island-spat_6087

You hear many words of wisdom traveling through the Mideast, all which offer insightful pondering to events past and present.  Watching the tragic escalation of events in Syria and the failing efforts to bring the fighting to a close bring to mind words often spoken by the Kurds of the region, who are well-versed in being oppressed and slaughtered.

“It is useless for sheep to pass resolutions for vegetarianism when the wolves are of a different persuasion,” they often would observe.  And so it is.

The United Nations talks ceasefires and negotiations as it tries to cajole the Assad government into peaceful means to stop the carnage and find a solution that can reset Syria as a living nation. Assad offers hollow promises as he ramps up the attacks.  The day before the U.N. ceasefire was to go into effect– or at least begin — dozens more civilians were killed when regime forces intensified their operations to mow down more opposition. At least 101 were killed and that is before any real count could begin – since the shelling, missile strikes, tank blasts and the gunfire were in full fusillade. To make sure it was thorough, the air force was also involved.

Augmenting the shower of lead in some towns were arbitrary arrests and sweeps, which included many counts of plundering and sabotaging. 
 
The wolves do seem of a different persuasion.

So what is Plan B? Amazingly to some, invite in more wolves. Kofi Annan, who is the United Nations’ special envoy to Syria, flew to Iran to ask them for help. Iran, of course, is one of Syria’s few patrons and a nation loathed by many members of the Arab League for following a different version of Islam.

“Iran, given its special relations with Syria, can be part of the solution,” Annan said during a news conference with Iran‘s Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi. “The geopolitical location of Syria is such that any miscalculation and error can have unimaginable consequences.”  (http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/envoy-kofi-annan-turns-iran-syria-crisis-article-1.1059855?localLinksEnabled=false)

No doubt the sheep feel much better now.

The conflict in Syria keeps adding grisly remembrances from wars past and present, this time with an unforgivable déjà vu from the “War To End All Wars” – World War I.

In that great conflict the two sides finally agreed to stop fighting and have an armistice, with the cease-fire to begin on the “11^th hour of the 11^th day of the 11 month.”  As that date and hour approached, both sides emptied much of their remaining stocks of ammunition and actually ordered troops “over the top” for one last futile charge across No Man’s Land. The result was the same as almost every other day of that war: more senseless slaughter occurred.

On average, 2,250 troops on all sides were dying on the Western Front every day.  But in the 24 hours leading up to that ceasefire, here is the estimated toll: 2,400 British, 1,170 French, 4,120 Germans, and 1,100 Americans killed.  Losses on all sides that day approached eleven thousand dead, wounded, and missing.

Indeed, Armistice Day exceeded the ten thousand casualties suffered by all sides on D-Day.  Had appeals been heeded to stop hostilities while the talks went on, some sixty-six hundred lives would likely have been saved. In the end, Congress found no one culpable for the deaths that had occurred during the last day, even the last hours of World War I.

As time ticked in Syria, the Assad government said it had succeeded in asserting government control over the country after more than a year of unrest and would therefore observe a U.N.-brokered cease-fire. In the same breath it said it would retain the right to retaliate against attacks by “armed terrorist groups,” casting into doubt its promise to stop fighting under the terms of the Annan proposal. (http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/syria-says-it-will-observe-un-cease-fire-on-thursday/2012/04/11/gIQAx9AGBT_story.html

The world will not need a congressional investigation to determine culpability in Syria.

(Photo: HO/AFP/GETTY IMAGES)

Members of the SNC

A few weeks ago the Syrian National Council (SNC) appeared to be losing traction in its efforts to gain recognition as the legitimate political representative of the Syrian people. Dogged by a few high-profile resignations and accusations that it was undemocratic and unrepresentative, critics dismissed the SNC as a collection of European-based diaspora Syrians who were not really representative of the Syrian opposition on the ground; or alternatively as an instrument of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Following the April 1st Friends of Syria meeting in Istanbul, however, the organization seems to be back on the upswing, having won increased recognition from key international players and perhaps crucially, control of the money that will be disbursed to the Free Syrian Army (provided by Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States). Some elements of the decentralized FSA may not like this, but it is likely to significantly bolster the SNC’s influence within Syria. Still, while the SNC has always been relatively successful in courting foreign governments, it has thus far been unable to fully unify the traditional opposition to the Assad regime (ie the Sunni majority), let alone gain broad support from the various minority groups (Alawites, Shias, Christians, Druze, Kurds — although they are quite well represented within the SNC membership) that remain worried about their positions in a post-Assad Syria. (It should be noted that these sectarian divisions are far from universal. As Jonathan Steele’s excellent piece in the London Review of Books details, the reality is far more complicated.)

The SNC’s website contains all the rhetoric that Western governments will want to hear (“Affirming national unity among all components of Syrian society (e.g., Arabs and Kurds, as well as ethnic, religious, and sectarian groups) and rejecting all calls for ethnic strife.”), and on the surface, the SNC’s membership list does appear to be relatively diverse, despite some assertions that the organization is controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood bloc. British Foreign Minister William Hague — along with other Western Leaders — has made note of the SNC’s recent efforts to be more inclusive, but others are less convinced.

Kamal al-Labwani: a prominent Syrian liberal who resigned from the SNC

For now, it is hard to tell where power really lies within the SNC, or what it truly stands for, but it appears likely that the organization will play a prominent role in the Syrian political opposition for the foreseeable future.

Since the reign of terror from President Bashar-al Assad’s regime began the UN estimates that over 9,000 innocent Syrian civilians have died at his hands. The local coordination committees estimate that the number of those killed is upwards of 11,000 in addition to those who are injured or incarcerated. Syria has accepted a peace plan from the U.N which includes a cease-fire by the Syrian government; however the violence continues to rage on.

Clashes continued between the government and rebels which caused some of the rebel forces to cross over into Lebanon. The conflict is dangerously close to reaching a full-scale civil war. The Syrian American Council (SAC) is has no faith in Assad since he hasn’t honored past agreements. Additionally, the Syrian government already announced that it will refuse and will not cooperate with any decision or resolution that comes out at the Arab League Summit, which is currently in session.

Most recently, there have been horror stories about cities like Homs where people have been forced to leave their homes due to the violence that rages on in the area. In fact, SAC members have relatives who have been displaced in Homs due to the rampant waves of violence from Assad and his regime. According to a SAC member who asked to remain anonymous for fear of retribution, the regime is attempting to eradicate any opposition inside Homs in what appears to be a systematic move towards ethnic cleansing. “My own relatives in Homs were forced to flee their home and were then replaced with families loyal to the regime,” the SAC member said.

About Syrian American Council

Founded in 2005, the Syrian American Council (SAC) is a grassroots organization devoted to promoting educational, civic, economic, and human development, as well as advancing civil liberties and human dignity inSyria. It also aspires to build bridges of understanding and cooperation between American and Syrian people and institutions. With 18 chapters located across the country, SAC’s membership is open to all Syrians or those of Syrian origin who live in North America. For more information on the Syrian American Council visit sacouncil.comor follow SAC on Twitter @sa_council.

