Accompanying the significant blow dealt by the failed launch has been the regime’s routine rhetoric directed at their South Korean neighbours. However, the latest international outcry has followed last week’s declaration from a senior regime official that “preparations are almost complete” for the state’s third nuclear test.

That this announcement comes in the face of such international censure is indeed cause for concern, as it illustrates that the impetus for Kim Jong-un to consolidate his leadership far outweighs any motivation to diffuse tension. In such capricious circumstances, one thing is at least clear – the regime’s ardent determination to project power is symptomatic of a desperate leader struggling to legitimize his rule.

Whilst the consistent condemnation and mounting sanctions emanating from the West will only decrease the likelihood of cooperation, China’s sway with North Korea could well be the only remedy. On this front, Beijing’s increasing adherence to international norms could be accompanied by a tougher stance on North Korean assertiveness in the future.

Despite the controversy about the showcasing of a Beijing-built missile transporter at a recent North Korea military parade, China’s decision to condemn North Korea at the Security Council could be the harbinger of a tougher, more resolute commitment to keep Pyongyang in check.

But on the other hand, rebuking North Korea could serve only to force the regime’s hand, encouraging even more bellicose behaviour from the hermit state. Indeed, the coupling of a more inflexible Beijing and increasing international castigation could well back Kim Jong-Un into an even tighter corner. Here, any impulse to denuclearize and conform to normative conventions would soon evaporate, putting the region’s future security under even thicker clouds of uncertainty.

Ultimately though, nothing is certain with a state subject to such mercurial shifts in posture. With the inevitability of some sort of nuclear display in the upcoming months, there seems to be no immediate solution to the North Korea situation. Whilst the six-party talks could serve to ease tensions, as they have done in the past, the domestic origins of Pyongyang’s assertiveness mean that change has to come from within. All in all though, we can only speculate about the powers that operate behind the esotericism of North Korea’s political leadership.

Alex Ward

I wrote yesterday about the ridiculous inconsistency of the Administration’s response first, to the DPRK’s failed launch and second, to the non-response to the Indian Agni V launch shortly thereafter.

Well, it seems I’m not alone.  Enter Walter Pincus, Columnist for the Washington Post.  Writing yesterday in a piece entitled Washington Double-Talk on Nukes, Pincus sums up Washington’s varied reactions to the DPRK’s failed launch and touting of supposed ICBM technology which looks suspiciously like it has come from China, its non-reaction to the India launch, and the profoundly ill-advised U.S.-India 123 agreement for nuclear cooperation thusly:

“The hypocrisy attributed to Washington is that the United States talks about enforcing nonproliferation when it comes to countries it does not like but who have signed the treaty, but gives assistance to those countries friendly to it who have not signed the treaty. Both groups are violating the intent of the treaty.

That makes nonproliferation for the United States not a principle but a negotiable position depending on Washington’s view of its national interests. However, the United States appears not to want other, often unfriendly countries, to practice that same flexibility when it comes to nonproliferation.”

One word, Mr. Pincus:  AMEN!!

While the ruckus over the failed DPRK missile test cum-satellite launch continues to linger, another non-NPT country recently followed suit with its own test.  But this time, the uproar, well, didn’t happen.  Or at least, that’s what the media wish us to believe.

Here is what the NYT reported after Thursday’s test:

“The United States, which led the criticism of North Korea’s missile launching last Friday, appeared to warily endorse the Indian missile test. ‘We urge all nuclear-capable states to exercise restraint regarding nuclear capabilities,’ said Mark C. Toner, a State Department spokesman. ‘That said, India has a solid nonproliferation record,’ he added, and noted that India had a ‘no first use policy on nuclear weapons.”

Hm.  Wonder what the folks convening for the upcoming NPT RevCon might have to say about that ringing non-endorsement?

And, more importantly, why the difference?

I’m not sure I would agree with AP reporter Ravi Nessman’s characterization that “The vastly different responses [to the DPRK versus the Indian missile tests] show the world has grown to accept India as a responsible and stable nuclear power, while shunning North Korea as a pariah.”

