Lawrence J. Korb

The following is a guest appearance by Lawrence J. Korb, a Senior Fellow at American Progress. Mr. Korb is also a senior advisor to the Center for Defense Information and an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. Mr. Korb was also assistant secretary of defense during the administration of President Reagan. The following originally appeared in “The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists”

As talks between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany (P5+1) move to Baghdad, leaders and analysts alike are wondering whether diplomacy will be any more successful now than during previous negotiations involving the Obama administration. To answer that question, it is important to understand why the previous talks failed and what is — or might be — different now.

The previous two rounds of talks — which came in 2009, after Obama took office and almost immediately extended a hand of friendship toward Iran, and again in 2011 — failed for eight major reasons. In many of these areas, circumstances seem at least slightly improved this time around.

1. Conflicting agendas. During earlier negotiations, the Iranians and the United States were both dealing with other issues that made it difficult to compromise. The Iranians faced the consequences of the Green Revolution and the struggle for power that followed President Ahmadinejad’s fraudulent re-election. Similarly, President Obama had a full political plate, trying to deal simultaneously with the collapse of the economy, landmark health care reform legislation, ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and tensions with Russia over missile defense plans. In fact, a senior State Department official told the National Iranian American Council’s Trita Parsi that the talks had to work right away or not at all. “Our Iran diplomacy was a gamble on a single roll of the dice,” he said.

You can read the article in its entirty here.

To hear Bacevich’s argument for a new American military role, check local listings or log on to the Bill Moyers‘ website. Watch the preview below:

Afghan civilians outside the US military base in Panjwai, Kandahar (AP)

In the late 1960’s, I spent my junior year of college studying in Europe. Before the start of the year, I along with all the other student participants did a 21 day whirl wind tour of the continent. It’s one of the highlights of my life but I had a unique experience as I traveled around. People kept coming up to me saying: “America must truly be a great country. They let you out of jail to come study in Europe.” The US had been racked by a series of race riots in many of its major cities and although at times it got pretty ugly, by no means were most black Americans languishing in US jails. European press coverage of the events apparently had given many a different impression. That brings me to the topic of today’s blog.

This week on PBS’ program Washington Week The Backstory, Gwen Ifill interviewed ABC News Senior Foreign Affairs Correspondent, Martha Raddatz. Raddatz, had just returned from touring Afghanistan with the ISAF Commander, General John R. Allen. Ifill asked her if she had experienced any uproar and upheaval in the after math of the alleged massacre of Afghans by a U.S. soldier and the Koran burnings. Raddatz said surprisingly she did not saying: “We think the whole world is erupting over there but it wasn’t”. She said she went up to several Afghan soldiers on her own and they weren’t ever aware of the Koran burnings.

The “so what” factor for me is the need to continue to look at as much information as is available in determining the effectiveness of our Afghan policy and the question should we just pull out now or stick with the previously announced 2014 deadline. If you’re read my blog before you know one of my pet peeves is analysis of an issue based just on media sound bites.

To get a better sense of what the people running the Afghan war think of what’s been happening recently in our operations, I checked two primary sources, Dr. James N. Miller, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and General Allen’s testimony before Congress this week. The second was the publication ISAF Monthly Data Trends through February 2012.

Speaking of trends Dr. Miller said:

“From 2010 to 2011, enemy-initiated attacks were down nine percent across Afghanistan. This trend has continued in 2012. For January and February of this year, enemy-initiated attacks are down 22 percent from the comparable period in 2011.”

The ISAF publication gave some more specific statistics on the stating:

“…enemy-initiated attacks over the last 3 months are 21 percent lower compared to the same period last year.
•Each month since May 2011 had fewer enemy-initiated attacks than the corresponding month one year ago.
•This is the longest sustained downward trend in enemy-initiated attacks recorded by ISAF.”

The definition of enemy-initiated attacks given in the publication is:

“Enemy-initiated attacks comprise enemy action (enemy-initiated direct fire, indirect fire, surface-to-air fire) and explosive hazard events, to include executed attacks only (improvised explosive device (IED) explosions / mine strikes).”

Other observations from the report are:

“IED and mine explosions for Feb 2012 are 32 percent lower when compared to Feb 2011.
• Insurgents continue to rely on IEDs as the principal means to execute their campaign.
• Over 60 percent of civilian casualties caused by insurgents result from indiscriminate IED explosions.
• More than half of IEDs and mines were found and cleared rather than exploded.”

“Insurgents caused over 90 percent of civilian casualties (deaths and wounded) in Feb 2012.
• The number of ISAF-caused civilian casualties decreased by 77 percent for the first two months in 2012 compared to 2011.
• ISAF continues to work with the ANSF to make every effort to protect the Afghan population and ensure that the number of civilian casualties is kept to an absolute minimum.”

Concerning the numbers and quality of the Afghan security forces, Dr. Miller said:

“Building an effective ASNF is crucial to success in Afghanistan, and we are making good progress. To get a sense of how far we have come in the last several years, in October 2008, there were only 140,000 Afghans in the ANSF. Today, there are approximately 330,000 – nearly two-and-a-half times as many. We are nearing our October 2012 goal of 352,000 Afghan soldiers and national police in uniform – and we expect to reach that goal well before October.

The quality of the ANSF is vitally important. And while there is much more work ahead, we are seeing some good signs. For example, Afghan National Army (ANA) attrition rates have improved from over three percent per month to less than two percent, although they are still short of the goal of no more than 1.4 percent per month. The Afghan National Police (ANP) has done better than its target attrition rate of no more than 1.4 percent for the last several months.
We are seeing the results of this improvement where it counts most – on the ground. Afghan forces continue to take charge and lead operations to secure their country. Almost 90 percent of Coalition operations in Afghanistan are now carried out in partnership with the ANSF. And the ANSF is the lead for more than 40 percent of operations. These figures will continue to grow.”

During his testimony, General Allen began by saying:

“I can tell you unequivocally three things. First, we remain on-track to ensure that Afghanistan will no longer be a safe haven for Al Qaida and will not longer be terrorized by the Taliban. Second, as a coalition, the largest in recent history, we are well aware and well along on the progress to meet our 2010 Lisbon commitments to transition security lead to the Afghan national security forces by December, 2014. And third, our troops know the difference that they’re making every day. They know it and the enemy feels it every day.”

Concerning the Taliban, the General said:

“We have severely degraded the insurgency. As one Afghan commander told me in the south, in the latter part of 2011, quote, “This time around the Afghan Taliban were the away team,” unquote.
On top of that success, as a result of our recent winter operations, we have seriously degraded the Taliban’s ability to mount a major spring offensive of their own. This spring they will come back to find many of their caches empty, their former strongholds untenable, and a good many of their foot soldiers absent or unwilling to join the fight.”

Concerning the importance and caliber of the Afghan forces General Allen stated:

“Throughout history, insurgencies have seldom been defeated by foreign forces. Indeed, they have been ultimately beaten by indigenous forces.
In the long run our goals can only be achieved and then secured by Afghan forces. Transition then is the linchpin of our strategy, not merely the way out…
The expansion and the professionalization of the Afghan security forces allows us to recover the remaining 23,000 U.S. surge forces this fall, enables us to continue to pressure the Taliban to reconcile, and makes possible security transition to the Afghans in accordance with our Lisbon commitments and on time…
the Afghan forces are better than we thought they were, and they’re better than they thought they were when tried in combat.
So as we move them to the fore, they’re gaining more and more confidence and they’re gaining more and more capability. In the past five months 89 percent of the total conventional operations were partnered with both coalition and Afghan forces and 42 percent were Afghan led.
Over the next two years coalition forces will remain combat ready, but increasingly focused on security force assistance missions as we continue to move the Afghans into the lead.
In this process, Afghan leadership is simply key, and I can tell you that the Afghans want to lead and they want the responsibility that comes with it. In fact, for the very first time, our joint coalition-Afghan operational campaign plan for January 2012 through July 2013 was conceived, developed and planned with Afghans in the lead. They are truly emerging as the real defeat mechanism of this insurgency and increasingly as an emblem of national unity. And this is essential for the long-term security of Afghanistan.”