Contact Ashley Gonias at agonias@empowerpr.com 

“The end of Al-Assad’s regime will end Iran‘s regional influence, so one can expect Tehran to play a full hand before it happens”.

For over three decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran invested billions of dollars in Syria in financial aid, commercial trade and most importantly military and intelligence cooperation. It set up a number of military installations around the country run by its Revolutionary Guards — to carve up an influential strategic and political power base in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, one of the main

President Al-Assad of Syria next to his Iranian counterpart, President Ahmadinejad

slogans of the clerical regime has been to rescue the Palestinians from Israeli tyranny, and presidents Hafez Al-Assad and his son, Bashar, who succeeded him in 2000, were happy to allow Syria to become Iran‘s transit route to arm and train Hizbullah in neighbouring Lebanon, a resistance group that took it upon itself to successfully challenge the powerful Israel, the country to the south.
Those efforts paid off, bringing Iran to the forefront of regional politics and putting it at loggerheads not only with Israel and the US, but also with some Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia that has portrayed Iran‘s predominantly Shia background as a direct threat to the Sunni majority in the Middle East.
The efforts also forged a lasting friendship between the Persian and Arab nation. Syria was Iran‘s unwavering ally during the eight-year Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s; it took the side of Iran in almost every Arab dispute.
Now with the prospect of Bashar Al-Assad being toppled, all those investments and strategy are in jeopardy. More importantly, his ouster would be, as analyst Amal Saad-Ghorayeb describes it, a “quasi-existential” threat to the Iranian regime — isolating it further internationally and weakening it both regionally and domestically.
Iran‘s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, made his position clear from the start of the crisis: “Our stance is clear: wherever a movement is Islamic, popular and anti-American, we support it.”
Without mentioning Syria by name, he said: “If somewhere a movement is provoked by America and Zionists, we will not support it. Wherever America and the Zionists enter the scene to topple a regime and occupy a country, we are on the opposite side.”
At the beginning of the unrest last year, the US — and Israel — were happy for Al-Assad to remain in power. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton even described him as a reformer. They had hoped that a weakened Al-Assad would strike a grand bargain: they would refrain from supporting the opposition in return for Al-Assad giving up Iran, Hizbullah and Hamas. When Al-Assad refused — as he’s done since 2000 — US pressure on him became relentless.
The US strategy to weaken Al-Assad was highlighted in US embassy documents that were made public by WikiLeaks. In one section, a US diplomat proposed to play on the fears of Sunni Syrians after reports circulated — “though often exaggerated” — “that Iranians were active in both Shia proselytising and conversion of mostly poor Sunnis.” “We should coordinate more closely with [Egyptian and Saudi] governments on ways to better publicise and focus regional attention on the issue,” suggested the report’s author.
Even more worrisome for the Iranian regime is that it could be the next to fall. Already, Iran has seen a tremendous decline in its regional clout, with Hamas, the Palestinian resistance group that Iran supported financially for many years, having left the so-called “resistance axis”.
The Arab uprisings that have swept through the region in the past year have damaged Iran‘s public image and “glory” among the Arab population, who viewed the Iranian regime as the defender of their rights with its defiance against America. Arabs are now more concerned about achieving democracy and reform or overthrowing their nations’ dictators, some of which were supported by the US.
The question of Palestine, meanwhile, has taken a backseat for now. Iran‘s unconditional support for the Al-Assad regime against protesters who had initially merely asked for political reforms will not be lost on the Arab street, which is taking matters into its own hands. So Iran‘s survival very much depends on the Syrian regime’s survival. It will not give up on Al-Assad easily, but how much more can it do to keep him in power?
Earlier in the crisis, Iranian officials offered to mediate between Al-Assad’s government and the Muslim Brotherhood, which is among the opposition groups fighting the regime. The brotherhood in Syria, whose branch is reportedly one of the most hostile to Iran, swiftly rejected the offer.
For the time being, Iran will probably take a wait-and-see position, as does the West and Israel, much to the chagrin of Saudi Arabia and Qatar who advocate arming the opposition immediately. Al-Assad still has a relatively widespread support base throughout Syria — mainly his fellow Alawites, an offshoot of the Shia Islam, Christians, many Kurds and other minorities, as well as the Sunni merchant community. Other Sunnis who support him may do so out of fear of a civil war or uncertainty of who may replace him, a sentiment partly shared by the Americans and Israelis. Since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Israel has relied on the Al-Assads (father and son) for honouring an informal truce on the Golan Heights.
Although there’s barely any evidence that the Iranians have any direct or military role in the repression of Syrian protests, there are indications that they are supplying the government with intelligence assistance.
Shahin Nourbakhsh, a Lebanon-based Iranian blogger and activist, claims Tehran is hacking the e-mails of Syrian opposition figures and is engaged in cyber espionage. “The Syrians are not in need of military assistance because they are not facing a sophisticated armed opposition,” said Nourbakhsh. “The local opposition are more active in social networking.”
Even their military assistance, analysts agree, is in the form of giving advice to the Syrian army and security. Also, according to an official in the Iranian foreign ministry six months ago, Iranians were transferring their expertise on security matters following their own crackdown on the Iranian opposition following 2009′s disputed presidential election.
The commander of the Quds Force, the Revolutionary Guard’s external operations wing, paid at least one visit to Damascus in recent weeks. Unconfirmed reports have even claimed that the commander, Brigadier General Qassem Suleimani, was in Syria for the fourth time this past month and met with President Al-Assad.
The Guards, or sepah as they are known in Iran, is one of the regime’s most powerful institutions with extensive economic and financial interests across the country. It is in charge of Iran‘s foreign policy in so-called sensitive countries, such as Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Afghanistan. The ambassadors to these countries are either former or current sepah commanders, not career diplomats appointed by Iran‘s foreign ministry.
The Sepah — by way of Ayatollah Khamenei — is also in charge of policies vis-³-vis the United States and the nuclear issue.
The current Iranian ambassador to Damascus, Mohamedreza Shaybani, is a former top diplomat to Lebanon who was dispatched to Syria at the height of the crisis in August and receives orders directly from the Quds Force in Tehran.
While the US has military bases in more than 140 countries, Iran boasts of a number of known and secret sepah bases in Syria, including one in Deir Al-Zour in eastern Syria, near the Iraq border, where Israel bombed a nuclear reactor in 2007. The largest base is in Zabadani, near the Syrian-Lebanese border, perched on a mountaintop in a closed 20-kilometre perimeter on the road to Damascus.
Rebel forces briefly captured Zabadani area earlier this year and it’s unclear if the Iranian sepah forces are still there.
Iran also has a base near the Golan Heights and the Iranian Defence Ministry has facilities in Damascus.
Iran‘s financial aid to Syria is crucial at a time when Syria is under an oil embargo, with restrictions on flights and sanctions against the central bank for attacking civilians. Iran‘s leading automaker, Iran Khodro, has a plant in Damascus under the name of SIAMCO, or Syrian-Iranian Motor Company. Observers speculate that in addition to producing civilian vehicles, the plant also manufactures military equipment. The claim, however, cannot be substantiated.