As Eric Margolis pointed out in the HuffPo, while the Agni V tested was not an ICBM, as was erroneously reported (that means you, Time Magazine), “India has become the world’s largest importer of arms. India’s navy is to deploy three aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered submarines with ballistic missiles, a powerful air force, and armed forces of 1.3 million. India has long land and maritime frontiers and needs large, well-equipped military forces.”  India has also been long working to develop an ICBM, reportedly called the “Surya”, that can reach North America, Europe and Australia.  This is a bad thing, right?

Certainly, the Administration does not put the rogue hermit state in the same category as our purported ally to the south east.  But, let’s face facts.  Neither country is in the NPT, much less the MTCR.  So a missile test by either country is not cause for celebration, tacit acceptance or anything less than condemnation, particularly a test of a three-stage missile capable of carrying a 1-ton nuclear warhead 3,100 miles.  Incidentally, besides the missile tests, these two countries have another thing in common:  lots of starving people and, outside of the upper echelons of government, countries both mired in extreme poverty.  Call me crazy, but isn’t that a wee bit more pressing than the “mine is bigger than yours” contest going on in Asia right now?

Don’t get me wrong: I understand that matters of strategic and regional stability and the like are at issue: China looms large for both countries.  In fact, China has reportedly eclipsed Pakistan as India’s number one on its list of scary countries.  But, why would either country devote so much time, energy and resources to defending countries that won’t be terribly valuable if they cease having populations that they are supposedly trying to defend?  Isn’t your populace the reason for defending your country in the first place?  There I go thinking rationally again.

Clearly, India is gunning for a seat on the UN Security Council.  It also wants to bolster its street cred against China.  And the U.S. may or may not be secretly wishing they succeed in taking China down a peg or two.  But, as I’ve written before, our partnership with India is far from in the bag.

Regardless, the U.S. cannot stand on the nonproliferation bully pulpit by cherry-picking applications of the NPT and MTCR.  Just as I have been harping on for months regarding application of the “Gold Standard”, it would be consistent for the U.S. to be as unhappy about the Indian missile test as it has clearly been about the DPRK test.

But, there I go thinking rationally again.

For a discussion of all technicalities connected with the Korean launch–from its military implications to the launch plan–I highly recommend the preview physicist David Wright had in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists last week. Wright, who is codirector of the global security program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, is unsure whether the rocket’s beefed-up third stage would be able to carry a relatively heavy nuclear warhead (in place of a small satellite). “But if the third stage could be married to such a warhead, a three-stage ballistic missile based on this technology could theoretically carry it 10,000 km to 11,000 km,” says Wright. “Such a range would allow it to reach the West Coast of the United States. If a one-ton warhead were launched on the first two stages of this rocket, it might reach a distance of 8,000 km.”

I am particularly struck by one rudimentary but perhaps telling element in Wright’s analysis. Among other things, he points out that the three-stage rocket was launched on an almost due-south trajectory so as to avoid flying over nearby landmasses, notably Japan. That means the the rocket got no boost from the earth’s rotation, making it harder to loft the payload and requiring therefore more propellant.

In fact, North Korea is none too optimally placed to launch long-range missiles to begin with. Situated roughly between 38° and 40°, it is at a high latitude compared to the sites from which most long-range rocket launching is done. Cape Canaveral is just above 28°, the South American site where France does its commercial Ariane launching at about 5°.  (The closer a site is to the equator, the greater the acceleration, because a point on the earth’s surface near the equator  is spinning at a higher speed than points further from the equator.)

The decision to make a satellite launch attempt under sorely constrained geographic and geopolitical conditions, together with the bizarre circumstance of the decision’s being made even though the U.S. government had warned a launch would torpedo what had seemed a breakthrough deal, suggests–to me anyway–an alarming disarray and incompetence on the part of North Korea’s leadership.

Russian-Made SS-1 SCUD medium range ballistic missile

Today in 1987, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established by seven countries, including the U.S., in order to control the spread of unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass destruction, and to coordinate national export licensing efforts aimed at preventing their proliferation.  The regime, which has since expanded its membership to thirty-four (plus Israel, Romania, and the Slovak Republic, which, while not members, have each committed to maintaining export controls consistent with the regime) just concluded its twenty-fifth plenary in Buenos Aires, Argentina.

