South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma (left) and one his wives Nompumelelo Ntuli (2nd right) pose with US President Barack Obama and first lady Michelle Obama as they arrive at the Phipps Conservatory for an opening reception and working dinner for heads of delegation at the G20 Summit in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, September 24, 2009. Photo/REUTERS

The US-South Africa bilateral relationship over the past eighteen months has been a diplomatic minefield. Issues include everything from military equipment and nuclear energy/weapons to oil, communication companies and the global north versus the global south.

The most recent, and the most serious issue regarding US-SA relations is Iran.

According to a press release sent out this week by the South African Revenue Service, South Africa imported 3.37 billion rand (US$435 million) of crude oil from Iran in March. This means Pretoria nearly doubled its purchases from the Islamic Republic compared to the same period last year, despite strong objections by Washington in order to cut off Iran financially and halt its nuclear program.

This is interesting because Sasol, South Africa’s global petrochemical group whose primary business is based on CTL (coal-to-liquid) and GTL (gas-to-liquid) technology, has stopped buying Iranian crude oil and is talking with potential buyers to off-load its Arya Sasol Polymers plant in Iran. Sasol sat in front of the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in October 2011 and were told of a risk that sanctions may be imposed on them by the US, the European Union and the UN as a result of its investments in Iran.

Moreover, Engen, the biggest South African importer of Iranian crude, said on 04 April that it suspended imports of oil from the Middle Eastern nation amid economic sanctions by the US and the EU.

Obama officially made his diplomatic threat on 31 December 2011 when he signed a law that may impose American penalties should a country not make “significant” reductions in Iranian crude oil purchases in the first half of this year. However, Washington did offer countries assistance in locating alternative oil, which was offered to South Africa.

South African Deputy Foreign Minister and member of the ruling African National Congress (ANC) Ebrahim Ebrahim told reporters in March that his country intended to follow the US request. However, the Department of Energy later corrected his statement, saying that no decision has been taken, and that they will not decide whether to reduce Iranian oil imports until the end of May.

COSATU, the South African trade union and an alliance partner of the ruling ANC, spoke out against America for “its attempts to bully countries to cut imports of Iranian oil,” on the basis of “unproven allegations.” The South African government must “stop this kowtowing to the US imperialists,” COSATU spokesman Patrick Craven said.

Adding to the oil fiasco is the issues surrounding Africa’s biggest cell phone company, South Africa’s MTN, who operates in Iran and who, unlike Sasol, doesn’t appear keen to pull out of Iran.

MTN is currently involved in lawsuit on behalf of Turkcell alleging that it conspired to help Iran obtain South African weapons and government support for its nuclear program in exchange for a license to operate in Iran. In a lawsuit filed in a US court under the Alien Tort Statute, court documents reveal MTN would persuade the South African government to vote in favor of Iran’s nuclear program at the UN and to sell it heavy weapons prohibited by international sanctions.

The lawsuit alleges that MTN struck a deal to deliver a large shipment of military arms and technology, code named “The Fish,” to Iran’s defense ministry in 2004. Although the deal never took place, it was supposed to include Rooivalkers, based on the US-made Apache, sniper rifles, G5 howitzers, canons, radar technology and other defense equipment barred by international sanctions.

In September 2008, the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control placed one of MTN’s Irancell partners, IEI, on a list designed “to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,” IEI, wholly owned by Iran’s ministry of defence, was also sanctioned by the European Union in June 2008 as well as under the US Iran and Syria Non-proliferation Act in December 2006.

Overall, this past year and a half has not been the most pleasant of times for US-South Africa relations. The real tension began in March 2011, over the war in Libya. South Africa and other African Union member-states had hoped the international community efforts would bring an immediate ceasefire and internal national reconciliation when the war began in March 2011. Instead, South Africa began to denounce the NATO bombardment of Gaddafi’s defense installations as an attempt at ‘regime change’. Washington then put intense diplomatic pressure on Pretoria to drop its opposition to the unfreezing of US$1.5 billion of Gaddafi regime assets by the UN.

Since 1994, South Africa hasn’t been shy in perceiving themselves as one the ‘champions’ of the Global South. As one American official pointed out, South Africa has had close ties with the Non- Aligned Movement countries, and has exhibited “marked sympathy toward countries that exert their independence from the West.” Their recent addition to BRICS has definitely not helped US-SA relations.

South Africa recently stated that as host of the next BRICS summit [2013], it has a duty to ensure the grouping realise their dream of a Development Bank. Some consider this discussion to be a response and challenge to the Bretton Woods institutions of which the US, for the most part, has large control over. Others say this move is set to challenge the supremacy of the US dollar.

I was hopeful at the start of the Obama/Zuma administrations in 2009 that the US-SA relationship would improve after a relatively low point towards the end of the Bush and Thabo Mbeki administrations, and it did. There was, and still is, great cooperation in various fields from HIV/AIDS to economics and numerous others. The US is still one of South Africa’s key trading partners in the world today, and the bilateral trade relationship has maintained a consistent pattern of expansion since 1994. Both the US Ambassador in SA and the SA Ambassador in the US are well liked.

However, like a former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs described US-South African relations in 2007, the bilateral relationship has hit another “rough patch.” The combined issues of Libya, Iran, and BRICS are all fuel for a fire that continues to grow. Nevertheless, I am certain the situation will be managed as it has been in the past, but it will be bumpy.

Let the rollercoaster ride continue.

The past week has been a particularly bloody one for Nigeria. Simultaneous attacks against This Day newspaper offices in Abuja and Kaduna killed nearly a dozen last week. Last weekend, gunmen attacked church services at Bayero University in Kano. Yesterday, the U.S. State Department released a statement emphasizing its concerns regarding continuous attacks against Christians. And on Monday, 11 people died in an IED attack against the police commissioner in Taraba State.

Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan who has frequently spoken out against Boko Haram, has ordered an increase in security throughout Abuja and the north, and has repeatedly attempted to negotiate

Security forces view the scene of a bomb explosion at St. Theresa Catholic Church at Madalla, Suleja, just outside Nigeria's capital Abuja, December 25, 2011. REUTERS/Afolabi Sotunde

with the group. However, Jonathan has yet to generate a strategy for addressing the security threat.

Nigerian civil societies, such as the Christian Association of Nigeria, are running low on patience. According to the group’s spokesman, Elder Sunday Oibe:

It seems that the government of [Nigeria] led by Goodluck Jonathan is helplessly looking on, always telling us that security men are on top of the situation.… We are telling President Goodluck Jonathan if he has not done anything to put an end to this madness, then, he should now that there is trouble in his hand.

Nigerians are not the only ones fearing for their security. Speaking at the Lake Chad Basin Commission, Chad’s autocratic Muslim leader Idriss Deby Itno demanded the creation of a joint deterrence force to stop Boko Haram before the group spreads it influence throughout the region: “Now is the time for action. We cannot save Lake Chad without eradicating this Boko Haram sect.” President of the Central African Republic Francois Bozize echoed Itno’s assertion: “A joint effort is needed to tackle insecurity in the region.”

Regional concerns are not unfounded. Boko Haram militants are known to have received training and resources from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Shabab in Somalia. Furthermore, documents recovered from Osama bin Laden’s Abbottabad residence in Pakistan reportedly reveal that Boko Haram has been in contact with core members of al-Qaeda. Considering the latest instability throughout the Sahel, the opportunity for extremist groups to take advantage of the power vacuum is apparent.

It’s past time that Jonathan and his administration start taking Boko Haram seriously. Ignoring the problem will result only in escalating attacks and regional instability.

For those who thought India-US was going to be another Special Relationship this may be accurate. India and US have much in common and the geopolitics of the 21st century appears to be putting them on the side of the key international shift of our time, China’s rise. However, this does not make the US and India best friends. They each have diverging interests (Iran, Pakistan), unique cultures, and domestic politics that will likely keep the two from ever crossing the threshold. That being said, I disagree with those seeing a serious drift in the young alliance. After all, look how far the two sides have come in 20 years. Daniel Twining provides some much needed historical context:

Recall the context in which U.S. and Indian officials, nearly 15 years ago, sought to forge a new relationship. For half a century, the American and Indian governments were alienated by India’s refusal to sign on as one of Washington’s Cold War allies; by the U.S. military alliance with Indian rival Pakistan, forged in 1954; and later by America’s tacit alliance with Indian rival China, countered by India’s tacit alliance with Moscow. Following wars with both Pakistan and China, India launched a covert nuclear weapons program, leading the United States to muster its allies to impose sweeping sanctions on technology trade with India — further stifling its development after state socialism had already undercut India’s growth potential. Even after the Cold War, Washington and New Delhi spent the 1990s feuding over proliferation, culminating in the imposition of even more U.S. sanctions following India’s 1998 nuclear weapons test.

Those who know their Cold War history know that India was no friend to the US. From India’s perspective, the US for decades had put their support toward their greatest rival Pakistan. The positive steps taken by the US and India in the past decade or so need to be given space to breath. China is not going anywhere and neither are the strong democratic elements that bring New Delhi and Washington together. I’m confident that this alliance is still on the upswing, it just needs patience and consistent efforts from both sides to embolden the ties and interests that bind them. The US and India are in the early stages of going steady, and that’s not a bad place right now. As the not so distant past shows, it has been a lot worse.

Postage stamps commemorating the “successful” delivery into orbit of North Korea’s two satellites, Kwangmyongsong-1 (1998) and Kwangmyongsong-2 (2009)

Nearly five months have passed since I last evaluated the situation in North Korea, making predictions and recommendations on how the United States should proceed with the nascent “Kim 3.0.” All those months ago, I argued that it would be a mistake to continue negotiations with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) until the political dust had settled—to give Kim Jong-Un time to consolidate his power. I was shocked when I read the announcement that not only had the United States resumed talks so soon after Kim Jong-Il’s death but had also come to an agreement with the DPRK to suspend long-range missile launches, nuclear tests, and nuclear activities at Yongbyon. As I was preparing a mea culpa post, the DPRK declared that it would be launching a weather satellite into space in celebration of Dear Leader’s 100th birthday; code for testing an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (a system capable of delivering a nuclear warhead to the west coast of the United States). Of course, this was followed by blustering on either side and the launch eventually failed. Much has been said and written about the events of the last few months, but I would like to focus on the role China will play in future U.S.-DPRK relations.

Between a Rock and a….

As South Korea has moved away from its Sunshine policy, the DPRK has become more and more dependent on China to support its feeble economy. If it so desired, China could put enough pressure on North Korea to convince it to drop its weapons program. However, as experts recently testified at a House Committee on Foreign Affairs hearing, China walks a tenuous rope between preventing a fully nuclear capable North Korea from emerging and forestalling the implosion/explosion of the Kim Regime. From China’s past behavior, it is clear that China prioritizes maintaining the stability of the Kim regime.

There are a number of reasons why regime-collapse in North Korea is an undesirable outcome for China. First, the DPRK plays a strategic role as a buffer state both to U.S. military presence in the region and Russian neighbors to the North. Historically, China has questioned American strategy in the region and even suspected that U.S. activities on the Korean peninsula are an excuse to maintain a military presence in the event that China decides to aggressively reunify Taiwan with the mainland.

Second, China would face an enormous influx of refugees if the Kim regime were to destabilize or fall apart entirely. Even when not facing massive famine, it is estimated that 5,000 North Koreans cross the border every year to escape starvation. If the Kim regime were to collapse, China would be subject to unprecedented mass migration in an area that is already saturated with ethnic Koreans. A mass migration would make it difficult for Chinese officials to control movements along the border and to distinguish refugees from residents of China. Evolving domestic politics in South Korea could also exacerbate the refugee problem as recent polling and aid programs indicate that South Koreans are dubious at the possibility of reunification with their Northern brethren. If this scenario were to play out, China would face extreme difficulties coordinating the handling of refugees.