According to two-month-old documents obtained by the Israeli Haaretz newspaper, Iran has delivered $1 billion to the Al-Assad regime to bypass sanctions. The cash from Iran, which itself is a target of severe international embargo, will be used to pay the salaries of tens of thousands of officials and security officials loyal to President Al-Assad.
Also, Haaretz said, Iran will export to Syria fertiliser and raw materials for the petrochemical industry and will purchase 150,000 barrels of oil from Syria per day for a year “to use it domestically or resell to others.” This way, Syria will be able to continue to export oil despite the sanctions.
There’s not much more Iran can do to help Syria. Over the past decades, especially in the past year, Iran has become too contaminated in Al-Assad’s domestic issues and more recently in his brutal suppression of the opposition that has claimed the lives of more than 7,000.
Tehran itself is a target of a possible Israeli or US attack over its nuclear weapons programme. With the weakening or the ouster of Al-Assad, that possibility may increase. However, there have been suggestions by Israeli officials that if Al-Assad is overthrown, there will be no need to strike Iran since Iran will no longer pose a threat.
What will determine the outcome of the Syrian crisis is, therefore, not Iran, nor the Gulf Arab states, but the United States, which until now has been reluctant to arm the fractious opposition made up of incoherent, confused, disorganised and untrained groups inside and outside the country.
The Free Syrian Army, made up of exiled Syrian army officers, defectors and militias, by no means control any significant territory, albeit because of lack of sophisticated weapons.
The US — as well as Israel — is also worried about Islamist groups, including the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafis, which are among the armed opposition. “We still have a very strong opposition to foreign intervention from inside Syria, from outside Syria,” US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton told the BBC recently.
“We have a very dangerous set of actors in the region, Al-Qaeda, HamasÒê¦ claiming to support the opposition. You have many Syrians more worried about what could come next. I think that there’s every possibility of a civil war. Outside intervention would not prevent that; it would probably expedite it,” said Clinton.
She also admitted that Al-Assad enjoys support inside the country. “We don’t know which way to jump and are scared about what might come after, the opposition, which doesn’t have any place that can really be a base of operations.”
Even if her country agreed to arm the opposition, she said, “What are we going to arm them with?… We’re not going to bring tanks over the borders of Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. That’s not going to happen.
“So maybe at best you can smuggle in, you know, automatic weapons. Maybe some other weapons that you could get in. To whom? Where do you go?” said Clinton.
Saad-Ghorayeb and Nourbaksh agree that the Americans have already taken some steps back in the Syrian crisis. “We’re witnessing back-peddling on the part of foreign backers of the opposition,” said Saad-Ghorayeb, adding that it indicated “a kind of preventive diplomacy”. She said in addition to refusing to arm the opposition and calling Al-Assad a war criminal, they have also objected to the Gulf countries’ demand to station Arab peacekeeping troops in Syria.
“They’ve increasingly become stuck between a rock and a hard place. And this might bode well for a resolution,” she added.
Paris-based Iranian journalist Ali Mohtadi says before the Americans take any military action or arm the rebels, they need to see the opposition firmly united and willing to guarantee Israel’s security. “They are still at the talking stage,” he said.
“Clearly if there turns out to be a radically Sunni regime there, that would be very worrisome for them [the Israelis], but I think they are hoping it would be a more Saudi-type regime — radical when it comes to its internal interpretation of religion and society, but that it is very pliant when it comes to submitting to American and Israeli interests in the region,” said Trita Parsi, president of the National Iranian American Council (NIAC) in Washington.
“Whatever money that’s being coming in (to the opposition), there’s also Saudi ideology coming in. And that has a reaction inside Syria and you can see it right now when you talk to people of various religious minorities in Syria. You don’t see any love for Al-Assad, you see a lot of fear of a situation in which it will fall into the hands of a Sunni majority that is beholden to the Salafis in Saudi Arabia,” said Parsi.
The possible and eventual fall of Al-Assad will be the end of Iranian influence in the region, at least in the short term. It will almost certainly unleash a sectarian conflict in the region, if not an outright war. Already a proxy war is being waged on Syrian soil between Iran and its main regional rival, Saudi Arabia.
“Unlike Libya, Syria is of strategic importance, sitting at the centre of ethnic, religious and regional rivalries that give it the potential to become a whirlpool that draws in powers, great and small, in the region and beyond,” said Parsi.
Saudi Arabia’s principal aim of intervening in Syria, Iran‘s only Arab ally, is to alter the regional balance of power away from Iran. It reckons when Iran is weakened, the fear of its own Shias in the Eastern Province rising against its rulers will be diminished.
The question is how far the Islamic Republic is prepared to go — and sacrifice — to save the Al-Assad regime.
“I think [the Iranians] are committed to making sure that Syria does not end up having a pro-Saudi, pro-American regime,” said Parsi. “And if that means accepting that Al-Assad falls, but that there are other elements within his power establishment that take power and then they use their influence with them to strike a compromise. That is certainly a scenario. I don’t know if it’s the scenario for the short term.”
Although very unlikely, Mohtadi said the only way the Syrian army would stage a coup against Al-Assad would be if it were “bought” by Iran or America. “If Iran reaches the conclusion that with Al-Assad’s departure a lot of its problems will be addressed, then it may well help stage a coup.”
However, he added, the Syrian army is under total control of the Al-Assad family and doesn’t appear to be cracking.
In the event of Al-Assad’s fall, Saad-Ghorayeb warned: “Iran can set the region on fire if it wants.” She said Iran has many cards to play, including causing trouble in Iraq or inciting Shias in the Persian Gulf against their Sunni rulers, such as in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.
In such an event, Nourbakhsh said, Iran will have to find a new strategic ally to use against the US and the Gulf states in order to retain its regional power. The only obvious one would be Iraq, even though unlike Syria it has no borders with Israel or Lebanon, but with the help of its Shia majority can exercise its ideological and sectarian influences.
Only time will tell which direction the Syrian crisis takes. As regional and international powers try to reach an agreement to their advantage, ordinary Syrian people will continue to suffer and die.
The local and peaceful opposition — who initially were genuinely demanding reform and freedom — see their cause hijacked by bigger and more powerful players inside and outside the country. Al-Assad’s mistake was to launch a bloody retaliation against them instead of agreeing to dialogue, prompting them to demand nothing less than his ouster. Al-Assad even ignored his staunch Iranian supporters who advised him to reform.
The Syrian army remains strong and intact. The opposition will continue to receive light arms from the Saudis and others. As a result, Saad-Ghorayeb believes there may be gradual wearing down of the opposition, especially the local opposition, which may eventually relinquish its precondition of Al-Assad’s ouster and enter a dialogue with the regime.
Saad-Ghorayeb envisages Qatar, which along with Saudi Arabia insists on arming the opposition, “flip flopping” as it’s done in the past and taking a more neutral role, or at the very least stepping aside. “If foreign powers, especially Western powers, realise that there’s so little they can do Òê¦ The real problem I think now isn’t so much for military intervention but rather how much Arabs are willing to equip and arm the opposition and to what extent is this attack against the regime is going to get worse; is civil war going to spread further?” she said.
Meanwhile, a low intensity war will simmer for some time to come, with no winners. Innocent civilians will bear the brunt of this insane conflict that like a vacuum sucked in so many actors. Only time will tell the outcome.