According to the Arms Control Association, “the MTCR has been credited with slowing or stopping several missile programs by making it difficult for prospective buyers to get what they want or stigmatizing certain activities and programs. Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq abandoned their joint Condor II ballistic missile program. Brazil, South Africa, South Korea, and Taiwan also shelved or eliminated missile or space launch vehicle programs. Some Eastern European countries, such as Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, destroyed their ballistic missiles, in part, to better their chances of joining MTCR.  The regime has further hampered Libyan and Syrian missile efforts.”  Members, including the U.S., Japan and others have often used their history of strict adherence to the MTCR guidelines in order to pressure non-member countries to comply.

But, like all other international regimes, particularly voluntary ones, the MTCR has had its problems.  In fact, such a commemoration smacks of profound irony given the events on the less pleasant side of the DMZ last week.  India was also able, despite the MTCR, to establish a largely self-sufficient space-launch and ballistic-missile program, while Pakistan procured missiles and turn-key production facilities from North Korea and China, neither of which are MTCR members. Iran acquired an initial stockpile of missiles from North Korea, and used production infrastructure it received from China to establish an indigenous capacity to produce solid-fuelled missiles. Unbound by MTCR guidelines, the DPRK has also been a leading supplier of short- and medium-range missiles and related technologies for more than 20 years.

So, does the MTCR still matter, despite its failings?

The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) believes the answer is yes.  Despite the fact that the MTCR “ has not been as successful at curtailing the spread of cruise missiles, and nor is it structured to regulate the development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)”,  no additional states have established a viable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability since 1987, and only Israel and India have created missiles with a range of more than 3,000 kilometers.

BUT, and this is a big but, two key challenges facing the regime today remain.  While the MTCR arose from concerns that nations pursuing nuclear weapons might also seek long-range delivery systems, IISS suggests that control of cruise missiles and unmanned aircraft still need to be addressed.  When it was established in 1987, “Less attention… was paid to cruise missiles and non-nuclear payloads. Consequently, the MTCR has been less effective in curtailing the threat posed by cruise missiles capable of carrying chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. For these, a different set of criteria is needed.

“Cruise missiles need not fly long distances to strike targets, since they are relatively small and can be launched from simple platforms located inside or outside a country’s borders, including ships at sea. Stealth, speed and maneuverability are key performance criteria. If the MTCR were updated to reflect these new realities, highly manoeuvrable, hypersonic cruise missiles capable of carrying more than 500kg would be regulated as Category I items, regardless of range. Similarly, emerging technologies such as radar-absorbing materials and designs, miniaturized propulsion systems and high-precision navigation and guidance units would be more tightly controlled.”

However, attempts at changes to better address these loopholes have not yet been successful.  For example, Russia and others have opposed a US and UK proposal to amend the regulations to include restrictions on the transfer of hypersonic, short-range cruise missiles.

In light of what is continuing to happen in Iran, India, North Korea and Pakistan, the question is, is altering the MTCR to address UAVs and cruise missiles now a day late and a rupee short?

Nuclear negotiations with Iran having been punted forward six weeks to a day in May, a positive development in principle, attention is focusing on whether Iran can be trusted at all and on who’s really in charge. The consensus of close observers seems to be that the country’s eminence grise Ayatollah Ali Khameini has tightened the reins, with Ahmadinejad sharply weakened as economic sanctions are starting to bite hard. It’s recognized on the one hand that Khameini has declared nuclear weapons absolutely inconsistent with Islam. On the other hand, it’s also recognized that Shiite Islam explicitly acknowledges the right of political leaders to lie when necessary in self-defense.

Former IAEA chief Mohamed ElBaradei expressed dismay in his book last year that when Iranian nuclear negotiators were caught out in misrepresentations, they treated the matter lightly, as if it were of no import.

So does it make sense to attempt negotiations at all with people who admit their word may be of no real value? Arms Control Association Greg Thielmann has been arguing that it would be best to take Iranian leaders at their word, in hopes they may be boxed into delivering on commitments however insincerely made, while at the same time trying to make “nuclear breakout” as unappealing an option as possible. (His thoughts on the second point are contained in a recent ACA threat assessment brief.)

I agree, though the difficulties are not to be underestimated. Elements of radical uncertainty are evident even in statements from those who have been critical of Iran‘s regime and yet also support negotiations. Nobelist Shirin Ebadi, who has been living in exile, is quoted in yesterday’s New York Times as opposing economic sanctions because they are so punishing of innocent Iranians. And yet she worries that Iran’s leaders may be just playing for time in the current round of negotiations, a concern that has dogged efforts to talk since 2003.