If a conflict were to emerge out of a DPRK regime collapse, China, for all its might, is unprepared for a crisis situation. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has not been subject to significant combat since the invasion of Vietnam in 1979—an unmitigated disaster. The chain of command is also complicated; the PLA is not a part of the state apparatus but is instead responsible to the communist party and is run by their Central Military Commission, not the Ministry of Defense. If there was disagreement between top-leadership of the Chinese government and the members of the Central Military Commission over policy, it could lead to a break-down in response to any humanitarian or other security emergency. Finally, corruption is rampant in the PLA, to such an extent that it has caused the development of a “fragmented and stove-piped structure of the overall crisis decision making process.” This is a fundamental problem that touches all points of Chinese Foreign Policy, not just the possibility of dealing with the potential collapse of the Kim regime.

Conclusions for Future U.S.-DPRK Relations

By relying on a negotiating partner and interlocutor with objectives that diverge so greatly from our own, the United States has laid a weak diplomatic foundation. Yet, there is some strategic space where the United States and China have common ground.** China does not want a full-fledged North Korean Nuclear power, as this would likely cause South Korea, Japan, and perhaps even Taiwan to pursue similar weapons programs. Therefore, the United States ought to establish an official line of communication with China to prevent miscommunications and coordinate during times of crisis, while, at the same time, move away from the expectation that China will solve the North Korean problem to our satisfaction.

It is time for the United States to re-evaluate its objectives for relations with the DPRK. Patrick Cronin and Scott Snyder recently testified that it is unreasonable to expect to achieve the maximalist goal of a non-nuclear North Korea and that United States should look to its allies South Korea and Japan. I agree that such maximalist goals are unrealistic, but I do not believe that South Korea is willing to gamble the status-quo when losing the game would be unacceptably costly (possible nuclear war, economic decimation in a reunification process).

Instead, the United States needs to take ownership of its own goals and declarations.

Most recently, American leadership stated that a North Korean missile launch was unacceptable, but neither cited nor executed any repercussions. After the sinking of the Cheonan in 2010, President Obama claimed that the United States would not negotiate with North Korea unless they made a demonstration of their dedication to de-nuclearization; soon thereafter American diplomats returned to the table. If we do not create, pursue, and take ownership of consistent set of policy objectives and follow up provocative actions with repercussions, the United States will continue to fail in its dealings with North Korea.

**After finishing this post, Secretary Leon Panetta testified before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, confirming that to some degree China has been assisting North Korea with the development of their missile weapons systems. Due to the “sensitivity” of the information, Secretary Panetta did not elaborate on the extent to which the U.S. Government believes China is assisting the DPRK with these programs. Without more information, it is difficult to determine how much common ground remains between the United States and China when dealing with North Korea.

With President Obama describing them as Tehran’s “last chance” for a peaceful resolution, international negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program started up again this past weekend.  Washington has been talking tough with Iran of late, insisting that it is prepared, if necessary, to use military force to stop the country’s atomic ambitions.

But how credible are these threats?  The question is all the more pertinent given the White House’s contention this week that it is actually pursuing a harder line vis-à-vis North Korea – Iran’s precursor as proliferation rogue – than the George W. Bush administration did.

Yet if the U.S. saga with Pyongyang is any guide, President Obama is more likely to accept a nuclear-armed Iran as a fait accompli.  Indeed, the rhetoric issuing from Washington nowadays is nearly a verbatim copy of the words Obama’s predecessors once directed at North Korea.  And we all know how well that turned out.

Consider, for example, the Clinton administration’s declarations on Pyongyang’s proliferation. In late 1993, President Clinton signaled U.S. willingness to thwart North Korea’s nuclear activities by means of war, stating that it “cannot be allowed to develop a nuclear bomb.”  His defense secretary shortly thereafter termed the president’s statement an “ultimatum,” adding “we will not let the North Koreans become a nuclear power….nuclear weapons in the hands of North Korea is not acceptable.”

George W. Bush, who framed the invasion of Iraq as an act of counter-proliferation, took a similar stance toward Pyongyang. He declared categorically in May 2003 that “we will not tolerate nuclear weapons in North Korea.”  Like today, loose talk of military strikes filled the air but the lack of viable options ultimately stayed his hand.  When Pyongyang finally did explode a nuclear device in the fall of 2006, he could only repeat that the existence of its arsenal was “unacceptable.”

As the depressing track record with North Korea demonstrates, it is exceedingly difficult to stop a rogue regime determined to develop nuclear capabilities, especially if it located in a strategic part of the world, has powerful patrons, and is able to inflict retribution on important U.S. interests in the region.  Still, this has not kept such important thought leaders from continuing to advocate for the use of military force in order to disrupt Pyongyang’s proliferation activities.  Bill Perry, who served as President Clinton’s second defense secretary, and Ashton Carter, currently the U.S. deputy secretary of defense, called for a strike to preempt the North’s missile test in June 2006.  Philip Zelikow, who was the State Department’s counselor in the George W. Bush administration, repeated the same recommendation three years ago.

President Obama ignored this advice in the run-up to Pyongyang’s failed rocket launch a few days ago and has issued no threats regarding rumors of an impending nuclear test by the North.  So it is all the more puzzling why the administration is borrowing freely from the vocabulary used by Clinton and Bush on North Korea.  In his first press conference as president-elect, Mr. Obama declared that “Iran’s development of a nuclear weapon, I believe, is unacceptable.”  In his State of the Union address earlier this year, he vowed that “America is determined to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon, and I will take no options off the table to achieve that goal.”