Aftermath of U.S. airstrikes in Yemen (AFP/BBC News)

Al-Qaeda, the terrorist group that seeks to establish the return of the Islamic Caliphate over the Muslim world is believed to have grown way beyond “containment security parameters,” posing a very real threat to Yemen’s national hegemony within in its own territories.

As Yemenis rose against President Ali Abdullah Saleh in the wake of Egyptian President Hosni Mubaraks’ resignation, hoping that they would also be able to facilitate a change in regime by the sheer will of the people, the Islamic terrorist group saw in the unrest that followed a perfect opportunity. Aware that the regime was concentrating its efforts on quelling the brewing rebellion, as it recalled most of its military forces back to the capital, Sana’a, where massive protests were being staged, the armed militants moved into position, ready to pounce on Yemen.

A few months into the Revolution, al-Qaeda militants traveled along the country southern provinces, knowing that the terrain and somewhat lawlessness would favor their advances. Yemen’s southern territories are largely controlled on tribal grounds, which prevents to some extent the central government from fully establish its authority in the region. The provinces therefore also serve as a breeding ground for groups like al-Qaeda.

The most infamous defector from the regime, General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, who was once an ally of President Saleh, accused the incumbent of allowing the Islamic militants to roam the land in order to prove a point: to establish once and for all that only he could keep al-Qaeda at bay. President Saleh actually warned last year that with his departure al-Qaeda would soon move to the offensive, seizing several provinces and jeopardize the nation’s unity. Regardless of one’s belief, his foretelling of Yemen’s fall into darkness is materializing, striking fear at the heart of Yemenis.

The Caliphates

Seemingly, the elections that appointed Abdu Rabbo Mansour as Yemen’s new President signaled the beginning of al-Qaeda’s widespread military campaign across the country’s southern regions, with a surge in attacks of military bases and bombings against government buildings and officials. In a matter of weeks the group had declared two Caliphates in Yemen, claiming the southern provinces of Abyan and Shabwa.

Sources within the military and Yemen’s CTU have told the press that the militants are now moving dangerously close to controlling the southeastern province of Hadramaut, one of Yemen’s largest and natural resources rich regions. According to tribal leaders and local officials on Mukalla, al-Qaeda would have already spread out an impressive support network, warning that if the regional capital was to fall, nothing and no one would stop the militants from taking over and claiming control over the province.

Last week, pamphlets were posted all over Mukalla warning that whoever would side with the regime would be considered a traitor to Islam and therefore killed, a campaign that underscores the far reach of the group and its new daring approach. The Central Security Forces say an estimated 300 Jihadists are present on the ground and are currently training in the Azzan and Maifa’a directorates of the Shabwa governorate in preparation for an assault against Mukalla. If one bares in mind that 100 al-Qaeda fighters managed to slaughter their way through a reported 185 soldiers in Abyan last week, one can only imagine what tragedy could unfold if 300 were allowed to rain death on Mukalla.

Popular Outcry

Tens of thousands of Yemenis across the nation came out this Friday to denounce al-Qaeda’s attacks and massacres in Dofes and al-Qud, urging President Abdu Rabbo Mansour Hadi to execute the people’s revenge. Yemen is mourning its braves, waking up to the harsh reality of terrorism, which so far seemed to be a mere political tool, a myth without substance.

Wounded in its flesh, Yemen is now calling for a national strike against the group, with Yemenis across the political spectrum expressing their outrage and disgust. “We are very sad about what happened in the Dofes massacre,” said Mohamed Mohsen, a government employee. “Al-Qaeda has gone way beyond the red line, taking advantage of [Yemen's current] military and political divide. The time has come for the state to take revenge for its men and restore stability to these areas, especially since there are thousands of displaced people from Abyan who are enduring hardship because of al-Qaeda’s presence there.”

Hamoud al-Hattar, former minister of endowments and guidance, told the press that terrorist acts are contrary to Islamic law. “We condemn all terrorist acts that occurred after February 21st, including al-Qaeda’s attack on the presidential palace in Mukalla and Sunday’s incident in Dofes,” he said. “We called for the formation of a neutral commission of inquiry to investigate what happened, especially if there was dereliction on the part of members of the army.”

Political Manipulation

The Joint Meeting Parties, an umbrella group comprised of all political factions opposed to the incumbent  General People’s Congress, interestingly expressed their condemnation of al-Qaeda’s attack on Yemeni soil after Saleh’s loyalists advanced the possibility of a proxy war with al-Islah, Yemen’s Islamic party, who they say would attempt “to raise hell and finish off the Republic” in order to attain power. The theory is that al-Islah’s most radical militants would disguising themselves as al-Qaeda agents or possibly would have infiltrated al-Qaeda ranks to draw the regime into an armed conflict, weaken the central government and pounce on the presidential seat asserting al-Ahmar rise to ultimate domination.

Although some might categorize the conspiracy as borderline delusional, it cannot be ignored that certain figures amongst al-Islah have undeniable ties with the terrorist group. Names such as Sheikh Abdel-Mageed al-Zindani and Sheikh al-Dhahab are all high ranking leaders of al-Islah and alleged terrorists according to the U.S.

Saleh’s loyalists also supported their allegations by pointing out that only the Republican Guards and the Central Security Forces, both under the control of Saleh’s family members, had been targeted so far, proof that al-Islah was trying to get rid of the competition.

Who Can Save Yemen?

But beyond political manipulation is the fate of a nation, with people looking towards Sana’a for a strong military leader. With its armed forces in tatters and little to no unity, Yemen faces its toughest challenge yet. And while politicians from the opposition are clamoring for an immediate military restructuring, urging President Hadi to fulfill the terms of the power-transfer, the people are starting to wonder whether it would be wise to remove the very figures who could save the country from utter disaster.

“Not that I necessarily agree with them or even know what they stand for politically, I would rather keep Ahmed Saleh [the Head of the Republican Guards and Saleh’s eldest son] and Yehia Mohamed Saleh [the Head of the Central Security Forces and Saleh’s nephew] than put Yemen’s fate into the hands of others. At least they have been trained and are fully in control of their men. Who’s to say that the soldiers would follow another leader? We don’t need more problems. Hadi should postpone the restructuring until after al-Qaeda is destroyed,” said a University professor, Mohamed al-Ansi.