Seyed Hossain Mossavian, a former top nuclear negotiator for Iran now  working quietly at Princeton University, likewise has opposed sanctions as counter-productive. He has suggested, as ACA’s Peter Crail noted in an ACA issue brief, that Iran might be talked into enriching uranium only to the extent it is needed to satisfy reactor fuel needs. “Such a commitment would entail a de facto suspension because of Iran‘s lack of near-term domestic fuel needs, but it would provide Iran with a way to rationalize such a halt without appearing to capitulate entirely,” Crail observed. But Mousavian also seemed to suggest, at the end of long interview with the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists last fall, that a comprehensive solution to the Iranian situation may be impossible without the question of Israel’s nuclear arsenal being addressed.

Perhaps the best we can hope for in the upcoming talks is a small agreement or series of small agreements that keep the door open for a wider and more ambitious approach to regional issues. Astonishingly, according to an opinion poll cited in a column that appeared on the op-ed page of the New York Times several months ago, nearly two-thirds of Israelis would support the idea of a Middle East nuclear free zone if that kept Iran non-nuclear–and they expressed that opinion even when told explicitly that this would mean Israel’s giving up its nuclear arsenal.

With the expected launch of a long-range Unha-3 rocket by North Korea in the next couple of days, speculation has turned to whether or not the exercise is a cover for a new ballistic missile test.  Space Development Department Deputy Director Ryu Kum Chol explained that “The launch of the Kwangmyongsong 3 satellite is the gift from our people to our great leader, comrade Kim Il Sung, on the occasion of his 100th birthday, so this cannot be a missile test.”  However, experts have observed that the Unha 3 rocket is likely to be a modified version of the North’s Taepodong 2 long-range ballistic missile, which is last assumed to have been tested in spring 2009.  Because of the elusive and very closed nature of the country, outside experts are left to speculate about what exactly the North Koreans are up to. Could it be some sabre-rattling to further consolidate the power of Kim Jong Il heir Kim Jong Un?  An attempt to communicate to the outside world, as Dr. Jim Walsh from the MIT Security Studies Program, speculated in a recent interview with CNN? Or both? Why might Pyongyang be conducting this launch on the heels of the deal with the U.S. for food aid for its starving people?  Why would they purposely scuttle the deal?  Clearly, Washington is not happy and has threatened to call off the deal.

The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation has issued a FAQ on the upcoming launch that provides useful information on what may be happening in the next couple of days, what the difference between a space launch and a missile launch is, and what may become of the so-called “Leap Day Deal’ between the U.S. and Pyongyang.

Adding to the missile/space launch situation is speculation that the DPRK is getting ready to conduct another nuclear test.  New satellite imagery obtained by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) suggests that Dep Director Ryu may not have been telling the truth about the nature of the missile launch – quelle surprise!  The South Korean media have also been reporting on a ramp-up of excavation activity at the Pungye.  At issue is the growing pile of dirt at the test site which seems to indicate not the excavation of another test shaft, but the accumulation of dirt from elsewhere which will be used to plug the existing test shaft in advance of a test.

According to ISIS:

“According to [the South Korean news] reports, North Korea would use this material to plug a shaft in advance of a nuclear explosive test, which by implication could happen soon.  However, it is possible that the increase in material seen in the April 1, 2012 image is resulting from further excavation of a test shaft, and not evidence of an intention to plug the shaft before a test. Moreover, even if the South Korean report is correct, the test may not be imminent.”  Confused?  Yeah, me too.

But, let’s review what we know:  the government in Pyongyang is getting ready to launch a missile which may or may not carry a satellite.  It may or may not be a test of a new missile capable of carrying nukes.  In addition, some satellite imagery indicates that the DPRK may, depending on the significance and timing of a growing pile of dirt, be prepping for an underground nuclear test.  All of this comes on the heels of the conclusion of a deal with Washington that would have provided food aid to the starving North Korean masses.

Two words:  Oy Vey.