In a media interview last month, he underscored that he is not bluffing when it comes to the possible use of military force and that “when the United States says it is unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapon, we mean what we say.”  He followed this up by asserting at a press conference that “we will not countenance Iran getting a nuclear weapon,” and then delivering a hard-hitting address to the American Israel Political Action Committee, an influential lobbying group in Washington, stressing that “when it comes to preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, I will take no options off the table, and I mean what I say.”

From the President to Secretary of State Hillary Rodman Clinton, and from Defense Secretary Leon Panetta to White House press secretary Jay Carney, the Obama team has put out the word: the diplomatic “window of opportunity” is closing.

Yet the Obama administration’s threat to pick up the cudgel of military action has always an air of unreality.  After all, a president determined to wind down George Bush’s wars in the Greater Middle East is quite unlikely to initiate a third one.  Ditto for the politician seeking re-election who justifies large-scale troop withdrawals from Afghanistan by declaring to a war-weary country that “it’s time to focus on nation-building here at home.” And not to mention the commander-in-chief who unveils the Pentagon’s new strategic guidance by announcing that “the tide of war is receding.”

Nor has it escaped notice in Tehran and elsewhere that for all of the tough-minded rhetoric, Mr. Obama was most reluctant to impose painful economic sanctions on Iran in the first place.  And even now, the administration is working to water down new sanctions legislation being drafted in the Senate.

Noteworthy, too, is how the Pentagon leadership is pouring cold water on the military option. Before his retirement last year, Defense Secretary Robert Gates acknowledged that the U.S. armed forces are “exhausted” and pointedly cautioned against launching any new conflicts in the Middle East.  His successor, Mr. Panetta, has warned that a military strike would have “unintended consequences,” touching off global economic instability and broader military hostilities. And the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff cautions against attacking Tehran and argues that the Iranian regime is a “rational actor,” suggesting that a nuclear-armed Tehran could be deterred from engaging in provocative actions.

Critics charge that Obama’s recent pronouncements are merely election-year palaver.  But it is also important to recognize that he is following a rhetorical playbook laid out by his predecessors.  Chances are, he will be no more successful in dealing with a Tehran determined to possess nuclear weapons than they were with Pyongyang.

This commentary was originally posted on Monsters Abroad.  I invite you to follow me on Twitter.

Allegedly, the proposed base would house a fleet of Global Hawk drones. At a unit cost of $218 million per aircraft, these unmanned aerial vehicles can reportedly reach a top speed of up to roughly 500 mph (805 kmph) and have a range of 15,000 miles – more than double the distance between New York and Beijing. Global hawks differ significantly from the more infamous Reaper drones commonly used to combat insurgents in that they are solely used for surveillance and do not possess any actual strike capacity.

A Global Hawk in action. Source: opinion-maker.org

The Cocos islands lie 800 miles south west of Indonesia, meaning they are within comfortable flight distance of the South China Sea – a veritable hotbed for regional confrontation over conflicting territorial claims. Since a number of these conflicts involve China, Beijing has naturally expressed concern. The increasing role played by the US as an extra-regional balancer to states threatened by China’s growing military presence constitutes a fundamental restriction upon Chinese freedom of action. Thus, the move to step up operations in China’s own backyard may evoke admonition from an increasingly encircled Beijing.

Source: www.caro.cc

The fact that drone-warfare has fast become the cornerstone of contemporary US military strategy is indeed cause for concern for the PRC. With its drone fleet’s total annual flight hours skyrocketing from just 12,500 in 2001 to a staggering 644,000 in 2011, the Pentagon’s firm commitment to drone surveillance will undoubtedly consolidate America’s surveillance and intelligence advantage over their Chinese counterparts.

A drone outpost in the region will also have the added benefit of a providing a way to keep tabs on the emerging regional threat emanating from the Korean peninsula. Indeed, there are fears that North Korea’s recent space missile test may well herald a new wave of recalcitrance from Pyongyang, especially since the woeful failure of the launch may pressure King-Jong to consolidate his leadership through assertive foreign policy. Whilst much is unsure about the dynamics of the regime’s internal structure, concerns over its unpredictability are likely to remain an integral feature of Washington’s regional strategy for the foreseeable future.

The Obama administration’s ambitions of ushering through a new ‘Pacific Century’ (http://tinyurl.com/44ht4sy) could, at worst, be viewed as a declaration of imperial intent – particularly when viewed alongside Washington’s  multiple military alliances with various regional players. Whilst there is no imminent threat of confrontation in the region, the South China Sea remains a veritable tinderbox for conflict. Perhaps the drones may even be able to spot the spectre of all-engulfing regional crisis as it begins to loom into view.

Last month the government-appointed National Commission, charged with carrying out the BICI recommendations praised the government for its reforms. According to Ali Saleh al-Saleh, the Commission’s chairman, nearly two-dozen of the report’s recommendations have been implemented, including retrials, the re-institution of those fired from their jobs and expelled from university and the creation of institutions and positions to ensure that human rights are respected. Al-Wefaq, Bahrain’s main opposition group claims that only ten percent of the mandated reforms have been instituted. Furthermore, al-Wefaq complains that political reforms are being ignored and human rights abuses continue. Al-Wefaq’s ultimate objective is the increase of Shiite representation in government.

This is a concession Bahrain’s government is not likely to make. Deep sectarian tensions between Bahrain’s Shiite and Sunni communities have divided the country. The Sunni-led government is deeply suspicious of the Shiite community, alleging that many are allied Iran. Such suspicions are not unjustified. Since Bahrain gained its independence from the United Kingdom in 1971, Tehran has repeatedly instigated unrest.

As such, al-Wefaq’s demands are unlikely to be met anytime soon. Bahrain’s government is divided between reformers such as Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa and the old guard, including Prime Minster Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa. Internal friction has prevented significant progress as the two factions disagree on how to manage the opposition.

As the government determines its course of action, the opposition, not without its own questionable objectives, continues wage violence on the streets. Though the opposition claims that those taking part in the violence are a small faction (14 February Youth Movement), their actions have nevertheless changed the character of the opposition. Police have responded, using tear gas and rubber bullets and according to some, through unprovoked violence and arbitrary arrests.