So far the Americans and the Saudis have been in favor of keeping those two main figures of the regime as they represent strategic allies, directly going against the JMP’s wishes as the latter seeks to appoint their own loyalists. With alarming reports warning against al-Qaeda’s plans to strike at the very heart of the Yemeni capital by targeting the U.S embassy and other state institutions, the government has raised the alarm to a maximum.

Sources said that al-Qaeda cells in the areas of Zindan and Arhab have trained for operations involving the storming of fortified sites, attacking fixed and mobile targets while aboard vehicles and motorbikes, and that al-Qaeda militants have entered Sana’a in preparation for carrying out their attacks in the coming few days.

While Cairo and Damascus are burning, things in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan seem somewhat stable. However, at an information session about the future of the Kingdom, former Israeli Ambassador to Jordan Oded Eran and the Washington Institute for Near East Policy’s David Schenker expressed reservations about the Arab country’s future.

Jordanian King Abudullah II (Photo: Jspace.com)

Ambassador Eran stated that Jordanian King Abudllah II faces three serious problems. First, he faces mounting criticism and complaints from his own support base, made up mostly of Bedouin and non-Palestinians.

“They aren’t calling for the removal of the regime, or even calling to curb the King’s power. They are using the Arab Spring to try and get more economic benefits from the government. They understand the regime is vulnerable and sensitive to all signs of protest, so they are going to the streets and demonstrating,” Eran said.

Second, the king is facing major pressure from the Muslim Brotherhood, who is largely responsible for organizing the weekly protests in Amman. Their lasting success, according to the ambassador, will largely depend on the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Third, the economy is failing. While it is “staying afloat,” it is a result of an infusion of cash from the Saudi and United States governments.

Schenker stated, “there is no guarantee the king is going to make it out of this, but he’s doing all the right things to help the odds.” He first pointed to the fact that not a single protestor has been killed by the police force. The king has sent his forces to monitor, and at times break up, protests without firearms. While they have been forced to use objects like bats or clubs, Schenker states the fact that no one has died is quite significant.

Schenker also pointed to positive reforms that the king has made within parliament and the electoral process. Like Egypt, though, economics lies at the heart of the protests and “people are still lighting themselves on fire in Jordan,” Schenker said.

It is also unclear what the status of the Israel-Jordan peace treaty would be if the King fell. Israeli officials are patiently waiting to see what happens.

In the past month, some 40 Iraqis accused of homosexual preference have been kidnapped, tortured and murdered . Most of these attacks have occurred in predominantly Shi’a neighborhoods in Baghdad and Basra – two hotbeds of simmering Shi’a radicalism – possibly egged on with the full protection of the law.

The attacks began in early February after an unidentified group posted public death threats against “adulterous individuals” in the two cities. Given four days to adjust their behavior or face violent payback (clumsily masquerading as “divine retribution”), the victims began to disappear shortly thereafter.

This is not the first time such targeted attacks have surfaced. In 2006, asylum requests filed by LGBT Iraqis to the United States and Great Britain soared as evidence mounted that Shi’a militias were murdering suspected adult homosexuals and children who had been sold into sexual slavery.
Homosexuality in Iraq has been decriminalized, but it is still considered strictly taboo by the vast majority of the population. Allegations had previously surfaced that uniformed Iraqi police officers have moonlit as death squads, carrying out lethal attacks on perceived homosexuals.

It’s a sad fact that the worst and most virulent homophobia in Iraq has been witnessed in Shi’a neighborhoods. Although Iraqi gays claimed success in 2006 following the decision of Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani to remove a fatwa calling for the killing of all homosexuals in the “worst, most severe way possible” from his website, the tone of conduct was clearly established years ago.

Cyber warfare is becoming an increasingly important problem, as Israel very well knows. An information session at the AIPAC Policy Conference focused on the need for Israel and the United States to increase their cyber defensive cooperation.

(Photo: Jspace.com)

Panelist Major Gen. Itzik Ben Israel, Head of Tel Aviv University’s Security Studies Program, stated that there is not enough cooperation. Israel is at the top of the game in the internet defense world and the United States needs to utilize this Israeli know-how. Israel is among the three leaders in readiness to fight cyber warfare, according to a new report from McAfee and Security& Defense Agenda, a leading defense and security think-tank in Brussels. Even with its high ranking, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has provided immense resources for his newly established cyber defense unit.

Ben Israel also emphasized the need for the international community as a whole to develop an international regime on the level of Interpol to combat cyber terrorism. A common misperception, he pointed out, is that cyber terrorism is all about stealing military information and harming a state’s government, when “civilian infrastructure is where the real damage can be done.” Its implications are obvious: water, energy, travel and finance, are all reliant on computers and are all within the civilian infrastructure.

Panelist Dr. James Van de Velde, an internet terrorism expert at Booze Allen Hamilton, expressed his opinion that industry needs to take a stronger role in internet regulation and defense. He also stated that cyber terrorism should be an increasing priority in the Israel-US relationship as groups like al-Qaeda move away from organized physical attacks and more towards providing written inspiration via the internet for random acts.

My friend was referring to the haberdashery of the newly installed Afghan leader, Hamid Karzai, whose fashion attire – robes, hat and more – was the first impression many Americans and others fixed upon the new Afghan leader. The hat and wardrobe conveyed a style that seized the imagination of many and added to the vibes that seemed to suggest the United States was in a good fight and was going to make a positive difference.

Even the merchants of Kabul bought into it. When I first asked around for such a hat, there was none for purchase. Two days later, the same merchants were waving me into their stores and quickly the phase “Karzai hat” went like a tsunami through the streets. “Karzai hats” – like that unexpected love affair between Afghans and their new American friends — were sprouting everywhere. The merchants knew a good thing as well. Everything was beautiful.

Americans were happy to go after the bad guys hiding in Afghanistan and be a friend of the good people. Afghans were truly happy Americans were helping them throw off some evil oppression and, in the process, settle a few scores. America showed the world it had learned from the mistakes made by the Soviets – who after all invaded Afghanistan, not liberated it. This was going to be different. The people there liked us.

Indeed they did. Afghans were genuinely grateful for how U.S. action gave them another chance to breathe.

Then things just slipped away, much like Osama bin Laden did at Tora Bora. The U.S. idea of democracy and what should happen in Afghanistan, as noble as it was, was not quite the Afghan’s cup of tea (and this is in a nation where a lot of tea is served). The U.S. military effort seemed mismanaged and without direction. The nation-building plan was as poor, thin and brittle as the attempt to build a ring road around the country.

Only Karzai’s hat still looks good 11 years later, although the colors seem less crisp. He remains president over a government that is weak and lacking popular support, except from those who use it for their own personal enrichment.

Today’s blowback in the wake of the burning of the Korans was just a matter of time. In fact, the violence associated with the burning merely made public what has been brewing for years, as the Afghan people shifted from being wildly pro-American to becoming confused and upset to putting U.S. and NATO troops close to the same category where they hold the Russians.

It does not matter that the Koran and other Islamic texts that were removed had extremist inscriptions written in them. Burning them was foolish and gave an opening – and a vivid reason — to those who oppose the Western efforts to justify violence and improve their own personal political motives.