I’ll conclude with General Allens overall assessment of the Afghanistan operations:

“But none of us harbor illusions. We know that we face long-term challenges as well. We know that Al Qaida and other extremist networks, the very same networks that kill Afghan and coalition troops every day, still operate with impunity across the boarder in Pakistan.
We know that the Taliban remain a resilient and determined enemy and that many of them will try to regain their lost ground this spring through assassination, intimidation, high profile attacks and the emplacement of IEDs.
We know that Iran continues to support the insurgency and fuels often the flame of violence.
We know that corruption still robs Afghan citizens of their faith in their government and that poor governance itself often advances insurgent messages.
This campaign has been long. It has been difficult. And it has been costly. There have been setbacks, to be sure, and we’re experiencing them now. And there will be setbacks ahead.
I wish I could tell you that this war was simple and that progress could easily be measured, but that’s not the way of counterinsurgencies. They are fraught with both successes and setbacks which can exist in the same space and in the same time, but each must be seen in the larger context of the overall campaign.
And I believe the campaign is on track.”

As always my views are my own. I’m off to Alabama to help my Mother celebrate her 85th birthday.

Click to read the article and watch the video, and be sure to check back on Foreign Policy Blogs for more expert commentary from Gail Harris’ blog: GailForce.

Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai meets with Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta (REUTERS/Mohammad Ismail)

As promised, here are more of my thoughts on current happenings in Afghanistan and Iran. Yesterday I blogged about Afghanistan so this blog will focus on Iran. This past Sunday evening I was pleasantly surprised to see Meir Dagan, the former head of the Israeli Mossad their equivalent to the CIA, on CBS’ 60 Minutes. He spoke out against attacking Iran saying:

“An attack on Iran before you are exploring all other approaches is not the right way how to do it.”

Considering his past job this was quite remarkable. He was interviewed by Lesley Stahl who reminded the viewer:
“For nearly a decade buying more time was his job. The Iranians say Dagan dispatched assassins, faulty equipment and computer viruses to sabotage their nuclear program. All the while, he was poring over the most secret dossiers about the Iranian regime, gaining insights and a surprising appreciation.”

Dagan considers Iran a rational actor by their standards and seemed to feel the best course of action was supporting Iranian students and minorities. He also indicated the problem of destruction of Iran’s nuclear capability is more complex than most think. It’s been widely reported that Iran has 4 main nuclear related facilities but he says there are actually dozens. He also said if Iran were bombed:

“We are going to ignite, at least from my point of view, a regional war. And wars, you know how they start. You never know how you are ending it.”

The US Intelligence community is of the mind that Iran has the capability to build a nuclear weapon but doesn’t believe they have. Testifying before Congress on January 31, 2012, James Clapper the Director of National Intelligence stated:

“We assess Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons, in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so.
We do not know, however, if Iran will eventually decide to build nuclear weapons… Iran’s technical advancement, particularly in uranium enrichment, strengthens our assessment that Iran has the scientific, technical, and industrial capacity to eventually produce nuclear weapons, making the central issue its political will to do so. These advancements contribute to our judgment that Iran is technically capable of producing enough highly enriched uranium for a weapon, if it so chooses.

We judge Iran would likely choose missile delivery as its preferred method of delivering a nuclear weapon. Iran already has the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the Middle East, and it is expanding the scale, reach, and sophistication of its ballistic missile forces, many of which are inherently capable of carrying a nuclear payload.”

As I read the media reports on Iran in the last couple of weeks I felt like I was in the Twilight Zone and had been magically transported back to 2003. The articles seem very similar with talk of non cooperation with UN inspectors and accusations the Iranians are delaying inspections so they can hide what they are doing.

Here’s the bottom line for me, good intelligence can do a lot for you but very rarely are you going to have a 100% idea of what is going on in a particular situation. I’ve blogged before about how complex the intelligence analysis process. The latest statistic I have is every 5 minutes the US intelligence community collects enough data to fill the Library of
Congress. This is a huge problem. In the event the US and/or Israel did decide to bomb suspected nuclear facilities they may not be able to prove the Iranians actually had a weapon and thus risk even more problems.

I was interviewed many times before the 2003 Iraqi conflict. I was often asked would the Iraqis use WMD against UN troops. I said it depended on whether they wanted to win the battle or win the war. I said if I were the Iraqis I would not use them and any capability I had I would either destroy or send to some other nation to hide it for me. That way the US and its allies would look like idiots.

The Iraqis had set a precedent for moving military equipment out of their country. During the first Gulf War when it became apparent they could no longer maintain air superiority, they flew most of their remaining aircraft to Iran.

I’ve written before on the fact that the President and his staff have more information on national security related intelligence than the public is or in my opinion should be aware of. I think based on what I know diplomatic efforts and sanctions are the best course…for now. For more on this topic I recommend the blog Israel vs Iran Fight Breakdown by FPA blogger Scott Firsing.

As always my views are my own.

Protesters outside an American base in Kandahar Province. Source: Ahmad Nadeem/Reuters

I’ve not had time to blog in the last couple of weeks because of travel but thought I’d offer my thoughts on the crises with Afghanistan and Iraq. Starting first with Afghanistan, like many I was horrified by the massacre of 16 Afghans, to include 9 children, allegedly by an Army Sergeant. This is a multi layered issue. When I learned that the suspected culprit was on his forth deployment I wondered if he had just snapped under the strain?

That is certainly no excuse for the situation but the stress of multiple combat deployments is unimaginable to those who have not experienced it. I have friends married to Vietnam veterans and they say even after all of this time they never touch their husbands to wake them up. One lady said she forgot one time, shook her husband to wake him and he grabbed her by the neck and started choking her. Thankfully he calmed down and stopped before he killed her but you get my point.

I know the military now has programs in place to treat the stress of combat. Was the alleged individual someone who slipped through the cracks? How many times should individuals be deployed into combat zones? These are questions I don’t have an answer to but I know for a fact from interviews I’ve done over the last couple of years one the military is working hard to solve.

What was the mission of US soldiers in the village? The best article I’ve seen was one written by Kimberly Dozier of the Associated Press yesterday. The soldier was part of an outreach program called Village Stability Operations (VSO). According to the article:

“Established in early 2010, the VSO program sends small units of Green Berets or Navy SEALs to remote villages to help provide security, as well as to learn the local culture and tribal structure. Once security is established, special operators then train local men to act as a sort of government-sanctioned, armed neighborhood watch, called the Afghan Local Police force. The program is designed to reach villages far from urban areas, and outside the security zone that NATO and Afghan troops provide around heavily populated areas.”

Dozier go on to write in the article:

“These areas are the Taliban’s traditional ground for recruiting fighters and resupplying by taxing local residents, or simply confiscating their livestock.
The program has been deemed so successful at deterring the Taliban that the list of waiting villages keeps growing, far outpacing the number of special operations forces available to help locals keep the peace. So far, there are 58 VSO sites complete, with a total of 100 planned, and some 12,400 trained Afghan Local Police, and nearly 18,000 more waiting to be trained, according to figures provided by NATO.
That growing demand is the reason a conventional Army staff sergeant ended up assigned to the elite unit. It was part of a pilot program U.S. commanders came up with more than a year ago — to stretch their special operations forces to more sites by mixing in roughly two battalions of conventional troops with the special operations teams.”