Without commenting on Israel’s decision today to declare Guenter Grass persona not grata,  Grass’s peculiar decision to publish what is really a short op-ed piece in the form of a poem, his decision to publish the piece at all given the embarrassment he suffered when his S.S. membership became known, the literary qualities of the poem or how its subtleties and elisions are best rendered in English, let me just say this: When Grass complains that the implications of Germany’s submarine deliveries to Israel have been too little discussed, he has a point.

The essential facts are the following. Since the immediate aftermath of the first Gulf War, when Germany was suffering some discomfort because of industrial sales it had made to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Chancellor Kohl agreed to supply Israel with sophisticated Dolphin submarines. It provided the first two gratis and the next three on a highly subsidized basis; agreement to deliver a sixth was reached just last month, which appears to be what prompted Grass’s poem. Though the submarines are conventionally powered, they are considered highly sophisticated and are capable to carrying nuclear-armed cruise missiles. The consensus among defense experts appears to be that at least some of the submarines do actually carry Israeli-made Popeye cruise missiles equipped with nuclear warheads, thereby providing Israel with an invulnerable, sea-based, second-strike nuclear deterrent.

In light to those facts, it is reasonable to ask whether indeed a nuclear-armed Iran would represent an existential threat to Israel, as Israel’s current leadership has been arguing. It is perhaps not unreasonable to worry whether an unduly alarmist Israeli leadership might actually be tempted to launch a preventive first strike against Iran. And it certainly is not unreasonable to suggest, with Grass, that everybody would be better off if both Israel and Iran renounced nuclear weapons and did so under the supervision of an international authority.

This is what a leader of Germany’s Easter Marches–the regular demonstrations in favor of nuclear disarmament that have been a regular occurrence since the 1950s–told the Sueddeutsche Zeitung today. “What Grass has brought up cannot just be swept under the carpet as anti-Semitism,” the official spokesperson for the Easter Marches told the SZ. It was the Sueddeutsche that published Grass’s poem in the first place, and so that is perhaps the best place to consult the original German. The Associated Press has made available an “unofficial translation” of the Grass poem, “What Must Be Said.”

IAEA Inspectors at Work

My colleague Andreas Persbo, the director of the UK-based VERTIC, has recently highlighted the existence of a very useful resource provided by the IAEA.  The page, which includes a newly-released document entitled Guidance for States Implementing Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, helps to shed light on the “ how, what, when and why of practical safeguards implementation”.

While some may not find this particularly sexy or thrilling, it is where the rubber meets the road for keeping tabs on nuclear materials and other resources.  Its how the IAEA does it work, down in the weeds, in the dark recesses of nuclear facilities around the world.  In its own words:

“The safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are a central part of international efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons. In implementing safeguards, the IAEA plays an instrumental, independent verification role, ensuring that States’ safeguards commitments are being respected….This Guidance is principally intended for State and regional safeguards regulatory authorities and facility operators….[and] addresses the legal obligations of States and the IAEA in the implementation of safeguards agreements and protocols thereto.”

Useful stuff indeed.

The bad: The absence of any evident progress in dissuading North Korea from a satellite launch, which, if it occurs, will vitiate the earlier agreement with Pyongyang that appeared to be a breakthrough. Evidently we are back to square one, not knowing who really holds power in the North and what the country’s ultimate intentions are.

The ugly: President Obama’s unfortunate overheard remark to Medvedev about missile defenses and the upcoming U.S. election, which was worse than a gaffe. It is unseemly for a U.S. president to apologize to the likes of Medvedev or Putin for U.S. domestic political constraints. At least we have domestic political constraints.

IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano (Courtesy IAEA)

Just as the self-congratulatory communiques have been issued in Seoul and pats on the back for a job well done have been distributed, Steven E. Miller has lobbed a wrench in the works.  In his very timely essay for the American Academy of Arts & Sciences, entitled Nuclear Collisions: Discord, Reform & the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime, Miller describes a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in crisis.