They were waiting for the chance. The media has reported the singing of “Taliban songs” during demonstrations. The New York Times wrote that Afghanistan is “a religious country fed up with foreigners.” Well, Afghans never did like foreigners but this is far beyond that: as the Los Angeles Times reported, there is now “a visceral distaste for Western behavior and values” among significant numbers of Afghans.

Nation building is tough. Especially when your side has kill teams allegedly hunting Afghan civilians for sport and posing with dead bodies, or when there are videotapes of your side urinating on dead Afghans or abusing children or wearing Nazi SS markings, all well documented in the media. Makes it easier to stir up Afghans to turn their weapons on good, well-meaning soldiers who train, work and patrol with them. Since 2007 there have been at least 47 such attacks, which is historically unprecedented. Not in Iraq, not in Vietnam, not in Korea or even in the Philippines did anything similar occur.

It was always going to be a hard sell. Even in those “Paris liberation” days, it was clear that only so much Western thinking would be politely permitted – and no thanks on actually doing most of what the West wanted. It was clear early on, at the dinner tables in the houses rented by Westerners. Male Afghans would graciously accept the invitation to sit and dine together, but would then refuse to sit at the same dinner table with newly appointed female members of the Afghan government who may happen to be guests.

So how do you pull out on terms and timetables not of your making? Does it matter? The reality: it is only delaying what will happen in two or three years. Not wanting to “lose” Afghanistan is a red herring; it was lost centuries ago.

Many Americans rightly feel that the U.S.’ time in Afghanistan should have ended, or downsized, long ago. The killing of Osama bin Laden gave the perfect moment to exit. No one wants a Karzai hat any more. And no one seems interested in selling them, especially to Americans. The transactions ended long ago.

http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/24/battle-for-power-in-iran/9ojx

Mehrzad Boroujerdi is Associate Professor of Political Science at Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs where he also serves as the Founding Director of the Middle Eastern Studies Program and Founding Co-Director of the Religion, Media and International Relations Program.

Karim Sadjadpour is an associate at the Carnegie Endowment. Iranian politics and society; Iran‘s nuclear program; Iranian foreign policy; and Iran‘s role in Iraq.

Ali Alfoneh is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. His research areas include civil-military relations in Iran with a special focus on the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps in the Islamic Republic.

Mehdi Khalaji is a senior fellow at The Washington Institute, focusing on the politics of Iran and Shiite groups in the Middle East.

John R. Bradley

From John R. Bradley, the Middle East correspondent and writer who correctly predicted the Egyptian revolution, comes a new message about the Arab Spring: “everything we have been told about it is wrong”. John R. Bradley sat down with Reza Akhlaghi, Senior Writer at FPA, to discuss his latest book: ‘After the Arab Spring: How Islamists Hijacked the Middle East Revolts’
Published by Palgrave Macmillan

Your book paints a bleak picture of what is coming the Middle East’s way following the Arab Spring. Much of what you say in your book runs counter to Robin Wright’s overarching argument in her acclaimed book ‘Rock the Casbah’, in which she essentially says that Arabs increasingly defy religious extremism and the doctrines of Islamic fundamentalism as espoused by Bin Laden and Ayatollah Khomeini. Whereas in your book, in sharp contrast to Wright’s, you argue that what will emerge from current developments in the region is Islamic extremism and wholesale defeat of the liberal and intellectual class in the Arab/Muslim world. Can you elaborate on this central argument?

I wouldn’t dispute the assertion, however odd it might be, that “Arabs increasingly defy religious extremism and the doctrines of Islamic fundamentalism as espoused by Bin Laden and Ayatollah Khomeini.” In fact, I would argue–and always have argued in my books–that the vast majority of Arabs have never had any interest in being terrorists, and that it’s patently absurd, to the point of being offensive, to suggest otherwise even rhetorically. Moreover, what exactly did Bin Laden and Khomeini have in common? Precisely nothing as far I can see. In any case, even to accept that argument does not by default mean we should assume Arabs are embracing the classic Western values of liberalism, pluralism, and freedom of expression. That’s an almighty conclusion to jump to, and it has no basis in logic. It’s like saying because they believe the sky is blue they, by extension, believe that sand is orange. Moreover, the argument is just hot air anyway, because it’s not justified by any of the facts on the ground.

For a start, these revolutions–or more accurately these lousy failed revolutions and military coups–were not motivated by a thirst for free-and-fair elections, but by economic desperation and the question of personal dignity. Now, obviously, no one wants to be tortured for speaking his or her mind, whether they are in Paris or Tunis. But to suggest that people of other cultures who speak other languages and have other belief systems and distinct social and political histories merely want to be like us in the West is far too simplistic, and to me smacks of cultural imperialism of the kind that the likes of Robin Wright are always guilty of. Why on earth wouldn’t they want to be just like us? But they don’t. And perhaps, just once in a while, we should have the humility to ask: why on earth should they?

In Tunisia you will find almost no one who has a bad word to say about Habib Bourghiba, the authoritarian post-independence leader who ruled from 1956 to 1987. And in Egypt, Gamal Abdul Nasser–who, like Bourghiba, restricted freedom of the press and democratic and civil institutions–is widely adored. I’ve lost count over the past two decades how many ordinary Tunisians and Egyptians I’ve asked about this, and their responses have always been the same: they are loved because they respected the dignity of their people and were not personally corrupt, and during their rule it was not difficult to bring food to the table. The question of whether or not they were elected has never entered into the discussion.

You argue that democracy, not its values, is a great friend of Islamists who may have no regard for democratic values but can greatly benefit from them particularly in the form of strong voter turnout who, based on your assertion, are the most active segment of the electorate in the Arab world. To quote directly from your book “In the Arab world, when the gift of democracy is unwrapped, it is the Islamists who spring out of the box”. Once in power, why should Islamists disregard democracy and derail the democratic process in their respective countries with no fear of socio-economic consequences particularly in an interconnected world and an increasingly interdependent global trade system?

I don’t argue that there is a contradiction between political Islam and the democratic process. I don’t in fact see any contradiction at all between the two. Have democratic elections not been a reality in Iran for the past three decades? A less frequently asked, but far more pressing, question is whether liberalism and creative dissent, the lifeblood of any culture worth living in, can survive the democratic triumph of Islamist fundamentalism. And the answer, as the case of Iran also tells us, is equally and categorically: no. The Arab Spring marks the last, tragic gasp of any hope for free expression and legal protection of personal liberties in the Arab world, as we understand those concepts in the West. The Islamists are for democracy as a system of government and a method of change but–and here comes the conversation stopper–only insofar as it is compatible with Islam. The Quran remains the sole authoritative basis for legislation, whose earthly manifestation are the scholars who interpret it so that the state’s function is essentially executive in nature. To put it in a nutshell: Islam is the answer to everything, the final authority, and the sole source of legitimacy of government.