The United States, a long-standing ally of Bahrain (the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet is based in Manama), has urged Bahrain’s government to show restraint and implement forms. The Obama administration even suspended a $53 million arms deal to show its objection to what it perceived as the Government of Bahrain’s abuse against protesters. However, the administration did permit a rather insignificant $1 million military supply sale to be exchanged. The blocking of the arms deal was a petty way of managing the situation as it sends the wrong message to America’s enemies in the region and downplays Bahrain’s strategic importance. Bahrain is a major partner in safeguarding international access to the Persian/Arabian Gulf, containing Iran and safeguarding oil flows through the Straits of Hormuz.

The Government of Bahrain does not have any time to waste in implementing reforms or reunifying the country. The latter will take years whereas the BICI reforms can and should be made expeditiously. However, for this to work King Hamad Ibin Isa al-Khalifa should take extra care in ensuring the human rights reforms that have been implemented are respected by those within the government. Restraint and professional conduct by security forces is a first step in showing the opposition movement that it is acting in good faith, but these measures will mean nothing if they are ignored.

When states become bureaucratized, war becomes a proposition of precarious value, an unmanageable risk to institutional integrity. State bureaucracies, fundamentally concerned with the maintenance of the domestic environment, come to view war as a policy more likely to undermine the state structure than to bolster it. It follows that conflict diverts resources away from the domestic environment and endangers the state itself. Modern states thus tend toward risk-aversion and therefore, abstain from international conflict in favor of diplomatic negotiations. Thus, it is these institutional, rather than ideological factors that are central in understanding the outbreak of war, or the maintenance of peace. States are no longer willing to endanger the political order and their own authority through external conflict.

The most relevant of examples can be seen in the relations between the U.S. and USSR. As a conflict between two well-institutionalized states, the Cold War exhibited a high degree of risk aversion and low conflict. Despite concern about Soviet willingness to initiate aggression with the West, the general trend of US-Soviet relations from the late 1940s to the late 1980s clearly reflects the mutual caution of the two superpowers, who obviously wished to maintain the status quo. A more specific example can be seen during what many consider to be the pinnacle of the Cold War—the Cuban Missile Crisis. Once the situation brought the U.S. and the Soviet Union to a crisis level, both sides quickly moved to defuse the situation. This was most visible in the U.S. use of a naval quarantine rather than an air strike or invasion against Cuba, and Kennedy’s offer to remove missiles in Turkey. Similarly, upon the realization that the U.S. saw the missiles in Cuba as a matter of vital national security, Khrushchev quickly backed away from the brink, admitting the error of his actions and barring the use of nuclear weapons stationed in Cuba even in the case of US attack. In conclusion, the US-Soviet interaction during the crisis indicated that neither country was seeking a confrontation, and both were doing everything they could to avoid one.

Traditionally, the simple explanation for the long peace of the Cold War was not seen as the relative institutionalization of both nations, but rather the overwhelming threat of nuclear weapons. However, this does not explain American inaction during the time in which it enjoyed an overwhelming advantage in nuclear weapons. It was very likely that the institutional, rather than ideological factors in each country, prevented any major armed conflicts between the two superpowers. According to political scientist John Mueller, nuclear weapons were not the primary factor in preventing superpower conflict, but rather the lessons of World War I and II—that large-scale war is costly and of limited value. As he succinctly pointed out, “Even allowing for stupidity, ineptness, miscalculation, and self-deception in all these considerations, it does not appear that a large war, nuclear or otherwise, has been remotely in the interests of the essentially contented, risk-averse, escalation-anticipating powers that have dominated world affairs since 1945.”

Of the countries known or believed to possess nuclear weapons, the U.S., China, France, Russia, UK, Israel, India, and arguably even North Korea, have historically strong state institutions. The same cannot be said for the lone wild card Pakistan, which has a barely-functioning central government and very little in the way of state institutions. Likewise, Iran also has a tumultuous recent history with state institutions. If Iran ever does develop nuclear weapons, they will not have the same incentives as most other nuclear powers to preserve the status quo, especially when the current regime already faces political turmoil from within its own borders. Nuclear powers have never gone to war with each other, despite their occasional bellicose disputes. When on occasion they do go to war with a non-nuclear power, the use of nuclear weapons has never been a factor, even in defeat—e.g., USSR/Afghanistan. Can we be assured a nuclear Iran would exercise this same restraint?

For this reason, the U.S. foreign policy of supporting stable regimes around the world is often criticized. No doubt, the U.S. would prefer to support democratic regimes, but even stable despots are worth supporting for the sake of regional security. It appears that with the spread of institutional state structures over time, the propensity for war declines, viewed as a policy with little to gain and much to lose. Because of this trend, the bureaucrat may be the real force that ushers in global peace.

 We need resolution; we need to resolve to be better, to define who we are as a country, set goals and fearlessly pursue them.

That said, we are not entirely without direction. In the last year we have ended the war in Iraq, tactfully supported revolution in the Middle East, and are attempting to streamline the defense budget and rebuild our anemic diplomatic resources. In the words of President Obama at the release of the Department of Defense’s new goals for 21st Century Defense—“our nation is at a moment of transition.” We need to seize this moment to decide what we want to represent to the world. And that is what I had hoped to hear last Tuesday.

Instead, the President stuck his head further into the sand, declaring that anyone who believes America is in decline “does not know what they are talking about.” Again, not to be tactless, but we have a Congress that was unable to complete one of its fundamental purposes (to pass a budget) and gave the rest of the world the impression that we have been practicing pluralism as long as the new Afghani parliament. Additionally, as a result of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, for the last ten years we have been a nation that represents secrecy, invasion, and violence to the rest of the world. How can we expect to negotiate with Russia, North Korea, and Iran with our recent track record? How can we help nurture new democratic regimes when we pass legislation like section 1031 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) of 2012? How can we return to a “normal” relationship with Pakistan, if we were never able to establish one in the first place?