His central tenet, one that is clearly correct, is that nuclear weapons states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) have different perceptions of the NPT’s adequacy and fairness, as well as its flaws and weaknesses. “Given this diversity of views,” he writes, “it is not surprising that states respond differently to proposed reforms of the regime; they do not agree on diagnoses of the NPT’s problems, and hence do not share the same reform agenda.”  The NPT, he rightly asserts, was created around three central pillars: nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear technology.  However, “There are notable differences… in perceptions of the relative importance of the three pillars. One view, common in Western nonproliferation circles, holds that the core rationale and principal purpose of the NPT is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. In this view, the existence of the three pillars is generally acknowledged, but the other two are regarded as secondary and less essential….This nonproliferation-centered view of the NPT regime collides with a widely held contrary belief that the NPT consists of three coequal pillars that together constitute the core bargain of the treaty…to many NNWS, the disarmament and peaceful technology pillars are at least as important to their understanding of the NPT and its value to their interests as the nonproliferation pillar.”

Aye, there’s the rub, one that goes back to even before the treaty was concluded in 1968.  This conflict of views plays out at every meeting of the IAEA General Conference, every NPT RevCon, and every time the Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee (TACC) deigns to allocate funds.  The NPT and its attendant regime, believes the NNWS, are simply an instrument of the U.S. to impose its will on the rest of the world.  Many bemoan the increasing politicization of the IAEA:

“Similarly, to many in the NAM, IAEA is not a neutral and objective technical body but rather, ‘a politicized instrument of the foreign policy goals of the U.S. and other Western states.’ This sense of the IAEA as a politicized instrument is reinforced by heavy-handed efforts to pressure the IAEA, to push it in directions that Washington regards as useful, and to press upon it intelligence that shapes the IAEA agenda—all actions that have been evident in the Iran crisis, for example. This perceived politicization is widely understood as objectionable by many NNWS and produces resistance to the reform agenda and sympathy for the targets of American and Western exertions in the context of the NPT regime—including a level of support for Iran that has exasperated Washington.”

I have an awful lot of mixed feelings about these latter statements.  Having sat in TACC meetings where NAM countries grudgingly pay pittances into the TC fund and then practically demand that the U.S. and other larger donors throw in for their activities, I find these sentiments a wee bit disingenuous, to the point of extortion.  Basically, because the U.S. and the P5 have not completely and fully carried out, in word and in deed, Article VI of the NPT, they have to pay the NNWS to toe the line on nonproliferation?  When did having nuclear power become an inalienable right?  Nuclear power is no more a “right” than is driving or having children.  Sorry folks.  But these technologies come with very serious responsibilities.  And if you can’t hack it, then don’t do it.

In essence, the NAM wants the U.S., which currently contributes the largest percentage of the IAEA’s regular budget, not including a significant portion of its “voluntary” contributions which go to TC activities that benefit the NAM countries, to pay up and shut up.  That, in my view, is simply not ever going to happen.  It is unrealistic and naive to think so.  Don’t want the U.S. imprimatur up in your Kool Aid?  Then don’t take our dollars.  Simple as that.

I am most certainly not saying that the P5 haven’t done quite a lot to undermine the NPT and that they are beyond reproach.  In fact, I am very pleased that Miller includes a section on the damage the U.S.-India 123 agreement did to the NPT and its regime.  But neither has the U.S. stood still in its efforts to reduce its nuclear weapons arsenal.  But domestic political reality greatly hinders the ability of the U.S. to do much at all right now.  It was a politically herculean feat of epic proportion to get New START done and ratified.  And its embarrassing that the CTBT has languished as long as it has.

In sum, Mr. Miller has written a timely and incisive piece on the NPT at a time when it has been greatly weakened by a number of assaults, not the last of which are the dalliances of Iran and North Korea.  One can only hope that the NPT can be repaired to the extent that it retains its credibility.

It is very easy to dismiss the utility of treaties as being unenforceable, partly because countries tend to cheat.  I am not of that opinion.  In fact, Mr. Miller alludes to the challenge of implementing international law in his very first paragraph, quoting legal scholar Michael Glennon:

“The international legal system cannot compel a state to subscribe to a rule unless it consents to do so. It cannot adjudicate the application of a rule to a state unless the state has accepted the jurisdiction of the tribunal to apply the rule. It cannot enforce a rule against a state unless the state has consented to the rule’s enforcement.”