There have been many articles in the media saying this incident combined with the furor over the Koran burning have damaged our relations with the Afghans beyond repair. Only time will tell if this assessment is correct. There have been some things that in my opinion have been underreported in the media. For instance in the midst of the riots over the Koran burning I heard one news report state that a number of Afghan security force personnel had been killed while protecting ISAF (NATO) installations.

One might say there were reportedly over 40 people killed and many others wounded what is the so what factor? To me it was an indicator that the Afghan security forces trained by NATO were doing their job. There were interviews with several who indicated disgust and dismay over the perceived disrespect to their religion but there were no reports that I saw that indicated that in the midst of the rioting that some or all of the security forces switched sides. Since there have been many questions about the capability and loyalty of these forces, this is pretty significant to me.
Since I couldn’t find anything in the media about the Afghan security forces and their actions during the Koran burning, I reached out to the Institute for the Study of War. Here’s their mission statement from their web site:

“The Institute for the Study of War advances an informed understanding of military affairs through reliable research, trusted analysis, and innovative education. We are committed to improving the nation’s ability to execute military operations and respond to emerging threats in order to achieve U.S. strategic objectives. ISW is a non-partisan, non-profit, public policy research organization.”
They’ve been doing some great research on the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Here’s their response to me from their senior research analyst Paraag Shukla:

“The size and response by Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) varied not only from province to province, but also at each protest. The ANSF, especially the Afghan National Police (ANP), were out in force at most demonstrations. As you might imagine, the situation when protests were violent was very confused. Reporting we’ve seen indicates that Afghan forces were present both in uniform and plainclothes. If protests were peaceful, they served just as a loose “wall” between the demonstrators and any ISAF/Afghan government installations. However, the police response in areas where the crowds were throwing stones, Molotov cocktails or brandishing weapons was very different. There are multiple reports of police firing rounds into the air to disperse crowds, but unfortunately there were instances of raging mobs being fired upon. As far as we’ve seen, there were a couple of instances of Afghan policemen being killed in the protests. There are a greater number of reports mentioning police injured/wounded.”

There are multiple reports in the press today that because of this latest incident the US and its NATO allies might be considering speeding up the departure of the their troops. I probably sound like a broken record but I think this decision should be based on recommendations by the military commanders on the ground. One could say Bin Laden is dead, al Qaeda is severely damaged and the Taliban momentum has been stopped.

One concern I have about the Taliban is from all reports they don’t think they’ve been beaten. One of the basic principles of warfare is the enemy has got to believe they’ve lost or they’ll keep coming at you. The Taliban expects they will be able to regain momentum after the NATO troops leave. Unless the Afghan government and NATO can succeed in their negotiations with the Taliban I don’t have a warm and fuzzy about the situation. If we don’t end it right we risk having to go back in at some future date.

I think the comments of former Secretary of State Colin Powell on the decision to go to war in Iraq and reported in the October 2007 issue of Atlantic magazine have a relevance here:

“I tried to avoid this war. I went to the president in August of 2002, after coming back from a trip and seeing all the planning that was under way, and we had a long meeting upstairs in the residence … For the better part of two and a half [hours], I took him through not only the military planning that was being done in the Pentagon but … through the consequences of going into an Arab country and becoming the occupiers.
It is said that I used the “Pottery Barn rule.” I never did it; [Thomas] Friedman did it … But what I did say … [is that] once you break it, you are going to own it, and we’re going to be responsible for 26 million people standing there looking at us. And it’s going to suck up a good 40 to 50 percent of the Army for years. And it’s going to take all the oxygen out of the political environment…”

I believe we owe it to the people of Afghanistan to leave them as prepared as possible to prevent them from being taken over again by the Taliban. We’ve been over there 10 years but they have experienced 30 years of war. A negotiated settlement is of course one solution, I worry about what happens to the fragile gains made by women among other things…but that’s another blog. The Taliban have said they will revenge the killings and will no doubt continue to use the recent incidents to their advantage.

Think I’ll end here. I’ll get to my thoughts on Iran tomorrow. As always, my views are my own.

A family evacuates after shelling in Idlib, north Syria (AP Photo/Rodrigo Abd)

With pressure rising to undertake some sort of action to assist the besieged rebels in Libya, the Obama administration has begun drawing up options. It appears that no final decision has been made as of yet. So far, the options do not include the use of military force, the establishment of a no-fly zone, or direct engagement with the armed rebels on the ground, the so-called Free Syrian Army (FSA). Officials remain concerned about the destabilizing effect on the region of a prolonged civil war in Syria, and of the possibility of becoming embroiled in another Iraq. Rather, the administration is considering offering the means by which the rebels might organize themselves. For example, it would like to find ways to insert humanitarian aid and communications equipment into Syria while keeping open the possibility of negotiating with the government for a peaceful transition. If nothing else, the options represent a clear choice of sides within the civil conflict, and the possibility of further aid to the rebels might make a negotiated settlement more attractive to Damascus. Beyond that, the administration has made a decision not to stand in the way of other countries’ efforts to arm the rebels, although it will neither state that position publicly nor request anyone to provide arms.

In the meantime, other Arab states have emerged as potential arms providers. On February 27, Qatar, which led the move to suspend Syria’s membership in the Arab League, voiced its support for arming the Syrian rebels. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait endorsed the idea some days later. (Notably, these are all countries that are interested in curtailing the influence of Iran in the region and that tend to see Syria as an Iranian outpost.) On February 29, Libya offered the rebels $100 million, which at least some observers believe was financed by Qatar (which also helped arm and train the Libyan rebels last year). Other Arab states and the head of the Arab League, however, oppose the move. Russia and Iran continue to provide equipment and supplies to the Syrian armed forces, including antiaircraft weapons, and the Russians have complained that training camps for Syrian rebels already exist in Libya.

On March 1, the 310-member Syrian National Council (SNC)—the self-styled rebel coordinating group—formed a defense committee authorized to receive donations of arms. The SNC apparently sees control of the arms flow as a way to gain influence over the rebels on the ground, and it is not at all clear that the rebels will welcome their intermediation. Representatives of the FSA have already refused to accept the SNC’s defense committee as part of its chain of command. The fractious SNC has no organizational link to the armed FSA units, nor for that matter are the various rebel units really linked to each other. Even less is known about potential rivals of the SNC, such as the Syrian National Coordination Committee, local coordinating councils, and revolutionary councils that operate in the various cities of Syria.

The Obama administration views the lack of rebel unity as a significant obstacle to progress. It would like to see the SNC’s defense committee bolstered to the point at which it could function as a credible point of contact for the rebel movement and as a possible conduit for future military aid, should it come to that.

The United States remains concerned that the flow of arms could fuel further civil war, trigger a wider, regional war, or draw in extremist elements. Some U.S. officials have also questioned the ability of the Arab states to provide sufficient equipment to negate the Syrian army’s armored forces and artillery. Washington has focused on organizing multilateral economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and quiet efforts to encourage Assad supporters to break with the regime.

Some members of Congress, however, have called for further action immediately. Senators Joseph Lieberman (I-CT), John McCain (R-AZ), and Lindsey Graham (R-SC) have advocated direct military intervention—including the provision of arms, tactical intelligence, and direct air strikes. They believe an international coalition can be built to support such action.