To achieve our diplomatic goals, I propose that as a country we resolve to return to our revolutionary roots. I am not espousing a return to a reckless neoconservative agenda bent on forcing democracy on any and all who oppose us, but pleading for us all to recognize that we are in decline and that decline is the result of a fractured American identity. Until we decide on who we are as a country, we will not be able to devise a successful foreign policy—how can you plan an itinerary without knowing the destination? Our founding mothers and fathers fearlessly fought against a seemingly unbeatable foe to win their freedom and independence. We need to eliminate the doubt and paranoia epitomized in the NDAA 2012 and proudly declare we are Patrick Henry’s country of “give me liberty or give me death,” not another country that tells its citizens to “shut up.” It is my hope that armed with such an identity we can elect more responsible leadership, proudly present ourselves to the international community with a strong sense of our goals and values, and retake our position as “the one indispensable nation in world affairs.”

Mr. Seidemann, a legal expert on Palestinian-Israeli relations in Jerusalem, has spent the past twenty years lobbying senior-level officials in Washington, Paris, London, Moscow, Cairo and both halves of Jerusalem to broker a two-state compromise which would, if not cure the cancerous conflict eating away at Middle East relations, at least put it into remission.

Cause of Death

“A surge of settlement activity the likes of which we have not witnessed since the early 1970s,” Mr. Seidemann explained, has enabled me “to project with a fair degree of authority what the map of Jerusalem will look like in two years time.”

From that projection two “unprecedented” conclusions can be drawn, he said. First, “the map of Jerusalem will be so Balkanized geographically and demographically that a political division of the city will no longer be possible.”

Second, the White House is for the first time in history completely beholden to Israeli leadership. “During the last six months, my Prime Minister Netanyahu has said in word and in deed, ‘President Obama you have no leverage over me on this issue. I know and you know you will not engage me publicly and probably not privately on these issues until probably after the November elections. I am at liberty to act with impunity.”

The United States’ February 18, 2011 veto of “its own language” on a Security Council resolution condemning settlement activity, together with the defunding of UNESCO a day after Palestine achieved full statehood membership there, reflect Washington’s “colossal trend of self-marginalization” in the peace talks, he said.

Next week, Mr. Seidemann plans to tell President Obama in person that if he chooses to cow to Israeli pressure and ignore the settlements issue until after the November elections, “by the time you get back there may not be anything left to talk about.”

But “short of catastrophe,” he added, “there is not going to be any engagement from Washington until after the elections. And maybe then none.”

A War of Rebirth?

“What I have described here is a state of acute disequilibrium in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” Mr. Seidemann said while calling attention to the brewing war next door in Syria. “Having two states of disequilibrium simultaneously creates pressure along the tectonic plates. These things correct themselves in one of two ways: either a new robust political paradigm – which is not in the cards over the next several months – or an armed conflict. I have a feeling that there is a war waiting to break out there to realign things. It just hasn’t decided where it will break out and over what.”

Photo courtesy of REUTERS/Ammar Awad (A general view of a Jewish settlement known to Israelis as Har Homa and to Palestinians as Jabal Abu Ghneim is seen near Jerusalem November 16, 2011. Israel said on Tuesday it will invite bids soon for constructing 814 homes in occupied land it considers part of Jerusalem, pursuing a decision to speed up building in settlements after Palestinians won full membership in the U.N. cultural agency).

REUTERS/Deborah Gembara – Detainees participate in an early morning prayer session at Camp IV at the detention facility in Guantanamo Bay

On New Year’s Eve, President Barack Obama signed into law the post-9/11 practice of detaining terrorist suspects indefinitely without charge. Shock and awe waves rippled through the blogosphere in response to the move, not least because Obama had threatened to veto an earlier version of the bill. Other grumbles included its lack of temporal or geographic limitations, which signaled to some the potential for military detention of anyone, anywhere, anytime.

But despite congressional approval of the well-worn practice, most rights wonks don’t expect any significant change in the frequency or type of indefinite detentions going forward. They do, however, maintain that the practice breaches international humanitarian law and undermines counterterrorism efforts.

One such expert, Martin Sheinin, professor of international law and UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and counterterrorism from 2005 to 2011, spoke with me about the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and its potential to derail US counterterrorism efforts.

The War on Law

To put the controversy in context, Mr. Sheinin explained why Washington supports indefinite detention:

“The NDAA builds upon the well-established rule in international humanitarian law (law of armed conflict) that during an international armed conflict combatants, i.e. soldiers of one of the states involved in the war, can be detained as prisoners of war until the end of hostilities. When there is an international armed conflict and when someone is a combatant, then such detention does not amount to arbitrary detention that would violate international human rights law.”

When the “global war on terror” was waged following 9/11, he said, the possibility of indefinite detention was extended to terrorism, “far beyond genuine situations of international or even non-international armed conflict. And it extends indefinite detention to persons who are not combatants. For instance, persons who are held to have provided substantial support to terrorism would be subject to indefinite detention.”

Against that background, Mr. Sheinan suggested several ways in which violating human rights in the course of countering terrorism can “backfire.” Rights violations can “add to causes of terrorism,” he said, “both by perpetuating ‘root causes’ that involve the alienation of communities and by providing ‘triggering causes’ through which bitter individuals make the morally inexcusable decision to turn to methods of terrorism.”

Further, “these kinds of legal provisions are always open for bad faith copying by repressive governments that will use them for their own political purposes.” Though such copying was found to be less common than expected, “repressive governments may do so for their own political purposes.”

“It is hard to see any practical advantage gained through the NDAA. It is just another form of what I call symbolic legislation, enacted because the legislators want to be seen as being ‘tough’ or as ‘doing something.’ The law is written as just affirming existing powers and practices and hence not providing any meaningful new tools in the combat of terrorism,” he concluded.