However, as Miller acknowledges, “Precisely because of its perceived value as an impediment to the spread of nuclear weapons, there has long been worry about the wounds the NPT regime has suffered and the threats to its health and long-term durability.”  So, do we try and fix the NPT or do we let it fall into hopeless disrepair?  Miller offers some suggestions about how to press ahead, followed by the responses of several NAM reps:  Wael Al-Assad (League of Arab States), Jayantha Dhanapala (Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs), C. Raja Mohan (Indian Express), and Ta Minh Tuan (Office of the Government,Vietnam). Miller’s suggestions have a “no-brainer” quality to them.  Don’t impose, consult.  Emphasize interests, not rights.  Right.

The real question, for me, is whether or not a country, say India, can put its own interests aside to get Iran to stop taunting the world with its nuclear aspirations.  Until it does so, fixing the NPT is a red herring.

After pledging $1 million to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Fund in Seoul, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made his case for India’s admission into four key export control regimes: the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Wassenaar Arrangement, and the Australia Group.  To paraphrase Yogi Berra, its deja vu all over again.  Delhi’s pursuit of membership in these control regimes is not new: the government argues,as PM Singh did today in Seoul, that India has “already adhered to the guidelines of the NSG and MTCR.”  Singh also emphasized in his speech that India “has never been a source of proliferation of sensitive technologies and we are determined to further strengthen our export control systems to keep them on par with the highest international standards.”  Excellent.

But, here’s the rub:  India continues to be one of three countries NOT in the Nonproliferation Treaty, the other two being Pakistan and Israel.  According to Delhi’s longstanding views,  the existing nuclear nonproliferation regime perpetuates an unjust distinction between the five states that are permitted by the Treaty on the NPT to possess nuclear weapons, while requiring all other state parties to the treaty to remain non-nuclear weapon states. India has also been highly critical of the pace of the nuclear weapon states’ disarmament progress, arguing that they have not fulfilled their commitments under Article VI of the NPT.  So, what did Delhi do?  Built their own nukes.  Two wrongs apparently make it right.  But, I digress.

With regard to the U.S.-India Agreement for Cooperation, the Bush Administration negotiated an agreement which craftily edged around the fact that India was not a party to the NPT, creating an exception to the longstanding rule.  Unsurprisingly, nonproliferation advocates were unhappy, to say the least.  The Administration, they have said, gave away a rather useful stick in getting other countries to toe the line on joining the NPT.  It created a gaping inconsistency in how the U.S. pursues its nonproliferation agenda.  India, at the time, argued that it “aligned” itself with the NPT and the other control regimes.  PM Singh reiterated that position in Seoul today.  However, I’m going to call BS on that one.  Aligning oneself with a key treaty is different than actually joining the club.  Why?  Because a treaty is a commitment, a measure of comity with other countries that is far less mutable than alignment.  It represents the fact that a country has invested political capital in something that other countries have also committed to follow.  Its less easy to undo.

But, there’s more,  Writing in CQ Weekly (Courting A Reluctant Ally, March 26th), Jonathan Broder details the uneasy alliance between India and the U.S. at a time when the latter needs the former to be a key strategic ally in South Asia.  India has balked at going along with a whole raft of U.S. foreign policy priorities, including sanctions on Iran, a push for regime change in Libya and Syria following brutal crackdowns in both countries, and efforts to contain China.  This despite the fact that two-way trade and investment reached $100 billion last year alone.  Washington is also hoping that India will play a greater role in Afghanistan as it looks to withdraw.

But, India continues to bristle at the notion of a closer relationship with Washington for a host of reasons, both historical and otherwise.  So, what’s an Administration to do?  Do like they did with the 123 agreement and press for India’s admission into the four control regimes maybe?

I can’t help but think that an Administration desperate enough to shake some things loose with a recalcitrant New Delhi might be prepared to offer such a concession in exchange for a stronger strategic commitment.  If Delhi plays its card right, such a Faustian bargain could be made, despite the wonderful words and grand gestures made in Seoul with week.  Talk about cutting off one’s nose to spite one’s face.

P.S.  An interesting little coda on Seoul via Dan Froomkin at the HuffPo.

Reuters

Amid the looming specters of a North Korean missile launch, Fukushima clean-up and an ever-saber-rattling Iran, the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit is under way.  This year’s summit promises another raft of commitments, initiatives and communique-issuing.  The very thought of sherpas, sous-sherpas and other underlings toiling for nearly two years on a workable agenda and set of deliverables is enough to set one’s mind a-twitter.  The Summit, you see, is the culmination of a whole lot of work by a whole lot of folks you’ve never heard of.