General Dempsey and Mr. Panetta spoke two days after Senator John McCain, Republican of Arizona, who lost to Mr. Obama in 2008, became the first senator to call for American airstrikes on Syria as “the only realistic way” to stop what he called a slaughter there. Both General Dempsey and Mr. Panetta faced sharp questions during their testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee from Mr. McCain, who is the panel’s ranking Republican.

Senator McCain, who proposed air strikes against Syria’s military targets, cited the example of former President Clinton, who used military force to answer the crisis in the Balkans during the mid 1990s. The problem is that using the model of a previous intervention ignores the realities of the situation on the ground, the international climate surrounding the situation, and assumes that the outcome of the intervention will be similar to the previous scenario. The New Republic’s Lawrence Kaplan best addressed this fallacy prior to last year’s NATO intervention in Libya.

Source: Euronews

As for the sober reality:  the Syrian opposition is barely organized, and the conflict on the ground is much more complex than the David vs. Goliath fight being broadly portrayed. The conflict in Syria goes beyond the authoritarianism of the Assad regime, and also involves the complicated interactions between race, religion and economic circumstance. No amount of military intervention can address long term societal problems instantaneously.  If anything, the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan should have taught policymakers that any intervention by foreign forces is rarely an easy, clean cut affair. Instead, good intentions can become painful, drawn out exercises in sorting out fights and maintaining a tenuous peace. Even the “relatively successful” intervention in Bosnia was fraught with difficulties, and had many analysts questioning the future value of the activity.

While many analysts wish it was more convenient, the situation in Syria nowhere resembles that of Libya, Bosnia, Rwanda, etc, and replicating the same strategy would be foolish. An air strike as proposed by Senator McCain may halt the progress of the Syrian army, but the strategy also runs the high risk of civilian casualties, as has been seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. For now, the Obama administration’s use of diplomatic pressure and indirect support for the Syrian opposition will be the best way to ensure that the right thing is done, while waiting for the nature of the conflict to become clearer.

(AP Photo/Carolyn Kaster)

A number of years ago while still in the military I was stationed in a highly volatile part of the world. The crisis was pretty intense and it was the first job I held where my boss was routinely on the evening news on both U.S. and world television stations. As has happened numerous times in history, the U.S. was attempting to solve the problem by bringing a considerable military presence to that part of the world. My job was the Command Briefer, in civilian terms think of network news anchor. I hadn’t particularly wanted the job; primarily because of a medical condition I was dealing with, I was over the accepted weight standards of the Navy. Because of that, I suggested to my superiors they might be better served by someone who was skinny. My Boss said: “Oh heck Gail, we need your intellectual skills and your operational background for this job. Wear your white uniform. You don’t look too fat in that one”. How could I refuse such a charming request?

I made one demand; I would only do it if I could write my own briefings (news reports). At the time most Command Briefers only read things that had been written by the organization’s intelligence analysts, who were considered the commands experts on various topics. In the arrogance of youth, I told them if they wanted me because of my intellectual skills then I was smart enough to write my own briefs. I wasn’t a total jerk and worked closely with the other intelligence analysts on the presentations.

Things went pretty well until the day my Boss told me to stick my neck out and make some predictions on the how the conflict was going. Several of us younger intelligence analysts were convinced looking at the still rising statistics of violent activities that things were going badly and the U.S. military policy and strategy was not working. We sat around talking trash about our bosses and wondered what were they thinking? The head of that organization was a crusty 4 star Army General. I decided to start out my next presentation by saying something to the effect: “As the increasing level of violence shows, our policy is not working.” The 4 star interrupted me and gave me a lecture on how sometimes it takes a while for a strategy to turn things around. He concluded by telling me I had my head up a certain portion of my anatomy. Needless to say that was the last time I was the Command Briefer for that organization.

The interesting thing about the whole situation was HE WAS RIGHT. Our military strategy did work…eventually. The crisis ended and now people from all over the world, to include the folks from the U.S., are buying luxury homes in that region. That brings me to the topic of this blog. A very courageous young army officer published an article in Armed Forces Journal titled Truth, lies and Afghanistan. Basically as I understood the article he stated the situation in Afghanistan was going “from bad to abysmal” and the senior leaders were not being honest in their public statements about the situation.

I thought long and hard about commenting on this article; primarily because I didn’t want to give anyone the impression that I thought I knew more than the author of the article about the situation on the ground in Afghanistan. I have never served in that country and am limited to knowledge I’ve gained from interviewing many of the senior officers and NCO’s serving in Afghanistan for this blog as well as conducting extensive additional research. What I can say is I have never felt that the military leaders were not being truthful during any of the presentations I participated in. In fact they were pretty consistent saying the major problems in Afghanistan interfering with success were corruption, literacy, and safe havens for insurgents in Pakistan. They never made statements guaranteeing the trained Afghan forces would be up to the task but they talked about what training they were doing to give them that capability. When discussing how the war with the Taliban was going the answers were also pretty consistent. Essentially they said in the past year with the help of the surge, NATO was able to halt the Taliban’s momentum but the change was fragile and reversible.

My experience is that senior military officers and NCOs are the glass is half full people. They focus on the solution and not the problem. This is not to say they have their heads in the sand; simply to state they focus on what can be done to fix a problem. Hence when talking about the efforts in training the Afghan forces, they give out a lot of statistics about numbers of people trained, results of literacy training as well as efforts made to get a handle on the corruption.

I’ve participated in two wars and numerous crises and the attitude of most military leaders I’ve worked for has been pretty simple. Here’s the problem, here’s the solution now “let’s go kick some butts”. How would it have been if I worked for someone who said: “Oh this is a problem we can’t fix. This is awful, let’s go home”. It’s been my experience that there is always a solution. The key is having the persistence to find it. This also means going against accepted military procedures and practices if necessary. I’m talking about innovative new ways of doing things, not breaking international laws. I was able to validate this view many times during my career when I was involved in many situations over the years most people felt at the time could not be fixed (read my book A Woman’s War for more specifics).

Early on in my career, if I thought something was messed up or not working, I’d barge into my boss’s office and as only someone born and raised in New Jersey could do put one hand on my hip, wave the other in the air and state something like: “This is screwed up!” My attitude was I was close to the problem and being leaders; they were too far up the chain of command to understand what was really needed in a particular situation. I would get really frustrated when my bosses not only wouldn’t listen to me but would also throw me out of their office.

I finally got smart and started going into their offices not just with a problem but also with a proposed solution, one in which I thoroughly researched and had already coordinated with whichever other organizations and commands that needed to be involved to make it work. In doing the coordination I was always careful to let the other organizations know I was not speaking officially for the command but was simply working on proposed contingency plans I wanted to present to the higher ups and wanted their opinion on how to make it better. I also told them I needed to know if the plan was accepted and they were officially asked to participate what would their issues be. Then we would work to come up with a solution they could live with if asked to help out.

I believe it’s also important not to continue with a strategy that’s not working. This is a tough one and something military planners grope with all the time. How do you know a policy is working? What is the desired end state? Are there metrics that could be used to help determine that? At what point do you institute a course change? What if a course change is needed but the higher ups don’t agree with you? Do we have the needed assets if that becomes necessary? I think this is why the Obama administration put the emphasis on “reversibility” in their recently announced defense strategy. In this new media centric world, if you make a course change, you run the risk of being accused of having failed. Then the argument goes the old policy has failed, why should we trust you to try something new? Maybe that will fail too. I believe the only way to have a successful military strategy is to be able to change directions as needed. I also don’t believe the media should be given the details; primarily, because the enemy will read the news reports and then make changes to their strategy as well.