With Washington simultaneously fostering democratic transitions across the Middle East and North Africa and gambling on military exits from Iraq and Afghanistan, such “backfires” may well hamper development of the rule of law and respect for human rights when they are needed most.

I have certainly come to view the end of the year with some degree of dread. Earthquakes, tidal waves, and a slew of other worrisome events seem to make appearances just when we think we are done with the year, and 2011 has not disappointed. The sudden death of Kim Jong-il and the rise of his youngest son, Kim Jong-un, as his successor left US analysts scrambling. NYTimes correspondents astutely observed that 48 hours after Kim Jong-il died at 8:30 am on Saturday, neither South Korean nor American intelligence knew anything about the death. This is the second major intelligence failure of 2011 (remember Egypt?) and just one of many intelligence failures when it comes to US analysts keeping tabs on the goings on inside the DPRK. However, unlike the failure of US intelligence to predict the Arab Spring, I do not believe the unexpected death of Kim Jong-il and subsequent American ignorance of the event will cost US diplomacy the advantage.

The questions have been flying. Where does this leave bi-lateral negotiations for a resumption of six-party talks? Will the US continue its dialogue on food aid? What should we be hoping for in this transition? There are a number of articles, good and bad, available, which provide in-depth analysis on all these questions (here, here, and here). Yet, I believe there are some fundamental truths about the current situation in the DPRK that make complicated analysis unnecessary.

The Monday after the announcement of Jong-il’s death, reporters pelted State Department Spokeswoman Victoria Nuland with questions about the condition of the bi-lateral nuclear negotiations. While Mrs. Nuland tactfully answered “we have not made any decisions inside the U.S. Government on that question, nor have we made any decisions inside the U.S. Government on the question of another round of U.S.-DPRK bilateral talks.”

The truth of the matter is that for probably the next six months or more, nuclear negotiations have been “over taken by events” and any talks would not only be unrealistic but dangerous. Un needs to demonstrate to the military that he is a strong leader, especially when it comes to dealing with the United States.

If Un agrees to come to the table too soon, he might be perceived as weak by military leaders and be removed from power, especially if they believe he is moving towards any of the goals the United States has in mind.

One of the best things the United States could do for stability in the region is to continue its dialogue on food aid. The citizens of the DPRK are starving and Un will be looking for a way to prove to the ruling political military elite that he can deal successfully with the United States. Getting the United States to agree to provide food aid might help solidify his grip on power. This way, Un would demonstrate that he can successfully navigate negotiations with the United States, and if the United States provides the kind of aid discussed in a recent article in the Washington Post, the people who need the food most will more than likely receive it. Additionally, this could be a bridge between the US and Un in future negotiations.

What should be we hoping for in this transition? For now, hoping for a thaw on the nuclear issue would be foolhardy. The best we can look for in the short-term is a peaceful and stable transition, keeping a good distance during North Korean mourning (read power transition here). One of the worst outcomes for the United States would be a split in governance in the DPRK between those loyal to Un and a military ruling group. In the context of a nuclear DPRK, the possibility of two groups claiming power would be a nightmare scenario. As any negotiator can tell you, if you have two groups claiming legitimacy “spoiling” becomes a major concern. “Spoiling” occurs when a group seeks to hinder, delay, or undermine negotiations while at least one other party is actively engaged in settlement. If the international community was forced to deal with a fractured DPRK, nuclear negotiations would almost certainly be subject to this type of behavior. Who controls the facilities? Who controls the scientists? Etc etc. And though it is repugnant to support a leader whose father has been “routinely described as a belligerent dictator who is not interested in the welfare of his own people, in fact has killed and jailed millions of them,” it is in the best interest for all of us that Kim Jong-un’s accession to power be peaceful, stable, and secure.

The management of South Sudan’s political dynamics will be a vital indicator in measuring the country’s democratic progress. The SPLM, once Sudan’s political opposition movement with a military branch known as the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), fought against the government in Khartoum for more than two decades. The SPLM is now the ruling party of South Sudan.

The SPLM enjoys broad support throughout the country. According to a September poll conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI), 91 percent of people who belong to a political party belong to the SPLM. Furthermore, 84 percent of respondents view the SPLM either “very favorably” or “favorably.” Such support is not surprising. South Sudanese view the SPLM/A as their liberators in the long struggle against the north, and according to some experts, it is considered treasonous to speak ill of the SPLM.

While the majority of respondents expressed favorability for the SPLM, their views regarding the necessity of political parties were less definitive. Thirty-eight percent of voters agreed with the statement that political parties create division and confusion and are unnecessary in South Sudan. This is compared to a small majority (53 percent) of respondents who believe political parties are needed to make sure the South Sudanese have a say in who governs them.

While the poll does not reveal the reasoning for this division, it’s clear that the South Sudanese majority is content with the SPLM and is divided on the necessity of political parties. Confident with broad public support, the SPLM-led government has made few efforts to encourage the organization of political parties. South Sudan’s administrative system of governance has remained unchanged since liberation, and the SPLM dominates cabinet positions and nongovernmental institutions across the country. The political parties that do exist are not well known, and some have failed to transition from a revolutionary platform to one that works within the democratic process. While South Sudan’s interim constitution includes political parties in the governing process, critics warn that the constitution is skewed to favor the SPLM and preserve its hold on power.

The United States, a lead mediator during the creation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement, is a major investor in South Sudan’s government. Since 2005, the U.S. has spent $10 billion for humanitarian relief in support of the peace process and U.N. peacekeeping operations. In an interview with Voice of America, Susan Page, Washington’s first ambassador to South Sudan, emphasized the need for South Sudan to create “a democratic space to allow other political parties to openly express their views.” A major component of this will be enshrining the rights of political parties in the new constitution. The United States must urge South Sudan’s government to encourage a vibrant civil society via political activity. Having an engaged and active electorate puts pressure on the government to respond to the country’s needs. American NGOs such as IRI, which have had success in assisting political party growth in Africa (e.g. Zimbabwe’s Movement for Democratic Change), can facilitate this.