Having been involved in these high-profile confabs, I am well-aware that they serve worthy, but limited purposes.  And of course, they do set some countries up for failure, the highest profile of which had been when Belarus reneged on its pledge to hand over HEU to Russia. The government suspended the deal in retaliation for the U.S. State Department’s imposition of sanctions targeting four Belarusian state-owned firms due to concerns over ongoing political repression.

This year’s get together is no exception: the meeting in Seoul will focus on nine key concepts, including illicit trafficking, nuclear forensics, and radiological source security.  I was quite pleased to see the latter two items on the agenda given that they are rather down-in-the-weeds.  Nuclear forensics, for example, is the way in which folks can trace the origins of nuclear materials – a particularly useful capability in  a “post-det” scenario.  It turns out that the U.S. capability to do post-detonation nuclear forensics was aging rapidly.  In the post-9/1 world, attention has turned to rebuilding that capability.  And of course, the probability of having a radiological dispersion device detonated in the U.S. or elsewhere is far more probable than having a nuclear weapon used given the widespread use of radiological sources.

While I applaud the Obama Administration and the fifty-three countries and four organizations for coming together to review the results of the past two years and to plan for the next set of accomplishments, I return to the seeming hypocrisy of the Administration’s stance on the Gold Standard.

In a speech today at South Korea’s Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, President Obama spoke loftily about the moral obligation of the U.S. to reduce its nuclear weapons arsenal.  He spoke of working with Russia to finally address reductions in tactical nuclear weapons and warheads in reserve.  And he even spoke of the need for nuclear power.  To wit:

“….And with rising oil prices and a warming climate, nuclear energy will only become more important.  That’s why, in the United States, we’ve restarted our nuclear industry as part of a comprehensive strategy to develop every energy source.  We supported the first new nuclear power plant in three decades.  We’re investing in innovative technologies so we can build the next generation of safe, clean nuclear power plants.  And we’re training the next generation of scientists and engineers who are going to unlock new technologies to carry us forward.

One of the great challenges they’ll face and that your generation will face is the fuel cycle itself in producing nuclear energy.  We all know the problem:  The very process that gives us nuclear energy can also put nations and terrorists within the reach of nuclear weapons.  We simply can’t go on accumulating huge amounts of the very material, like separated plutonium, that we’re trying to keep away from terrorists.

And that’s why we’re creating new fuel banks, to help countries realize the energy they seek without increasing the nuclear dangers that we fear.  That’s why I’ve called for a new framework for civil nuclear cooperation.  We need an international commitment to unlocking the fuel cycle of the future.  In the United States we’re investing in the research and development of new fuel cycles so that dangerous materials can’t be stolen or diverted.  And today I urge nations to join us in seeking a future where we harness the awesome power of the atom to build and not to destroy.

In this sense, we see how the efforts I’ve described today reinforce each other.  When we enhance nuclear security, we’re in a stronger position to harness safe, clean nuclear energy.  When we develop new, safer approaches to nuclear energy, we reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism and proliferation.  When nations, including my own, fulfill our responsibilities, it strengthens our ability to ensure that other nations fulfill their responsibilities.  And step by step, we come closer to the security and peace of a world without nuclear weapons.”

All good stuff.

But what about requiring potential civilian nuclear trading partners to forgo development of enrichment and reprocessing technologies?  You know, the technologies that allow countries to actually generate the very materials that the summitteers are seeking to lock down?  Sure, fuel banks are a very useful and important step in limiting the spread of these technologies.  But, the icing on the cake would be to require other countries not to develop the technology.  It would be so….consistent.

I have spoken at length about this seeming inconsistency in the Adminstration’s nonproliferation policy in previous posts.  But, in light on this high-profile meeting, I thought it bore repeating:  if the Administration is serious about making sure that terrorists and unsavory governments do not gain access to weapons of mass destruction or their components, then it should make providing access to civilian nuclear technologies contingent upon giving up the “right” to build and operate ENR facilities.  Doing anything less would just be hypocrisy.

P.S. For more on how the U.S. has sought to implement its 2010 commitments, check out NNSA’s handy dandy fact sheets.