While researching this blog I went and looked at what some of the senior leaders were saying about Afghanistan. Testifying before the Senate Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Worldwide Threats to U.S. National Security on February 16, 2012, the Director on National Intelligence James Clapper stated the following:

“During the past year, the Taliban lost some ground but that was mainly in places where the International Security Assistance Forces, of ISAF, were concentrated and Taliban senior leaders continued to enjoy safe haven in Pakistan.

ISAF’s efforts to partner with Afghan national security forces are encouraging but corruption and governance challenges continue to threaten the Afghan forces operational effectiveness. Most provinces have established basic governance structures, but they still don’t provide essential services.

The International Security Assistance Forces and the support of Afghanistan’s neighbors notably and particularly Pakistan will remain essential to sustain the gains that have been achieved. And although there’s broad international political support for the Afghan government, there are doubts in many capitals, particularly in Europe about how to fund the Afghanistan initiatives after 2014.”

Testifying before the same group, Lieutenant General Ronald L. Burgess, Jr, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency stated:

“I would like to begin with current military operations in Afghanistan where we assess that endemic corruption and persistent qualitative deficiencies in the Army and police forces undermined efforts to extend effective governance and security. The Afghan army remains reliant on ISAF for key combat support, such as logistics, intelligence and transport.

While Afghan Army performance improved in some operations when partnered with ISAF units, additional gains will require sustained mentoring and support. Despite successful coalition targeting, the Taliban remains resilient and able to replace leadership losses while also competing to provide governance at the local level. From it’s Pakistani safe havens, the Taliban leadership remains confident of eventual victory.”

According to a January 11, 2012 article in the LA Times the latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Afghanistan also paints a dire picture of the situation. In the article, written by Ken Dilanian and David S. Cloud, they state the NIE:

“Appeared at odds with recent optimistic statements by Pentagon officials and have deepened divisions between U.S. intelligence agencies and American military commanders about progress in the decade-old war… it challenges the Pentagon’s claim to have achieved lasting security gains in Taliban strongholds in southern Afghanistan, according to U.S. officials who have read or been briefed on its contents… Although the review gives the U.S. military and its allies credit for driving the Taliban out of some areas last year, it says the gains were not enough to bolster the weak central government in Kabul, haven’t diminished the Taliban’s will to keep fighting, and haven’t instilled confidence among Afghans in much of the country.”

I have never seen any statements from Pentagon types saying the security gains achieved lasting security. I also can’t claim to have heard every Pentagon statement on Afghanistan so it’s possible I missed something. When asked during the Senate testimony about the NIE and its differences with the estimates of military leaders, Director Clapper stated:

“Classically, intelligence is supposedly in the portion of the glass that’s half empty and operational commanders and policy-makers for that matter are often in the portion of the glass that’s half full.
Probably the truth is somewhere in the — at the water line. So I don’t find it a bad thing, in fact I think it’s healthy that there is a contrast between what the operational commanders believe and what the intelligence community assesses.”

Time will tell how good the Afghan forces are. The world is getting the first really good luck as we watch them deal with the crisis caused by the inadvertent burning of Korans by U.S. forces. I continue to be concerned about a hard deadline for the departure of NATO troops but… think I’ll end here. As always my views are my own.

Soldiers wave as a convoy crosses into Kuwait . (Getty Images/Mario Tama)

I just finished previewing an upcoming PBS program on the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. The segment is part of the Great Decisions in Foreign Policy television series produced by the Foreign Policy Association and hosted by former CNN World Affairs Correspondent Ralph Begleiter. This is the 42nd season it has been aired on PBS stations nationwide. As they say on their web site, Great Decisions is also “America’s largest discussion program on world affairs. The name is shared by a national civic-education program and publication of the Foreign Policy Association. Published annually, the Great Decisions briefing book highlights eight of the most thought-provoking foreign policy challenges facing Americans today. Great Decisions provides background information, current data and policy options for each issue and serves as the focal text for discussion groups.”

Joining Begleiter in studio were Dr. Nora Bensahel, Deputy Director of Studies and Senior Fellow, Center for a New American Security and Michael Knights, Lafer Fellow, Washington Institute for Near East Policy. A host of other experts such as Stephen Hadley, Former National Security Advisor, General Michael Hayden, Former Director, Central Intelligence Agency and Former Director, National Security Agency, were also featured on the episode.

I think the producers did an outstanding of job breaking down a very complex constantly evolving topic into segments that could be easily understood even if the viewer had little familiarity with the topic. I found the episode informative, insightful and thought provoking. The only thing I thought was missing was having a couple of senior military or civilian experts who are currently involved in U.S. military operations in the region participate. They could have provided insights from the perspective of people who are currently or who have recently worked hand in hand with the Iraqis and Afghans on implementing U.S. policy in the region.
I’m not implying that the other participants were not qualified to speak on the topic, far from it. They all had strong backgrounds in national security. In fact three had an extensive military background: Retired Air Force General Michael Hayden (one of the greatest intelligence officers in history), Dr. John Nagl, and Celeste Ward Gventer. Dr. John Nagl is a retired Army officer with extensive experience in the Middle East and Celeste Ward Gventer, before joining the Rand Corporation, was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations Capabilities from 2007 – 2009.

My point is since the theme of the program was, do Iraq and Afghanistan still pose a threat and what is the return on the investment made by the U.S. and its allies; it would have been useful to see what people who are currently working the issues had to say. I’ve had the privilege of participating in interviews with many senior military and civilian officials in both Iraq and Afghanistan and have found the experience extremely valuable in understanding what’s going on in the region from an insider’s perspective.

That said Ralph Begleiter did an excellent job laying the groundwork for the discussion by making effective use of questions to keep the discussions on the main topic. The format for the show ensured there was none of the theatrics and lack of professional decorum that now runs rampant in similar programs in the mainstream media. The in studio guests spoke in turn and did not interrupt or put down the other person. After the in studio guests spoke, Begleiter showed the audience responses to the same questions given earlier by various national security experts.

I thought the questions Begleiter posed were spot on. They included things like:

• Is now the right time to withdraw from Afghanistan and Iraq?
• Will anyone ever be able to claim that the Iraq war has been won?
• What is the capability of Iraq’s military and security forces?
• Can they step up to the plate?
• What are the chances the Taliban will remain in pace after the U.S. withdraws?
• Can the war in Afghanistan ever be considered as won?
• How can we integrate U.S. troops back into society?

If you want to know the answers the participants gave, you’ll have to watch the program or you can go the Foreign Policy Association web site (www.fpa.org) and order the Great Decisions DVD and a copy of a briefing book with extensive background material on both Iraq and Afghanistan. Think I’ll end here.

“The art of war is of vital importance to the State. It is a matter of life and death,
a road to safety or to ruin. Therefore, it is a subject that must be thoroughly
studied.”

I start out with a quote from the old guy because the Defense Department folks are tasked with the difficult problem of designing a military that protects against 21st Century threats in an era of fiscal hardship. The challenges they face are not just financial but also in identifying what are the threats? Some are fairly obvious like North Korea and Iran and its “possible” nuclear weapon development program. I put possible in parenthesis because there are “declared” nuclear powers and those nations we suspect may have or are in the process of trying to develop nuclear weapons.