So ask the Islamists anything about maintining close ties to the West and peace treaties with Israel and they’ll tell you just what you want to hear. But Islamicizing their societies from below, not reassessing foreign policy or banning elections, has always been their top priority, and while they accept for the most part the deomcratic process, they put in safeguards that no legislation can be introduced which contradicts the Sharia (however it is interpreted). On the question of freedom of expression and personal behavior, there is, therefore, always the massive qualifier of “local customs” and “Islamic norms” from the committed Islamists. Consider, for example, the response of Rachid Ghanouchi, the leader of Tunisia’s notoriously moderate Ennahda party, to the violent attacks on secular artists in his country during the past year. “Art is linked to the values and traditions of each society,” he said, “and no one should take away freedom of expression through art, as long as it reflects those traditions (my emphasis).” In other words: provided they do not bulge, or threaten to bulge, or threaten to lead to behavior that bulges, out of the cultural straitjacket of whatever he and self-appointed scholars like him think of as Islam.

Hazem Saleh Abu Ismail, a Salafi presidential candidate in Egypt and vocal supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood, at least did us all a favor last month by cutting through the nonsense. When asked to elaborate on the importance of personal liberties and individual rights in countries governed by Islamic law, he was gobsmacked: “If you claim that Allah considers your personal freedom, show me your reference,” he said. “Nobody has ever said that—except for people who have no understanding of Sharia.”

Why do you think that the Arab/Muslim youth care little for democratic values and that the only reasons they took to the streets were poverty, hunger, and lack of access to descent jobs? Do you think they will get that from the Islamists whom you argue will be ruling them in a new post-Arab Spring Middle East?

Let’s look at what’s actually happened during the last year. When the first deadline for voter registration passed in July, a paltry 16 percent of Tunisians had bothered to register. We were constantly told that there was an 80 percent turnout for the elections, but that was 80 percent of the 50 percent who eventually registered after the deadline was extended. In other words, there was a 40 percent turnout. In Egypt in March, there was a turnout of just 41 percent for a crucial referendum on a new constitution that would determine the country’s future. Again, that’s 41 percent of registered voters, meaning–because millions of Egyptians aren’t registered–only about 20-25 percent actually turned out. An extensive study by researchers at Oxford University last month found that only 16 percent of Libyans are now in favour of Western-style democracy, as opposed to 60 percent who prefer authoritarian rule.

There are two reasons this reality is not reflected in the Western media’s appalling coverage of the so-called Arab Spring. The first is that, because of the continued influence of Edward Said’s Orientalism, no one wants to sound like some reactionary old Orientalist labeling the Arabs as culturally and politically distinctive, because it easily lends to charges–however unfounded–that they are being labeled inferior. The second is that the Western “experts” like Robin Wright home in on a tiny little band of English-speaking bloggers, activists, human-rights campaigners and so on. The Muslim Brotherhood always dismisses this group as “an out of touch, irrelevant, Westernized elite;” and while I don’t usually have much time for what the Muslim Brotherhood has to say, on this question they are absolutely right. In Egypt, for example, the parties set up by the revolutionaries got just 2 percent of the vote, as opposed to 77 percent for the Islamists–25 percent of which went to the Salafi party,Al-Nour, that openly campaigned on the promise of doing away with elections if they were voted in.

In the face of all this overwhelming evidence to the contrary, how much longer can the absurd happy-clappy, Facebook, picnic-in-the-park narrative of the Arab Spring continue? I suppose until all the pundits who got it completely wrong from the outset have no choice but to admit the fact. And that means it will likely continue forever. But now that it’s obvious the revolutions have created a security vacuum and clearly failed to alleviate the economic woes and human rights abuses that spawned them—indeed, in the case of Egypt and Tunisia, quite the opposite—the Islamists offer something seductive in the absence of meaningful solutions: a simple answer, Islam is the solution. The Islamists certainly don’t have viable economic policies. But nor do those in charge of Western democracies.

In Tunisia and Egypt before the Arab Spring, youth unemployment was about 30 percent. But in Spain it was 50 percent, and in Greece, Italy and Portugal it was 45 percent. How then was a quick and messy transition to democracy ever going to solve that problem, whoever was elected? The Islamists instead offer solace in the face of these frankly insurmountable problems. The terrible price that the ordinary people of these countries will have to pay for that solace will only gradually become evident to them, as it did to the historically very liberal and tolerant Iranian people.

I guess this could be called the $4 billion question, both literally and metaphorically. What was the rationale for the Saudi leadership, as you claim in your book, to give $4 billion to the new post-Mubarak military regime in Cairo? You also assert that this infusion of cash was followed by “indirect threats” to the interim military regime. What were some of those “threats”?

Actually, while they promised $4 billion, only about $500 million has materialized. There’s nothing odd in that. Only about 10 to 20 percent of aid ever pledged by any donors for whatever cause ends up being sent. The Saudis were only interested in gaining leverage, and one way of doing that is by holding out the carrot of economic aid for the bankrupt military to run after. Then, as you suggest, there’s the stick. This mainly came in the form of threatening to change the kingdom’s labor laws in a way that would have resulted in the expulsion of millions of Egyptian expatriate workers from Saudi Arabia, which would have had an immediate and devastating impact on the Egyptian economy. That didn’t happen, either. In any case, the Saudis can now relax: the Egyptian military clearly is not in any way itself revolutionary, and the Wahhabis have installed, through extensive funding, their Muslim Botherhood and Salafi proxies in Egypt’s new parliament. One thing we can be certain of is that they will not offer a peep of criticism of the Saudi regime. They never have.

In the new evolving Middle East to be soon dominated, based on your assertion, by Islamic fundamentalists, will and should Israel’s strategic objectives and security calculus change?

At the beginning of the Arab Spring, Israel breathed a sigh of relief. Tunisia doesn’t matter geopolitically one way or another, but Egypt of course does. And in Egypt there was a military coup. The Egyptian military is very pro the 1979 peace treaty with Israel, and its army is funded, trained, and equipped by America. The triumph of the Islamists in Egypt’s parliamentary elections doesn’t change things much vis-à-vis Israel, at least not in the short term. The parliament has limited powers, and all this talk about the Muslim Brotherhood taking on the military to push them to hand over to civilian rule is nonsense. With real power comes responsibility and accountability, and while the Muslim Brotherhood may be many things, one thing they certainly are not is stupid. As I’ve already suggested, with the cleanest, most efficient government the world has ever known, it would take a generation or more to cleanse the country of its corruption, brutality, poverty, illiteracy, chronic unemployment, nepotism, and so on. This is one reason the Brotherhood are more interested in forming a coalition with the liberal block in the new parliament than with the Salafis: that way, when the next elections come round, they can blame the liberals for the ills that still plague their nation. And the Brotherhood will avoid direct confrontation with the military because their first priority is not the defense budget or launching wars but imposing Islamist dogma on the Egyptian society, and that is what will preoccupy them during the first parliamentary session.