A crucial element of democracy is leaders’ acceptance of defeat when they have lost the confidence of the people. Too often in Africa, rebel groups have been successful in overthrowing autocracies, only to fall into the same pattern as their predecessors. Having amassed significant goodwill from the international community, South Sudan has the potential to be a success story. This opportunity must not be wasted.

“Human Security Is The Primary Purpose Of Organizing A State In The Beginning.”
– Surin Pitsuwan, ASEAN

In the wake of the Arab Spring, and in light of the ongoing global economic disorder, world leaders would be well advised to examine their understanding of national security. Recent events paint a picture of national leaders who are wildly out of touch and hopelessly behind the principal national challenge of the 21st century – human security.

(Source: Newsweek)

In 2011, the world witnessed the sudden and total political implosion of a handful of states that up until recently were firmly in the hands of their autocratic rulers. There was much debate about how the warning signs and red flags were missed. Clearly, N. African leaders were out of touch and not able to sense the social fissures and stress points that indicated popular rage.

Though one of the core lessons of the Arab revolts is that super angry citizens now have virtual meeting grounds to vent, meet, organize and to act, the most memorable lesson of the revolts is that governments must provide for the legitimate needs of their people or face ouster. Authorities must quickly learn that protecting their people from state on state conflict or homeland attacks (i.e. Freedom of Fear), must be balanced with the human requirement for the basics, or what social scientists call “Freedom of Want” (think shelter, food, clean water etc.). In most societies, this need is satisfied when people are productively employed in the economy and basic goods/services are made available through a combination of social programs and a healthy private sector. Mubarak, Gadaffi, and other modern day pharaohs simply failed to effectively work with the ‘whole of society’ to deliver on their respective “Freedom of Want” promises.

From Pharaoh to Prisoner (Source: Newsweek)

As we prepare to start a new year, basic food prices across the globe remain at historically high levels and although great strides have been made in the anti-poverty fight, the numbers are still staggering.

• Approximately 9.2 million children under the age of 5 die each year, mostly from preventable diseases. That’s approximately 25,000 children each day.
• 69 million children are out of school around the world, a figure equivalent to the entire primary school-aged population in Europe andNorth America.
• Food prices have risen 83 percent since 2005, disproportionately affecting those in poverty who spend a higher percentage of their income on food.
• Daily disasters. HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria—all treatable diseases—claim the lives of over 8,000 people every day in Africa due to lack of access to health care.
• More than 800 million people go to bed hungry every day…300 million are children.

(Statistics are from the World Bank and the ONE Campaign)

To make matters worse, the global economic recovery continues to stall with very little sign that industrialized nations have a solid game plan to get the ball closer to the goal line. Sadly, even with this bleak economic reality, developing nations today account for the majority of arms purchases in the world, buying arms supplied mainly by the permanent UN Security Council members—the USA, UK, France, Russia, and China. Yes, I know what you’re thinking.

So while the international community and mainstream media focus their collective attention on containing the nuclear genie, nations that can least provide human security for their people purchase conventional weapons from the countries that claim to want world peace and social development.  Perhaps all should heed a warning from Thomas Jefferson who once said, “When the people fear the government, there is tyranny. When the government fears the people, there is liberty”.

Presidents and Prime Ministers — Fear And Respect Your People!

Under Tunisian President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, women were, broadly speaking, given equal treatment. They were entitled to receive an education, pursue a career, dress as they pleased, smoke and consume alcohol. While Tunisian women who are less educated and financially well-off tend to be more conservative, many middle-class women make an important contribution to the country’s professional elite. Despite the rights afforded to women, Tunisia’s government was plagued by rampant cronyism, widespread corruption, and a president who looked only to tighten his grip on power. We saw how that turned out.

Now that Tunisia, the initiator of the “Arab Spring,” is in a governmental transition, many women are nervous that their freedom will be usurped by the new government. The constituent assembly elections held in October resulted in the success of al-Nahda, Tunisia’s Islamist party. Claiming 89 out of 217 seats, al-Nahda was the clear winner. However, as al-Nahda did not receive enough seats for an absolute majority, it formed a coalition government with the secular Congress for the Republic and Ettakatol parties.

A Tunisian casts her vote in la Marsa near Tunis, Sunday Oct. 23, 2011 (Credit: AP Photo/Hassene Dridi)

Under the Ben Ali regime, Tunisia was a secular state and political Islam was suppressed, often brutally. Following the regime’s demise, many welcomed a moderately Islamist government. In a poll conducted last May by the International Republican Institute, 54 percent of respondents approved of a secular government whereas 40 percent disapproved. Given the valued role religion plays in the lives of Tunisians, the election results are hardly surprising.

Rachid Ghannouchi, the Secretary General of al-Nahda, has pledged that his party will not restrict the rights of women and will pursue a moderately Islamist system of governance, much like that of Turkey. However, in a region where pledges of democracy and freedom often go unfulfilled, skepticism is warranted.

Following the collapse of the regime, Tunisians welcomed the political activity. Out of this rose the Salafist group Ansar al-Sharia (AST). Founded last April, AST promotes a radical interpretation of Islam without explicitly endorsing violence. AST has refused to engage in the democratic process, which it characterized as a violation of God’s primacy.

In the past few months, hardliners have taken their purist interpretation of Islam to universities. A few weeks ago, Salafists stormed a university in Tunis demanding that women wear the niqab (a full face veil) and that classes be segregated. Additional reports indicate that Tunisia’s new openness has encouraged radical Islamists to become more vocal in their ideology.

As one oppressive regime is ousted, Tunisians are free to be more politically active. A vibrant civil society is one of the main characteristics of a democracy, and Tunisians have rightfully taken advantage of opportunities for political engagement. However, the embrace of new liberties should not come at the limitations of others. Tunisia’s new government must ensure that for democracy to thrive, all Tunisians must be treated equally under the law.