There are many other potential problems. Just because Bin Laden is gone does not mean terrorism will go away. Terrorism was a problem before Al Qaeda and it will remain one after that group is wiped out. The issue will always be which terrorists groups only have the capability of “trash talk” and which groups or lone individuals are real threats. Cyber also presents an ongoing threat which so far has not resulted in a Cyber Pearl Harbor because of the hard work of countless people working to counter the situation but much still remains to be done.

I initially wanted to name my book A Woman’s War, War On Any Given Day, because as I worked in military intelligence I knew if the intelligence community didn’t get it right war could erupt on any day. There are any numbers of potential flash points but it’s difficult to predict if, when and/or which ones will erupt. Speaking before a conference in San Diego last week, Marine Corps Lt. Gen George Flynn, Director, J-7, Joint Staff, speaking on potential threats said, “We guess wrong 100% of the time.” This is why I consider the concept of “reversibility”, one of the points mentioned in the Obama administrations new defense policy, probably the most important part of the strategy. Basically as I understand it if we have “guessed” wrong we can reverse our defense policy and strategies as needed.

George Little and Captain John Kirby. (Department of Defense)

This brings me to the main topic of today’s blog, the defense budget. Last week I participated in a Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable With Dr. George Little, Pentagon Press Secretary, and Captain John Kirby, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Media Operations, on the subject: “Programmatic Preview of
the FY 2013 Defense Budget”.

Dr. Little opened the proceedings by stating the budget decisions “flowed from the strategic guidance that the department issued earlier this month…And that was the mechanism that secretary and other senior department officials insisted on, and that’s how we view these budget decisions…the Congress of the United States, through the Budget Control Act last summer, required that the department find nearly $500 billion in savings over the next 10 years. So we have undertaken a multi-month effort to define a strategy based way ahead for framing the budget decisions that we’re starting to see come out. We’ve kept in mind the men and women of the U.S. military. We want to make sure that we don’t break faith with them.”

Here is the guidance they were working on as presented in the January 2012 Department of Defense publication Defense Budget Priorities and Choices:

“I. Rebalance force structure and investments toward the Asia–‐Pacific and Middle East
regions while sustaining key alliances and partnerships in other regions
II. Plan and size forces to be able to defeat a major adversary in one theater while
denying aggression elsewhere or imposing unacceptable costs
III. Protect key investments in the technologically advanced capabilities most needed for
the future, including countering anti–‐access threats
IV. No longer size active forces to conduct large and protracted stability operations while retaining the expertise of a decade of war
V. To the extent possible, structure major adjustments in a way that best allows for
their reversal or for regeneration of capabilities in the future if circumstances
change “

Last Thursday, the day before the bloggers roundtable, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Army General Martin E. Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff announced the major changes. Panetta said there was a need to make $487 billion in cuts over the next 10 years. The budget request for 2013 is $525 billion with an additional $88 million for overseas contingency operations. Last year’s budget request was $531 billion plus $115 billion for overseas contingency operations.
Some of the major changes are a reduction in the size of the Army from 570,000 in 2010 to 490,000 by 2017. The Marines will go from 202,000 in 2010 to 182,000 by 2017. The Air Force will loose some of its transport aircraft, while the Navy gets to keep all 11 of its aircraft carriers and all of its amphibious ships but will loose some of its older cruisers.

Captain Kirby provided some more information on what the proposed cuts mean to the Navy:

“…there are some platforms in the fleet that are going to be curtailed in the near term, in
terms of the buys. And some of them, the purchases are going to be pushed a little bit beyond the future years’ defense plan — in other words, beyond the next five years.
But I think it’s also important to remember that we’re still at the end of the FYDP going to have a fleet that is roughly the same size as it is as you and I speak today — over 280 ships — so certainly, still the biggest, most capable navy in the world. And … while we may not have the same number of decks in some categories of some classes of ships that we do right now, we’re very comfortable that the — that what we will have will be commensurate with our Fleet Marine Force requirements. I mean, as the Marine Corps gets smaller, to the tune of about 20,000 Marines, there’s — we want to — they want to get back to expeditionary amphibious warfare, as does the Navy. But as the Marine Corps
gets smaller, so, too, will, probably, get smaller the requirement for sealift for them and for support. So we understand there’s a risk there, but we’re very comfortable that we’re able to mitigate that risk.”

I asked was there any provision in the budget to finance Black Swan (unpredicted bad events) in the budget. Dr. Little responded:

“…that’s something that we grapple with all the time in the national security community. I would not be credible if I said to all of you today that we could perfectly crystal ball the future. That is simply impossible. That being said, we think we have an understanding of the near-term strategic horizon and where the threats are likely to come from. And we’re adapting to be able to meet those threats. Now we have factored in the possibility of surprise. As we’ve gone through this strategic review and the budget decisions, we’re preserving capabilities that enable agility — rapidly deployable forces, the most advanced technology to be able to account for and put capabilities against any challenges that come our way — any unanticipated challenges that come our way in the future. So I don’t know that we have a specific fund set up for that. That’s really something kind of that we believe we need to account for across the defense budget, because we know that we can’t always perfectly predict what’s going to occur. So your point is one that is well-taken, and I — and I appreciate it. And the bottom-line answer is: absolutely. We need to preserve the mix of skill sets and capabilities and of course people. People are the heart of our enterprise here. Without our people, the rest of it falls away. And we need to make sure that we’re ready for whatever comes down the pike.”

One of the bloggers brought up what he called the “monkey in the room”; the issue of health care for retirees and did the proposed health care (Tricare is the military health provider) cuts break faith with the retiree community. In the spirit of disclosure I have to remind the reader I am a military retiree. Here’s the response:

“Captain Kirby: these TRICARE fees, as you know, have not gone up since they’ve — since they were first implemented for our retirees. And the only retirees affected by this are those that are under 65. And therefore most — and most retirees under 65 are working and have other means of income and oftentimes have health care plans in conjunction with that civilian employment of theirs that can help offset their health care plans and needs. We understand that any change to compensation and health care fees is an emotional thing. And we understand that there’s — there is an impact. But we really believe that this was the right thing to do for — to help us get control of spiraling health care costs and to keep — to keep pace with the kind of — with the kind of commitments we — that we have to our people, our retirees, and realizing that they have other — these retirees under 65 have other options as well. Now, I say another thing that — you know, you talked about breaking faith. We would be breaking faith with our retirees and our active-duty if we didn’t make some of these difficult decisions because health care costs and the cost of personnel, which run roughly 60 (percent) to 70 percent of the department’s budget year to year, can very well eat you alive if you don’t try to take care of it. If we don’t try to do something to stem that, we’re going to — it would
force us to cut back on other things that are absolutely vital to the force, like training and readiness.”

I challenged the assumption that all military retirees under 65 were working and had other health care programs by telling Dr. Little and Captain Kirby I was under 65, self employed and had no other health insurance. I also told them I had undergone 3 surgeries since September. I suggested they do a survey with retirees before implementing any new health care policy. General Dempsey and Secretary of Defense Panetta say no new health care policy will affect those that are medically retired from the current conflicts. I believe if they go back on promises they’ve made to military retirees of my generation, they’re setting a precedent that might encourage future administrations to go back on promises to this current generation. Think I’ll end here. As always my views are my own.

Brendan Smialowski/Getty Images

Would President Obama’s new security strategy, a plan for a “leaner” U.S. military, unveiled earlier this month, have prevented the Iraq War were it adopted a decade sooner? Sarwar Kashmeri, a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council and the Foreign Policy Association, makes just this point in his analysis of U.S. defense strategy in the Huffington Post.  Is the history of U.S. intervention since 9/11 necessary to understand President Obama’s decision to refocus military power on small, agile forces rather than large ground troops? Or could the U.S. have implemented this defense doctrine sooner?