More generally, Israel is putting all its hopes on its undeclared and bizarre, but very real, alliance with Saudi Arabia, which, despite spewing anti-Semitic venom of the kind not seen since the Nazis, poses no military threat to the Jewish state. The Saudis are also aligned with Washington and hate the Iranian mullahs like the plague. Along with Qatar, Saudi Arabia has led a region-wide counterrevolution, shoring up pro-Western Persian Gulf monarchies as well as those of Jordan and Morocco, and backing the Muslim Brotherhood and its franchises in Tunisia, Syria, and Yemen. The question we can’t answer at this stage is whether the Saudis, through their funding and Wahhabi doctrine, will be able to control the Islamist groups taking power everywhere in relation to their relations with the West and Israel, in the same way the House of Saud has more or less been able to control their own Wahhabi religious establishment.

Do you think a new Middle East dominated by Sunni Arab governments will experience a Sunni-Shiite conflict?

On the government level yes. The main reason Washington has backed the Saudi-led counterrevolution, which is to say the move by Sunni Islamist parties to fill the post-Arab Sring vacuum, is to contain Iran. But ordinary Arabs have little time for such distinctions, despite the anti-Shia propaganda campaigns they have been bombarded with over the past five or so years. If Israel and America attack Iran, ordinary Arabs will side with the latter. It will be interesting to see how the Saudi- and Qatari-aligned Sunni parties throughout the region will try to box themselves out of that corner.

What, in your opinion, would it really take to see Kant and Sartre being taught at Saudi universities?

A miracle of the kind the world has never seen before.

Is the "leading from behind" foreign policy strategy, as constructed by the Obama administration a good one? (Picture: Wikipedia.org)

McDougall labels the first age of American foreign policy, 1776-1898, the “Old Testament” period.  While the US maintained alliances and dealings abroad, it showed little interest in managing the world.  Foreign policy was a domestic development tool, which used relations with other states to help increase prosperity at home.

The US’s inkling to move towards major global leadership began around 1898 and has continued on to today.  McDougall calls this the “New Testament” period.  It is characterized by the pro-active spread of American and democratic ideology in an attempt to help the world realize their own version of the American Dream.  The “New Testament” reflects an arrogant, moral crusader mission.  Policies were, and still are, less centered on a balanced mix of security and development at home, and more on imposing American will and values on others.  This mentality has created an environment where the US involves itself in unnecessary conflicts, and ends up on the wrong side of public opinion.  The resulting over-extension has overtime helped facilitate its gradual decline in relative power.

If seriously developed, “leading from behind” has the potential to be an even keeled, middle-ground blend of “Old Testament” and “New Testament” policy.  While it might reflect US understanding that its relative power is in decline, a few clarifications need to be made.  The US is and will continue to be for some time, the overwhelming dominant world power.  In 2009, the US economy was worth $14.3 trillion, three times as much as the next closest country, Japan (which has since been overtaken by China).  Additionally, the US was only worth slightly less than the economies of the next four closest states combined.  This represents the widest gap between great powers in modern history.[ii]

US military dominance is in a class of its own.  In 2008, America spent $607 billion on its military, almost half of the world’s total military spending.  The countries that the US is supposedly losing its relative power to—China, India, Japan, and Russia—together only spent $219 billion on their militaries.[iii] America’s relative global power may be decreasing, but no other state comes remotely close to its mix of economic and military power and capability.

Getting back to the strategy itself, “leading from behind” is mainly focused on the use of alliances and the empowerment of the other states involved.  The goal is to alleviate individual public pressure and responsibility on America.  Based on the US’s current predicaments in Iraq and Afghanistan, this seems like a good foundation for securing future diplomatic and international political success.  There are those critics, though, who believe this strategy dilutes Washington’s Rule on America’s freedom and responsibility to act unilaterally.  This is alarmist thinking.  America should trust the alliances it is involved in, knowing it always reserves its right to act unilaterally if it feels it must.  Such was the case with Pakistan and the Osama bin Laden assassination.  But, it also needs to be reasonable in doing so.  Unilateralism in its purest form is the right to act independently in order to protect liberties and self-interest at home; not to “…go abroad in search of monsters to destroy.”[iv]

The US should be more concerned with balancing opposition influence and power, not overtaking it.  This can only be done through maintaining and unifying alliances.  Allowing its allies to exert more international political influence, while simultaneously decreasing its own public display, will help repair America’s image.  It will also increase its credibility amongst friends.  This will in turn temper the rise in power of its opponents, as well as increase its own.

If “leading from behind” is a sincere shift in foreign policy, it potentially lays out the possibility of bringing back the most important, and largely lost, aspect of America’s “Old Testament” period: using foreign policy as a tool to ensure and develop liberties and freedoms at home:

[I]f other nations want our style of democracy and/or high rates of economic growth, they know what steps to take to achieve them.  If they do not want to take those steps, the United States cannot force them or take those steps for them…Otherwise, the best way to promote our institutions and values is to strengthen them at home…American Exceptionalism as originally conceived was to be a measure of all that we are, not what we do far away.[v]

Getting involved in some global issues is unavoidable.  For instance, battling groups like Hezbollah and al-Qaeda require activism and a slight imposition on some civil liberties.  However, applying a missionary-like mentality, like that of the Bush Doctrine, has been counter-productive.  Because of its crusades abroad, the US has developed a somewhat fearsome national-security state.  Core civil liberties are under a much greater threat than need be.  By attempting to take on the whole world, the US has created violent enemies that had no quarrel with it before the Iraq and Afghanistan wars.  “Leading from behind” is a good first step in reversing these trends.

The US always reserves the right to act unilaterally if it must, as was the case in the assassination of Osama bin Laden. However, it must do so within reason. (Picture: Boston Herald)

It is clear that a complete return to the “Old Testament” is impossible.  The Monroe Doctrine of restricting America’s affairs to its own hemisphere is unrealistic (unless you’re Ron Paul).  The US is still the dominant power in the world and will be forced to intervene in certain situations that may not seem to further its national interest.  But, it does not necessarily have to be the face of every major international intervention or issue, nor a crusader of democracy and ideology.

If the US is worried about the rise of un-democratic and illiberal states, it must realize that there is no real competing global organizing logic to liberal internationalism.  Anything centered in Beijing or Moscow would be less open and rule-based, and would hurt China and Russia’s national interests.  While it may feel like these states are not moving towards liberalism, it is merely that they move slower.  There is little evidence that authoritarian states can become truly advanced societies without moving in a liberal democratic direction.[vi]

Given its overseas wars, its attempt at restoring its international reputation, and its domestic problems, the US has begun to feel that it is in need of a foreign policy change to preserve its long-term interests and security.  It is in America’s best interest to adopt a middle of the road policy, and if executed properly the evolving Obama doctrine of “leading from behind” is a good one.  It does not require anything significant or drastic from the American public and is the perfect mix of American modernism and traditionalism.  So what would Walter McDougall think? Get your hands on a copy of Crusader State and read the last chapter.  He would likely agree that moderation is the best policy.

Notes