Read Kashmeri’s interesting analysis here.

REUTERS/Deborah Gembara – Detainees participate in an early morning prayer session at Camp IV at the detention facility in Guantanamo Bay

On New Year’s Eve, President Barack Obama signed into law the post-9/11 practice of detaining terrorist suspects indefinitely without charge. Shock and awe waves rippled through the blogosphere in response to the move, not least because Obama had threatened to veto an earlier version of the bill. Other grumbles included its lack of temporal or geographic limitations, which signaled to some the potential for military detention of anyone, anywhere, anytime.

But despite congressional approval of the well-worn practice, most rights wonks don’t expect any significant change in the frequency or type of indefinite detentions going forward. They do, however, maintain that the practice breaches international humanitarian law and undermines counterterrorism efforts.

One such expert, Martin Sheinin, professor of international law and UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and counterterrorism from 2005 to 2011, spoke with me about the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and its potential to derail US counterterrorism efforts.

The War on Law

To put the controversy in context, Mr. Sheinin explained why Washington supports indefinite detention:

“The NDAA builds upon the well-established rule in international humanitarian law (law of armed conflict) that during an international armed conflict combatants, i.e. soldiers of one of the states involved in the war, can be detained as prisoners of war until the end of hostilities. When there is an international armed conflict and when someone is a combatant, then such detention does not amount to arbitrary detention that would violate international human rights law.”

When the “global war on terror” was waged following 9/11, he said, the possibility of indefinite detention was extended to terrorism, “far beyond genuine situations of international or even non-international armed conflict. And it extends indefinite detention to persons who are not combatants. For instance, persons who are held to have provided substantial support to terrorism would be subject to indefinite detention.”

Against that background, Mr. Sheinan suggested several ways in which violating human rights in the course of countering terrorism can “backfire.” Rights violations can “add to causes of terrorism,” he said, “both by perpetuating ‘root causes’ that involve the alienation of communities and by providing ‘triggering causes’ through which bitter individuals make the morally inexcusable decision to turn to methods of terrorism.”

Further, “these kinds of legal provisions are always open for bad faith copying by repressive governments that will use them for their own political purposes.” Though such copying was found to be less common than expected, “repressive governments may do so for their own political purposes.”

“It is hard to see any practical advantage gained through the NDAA. It is just another form of what I call symbolic legislation, enacted because the legislators want to be seen as being ‘tough’ or as ‘doing something.’ The law is written as just affirming existing powers and practices and hence not providing any meaningful new tools in the combat of terrorism,” he concluded.

With Washington simultaneously fostering democratic transitions across the Middle East and North Africa and gambling on military exits from Iraq and Afghanistan, such “backfires” may well hamper development of the rule of law and respect for human rights when they are needed most.

I think the first thing that jumps out at me is the continuing disconnect between the American public and the 1% of the nation that has and is participating in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. If you just look at most of the media reports, one is under the impression the timing of the departure is a sole initiative of the Obama administration. If you look into it you discover the timeline for the departure actually was set up by the Bush administration as part of a Status of Forces agreement. A little background is in order. According to the Council for Foreign Relations, “the status of forces agreement is a legal framework that defines how foreign militaries operate in a host country. Typically established by executive agreement, there is no uniform or standard format for the document, which can vary in length and specificity.”

According to an article in the December 12, 2011 New York Times/International Herald: “On Nov. 27, 2008, the Iraqi Parliament ratified a Status of Forces agreement with the United States that set a course for an end to the United States’ role in the war and marks the beginning of a new relationship between the countries. The pact called for American troops to pull out of most Iraqi cities by the summer of 2009 and set the end of 2011 as the date by which the last American troops must leave the country.”

Why is this important? It is not my intent to down play the considerable achievements of the Obama administration in Iraq, simply to provide some additional information in order to put the event in the right context. Why is this important? One of the questions being asked is what happens after the U.S. troops leave? Can the Iraqi security forces handle the expected levels of violence? In order to understand the question and answer, it’s important to gain a sense of how involved have the Iraqis been in providing their security up to this point. Here is how General Becker replied when asked that question:

“I think the Iraqi security forces are capable of managing the violence from both the violent extremist organizations such as al-Qaida and JRTN as well as some of the Iranian-backed militias such as Asaba al-Haq (ph). Those organizations will still be able to conduct attacks. They’ll be able to conduct high-profile attacks periodically. But the Iraqi security forces have shown all the way back to June 2009 when U.S. forces came out of the cities that they are capable of being able to disrupt these organizations to prevent them from, you know, getting away with major sustained attacks and really enforce these organizations to just be able to conduct high-profile attacks that make — that make the headlines, but they don’t really have any impact on the government, and they have really limited impact on the people. In fact, most of the people have, you know, completely rejected these organizations.
So I think the Iraqi — I think there may be a spike in violence…But the Iraqi security forces have been in the lead since Operation New Dawn and since really out of the cities in 2009. So the Iraqi security forces have already shown that they’re capable. They did it during the elections. They did it, you know, during the Arab Spring when there were protests around the region and small protests within Iraq. But the Iraqi security forces have shown that they’re capable for that type of a threat.”

Concerning the Iraqi Air Force, Major General Handy stated:

“Since the president’s comments last month (October 2011) highlighting our current path to compliance with the security agreement to have all of our military forces out by December 31st, we’ve really seen a renewed interest in these efforts from the States. And I’m proud to be able to talk about where we are in that process… The president’s remarks, though, only punctuated what we are already doing, was already under way, and that is our obligation to living up to our commitment of complying with the security agreement.
From an airman’s perspective, this stage of the operation takes on a particularly unique importance and represents unique challenges. Some of our tasks remain constant. We’re clearly still performing all of those air component missions you’ve become accustomed to hearing of: intelligence; surveillance; reconnaissance and close-air support, to keep overwatch and protect our forces; air mobility, to include air lifts and air refueling; search and rescue and personnel recovery; and operating and securing airfields, to name a few.
What is evolving here is how our airmen continue to do all this while they transition bases back to the authority and control of GOI, and assist U.S. Mission-Iraq in their efforts. And we do continue to do this in a dangerous place. We are, regrettably, reminded here on a regular basis there are still those out there who would seek to do us harm and would seek to do our Iraqi partners harm.
Our plans for what we’re doing now, how we’ve postured our force in this phase, have really been in the works for the better part of a year now. This has taken a tremendous amount of collective effort from our entire joint team to be ready for this, and there is still much to be done. But I will tell you, we are ready; it’s under way. And one thing you can be sure of: Our airmen will be here, overhead, keeping watch, protecting our forces until the last convoy, the last soldier, sailor, airman, Marine, Coast Guardsman or civilian departs the country from USF-I.”

Time will tell how successful the Iraqi security forces will be but since they’ve been more involved since 2009 it shows they’ve gained some experience. General Becker provided some interesting background summarizing the drawdown stating:

“At the height of coalition operations in 2007 and 2008, we had 505 bases in Iraq and 165,000 service members. As you can imagine, it’s a monumental task to properly account for all of this property, retrograde what has to be moved out of Iraq and transfer it to the Department of State and the government of Iraq properly designated for transfer to them.
What’s truly impressive, at least to me, is that our soldiers have set the conditions to professionally complete this massive drawdown of people and equipment while continuing to partner with Iraqi security forces and to make them better and successfully transition responsibility to the Department of State to ensure their success in the future…In August of 2010, we developed a very detailed and thoughtful plan for how we would execute this mission. We made adjustments to the plan during to and prior to our arrival in December and have continued to improve the plan since we arrived.
So where we are now in November 2011 with seven bases remaining to transfer, only 1700 truckloads of equipment to retrograde and less than 20,000 soldiers still in Iraq, is a result of a really thoughtful and well-executed plan and, of course, the hard work of thousands of great soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines.”

Think I’ll end here. As always my views are my own.

I thought I’d start out with the ones covering Afghanistan. There’s been a lot in the media about the differences in what the level of violence between the UN report which has said it’s increased by 39% over last year and the ISAF reports which indicates the situation is not that bad. A recent report written by “60 Minutes” associate producer Jeff Newton who has spent a lot of time in Afghanistan and reflects on covering the war for 10 years stated: “Roads that I used to drive for fun in 2002 and 2003 outside of Kabul are now no-go areas. Seems the Taliban has begun to move back into the provinces around the capital once held safely by American forces. In fact, it is now much more dangerous to leave the city than it was back then”.
There has also been much discussion on whether it has it been a 10 year wasted effort and that the NATO effort to build the Afghan security forces in the image of western organizations is wrong headed and doomed to failure. This was one of several topics covered during the bloggers roundtable I participated in back in September with Major General Peter Fuller, Deputy Commander for Programs, NATO Training Missions Afghanistan (NTM-A). The topic was “Providing Logistical Support to the Afghan Security Forces”.
On the subject of whether we were trying to build a security force in a western image, General Fuller stated the following:
“…we’re trying to be Afghan-right, we’re trying to be Afghan-first, and now, we’re trying to be Afghan-like.

And let me hit the first one: Afghan-right. We recognize that the Afghan army and police force are not going to be something similar to what the U.S. Army might have or some other Western country, so we’re looking at what capabilities they really need to have, meaning do they need to be equipped to be an expeditionary type of army?

And an example would be, in our Army, we have these mobile kitchens so we can go and set up a mobile kitchen until we can have a contractor potentially come in and provide us our food. Well, they operate out of — their corps are really regionally based and they stay in their region and fight in their region, so they go back and forth to their bases. Do we need to give them that type of capability?
Another example is in the infrastructure builds. Initially, when we started doing infrastructure builds for the Afghan army and the Afghan police, we thought of Western standards because we were using our Corps of Engineers with the Air Force and the Army and they have established standards that they follow. So in light of that, they put air-conditioning in all the buildings. They gave us Western-style toilets. They gave us really nice, propane-equipped kitchens, and they gave us really nice bathrooms.

Well, the bathrooms had pedestal, porcelain sinks because that’s, you know, a standard you would see in a U.S. side. But…the Afghans like to wash their feet before they do prayers. So they were trying to perch on the edge of a porcelain sink and it didn’t work out very well, so now we’ve changed it to Afghan-right… don’t give them air-conditioning in all the buildings, give them ceiling fans and the ability to open windows.

And we’ve seen a potential reduction between 100 (million dollars) and $150 million worth of fuel associated with all the generators that had to be powered up before and run to provide all that electricity. We have changed out the latrines. We’ve given them both a wood-burning stove outside because they have a lot of wood that they burn here in this country, and a propane stove inside. So if they don’t have propane, they can still burn — or cook their food on these wood burners.

Afghan-first. We are trying to generate industries here in Afghanistan that will allow them to be sustainable. And an example is we’re going to have 352,000 Afghans in the security force — that’s 195,000 in the army and 157,000 in the police force. Well, in light of that, we’re not buying any of the uniforms from the States anymore.
We’re having an Afghan company — or actually, several Afghan companies — make the uniforms, make the boots, make all the equipment items that they need. It’s a light-industry capability, though it is Afghan-owned, Afghan-operated.

And now we’re getting a much lower price because the price we had to pay for in the United States was one that had a shipping cost associated with it. We have the Berry Amendment requirements in the United States, so we had requirements that it had to be all U.S.-manufactured and the end result was it was almost twice as expensive to have a uniform and boots made in the United States as it was here in Afghanistan. So we’ve gone the other direction and have them built here, or manufactured here.

Afghan-like is trying to have the Afghans understand this is our national treasure — and I’m speaking from an American perspective because we are funding 92 percent of the operation, in terms of the building of the Afghan security forces. So in terms of Afghan-like, we are articulating when we give you a piece of property and you identify the standard in which you’re going to maintain it, if you do not maintain it we are going to take it away from you until you demonstrate you are going to maintain property appropriately.

So one thing on vehicles is if we see they’re not maintaining them appropriately, we withdraw their fuel allocation associated with the vehicles that they’re not maintaining appropriately. Actually, in some cases, they have battle-lost vehicles and we’re trying to incentivize them to turn in the vehicles and we’re saying, I’m not giving you fuel associated with that vehicle because you’re not driving it.

So if you turn the vehicle in, we’ll give you another one. You have to follow your processes to turn it in and then you will get your fuel back. So we’re trying to do several things, as I said, Build what’s appropriate for Afghanistan, use Afghanistan companies as much as possible and then ensure that as they establish standards for accountability and stewardship, that they follow them. And so that’s the first, right and like”.

I asked General Fuller about a U.S. Inspector General July report on Afghanistan that stated: “While U.S. agencies have taken steps to strengthen their oversight over U.S. funds blowing through the Afghan economy, they still have limited visibility over the circulation of these funds, leaving them vulnerable to fraud or diversion to insurgents.”

His response: “I think there’s a couple things. One part of the report was saying we do have a lot of contractors on the battlefield and for a lot of different reasons. They are assisting us in inspecting the police at the police training sites.

We are trying to move away from having contractors do that, and we’ve gone to the international community and we’ve actually had about 500 policemen from the international community come in and support. But what we try to do is we try to train a policeman and then get that policeman out there, and then you have them out into their various stations and districts, et cetera, and we want someone to go out and inspect them.
So we don’t have enough policemen and we can’t use just military policemen, so we use contractors. And these are typically former policemen. So we have the contractors going out there, and one of the parts of the report was saying, you didn’t provide appropriate oversight of these contractors to ensure that they were doing their job. Well, we have changed that and we now are ensuring that the contractors that we have in the battle space have oversight, have an individual that knows what the contract says and knows what they’re supposed to be doing.

The second piece of that goes back to the only cash that we are injecting into — directly into the ministry of finance that goes down to the ministry of defense and the ministry of interior is the money that we are injecting, and we have oversight because we watch every project. We know exactly what the vouchers were for. We track that very carefully. It gets more challenging when, for example, we hire a contractor to go and build a building and then, in the process of getting their materials, they have to make a payoff for a different reason. And we’re trying…to stamp that out wherever we can find it. There’s actually a whole organization within our next-higher headquarters, which is the ISAF headquarters, and they have a whole anti-corruption task force that’s looking at, to move trucks on the road, does a trucking company have to pay a tariff to, you know, go through a particular area, otherwise the trucks are going to be attacked?

So we’re trying to attack this in any way we can. So that’s where, I think, that report — can it happen? Yes. Yes, we can pay a contractor to do something, pay him a fair value, and in the process of them being able to perform that contract, such as moving trucks on the road, they might have to pay money to somebody to ensure that the trucks don’t get damaged coming across the road, and that money could then go back to support the insurgency through the Taliban or whoever.

So we’re trying to manage that and we’re trying to have them come forward when they have that type of challenge, and we’re trying to address it. It’s an interesting culture, here, and we’re trying to address that”.

Think I’ll end here. More to follow. As always, my views and opinions are my own.